LIBRARY 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 


Class 
\ 


By  HORATIO  W.  DRESSER 


The  Power  of  Silence. 

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In  Search  of  a  Soul.     12°      .        . 
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Education  and  the  Philosophical  Ideal. 
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Living  by  the  Spirit.    16°     . 
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A  Book  of  Secrets.    12°         ... 
Man  and  the  Divine  Order.    12°  . 
Health  and  the  Inner  Life.    12°    . 
The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit.    12°     . 


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The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

A  Study  of  the  Spiritual  Nature  of  Man 

and  the  Presence  of  God,  with  a 

Supplementary  Essay  on  the 

Logic  of  Hegel 


By 
Horatio  W.  Dresser,  Ph.D.  (Harv.) 

Author  of  "  Living  by  the  Spirit,"  "  Man  and  the  Divine  Order," 


OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY 

or 


G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 

New  York  and  London 
fmfcfcerbocfter  press 
1908 


tiENEHAt 


COPYRIGHT,  1908 

BY 

HORATIO  WILLIS  DRESSER. 


TTbe  ftnicfccrbocbcr  prceg,  1Acw 


A1^ 

or  THE 

UNIVERSITY 


PREFACE 

THERE  is  a  tradition  that  certain  subjects  are  sacred 
and  can  never  become  matters  of  scientific  inquiry. 
One  of  these  ineffable  subjects  is  the  relationship  of 
God  to  man  in  the  highest  ranges  of  human  experience, 
particularly  in  those  beatific  moments  when,  in  expec- 
tant solitude  or  social  worship,  the  soul  communes  with 
the  Father.  But  in  these  self-conscious  days  psycho- 
logy has  been  triumphantly  carried  into  all  fields, 
and  if  psychological  descriptions  have  sometimes  been 
irreverent  it  is  a  question,  not  of  retreat,  but  of  the 
analysis  which  affords  the  most  appreciative  descrip- 
tion. The  success  which  has  attended  the  psychology 
of  religion  shows  that  very  much  is  to  be  gained  by 
undertaking  an  account  of  the  higher  experiences  of 
men.  What  must  be  said  in  behalf  of  the  sacred  or 
ineffable  may  be  added  when  science  has  achieved 
its  utmost.  In  the  following  pages  I  have  ventured 
to  mediate  between  science  and  religion  by  endeavour- 
ing to  be  appreciatively  true  to  the  everlasting  realities 
of  the  religious  life  while  taking  account  of  and  passing 
beyond  the  results  attained  by  modern  psychology. 
If  no  subject  should  more  deeply  inspire  our  reverence 
than  that  of  the  presence  of  God,  none  is  more  worthy 
of  our  thought.  Accordingly  I  offer  what  I  believe 
to  be  a  contribution  to  the  study  of  problems  which 
pertain  to  a  field  midway  between  the  philosophy 
of  religion  and  constructive  idealism.  Advocates 
of  various  points  of  view  may  meet  in  this  common 


180695 


IV 


Preface 


field  to  study  questions  that  are  rightfully  prior  to 
the  development  of  their  special  views.  Each  may 
make  such  qualification  as  he  will,  but  all  must  be 
concerned  with  the  issues  here  shown  to  be  funda- 
mental. 

The  point  from  which  all  men  must  start  is  experience. 
The  point  on  which  they  may  all  eventually  agree  is  in 
the  description  of  experience  on  its  subjective  side. 
What  lies  beyond  will  long  be  matter  of  dispute,  for 
some  will  maintain  that  experience  brings  us  into 
direct  relation  with  a  higher  order  of  being,  while 
others  will  insist  that  it  is  merely  a  question  of  human 
analysis  and  of  the  values  which  analytic  thought 
assigns.  The  experience  which  is  said  to  give  direct 
evidence  of  the  presence  of  God  is  only  one  of  a  number 
in  this  regard.  Hence  in  the  following  discussions  I 
have  begun  farther  back,  with  the  facts  of  universally 
verifiable  experience,  before  considering  the  special 
case.  I  have  pointed  out  that  to  understand  the  living 
flux  of  experience  we  must  study  the  immediate  side 
of  our  nature  in  general.  Having  directed  attention 
to  the  immediate  elements  of  all  experience,  I  under- 
take a  fresh  analysis  of  the  factors  that  may  rightfully 
be  supposed  to  enter  into  the  experience  of  the  divine 
presence,  always  reserving  room  for  that  which  may 
lie  beyond  psychological  description.  The  various 
factors  well  in  hand,  and  certain  misapprehensions 
removed,  it  becomes  possible  to  assess  theories,  such 
as  mysticism,  which  have  been  brought  forward  in 
explanation  of  the  divine  presence.  Mysticism,  al- 
though rejected,  is  treated  more  appreciatively  than 
by  most  critics.  It  becomes  clear  that  whether  or  not 
an  experience  be  said  to  reveal  the  divine  presence  it  is 
first  a  question  of  the  theory  of  human  nature  implied, 


Preface  v 

and  the  interpretation  put  upon  immediate  experience 
in  general. 

The  volume  begins  with  an  illustration  drawn  from 
universal  experience  which  gives  the  clue  to  the  entire 
discussion  of  the  idea  and  presence  of  God,  and  outlines 
the  problems,  allied  interests,  and  methods.  The 
second  chapter  formulates  a  conception  of  Spirit,  de- 
fined in  essentially  philosophical  terms  as  implying  the 
unity  of  the  divine  selfhood  and  the  orderly  proceeding 
forth  of  the  divine  creative  activity.  The  third  chapter 
is  a  justification  of  the  critical  or  human  point  of  view, 
in  contrast  with  the  dogmas  which  condemn  inquiries 
such  as  the  present  investigation.  The  interest  of  the 
fourth  chapter  is  wholly  practical  and  relates  to  the 
ideal  attitude  to  be  maintained  by  those  who  are 
seeking  the  realities  of  the  eternal  life.  The  subse- 
quent chapters  undertake  to  establish  the  relationship 
of  God  to  the  natural  world  and  to  the  commonplace 
by  considering  various  hypotheses  in  regard  to  peculiar 
faculties,  special  gifts,  authoritative  intuitions,  de- 
cisive feelings,  and  religious  emotions.  The  result  is 
not  that  the  presence  of  God  is  reduced  to  the  common- 
place but  that  many  considerations  are  brought  into 
view  which  devotees  of  special  sides  of  our  nature 
neglect.  No  faculty  or  experience  is  found  that  is 
solely  authoritative,  yet  all  considerations  in  question 
point  forward  to  the  discussion  of  the  last  chapter  in 
which  they  are  treated  as  phases  of  the  witness  of  the 
Spirit. 

The  discussion  of  immediate  experience  centres 
about  the  life  of  feeling,  and  the  theories  analysed 
and  rejected  are  mainly  those  in  which  one-sided 
emphasis  is  placed  upon  human  sentiency.  Hence 
other  phases  of  human  nature,  together  with  the 


VI 


Preface 


implied  theories,  are  passed  by  with  briefer  reference. 
That  is  to  say,  there  are  doctrines  founded  on  the 
supposition  that  the  life  of  feeling,  intuition,  or  a 
mysterious  "God-sense,"  is  mystically  continuous 
with  the  life  of  man.  These  doctrines  are  briefly 
classifiable  as  immediatisms,  and  they  are  character- 
ised by  disparagement  of  the  human  intellect  and  of 
rationalism  in  all  its  forms.  In  contrast  with  this  gen- 
eral procedure,  there  is  another  conception  of  human 
experience  which  starts  with  the  presupposition  that 
man  is  a  many-sided  being.  From  this  point  of  view 
there  is  contiguous  relationship  between  God  and  man 
without  mystical  union,  conjunction  without  identity 
of  selfhood.  That  is,  God  is  present  to  man's  nature 
not  merely  on  the  side  of  feeling  but  man  is  able  to 
apprehend  the  divinely  real  and  true  through  reason. 
Furthermore,  the  volitional  reaction,  the  effect  on 
man's  conduct,  should  be  taken  into  account.  But  to 
establish  this  richer  conception  of  human  nature 
and  human  experience  is  to  vindicate  the  rights  of  the 
intellect,  hence  to  show  that  there  must  be  rational 
interpretation  of  the  presence  of  God.  It  is  this 
conception  of  the  manifold  character  of  human  respon- 
siveness which  points  the  way  to  the  present  dis- 
cussion. The  book  is  polemical  only  so  far  as  mystical 
or  merely  empirical  immediatisms  are  concerned: 
it  is  constructive  in  terms  of  an  idealistic  study  of  the 
entire  problem  of  immediacy. 

The  central  problem  is  further  suggested  by  the 
questions  often  raised,  namely,  Is  man's  first  duty 
to  obey  that  which  is  first  in  experience — his  instincts, 
emotions,  impulses,  leadings — or  should  he  endeavour 
to  improve  on  experience  of  all  types?  Is  there  any 
spontaneous  prompting  that  is  directly  authoritative? 


Preface  vii 

Granted  that  man  has  departed  from  nature  and 
devised  ways  of  his  own,  is  there  a  way  of  escape  from 
the  conflicts  which  ensue  between  original  promptings 
and  conventional  systems?  Granted  modern  criticism, 
with  its  self -consciousness  and  the  truths  it  has  brought 
to  light,  how  shall  we  escape  from  the  paralysis  of 
agnosticism  into  the  life  of  productive  belief?  Plainly, 
these  issues  must  be  wrestled  with  afresh  in  our  day, 
for  it  is  a  day  when  men  are  sent  back  to  experience 
with  new  conviction.  The  method  of  solution  would 
appear  to  be  to  test  each  conception  to  the  full  for 
what  it  may  be  practically  worth,  then  compare  the 
results  in  terms  of  ultimate  standards  and  the  pro- 
foundest  philosophic  systems.  For  merely  practical 
considerations  are  not  all-sufficient.  The  great  systems 
are  by  no  means  dead.  The  life  has  not  departed 
from  the  church  and  the  other  great  institutions.  The 
central  clue  will  be  found  through  a  new  adjustment 
between  the  systems  of  authority  and  the  revelations  of 
the  modern  spirit. 

In  accordance  with  the  practical  methods  of  the  day, 
the  conception  of  God  'defined  as  immanent  Spirit  is 
here  tested  in  the  light  of  its  direct  bearings  on  human 
experience.  But  experience  is  shown  to  be  unmeaning 
unless  it  have  real  relation  to  a  higher  order  of  existence 
corresponding  to  the  values  assigned  by  enlightened 
self-consciousness.  In  contrast,  then,  with  those 
who  regard  religion  as  "the  conservation  of  values" — 
to  borrow  Hoff ding's  phrase — the  spiritual  life  is  here 
regarded  as  actually  revealing  superior  existences. 
In  contrast  with  naturalism,  the  attempt  is  made  to 
relate  the  natural  with  the  spiritual.  The  start  is 
made  with  the  results  of  the  critical  philosophy  steadily 
in  mind,  and  the  argument  keeps  close  to  those  results. 


viii  Preface 

Nevertheless,  the  main  purpose  is  to  direct  attention 
rather  to  the  Spirit  than  to  the  human  limitations 
which  might  sceptically  be  taken  to  exclude  the  Spirit. 
Hence  the  constructive  doctrine  assimilates  an  element 
from  empiricism  without  agreeing  with  the  mystic, 
or  other  devotees  of  the  life  of  feeling.  In  the  last 
analysis,  the  problem  of  immediacy  is  the  same  wher- 
ever found,  and  if  the  main  argument  be  conclusive 
it  will  be  plain  that  one  must  assimilate  the  realities  of 
immediate  experience  while  passing  beyond  all  empiri- 
cism by  undertaking  a  thorough  idealistic  reconstruc- 
tion of  experience.  Hence  the  volume  closes  with 
suggestions  of  a  system  which  is  here  treated  merely 
as  an  implication. 

The  book  as  a  whole  involves  some  changes  in 
method  as  compared  with  earlier  volumes.  Having 
published  several  volumes  of  essays,  written  at  various 
times  and  not  in  the  order  published,  in  the  present 
book  I  have  undertaken  a  systematic  development  of 
the  main  interest  throughout^  namely,  the  relationship 
of  the  immanent  Spirit  to  man.  That  interest  was 
involved  in  too  many  issues  in  the  preceding  volumes. 
Here  it  is  disengaged  from  special  topics  and  considered 
without  reference  to  the  practical  mysticism  with 
which  the  writer's  teaching  has  been  erroneously 
identified  by  the  public.  Were  there  space  to  make 
the  distinctions  clear,  it  would  be  plain  that  the 
philosophy  of  this  book  is  radically  different  from 
therapeutic  mysticism  in  all  its  forms.  Such  mysticism 
"involves  acceptance  of  the  ideas  of  God,  human  nature, 
and  immediate  experience  here  rejected  in  favour  of 
the  idealistic  view  above  mentioned.  The  earlier 
volumes,  because  they  dealt  with  practical  interests 


Preface  ix 

were  supposed  to  be  merely  practical,  hence  they 
have  been  hastily  classified  under  the  head  of  various 
new  doctrines.  The  present  discussion  shows  that  the 
main  interest  is  decidedly  idealistic.  As  matter  of  fact, 
the  present  doctrine  has  been  developed  without 
reference  to,  or  even  criticism  of,  current  popular 
beliefs,  but  as  a  result  of  technical  studies  begun 
long  before  the  earlier  books  were  written.  The  cul- 
minating study  was  a  comparison  between  modern 
empiricism,  as  expressed  in  such  works  as  Professor 
James's  The  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  and  the 
logic  of  Hegel.  The  decisive  issues  are  embodied 
in  Chapter  XI,  which  is  a  summary  of  studies  in  the 
concept  of  immediacy  carried  on  a  number  of  years  ago 
in  the  logical  seminary  at  Harvard.  Out  of  these  re- 
searches, in  which  I  had  the  benefit  of  the  constructive 
criticism  of  Professor  Royce,  grew  the  problem  of  the 
relationship  of  immediate  experience  to  the  religious 
and  idealistic  interests  of  the  earlier  volumes.  Hence 
the  study  of  the  presence  of  God  is  regarded  as  typical 
of  a  general  logical  problem. 

The  study  has  been  made  as  untechnical  as  possible 
so  as  to  be  verifiable  in  terms  of  common  human 
experience.  Nevertheless,  the  conception  of  immediate 
experience  is  the  writer's  point  of  departure  from 
the  merely  practical  to  the  technically  philosophical. 
Hence  the  chapter  on  immediacy  is  supplemented  by 
an  essay  on  the  logic  of  Hegel  in  which  the  decisive 
analysis  is  found.  Readers  whose  interests  are  pre- 
vailingly practical  may  omit  Chapter  XI  and  the 
Supplementary  Essay,  and  yet  find  all  that  is  required 
for  practical  purposes.  But  it  is  just  this  assumption 
that  truth  is  true  enough  if  it  serves  us  "for  practical 


x  Preface 

purposes"  to  which  this  book  takes  most  emphatic 
exception.  It  was  precisely  because  one  believed  in 
the  value  of  fundamental  principles  that  this  long 
investigation  seemed  worth  while.  That  investigation 
was  twofold  for  many  years,  and  the  essentially 
practical  branch  of  it  has  been  developed  in  the  pre- 
ceding volumes:  the  present  work  marks  a  departure 
inasmuch  as  the  technical,  constructive  clue  is  pub- 
lished in  the  same  volume  with  the  practical 
analysis. 

The  Supplementary  Essay  belongs  with  Chapter  XI, 
and  should  not  be  regarded  as  the  conclusion  of  the 
book.  The  problem  is  stated  less  technically  in  the 
first  seventeen  sections,  and  the  main  problem  in  regard 
to  irrationality  is  discussed,  with  certain  references  to 
pragmatism,  in  Sec.  126  and  the  sections  following. 
Sections  37-63,  68-77,  89-108,  may  be  omitted  by 
those  who  do  not  care  for  dialectic  detail.  The  con- 
clusions of  the  Essay  point  forward  to  constructive 
idealism.  That  is,  one  believes,  with  Hegel,  that  it  is 
the  third  or  reconstructive  moment  of  thought  which 
makes  clear  the  truly  real.  Neither  sentiency  nor 
reason  is  proved  all-sufficient.  Reason  is  dependent 
on  the  immediacies  of  experience,  hence  cannot  create 
its  items  out  of  its  own  pure  selfhood;  while  mere 
experience  never  takes  us  beyond  the  realm  of  appear- 
ances. One  believes  more  firmly  than  ever  in  spon- 
taneity, receptivity,  guidance,  intuition,  and  the 
rich  values  of  the  religious  life;  but  one  turns  to  Hegel, 
who  teaches  a  man  how  to  interpret  immediate  experi- 
ence fundamentally,  rather  than  to  those  who  disparage 
one  side  of  our  nature  (the  rational)  while  imperfectly 
mediating  the  other  (the  element  of  sentiency) .  Hegel 


Preface  xi 

is  not  the  prejudiced  rationalist  he  is  supposed  to  be, 
but  the  most  faithful  to  the  concrete  of  the  great 
philosophers.  Well  might  devotees  of  the  modern 
pragmatic  movement  take  their  clues  from  him,  in- 
stead of  giving  up  the  ideals  of  metaphysics  before 
they  have  even  reckoned  with  the  great  systems. 

CAMBRIDGE,  MASS. 
January,  1908. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTBR  PAGE 

I.  THE  SCOPE  OF  THE  INQUIRY                                    i 

II.  THE  DEFINITION  OF  THE  SPIRIT  ...       31 

III.  THE  STARTING-POINT         .         .         .         -57 

IV.  THE  ETERNAL  TYPE  OF  LIFE       ...       76 
V.  THE  NATURAL  AND  THE  SPIRITUAL       .         .     102 

VI.  THE  CHANNELS  OF  THE  SPIRIT    .         .         .128 

VII.  THE  IMMEDIACY  OF  THE  SPIRIT  .         .         .154 

VIII.  THE  VALUE  OF  INTUITION            .         .         .178 

IX.  A  STUDY  OF  THE  EMOTIONS         .         .         .     199 

X.  THE  VALUE  OF  FEELING     ....     232 

XI.  THE  IMPORT  OF  IMMEDIACY         .         .         .     240 

XII.  AN  ESTIMATE  OF  MYSTICISM        .         .         .     272 

XIII.  GUIDANCE         ......     296 

XIV.  THE  PLACE  OF  FAITH          .         .         .         .328 
XV.  THE  WITNESS  OF  THE  SPIRIT       .          .          .     349 


xiv  Contents 

SUPPLEMENTARY    ESSAY 


PAGE 


FOREWORD  .  •  387 

THE  ELEMENT  OF  IRRATIONALITY  IN  THE  HEGELIAN 

DIALECTIC      ...  •  393 

INDEX  539 


The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 


THE 

UNIVERSITY 


THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF 
THE  SPIRIT 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  SCOPE  OF  THE  INQUIRY 

ONE  of  the  most  deeply  suggestive  events  in  nature 
is  the  reawakening  of  life  in  the  spring-time,  with  the 
sense  of  fresh  beauty  and  newness  of  being  which  it 
brings,  as  though  spring  had  never  arrived  before. 
The  same  landscape  lies  around  us,  the  same  grass-plots 
and  flower-beds  are  there.  Once  more  the  familiar 
changes  take  place,  from  early  March  with  its  pro- 
mising winds  to  the  sunny  skies  and  budding  life  of 
April  and  the  wondrous  green  beauty  of  May.  Once 
again  the  birds  arrive,  to  make  the  heart  glad  and 
awaken  us  with  their  morning  song.  Again  the  beau- 
ties of  late  spring  blend  with  the  customary  scenes  of 
early  summer.  Everywhere  regularity  reigns.  Yet 
it  is  not  nature's  orderliness  which  then  impresses  us 
but  the  new  life  astir  in  things.  No  mere  reference  to 
what  nature  was  yesterday,  last  year,  or  the  year  before, 
can  explain  this  miracle.  The  great  fact  is  the  presence 
of  life,  life,  that  perennial  power  which  annuls  time, 
transforms  the  familiar  into  the  new,  and  compels 
ancient  nature  to  be  born  again. 

The  same  miracle  is  wrought  in  the  human  heart. 


2  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

A  true  friend  never  ages.  There  is  neither  time  nor 
space  where  love  abides.  When  the  heart  speaks, 
however  many  times  it  may  have  uttered  the  identical 
words,  or  prompted  the  same  act  of  gracious  service, 
it  is  as  if  love  had  never  expressed  itself  before.  The 
variations  of  love's  familiar  themes  constantly  sur- 
prise us  by  their  novelty.  The  entire  world  is  trans- 
formed at  love's  bidding.  If  we  are  ever  in  danger 
of  servitude  to  the  dull  routine  of  our  natural  existence, 
it  is  love  that  saves  us.  In  a  single  hour  the  prosaic 
details  of  ordinary  life  take  on  a  new  beauty.  The 
ugliest  environment  may  thus  be  transfigured  and 
the  most  difficult  task  made  sacred.  Consciously  or 
unconsciously,  it  is  love  that  sends  us  forth  anew  when 
we  seek  truth,  beauty,  or  goodness.  We  may  cherish 
the  belief  that  some  other  prompting  will  send  us  as 
far  and  as  high.  But  take  love  away,  remove  us  from 
those  who  encourage,  inspire,  and  sympathise,  and  we 
discover  that  love  is  the  great  essential.  Love  grows 
with  the  years  and  it  is  not  the  sudden  upheavals  of 
passion  which  genuinely  transfigure  the  world  for  us. 
Love  has  the  power  to  assimilate  all  moments  unto  her- 
self so  that  we  live  in  an  eternal  present.  Most  of  all 
when  we  love,  when  we  are  loved,  do  we  know  God. 
If  "God  is  love,"  we  have  in  deepest  truth  the  secret 
of  this  everlasting  wonder,  this  constant  renewal  of 
that  which  otherwise  were  old.  The  entire  universe, 
nature  with  its  varied  forms  and  types  of  life,  the 
human  world  with  its  struggles  and  achievements, 
may  be  said  to  be  each  moment  created  anew  by  the 
Love  which  imbues  it. 

More  memorable  still  is  the  reawakening  of  faith 
within  us  after  a  period  of  doubt  and  struggle.  There 
are  times  when  we  are  immersed  in  circumstance  and 


The  Scope  of  the  Inquiry  3 

can  make  no  headway.  We  are  overwhelmed  by 
limitations,  beset  by  obstacles,  and  victory  seems 
impossible.  Whatever  happens,  we  are  constantly 
made  aware  that  we  are  decidedly  human.  Moreover, 
there  are  arguments  without  number  to  convince  us 
of  our  finitude.  Yet  even  when  the  prospect  is  dark- 
est, when  all  convictions  appear  to  be  shattered,  a  new 
light  gleams  across  the  mind.  That  which  a  moment 
before  seemed  to  be  insuperable  limitation  now  proves 
to  be  the  essential  condition  of  a  new  life.  The  point 
of  view  is  suddenly  shifted  from  the  besetting  cir- 
cumstance which  made  belief  impossible  to  the  power 
which  creates  the  circumstance.  The  outlook  is  en- 
larged beyond  all  description,  mind  and  heart  alike 
experience  a  new  impetus.  The  dull  facts  which  in 
our  agnosticism  we  insisted  upon  are  still  there,  but 
clothed  with  meaning,  instinct  with  philosophic  sug- 
gestiveness.  Nothing  surpasses  the  transfiguring 
might  of  the  new  conviction  which  now  inspires  the 
mind. 

It  is  this  greatest  of  miracles  in  the  universe  of 
beings  and  things,  in  the  human  mind  and  heart,  which 
I  shall  consider  in  the  ensuing  discussions.  Life 
itself  in  whatever  form  is  a  miracle.  Fatigued  beyond 
all  apparent  power  of  recovery,  downcast  beyond  all 
visible  hope,  we  lie  down  to  rest  presently  to  awaken 
into  the  fresh  vigour  of  being.  The  fact  of  being,  the 
gift  of  life,  is  basal.  Our  thought  takes  its  clue  from 
thence  only  to  find  that  the  fact  surpasses  the  de- 
scription. Such  being  the  case,  it  would  seem  well 
to  give  life  freer  play  through  us  with  the  hope  that 
it  may  write  its  own  description.  And  what  more 
fitting  symbol  of  the  imbuing  Presence  could  be  found 
than  this  same  renewal  of  life  within  and  without? 


4  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

It  has  too  long  been  customary  to  speak  of  God  as 
static,  fixed,  immutable.  We  have  been  told  again 
and  again  that  "God  created  the  heavens  and  the 
earth,"  as  if  that  were  all  He  ever  could  do.  We 
have  heard  times  enough  that  God  is  inscrutable, 
that  "His  ways  are  past  finding  out."  It  is  an  ex- 
ceedingly familiar  thought,  that  God  is  so  far  tran- 
scendent that  to  define  is  to  limit  Him.  To  be  sure, 
so  much  is  said  nowadays  about  God  defined  as  imma- 
nent, as  active  in  if  not  identical  with  all  forms  of 
energy,  that  we  are  in  danger  of  passing  to  the  other 
extreme  and  indulging  in  a  new  pantheism,  as  if  God 
were  the  mere  substance  of  nature.  But  we  have  not 
heard  enough  about  God  as  Spirit,  viewed  as  going 
forth  from  His  own  plenitude  in  forms  of  perennially 
creative  life,  brooding  over  the  face  of  the  waters, 
and  leading  His  children  along  the  varied  pathways 
of  the  soul.  Thus  regarded,  God  is  essentially  dynamic, 
achieving;  it  is  life,  movement,  growth,  that  reveals 
Him.  When  one  seriously  pauses  to  reflect,  it  is 
plain  that  the  presence  of  life  is  what  chiefly  leads  the 
mind  to  conceive  of  God.  The  God  of  life  is  in  reality 
the  true  God. 

The  idea  of  God  as  manifested  through  all  modes  and 
forms  of  life  is  intermediate  between  the  old-time 
deism  and  modern  pantheism.  This  intermediate 
conception  need  not  at  present  be  complicated  by  the 
problems  of  the  infinite  and  the  transcendent.  It  is 
concerned  for  the  moment  with  God  as  found  in  action, 
yet  is  not  limited  by  the  consideration  of  what  is 
taking  place  to-day.  God  is  thus  conceived  as  ever- 
present,  as  fully  active  at  one  point  or  in  one  time 
as  at  any  other.  The  great  consideration  is  the  mean- 
ing of  His  presence  at  all  times  and  in  all  places.  Hence 


The  Scope  of  the  Inquiry  5 

attention  is  directed  to  the  thought  of  God  anew. 
For  it  is  neither  a  question  of  the  "  far-off  divine  event " 
nor  of  the  mere  deeds  accomplished  in  the  near-by 
present,  but  of  the  Power  which  ever  accomplishes. 
To  dwell  upon  the  remote  event  is  to  forget  that  God 
is  even  now  giving  of  His  life.  To  be  alone  concerned 
with  the  things  done  is  to  be  subservient  to  the  time- 
spirit,  hence  to  lose  sight  of  all  save  circumstance. 
But  to  dwell  in  thought  with  the  Power  that  works 
in  all  who  labour,  lives  in  all  who  love,  is  to  begin  to 
know  what  the  Spirit  is. 

It  is  no  doubt  audacious  to  speak  in  behalf  of  the 
Spirit.  We  have  grown  so  accustomed  in  these  cau- 
tious days  to  speak  of  the  deed  that  has  been  wrought, 
omitting  all  mention  of  the  actuating  principle,  that 
an  apology  seems  almost  to  be  needed  when  one 
ventures  to  speak  of  God.  Yet  even  the  most  negli- 
gent do  not  hesitate  to  assume  enough  knowledge  to 
declare  that  God  is  "inscrutable,"  "  unknowable," 
or  beyond  all  definition.  It  is  far  more  modest  to 
consider  the  actual  achievements  of  the  Spirit — that 
is,  to  accept  the  miracle  of  life  as  an  earnest  of  the 
reality  of  God.  Moreover,  the  miracle  is  confessedly 
accepted  as  symbolical.  It  is  not  claimed  that  the 
Spirit  is  absolute.  A  recent  writer  has  said  that 
"when  you  make  a  thing  absolute,  far  from  empha- 
sising its  nature,  you  remove  its  nature."  It  is 
seriously  to  be  questioned  whether  those  who  so  freely 
use  the  adjectives  "absolute,"  "inscrutable,"  and  the 
like,  have  even  a  vague  idea  of  the  meaning  intended 
to  be  conveyed.  To  say  what  one  means  is  to  be 
definite,  concrete,  to  indicate  details,  not  to  indulge 
in  generalities.  When  one  ceases  to  apply  epithets 
which  theoretically  remove  the  divine  nature  from  all 


6  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

further  consideration,  one  is  surprised  to  find  what  a 
wealth  of  concrete  clues  men  already  possess.  If  in 
due  course  it  seriously  becomes  a  question  of  absolute 
Being,  it  is  because  the  concrete  clues  logically  lead 
to  the  conception. 

It  is  plain  that  the  idea  of  the  divine  presence  has 
been  greatly  neglected.  We  have  heard  so  much 
about  the  relativities  of  knowledge,  the  merely  human 
conditions  and  factors,  that  many  have  lost  the  power 
to  believe.  The  same  theorists  who  insist  upon  human 
relativities  declare  that  God  is  "unknowable."  Thus 
the  same  doctrine  brings  man  too  near  and  puts  God 
afar.  But  the  true  God  is  discoverable  amidst  the 
limitations,  if  at  all.  The  human  factors  well  in  hand, 
it  is  opportune  to  consider  the  reality  which  is  made 
known  through  them.  The  doubts  which  perplexed 
men  for  a  season  were  profitable,  but  mere  doubts  are 
of  little  value  till  their  positive  content  be  made  ex- 
plicit. The  considerations  which  make  for  a  philo- 
sophy of  Spirit  are  already  at  hand,  already  in  the  minds 
of  the  people,  otherwise  it  would  indeed  be  audacious 
to  undertake  the  development  of  such  a  philosophy. 
In  fact  it  is  the  awakening  of  the  mind  into  freshness 
of  conviction,  even  amidst  the  deadening  sense  of 
relativity,  that  may  be  set  down  as  evidence  that  the 
Spirit  exists. 

At  the  outset  we  may  regard  the  quickening  life 
of  nature,  the  ever-fresh  welling  up  of  love  in  the  human 
heart,  as  typical  of  the  relationship  of  God  to  the  world. 
The  more  precise  definition  of  the  term  "Spirit"  may 
he  postponed,  together  with  the  discussion  of  the 
critical  issues  which  the  conception  involves.  Our 
first  need  is  to  approach  the  conception  of  God  from 
the  immediate  point  of  view  which  regards  Him  as 


The  Scope  of  the  Inquiry  7 

the  Father  achieving  a  purpose.  Our  clues  are  taken, 
not  from  speculative  needs  implying  a  demand  for  a 
formally  correct  conception,  but  from  essentially 
human  interests  pointing  forward  to  a  concrete  idea 
of  God's  efficiency.  We  are  first  to  learn,  or  endeavour 
to  learn,  what  God  is  doing,  then  from  this  concrete 
consideration  pass  to  the  question  of  the  essential 
nature  of  God.  Our  motive  throughout  is  to  direct 
interest  afresh  to  the  ever-living  God  of  the  human 
heart  and  of  progressive  achievements,  in  contrast 
with  the  agnostic  argument  which  has  steadily  re- 
moved God  from  human  ken. 

There  are  two  general  sources  of  the  agnosticism 
which  for  several  decades  has  made  it  difficult  for 
men  to  declare  their  positive  faith  in  God,  the  critical 
philosophy  of  Immanuel  Kant  and  the  philosophy  of 
evolution.  Kant's  analysis  of  human  reason  withdrew 
the  interest  from  what  may  be  denominated  the  divine 
factors  and  placed  it  upon  the  essentially  human 
factors  of  all  our  experience  and  thought.  Our  own 
rational  constructive  power  was  thus  seen  to  be  the 
central  agency.  The  conception  of  God,  together 
with  the  lesser  conceptions  of  the  world  as  a  complete 
system  and  the  human  soul  as  a  real  being,  unitary 
and  immortal,  thus  became  "ideals  of  pure  reason" 
rather  than  ideas  which  implied  positive  knowledge 
of  the  existence  of  their  objects.  To  be  sure,  Kant 
restored  the  higher  objects  of  belief  in  his  ethical 
philosophy — that  is,  as  postulates  of  practical  reason. 
Thus,  as  he  himself  said,  he  did  "away  with  knowledge 
to  make  room  for  faith."  But  the  fashion  in  philo- 
sophy was  set  by  his  conclusions  in  regard  to  pure 
reason.  It  seemed  poor  consolation  to  restore  the 
conceptions  of  God,  freedom,  and  immortality  as  ob- 


8  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

jects  of  faith,  as  opposed  to  objects  of  knowledge. 
The  attempt  to  prove  the  existence  of  God  in  the  old- 
time  ontological  way  not  only  ceased  with  Kant,  but 
it  became  difficult  even  to  believe  in  God  in  the  former 
fashion.  Hence  increasing  attention  was  given  to 
the  limitations  of  human  knowledge,  the  study  of 
human  nature  regarded  as  relatively  independent. 

Likewise  with  the  philosophy  of  evolution.  Al- 
though God  was  not  left  wholly  out  of  account,  the  new 
philosophy  gave  rise  to  a  tendency  which  has  since 
become  a  habit,  namely,  to  dwell  upon  the  factors  of 
heredity,  natural  selection,  and  environment,  or  to 
bestow  emphasis  upon  such  principles  as  "the  sur- 
vival of  the  fittest,"  the  law  of  "use  and  disuse." 
Hence  the  old-time  theories  of  design  gave  place  to 
theories  of  nature  in  which  little  or  nothing  was  said 
about  purpose  save  so  far  as  the  mere  struggle  for 
existence  was  concerned.  Instead  of  indulging  in  the 
mere  generality,  "God  created  the  world,"  men  began 
to  show  how  existing  forms  of  life  came  into  being 
through  the  gradual  transformation  of  that  which 
pre-existed.  Thus  the  idea  of  God  fell  more  and  more 
into  the  background,  and  it  became  customary  to 
describe  what  happened  without  reference  to  its  ulti- 
mate cause.  Once  more,  then,  interest  was  directed 
to  relative  factors,  as  opposed  to  divine  agency. 
Herbert  Spencer  with  his  negative  conception  of  the 
"  Unknowable, "  and  Huxley  with  his  agnosticism, 
furthered  the  growth  of  this  evolutionary  relativism. 

Again,  the  new  or  higher  criticism  has  steadily  led 
to  withdrawal  of  emphasis  from  supposed  supernatural 
and  divine  factors,  and  to  the  placing  of  it  upon  essen- 
tially human  conditions.  So  much  stress  has  been 
placed  upon  environmental  influences,  the  variations 


The  Scope  of  the  Inquiry  g 

and  imperfections  of  texts,  the  hindrances  of  language, 
of  psychological  conditions,  and  of  human  nature 
generally,  that  it  has  become  impossible  to  believe 
in  the  Bible  as  the  literal  word  of  God.  The  gain  has 
been  enormous  so  far  as  actual  knowledge  of  the  Bible 
is  concerned,  and  from  the  point  of  view  of  acquaint- 
ance with  human  nature  and  the  natural  development 
of  religious  consciousness.  But  except  for  the  pro- 
founder  scholars  it  has  made  belief  in  the  direct  power 
of  God  extremely  difficult.  And  even  for  scholars 
it  has  been  difficult  if  not  impossible  to  reconcile  the 
conception  of  God  as  Father  with  the  idea  of  God  as 
the  immanent  agency  of  natural  evolution. 

Meanwhile  those  who  have  "preserved  the  faith" 
are  the  less  critical  people  who  cling  to  the  simplicity 
of  belief  in  authoritative  revelation.  Such  people  not 
only  unqualifiedly  condemn  the  critical  philosophy 
and  scientific  agnosticism,  but  discard  the  higher 
criticism  of  the  Bible.  In  the  midst  of  those  who 
point  out  that  the  idea  of  God  is  essentially  man's 
creation,  they  have  the  courage  to  speak  "from  God's 
point  of  view."  If  their  assumption  in  thus  speaking 
in  behalf  of  God  appears  to  be  great,  their  humility 
is  greater,  inasmuch  as  they  place  so  little  stress  upon 
their  own  thought  and  minimise  themselves  in  their 
zeal.  One  cannot  agree  with  these  people.  It  is 
impossible  to  take  a  backward  step  when  man  has 
once  begun  to  think.  Nevertheless  there  is  truth  in 
these  contentions.  Undoubtedly  it  is  possible  to  make 
too  much  of  the  merely  human  self  and  its  powers  of 
thought. 

The  result  of  the  interaction  between  the  critical 
philosophy  and  orthodoxy  has  been  gradual  recog- 
nition of  the  truth  in  both  points  of  view.  God  has 


IP  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

been  restored  to  His  place  as  creator,  or  rather  has  been 
given  a  worthy  place  for  the  first  time.  It  is  now  per- 
fectly consistent  to  be  at  once  a  theist  and  a  believer  in 
the  gradual  development  of  all  organic  forms.  Many 
problems  of  the  higher  criticism  are  far  from  being 
settled^  but  the  extreme  views  are  surely  doomed,  for 
they  assumed  too  much  and  excluded  more.  One  may 
assimilate  the  results  of  such  criticism,  yet  still  regard 
the  world,  the  travail  of  the  human  soul,  from  "the 
point  of  view  of  God."  For  the  emphasis  has  been 
changed  and  a  new  view  of  human  nature  has  taken 
the  place  of  the  one  in  which  only  the  divine  factors 
in  religious  experience  were  considered.  There  is 
nothing  to  fear,  when  the  limitations  of  human  lan- 
guage and  thought  are  dwelt  upon.  The  philosophy 
of  Spirit  wins  its  triumphs  precisely  by  virtue  of 
these  relativities.  Without  submitting  our  beliefs  to 
critical  investigation  we  could  hardly  have  continued 
to  believe. 

The  point  of  view  of  these  discussions  is  not  an 
eclectic  or  harmonising  standpoint,  but  one  which 
involves  a  reconstruction  of  the  conception  of  God, 
and  a  new  criticism  of  psychological  and  other  human 
factors.  Nor  does  it  imply  a  naive  return  to  the  re- 
ligious conceptions  of  man's  childhood.  It  is  first 
of  all  sympathetic,  so  far  as  the  real  objects  of  re- 
ligious belief  are  concerned.  But  the  point  of  view 
will  also  prove  to  be  progressively  critical  and  recon- 
structive. It  is  frankly  an  outgrowth  of  modern 
thought.  Such  thought  involves  the  gradual  en- 
largement of  our  ideas  of  God  to  meet  the  needs  of  the 
scientific  conception  of  nature.  It  shows  that  we 
may  well  proceed  as  far  as  the  philosophy  of  evolution 
carries  us  and  still  insist  that  the  idea  of  God  has  place, 


The  Scope  of  the  Inquiry  n 

especially  as  the  most  important  questions  concerning 
the  origin  of  life,  the  transition  from  the  inorganic  to 
the  organic  kingdom,  the  transition  from  matter  to 
mind,  and  the  questions  that  relate  to  the  origin  of 
species  still  remain  to  be  answered.  After  all,  it  is 
rather  a  question  of  the  continuous  manifestation  of 
Spirit,  the  continuous  origin  of  life,  than  of  the  oc- 
casional divine  activities  which  were  once  deemed 
interventions.  If  modern  criticism  alters  our  know- 
ledge of  human  nature,  so  much  the  more  must  we 
modify  our  conception  of  the  relationship  of  God  to 
man.  If  we  now  know  in  some  measure  how  God 
works  through  nature,  we  also  know  something  about 
His  mode  of  activity  within  men.  Hence  there  is  no 
reason  to  close  the  account  when  we  have  merely 
enumerated  and  described  the  finite  factors. 

There  are  truths  in  the  naive  conception  of  God  as 
Father  that  are  as  important  as  this  new  knowledge 
of  human  nature.  If  one  is  unable  to  reconcile  the 
enlarged  conception  of  the  God  of  natural  evolution 
with  the  more  childlike  thought  of  the  Father  to  whom 
one  prays,  the  resource  is  not  to  banish  the  naive 
belief,  but  to  bear  the  two  conceptions  along  side  by 
side.  Some  have  done  this  for  years.  They  have 
continued  to  address  prayers  to  the  Father  who 
"heareth  in  secret,"  while  philosophically  arguing  for 
a  decidedly  different  first  principle  as  an  eternal 
Ground.  To  bear  the  two  conceptions  in  mind  to  the 
end  may  well  be  to  discover  that  there  is  no  incom- 
patibility. 

Likewise  with  the  more  mystical  idea  of  God,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  negative  criticism  which  undertakes 
to  show  that  there  is  no  object  behind  the  mystic 
experience  except  the  poetic  or  picturesque  symbols 


12  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

in  which  the  mystic  clothes  his  vision.  The  critic  may 
be  as  severe  as  he  likes  and  reduce  the  experience  of 
the  presence  of  God  to  a  mere  blank.  Such  criticism 
is  profitable  because  it  clears  the  air,  relieves  mysticism 
of  its  misconceptions  and  exaggerations.  But  it  by 
no  means  proves  the  unreality  of  the  vision.  The 
light  it  throws  is  upon  the  human  factors,  the  type 
of  mediation  which  the  mystic  makes,  his  mode  of 
symbolic  reconstruction.  The  immediate  religious 
experience  still  remains  to  be  investigated.  It  re- 
mains even  after  the  religious  psychologist  has  ana- 
lysed the  experience  and  made  clear  its  conditions  and 
its  laws  so  far  as  he  is  able  to  discern  them. 

The  prime  difficulty  with  such  criticism,  whatever 
the  subject  under  consideration,  is  that  it  believes 
the  account  to  be  complete  when  everything  has 
been  said  that  at  present  can  be  said  about  spiritual 
experience,  divine  revelation,  or  the  idea  of  God, 
regarded  from  the  merely  human  side.  But  the  fact 
that  I  in  my  finitude  am  unable  explicitly  to  state  all 
that  God's  presence  means  to  me  is  no  reason  for  re- 
jecting the  rest.  Our  human  philosophy  must  fail 
somewhere,  precisely  because  it  is  human  and  attempts 
to  state,  as  best  man  may,  the  reality  and  significance 
of  his  experience.  If  God  was  also  present  in  that 
experience  the  philosopher  could  hardly  expect  to 
describe  everything  that  occurred.  There  is  no  reason 
for  falling  back  upon  a  sense  of  mystery.  But  there 
is  ground  for  the  plea  that  one  must  make  allowances 
for  factors  that  are  more  than  human.  One  could 
hardly  expect  to  know  and  describe  the  divine  nature 
through  and  through.  No  one  is  able  to  enumerate 
all  of  God's  purposes,  or  tell  how  and  when  they  are 
to  be  realised.  Possibly  God  has  access  to  man  in 


The  Scope  of  the  Inquiry  13 

ways  which  even  the  psychologists  and  the  critics 
of  the  Bible  have  been  unable  to  discover.  Modesty 
as  well  as  reason  constrains  us  to  state  what  we  dis- 
cover on  the  finite  side,  and  leave  abundant  room  for 
what  may  exist  on  the  divine  part. 

What  we  know  is  the  experience  of  the  presence  of 
God,  or  the  revelation  from  God,  after  it  has  made  its 
impression  upon  man,  not  what  took  place  before  man 
felt  the  divine  presence.  It  is  perfectly  legitimate 
to  dwell  upon  the  human  result.  But  it  is  equally 
legitimate  to  speak  reverently  and  modestly  from 
"the  point  of  view  of  God,"  to  dwell  poetically,  ap- 
preciatively, on  the  Godward  side.  This  in  the  end 
involves  less  assumption,  for  whose  universe  is 
this?  Who  is  manifested  in  nature?  Who  is  re- 
vealed in  the  soul  of  man?  What  is  man  that  he 
should  rear  himself  into  supreme  prominence  in  the 
world  ? 

Say  if  you  will  that  it  is  merely  an  hypothesis  that 
God  exists.  There  is  surely  room  for  differences  of 
terms.  If  to  you  the  notion  of  the  immediate  presence 
of  the  Spirit  is  superfluous,  you  nevertheless  have  in 
mind  a  rival  hypothesis  the  test  of  which  will  be  its 
rational  applicability.  Now,  that  is  all  that  a  con- 
ception of  God  as  efficient  Spirit  claims  to  be  at  the 
outset.  Its  validity  will  be  the  power  of  this  idea  to 
explain  events  not  adequately  accounted  for  by  the 
conception  of  an  absentee  God,  or  the  notion  of  a  God 
accepted  half-heartedly  as  existent  only  in  our  reason. 
Moreover,  even  as  an  ideal  of  pure  reason,  the  con- 
ception of  God  as  immanent  Spirit  might  have  a 
distinct  advantage  over  previous  conceptions,  an 
advantage  which  could  be  discovered  only  through 
actual  use ;  and  the  pragmatic  efficiency  might  well 


14  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

lead  to  rational  belief.  Let  us  agree,  then,  to  test  the 
conception  for  whatever  it  may  be  worth. 

One  arrives  at  the  conception  somewhat  as  follows: 
We  awaken  to  philosophic  thought  to  find  ourselves 
carried  on  from  day  to  day  amidst  a  series  of  events 
which  we  briefly  denominate  "experience."  No  man 
knows  whence  he  came  in  a  merely  matter-of-fact  sense 
of  the  word.  No  one  knows  why  the  universe  came 
to  be.  The  significant  consideration  is  that  we  find 
ourselves  existing,  philosophising  in  a  world  which 
was  here  before  we  thought,  which  we  accept  as  what 
it  proves  to  be,  and  upon  whose  structure  we  reflect. 
Finding  ourselves  thus  engaged  we  conclude  to  do  well 
what  we  have  somehow  begun.  Life  is  a  gift,  we  are 
constrained  to  live;  we  cannot  help  feeling,  thinking, 
acting.  It  is  plain  that  as  thus  constrained  we  belong 
to  a  somewhat — call  it  a  power,  a  law.  For  although 
we  frequently  please  ourselves  with  the  fond  conceit 
that  we  have  much  to  do  with  our  life,  it  is  plain  that 
what  is  within  our  power  is  mainly  the  ability  to  react, 
to  respond  in  some  manner,  already  largely  determined, 
in  the  presence  of  this  wonderful  gift  called  "life." 
Having  said  as  much  as  we  please  about  man  in  his 
intellectual  might,  the  last  word  is  to  be  said  in  behalf 
of  the  power  or  experience  that  constrains  him. 

We  might  denominate  this  strange  constraining 
power  "fate,"  but  that  would  be  to  emphasise  the 
stern  relentlessness  of  life  at  the  expense  of  other  con- 
siderations. We  might  call  it  "law,"  but  that  term 
chiefly  implies  the  existence  of  mechanical  or  other 
forces  which  act  in  accordance  with  law.  Shall  we 
then  denominate  it  "power"?  That  would  be  to  em- 
phasise the  deeds  wrought,  the  suffering  by  the  way, 
the  hard  conditions  of  survival.  There  is  a  gentler 


The  Scope  of  the  Inquiry  15 

side  to  life,  a  love,  spirit,  or  beauty.  If  " all's  love, 
yet  all  's  law,"  there  is  still  need  of  a  term  expressive 
of  wisdom,  purpose,  or  that  which  gives  unity  and 
meaning  to  the  system  which  thus  exemplifies  law. 
Our  reason,  dwelling  upon  the  facts  of  nature,  with  its 
hard  struggles,  its  warring  forces,  and  its  cruel  laws, 
leads  to  one  conception.  Our  heart,  dwelling  upon 
more  human  considerations,  leads  to  another  view. 
The  one  conception  is  relatively  impersonal,  the  other 
decidedly  personal.  The  question  is,  how  to  unite 
the  two.  The  supreme  power  or  reality  would  appear 
to  be  no  less  highly  organised  than  a  self,  and  a  ne- 
cessity of  thought  leads  us  to  use  the  term  "self" 
even  after  we  discover  that,  as  applied  to  God,  the 
conception  is  founded  on  knowledge  of  human  nature. 
We  are  led  to  the  conception  of  a  divine  personality 
both  by  a  study  of  man's  inner  life  and  by  the  dis- 
covery of  unity,  system,  purpose  in  the  cosmos.  When 
it  is  a  question  of  an  adequate  conception  of  the  power 
or  love  that  constrains  us  we  are  led  to  adopt  such  a 
term  as  "Spirit,"  a  term  which  is  expressive  of  both 
the  divine  reason  and  the  divine  will.  And  if  God  be 
Spirit,  we  may  appropriately  speak  of  the  universe 
as  in  reality  spiritual,  and  of  our  own  experience  as 
a  gift  of  the  Spirit. 

We  might  indeed  have  been  less  ambitious  and  called 
the  ultimate  somewhat  that  owns  and  uses  us  simply 
"x. "  We  might  have  denominated  it  "life"  and  con- 
cluded to  rest  content  with  mere  descriptions  of  the 
way  in  which  life  acts.  Better  still,  we  could  have 
used  the  now  frequently  employed  term  "pure  ex- 
perience. "  But  this  seems  too  vague,  as  if  indifferently 
inclusive  of  both  finite  experience  and  the  experience 
of  this  higher  power.  We  need  a  term  which  suggests 


1 6  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

the  hovering  nearness  of  that  which  guides  even  while 
it  carries  forward.  Whatever  the  term  employed,  it 
is  given  a  certain  significance  by  the  facts  and  laws 
which  thoughtful  men  discover. 

Life,  for  example,  takes  a  certain  course  through 
us,  moves  with  regularity,  with  observable  rhythms, 
sequences,  and  eventuations.  We  did  not  choose  that 
course.  We  have  accepted  and  are  undertaking  to 
describe  it  that  we  may  the  better  adapt  ourselves  to 
and  understand  it.  Let  us  agree  to  make  an  account 
of  it  which  shall  be  as  nearly  adequate  as  possible. 
If  the  facts  are  too  numerous  to  lend  themselves  to  our 
most  comprehensive  formulas,  let  us  state  that  our 
formulas  include  thus  much  and  that  there  is  still 
thus  much  more.  Having  admitted  that  our  formulas 
are  faulty,  that  it  is  a  question  of  a  Reality  that  is 
more  than  our  poor  words  can  compass,  we  may 
resolve  to  be  persistently  true  to  this  its  elusiveness 
while  still  remaining  faithful  to  our  logically  defined 
concepts.  Our  formulas  may  thus  serve  to  suggest 
our  ignorance  or  to  systematise  our  knowledge,  as 
the  case  may  be.  Whatever  the  point  of  emphasis, 
it  is  incumbent  upon  us  not  to  forget  what  lies  beyond 
the  fences  which  we  speculatively  rear.  If  our  fences 
hedge  in  they  also  shut  out.  Life  itself  is  poured  in 
and  around  all. 

It  is  significant  that  the  element  which  most  eludes 
us  when  it  is  a  question  of  positive  knowledge  and 
accurate  description,  is  precisely  the  one  to  which 
we  most  persistently  cling  despite  its  elusiveness. 
The  certain  divine  something  which  gives  to  life  its 
august  sense  repeatedly  reappears  in  our  thought, 
though  by  every  device  known  to  scepticism  we  assail 
it.  It  is  a  certain  added  element  which  must  be  ap- 


The  Scope  of  the  Inquiry  17 

predated  rather  than  described.  Now,  the  critics 
seize  upon  this  our  inability  to  say  what  we  would,  this 
persistence  in  clinging  to  a  belief,  and  call  it  dogmatism 
or  superstition.  These  critics  have  so  won  attention 
that  it  has  become  a  habit  to  spend  a  large  measure 
of  time  endeavouring  to  refute  them.  But  one  may 
make  concessions  to  the  critic  without  limiting  the 
data  to  the  considerations  which  come  into  his  view. 
In  order  to  establish  idealism,  for  example,  one  must 
meet  the  objections  of  the  materialist.  Yet  the  prime 
consideration  is  the  nature  of  the  experience  and  the 
reasoning  which  compel  us  to  be  idealists.  One  must 
have  the  courage  of  one's  idealistic  convictions  even 
though  the  critic  be  unconvinced.  Likewise  one 
should  have  the  courage  to  speak  as  if  from  "the  point 
of  view  of  God, "  even  though  the  mere  mention  of  such 
a  point  of  view  affright  the  critic  who  fails  to  see  what 
is  thereby  meant.  When  we  venture  to  speak  for  the 
Spirit,  it  is  not  alone  a  question  of  what  we  do  not  say, 
when  we  end  in  mere  poetic  suggest iveness,  but  of 
what  we  do  say. 

Now,  as  we  shall  see  later,  the  term  "Spirit"  is  pe- 
culiarly fitting  in  this  connection.  If  ambiguous,  the 
term  nevertheless  has  positive  content.  Whatever  the 
vicissitudes  which  await  us,  therefore,  the  undertaking 
on  which  we  embark  is  in  behalf  of  the  Spirit.  That 
is,  this  term  is  one  which  we  choose  as  representative 
of  the  universal  element  which  men  characterise 
differently  but  which  they  mean  when  they  speak  of 
the  Power  or  Life  which  owns  and  uses  them.  We  are 
confessedly  developing  a  philosophy,  making  an  in- 
terpretation. The  first  essential  is  precisely  this  won- 
drous quickening  Life  which  men  adore  in  the  perennial 
spring  and  in  the  recurrent  miracles  of  the  human 


1 8  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

heart.  Inasmuch  as  we  are  sharers  of  its  life,  observers 
of  its  beauty,  we  may  freely  make  use  of  the  facts  of 
its  universal  presence,  and  make  the  best  account  we 
can  of  its  gifts.  It  is  not  fitting  to  contest  the  terms 
or  dispute  the  formulas  until  we  have  characterised 
the  renewing  Presence  and  considered  whether  our 
account  be  loyal  to  it.  If  it  is  by  the  Spirit  that  we 
live,  by  it  we  must  think  and  make  good  our  thoughts. 
Hence  in  what  follows  we  shall  place  the  first  stress 
on  the  witness  of  the  Spirit  within  the  mind,  heart, 
and  conduct  of  man. 

We  assume  at  the  outset,  then,  the  existence  of  a 
world  and  finite  selves  having  experience  of  or  within 
that  world.  The  traditional  mode  of  investigating 
and  accounting  for  such  experience  would  be  to  start 
with  the  facts  of  consciousness,  analyse  them  into  their 
elements  and  their  logical  references ;  and  then  proceed 
with  the  development  of  a  closely  reasoned  system. 
There  would  first  be  a  conception  of  experience,  then 
of  the  world,  and  in  due  course  of  its  ultimate  Ground. 
The  present  method  begins  with  experience,  regarded  as 
primarily  an  activity,  and  proceeds  to  an  evaluation  of 
certain  of  its  factors  in  relation  to  a  conception  of  the 
Spirit.  We  reserve  for  later  consideration  the  analytical 
demonstration  of  the  conception  of  reality  here  adopted. 
If  the  conception  prove  effective  as  here  employed,  its 
effectiveness  will  already  be  an  argument  in  its  favour. 
That  is  to  say,  idealistic  analysis  is  apt  to  begin 
with  the  development  of  those  references  within  con- 
sciousness which  point  to  the  existence  of  a  world  of 
things  and  a  world  of  selves,  the  difficulty  being  to 
emerge  from  the  realm  of  one's  own  selfhood  into  a 
world  of  other  beings.  The  present  study  starts  with 
experience  as  found,  and  implying  certain  evaluations, 


UNIVERSITY) 

i^Phe  Scope  of  the  Inquiry  19 

and  looks  upward  to  God  rather  than  outward  upon 
the  world.  Trie  first  appeal  is  to  that  latent  evidence 
within  us  which  points  beyond  mere  belief  to  a  philo- 
sophy, evidence  which  until  we.  find  the  constructive 
clue  appears  to  be  susceptible  of  numerous  interpre- 
tations. That  is,  the  same  considerations  make  for 
disbelief  or  for  faith  according  to  the  way  we  view 
them.  There  are  times  when  we  seem  to  be  incapable 
of  performing  intellectual  synthesis.  But  those  are 
the  periods  when  our  wealth  has  increased  faster  than 
our  powers  of  generalisation.  The  resource  is,  rest, 
time  for  assimilation,  for  those  marvellous  syntheses 
of  which  the  mind  is  capable  when  left  to  its  spon- 
taneous devices.  There  is  a  richness  in  these  gradually 
developed  syntheses  which  analytical  thought  can 
scarcely  equal.  Experience  seemingly  makes  its  own 
synthesis  within  us,  and  constructs  into  the  totality 
of  a  new  insight  data  which  appeared  to  be  utterly 
inconsistent.  To  awaken  into  a  vision  of  wholeness 
where  we  once  saw  only  fragments  is  to  begin  to  have 
a  philosophy  of  Spirit. 

If  we  were  to  consider  the  witness  of  the  Spirit  at 
large  our  undertaking  would  involve  a  philosophy  of 
history,  a  reinterpretation  of  the  facts  of  natural 
evolution,  and  an  idealistic  interpretation  of  the  uni- 
verse as  a  whole.  Another  branch  of  the  philosophy 
of  Spirit  would  be  distinctively  ethical.  Again,  a  philo- 
sophy of  the  Spirit  is  also  a  philosophy  of  religion,  and 
as  such  implies  a  criticism  of  other  philosophies  of 
religion.  The  present  inquiry  is  chiefly  limited  to  the 
inner  life — that  is,  to  a  study  of  the  higher  nature  of 
man  regarded  from  a  point  of  view  farther  back  than 
the  point  where  the  philosophy  of  religion  and  philo- 
sophical idealism  begin  to  diverge.  That  is  to  say, 


20  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

there  are  certain  prior  questions  which  should  be  con- 
sidered before  one  may  rightfully  claim  that  the  be- 
ginning of  a  philosophy  of  experience  is  fundamental. 
The  theoretical  study  of  religion  is  apt  to  begin  with 
the  promulgation  of  certain  long-cherished  beliefs 
which  have  been  zealously  guarded  from  the  attacks 
of  scientific  criticism,  while  philosophical  idealism 
frequently  begins  with  an  antagonism  with  respect  to 
religious  beliefs  that  is  quite  out  of  place.  Philosophy 
and  religion  are  not  wholly  separable.  At  the  be- 
ginning and  at  the  end,  at  least,  they  are  closely 
united;  and  each  suffers  if  not  put  into  clear  relation 
with  the  other.  The  prior  questions  which  relate  to 
both  are  at  once  practical  and  logical.  It  is  with  one 
of  these  problems  in  logic  and  in  practical  life  that  the 
present  volume  is  concerned. 

The  prior  question  might  be  stated  thus:  What  is 
the  nature  of  the  immediate  element  in  practical  life, 
in  religious  experience,  and  in  human  thought  as  a 
whole?  That  is,  what  stands  first  in  authority  in 
human  experience;  is  it  feeling,  emotion,  intuition, 
reason,  a  certain  type  of  life,  a  special  mode  of  thought? 
What  is  the  order  of  reality  and  truth  in  religious  expe- 
rience and  thought,  judged  in  the  light  of  philosophical 
values?  With  what  does  human  thought  begin  when 
it  undertakes  to  meet  life  reflectively  and  to  start  with 
that  which  is  appropriately  first?  What  faculty  or 
power  is  authoritative  in  these  estimates  of  practical  life, 
religious  experience,  and  in  philosophical  considerations? 
Shall  the  immediate  element  be  expressed  in  terms  of 
mere  experience — that  is,  shall  it  be  merely  descriptive, 
impressionistic ;  or,  is  there  a  point  of  view  alike  faithful 
to  immediate  experience  as  man  apprehends  it  and  to 
the  demands  which  constructive  reason  imposes? 


The  Scope  of  the  Inquiry  21 

However  the  question  be  stated,  it  is  plain  that,  prior 
to  an  analytical  study  of  human  experience  with  a  view 
to  the  development  of  a  philosophical  system,  every 
thinker  should  first  consider  the  rights  of  that  which 
is  first,  or  immediate,  in  contrast  with  that  which  is  sec- 
ondary, or  mediate.  Just  as  in  practical  life  a  man  is 
sure  to  be  governed  by  his  conclusions  in  regard  to  the 
relative  worth  of  certain  "  faculties" — for  example, 
conscience,  so  in  religious  and  philosophical  matters 
very  much  depends  on  the  estimate  put  upon  the  phase 
of  human  experience  accepted  as  supreme  over  the  rest. 
The  arbitrary,  imperious  man  in  practical  life  is,  tacitly 
at  least,  a  believer  in  the  primacy  of  the  will,  while  the 
cool-headed,  judicious  person  chooses  an  intellectual- 
ism.  Running  through  human  life  and  human  thought 
there  is  an  unescapable  contrast  between  will  and  intel- 
lect, feeling  and  understanding,  spirit  and  reason,  spirit 
and  form.  Usually  a  practical  belief  or  philosophy 
takes  its  rise  without  previous  examination  of  these. 
This  book  undertakes  to  make  good  the  deficiency  by 
directing  attention  to  the  neglected  issues.  The  close 
relationship  of  the  religious  and  the  philosophical  topics 
considered  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  immediacy  of 
religious  experience  furnishes  the  best  illustration  of 
immediacy  in  general.  Whatever  one's  conclusions 
may  be  with  regard  to  the  so-called  higher  nature  of 
man  viewed  in  relation  to  the  experience  of  the  presence 
of  God,  those  conclusions  are  sure  to  be  profoundly  in- 
fluential alike  in  the  subsequent  philosophy  of  religion 
adopted  and  in  the  type  of  constructive  rationalism 
chosen. 

Psychologically  stated,  the  problem  is  this:  What 
are  the  constituents  of  the  higher  nature  of  man?  If 
said  to  consist  of  a  power  of  immediate  feeling,  direct 


22  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

apprehension,  or  appreciative  intuition,  what  is  the 
character  of  the  implied  immediacy,  the  firstness,  or 
original  relationship?  If  said  to  be  the  spirit  in  man, 
what  is  spirit?  If  described  in  purely  empirical  terms, 
what  is  the  relation  of  such  higher  experience  to  reason  ? 
Out  of  the  psychological  description  would  naturally 
grow  a  new  evaluation  of  feeling,  emotion, and  intuition. 
A  further  question  would  be,  How  far  does  the  psycho- 
logical description  of  higher  experience  point  the  way 
to  a  theory  of  its  reality  ? 

Prior  to  the  question  of  the  nature  of  conscience  and 
the  reality  of  mystic  experience  there  is,  for  example, 
the  larger  question,  Is  there  within  man  a  "faculty" 
for  the  immediate  apprehension  of  the  Spirit?  Is 
there  a  "  voice  of  God  in  the  soul  of  man  "  ?  If  so,  what 
are  the  conditions  of  activity  of  this  faculty?  Is  it 
universal  or  a  gift  bestowed  on  but  few?  If  not, 
through  what  types  of  experience  does  man  apprehend 
the  divine  presence?  Granted  primary  forms  of  expe- 
rience, types  of  guidance,  what  relation  does  immediate 
insight  or  experience  bear  to  subsequent  experience 
and  critical  thought?  Is  immediacy  of  experience  or 
sentiment  universally  primary  in  reality  and  author- 
ity? What  place  should  be  assigned  to  emotion  and 
feeling  in  a  philosophy  of  the  Spirit?  These  are  some 
of  the  questions.  Then  there  are  the  problems 
already  hinted  at  which  grow  out  of  the  comparison  of 
facts  with  ideals,  experiences  which  are  precisely  de- 
scribable  and  those  which  we  appreciatively  character- 
ise as  we  are  able,  in  symbolic  language  and  figures 
of  speech.  These  interests  lead  to  the  more  funda- 
mental question,  Is  there  a  real  order  of  higher  powers 
or  beings  corresponding  to  these  /alues  and  figures  of 
speech?  Granted  a  theory  of  immediate  experience, 


The  Scope  of  the  Inquiry  23 

it  will  then  be  possible  to  treat  mysticism  afresh,  and 
consider  in  what  terms,  whether  theistic  or  pantheistic, 
immediate  religious  experience  can  best  be  interpreted. 

In  terms  of  logic,  our  question  is,  What  relation  does 
the  immediate  element  in  experience  bear  to  the  thought 
which  formulates  it,  which  prepares  the  way  for  a 
theory  of  knowledge  and  of  reality?  It  is  first  a  ques- 
tion of  the  starting-point  of  thought,  what  thought 
must  assume  in  order  to  make  headway;  and  then 
of  the  method  to  be  employed  in  dealing  with  data 
accepted  as  immediate.  When  man  looks  abroad 
over  the  face  of  nature  or  into  the  world  of  mind,  what 
stands  first  in  order  of  reality,  or  at  least  in  the  order 
of  thought?  Does  the  philosopher  evolve  an  abstract 
starting-point  out  of  his  own  brain,  pronounce  it 
rational,  then  impose  it  on  the  world  as  a  genuine 
account  of  the  universe?  Or,  does  he  begin  with 
experience,  with  all  its  irrationality,  then  progressively 
develop  its  rationality?  Is  the  logical  process  purely 
formal,  or  does  the  logician  deal  with  the  actual 
subject-matter  of  human  experience  ?  What,  in  general, 
is  the  concept  of  the  immediate,  psychically  and 
otherwise  regarded?  In  the  present  inquiry  the  study 
of  the  immediacy  of  religious  experience  is  taken  as  a 
type  of  the  general  logical  problem. 

The  question  once  defined,  the  next  problem  is,  What 
method  shall  be  pursued?  If  one  is  interested  to 
evaluate  human  experience  afresh,  one  must  keep  close 
to  experience  and  avoid  technical  subtleties.  On  the 
other  hand,  one  cannot  be  exact  without  being  tech- 
nical. The  most  promising  course  would  appear  to  be 
this,  to  begin  with  actual,  verifiable  life,  then  introduce 
technicalities  only  so  far  as  necessary  for  precision. 
Modern  pragmatism,  with  its  emphasis  on  the  work- 


24  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

ability  of  human  conceptions,  supplies  the  first  method ; 
Hegel,  whose  Logic  includes  the  pragmatic  method, 
yet  passes  far  beyond  it,  has  examined  the  immediate 
with  the  thoroughness  requisite  for  constructive 
purposes.  The  Supplementary  Essay,  appended  to 
this  volume,  contains  a  study  of  the  immediate  element 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Hegelian  logic. 

However  our  subject  be  formulated  in  advance,  the 
central  consideration  is  the  interest  with  which  one 
approaches  facts  and  laws  as  familiar  to  some  as  the 
coming  of  spring.  For  it  is  the  spirit  of  approach,  as 
much  as  the  subjects  considered,  that  is  to  be  our  guide. 
One  can  hardly  hope  to  say  anything  wholly  new  to 
those  who  have  lived  with  the  great  poets,  essayists, 
and  seers,  and  with  the  Gospels.  Each  of  us  had 
evidence  of  the  existence  of  the  Spirit.  The  soul's 
own  revelations,  understood,  are  far  more  significant 
than  any  descriptions  which  other  men  may  give. 
Unless  we  already  bore  within  us  the  evidence  for  the 
great  realities  here  to  be  considered,  what  is  said  would 
signify  little.  Yet  it  is  precisely  the  new  way  of 
characterising  old  experiences  which  for  many  con- 
stitutes the  revelation  of  the  Spirit.  The  Spirit 
making  the  world  anew  is  no  doubt  the  real  revelation. 
The  Spirit  never  pauses,  and  the  great  miracle  is  not 
so  much  what  it  leaves  with  us  as  what  it  is  while  it 
pulsates  through  us  and  achieves  its  work.  Since  it 
is  the  Spirit  alone  that  giveth  life,  we  may  well  reflect 
on  the  conditions  under  which  the  life  is  given,  and 
learn  the  better  to  apprehend  the  Spirit's  presence. 

It  is  possible  to  outline  in  a  few  words  a  theory  of 
the  Spirit  and  of  adaptation  to  its  guiding  presence. 
Hence  the  question  arises,  Why  undertake  this  elab- 
orate investigation,  why  complicate  the  situation  by 


The  Scope  of  the  Inquiry  25 

raising  critical  issues?  The  answer  is  that,  while 
simplicity  is  the  key-note,  thoroughness  of  thought 
tested  by  depth  of  experience  is  required  to  discover 
and  rest  upon  a  simple  philosophic  basis.  If,  for 
example,  we  agree  that  the  Spirit  is  made  known 
through  experience,  through  life,  that  it  pursues  a 
certain  course  and  the  art  of  life  consists  in  adjusting 
our  conduct  to  its  promptings,  the  question  at  once 
arises,  What  are  those  promptings,  how  are  they  to 
be  discriminated,  whither  do  they  lead?  Much  de- 
pends upon  our  answer,  and  the  answer  cannot  at  first 
be  simple.  In  this  field  more  than  in  any  other  it  is 
the  life  that  avails;  a  mere  theory  of  the  Spirit  is  but 
one  point.  Granted  a  certain  degree  of  spiritual 
consciousness,  it  is  a  question  both  of  the  development 
of  that  consciousness  through  increasing  spirituality 
and  the  growth  of  understanding  through  the  study 
of  its  laws  and  conditions. 

Moreover,  all  sides  of  our  nature  must  be  satisfied, 
and  people  have  tried  to  be  spiritual  by  maiming 
themselves.  If  a  doubt  be  raised,  if  critical  issues  come 
to  the  fore,  and  too  great  emphasis  be  put  upon  the 
relativity  of  knowledge,  the  doubts  must  be  resolved 
in  the  completes t  fashion.  It  is  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant considerations  in  the  spiritual  life — this  es- 
timation of  the  sceptical  or  self-conscious  period 
through  which  man  passes  in  his  transition  from  un- 
critical faith  to  the  manhood  of  spiritual  thought. 
Many  are  in  this  intermediate  stage  at  present.  They 
are  down  under  circumstance,  immersed  in  the  rela- 
tivities, confronted  with  unruly  facts.  For  them 
there  is  no  return  to  the  unthinking  stage  of  the  world. 
Having  begun  to  think,  the  only  resource  is  to  think 
thoroughly,  courageously. 


26  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

Then,  too,  there  are  certain  great  problems  of  the 
spiritual  life  which  many  of  us  have  tried  to  put  aside 
in  part  unsolved.  There  is  the  long,  long  problem  of 
the  relationship  between  intuition  and  the  paradox- 
productive  understanding.  If  we  crucify  the  intellect 
we  have  no  peace.  If  we  rear  paradoxes  they  haunt 
us.  Persist  as  we  may  that  spiritual  things  must  be 
spiritually  discerned,  we  know  that  reason  is  divine  too, 
that  our  faith  is  unstable  until  we  can  give  convincing 
reasons  in  terms  of  well-systematised  facts. 

Again,  it  matters  greatly  what  theory  we  hold  in  re- 
gard to  the  way  in  which  God  is  made  known,  that  is, 
what  part  of  our  nature  is  fundamental  or  most  spirit- 
ual. For  we  exclude  or  invite  communion  with  the 
Spirit  according  as  our  theory  of  human  nature  varies, 
to  say  nothing  of  the  variations  caused  by  different 
theological  conceptions.  Insist  as  we  may  that  the 
spiritual  life,  the  presence  of  the  Spirit,  is  wholly  an 
affair  of  "feeling"  which  should  be  accepted  precisely 
as  it  comes,  the  undeniable  fact  is  that  from  first  to 
last  our  conduct,  our  attitude,  and  our  emotions  are 
profoundly  affected  by  what  we  believe,  by  our  first 
principles.  We  may  even  be  unaware  that  we  possess 
any  first  principles.  But  if  so,  there  is  all  the  more 
reason  why  we  should  awaken  to  the  fact,  and  learn 
that  when  we  seemed  to  be  entirely  free  from  the  intel- 
lect we  were  steadily  making  use  of  its  processes. 

Yet,  again,  there  is  the  persistent  problem  of  the 
relationship  between  the  individual  and  the  universal, 
that  is  to  say,  the  place  of  man  with  respect  to  the 
Spirit.  On  the  one  hand,  we  find  the  individual  dis- 
paraged and  the  Spirit  so  greatly  emphasised  that  some 
form  of  absolutism  or  pantheism  is  the  result.  Again, 
we  find  that  man  is  belittled  for  the  sake  of  exalting 


The  Scope  of  the  Inquiry  27 

God  as  a  person.  Man's  sinful  nature  is  so  greatly 
enlarged  upon  that  the  finite  self  supposably  is  capable 
of  nothing  except  error  and  sin.  On  the  other  hand, 
so  much  is  made  of  the  finite  self  that  the  opposite  ex- 
treme is  the  result.  Apparently  the  Spirit  is  nothing 
to  us  without  persons,  yet  persons  may  obscure  the 
Spirit.  The  question  therefore  rises,  What  allowances 
must  be  made  for  the  personal  equation?  Shall  we 
seek,  the  Spirit  directly  or  through  persons?  Is  God 
to  be  found  in  solitude  or  amidst  society?  If  we  must 
lose  self  in  order  to  find  God,  what  becomes  of  our  self- 
hood, why  are  we  disparate  individuals? 

Once  more,  there  is  the  question  of  the  relationship 
between  the  natural  and  the  spiritual,  the  temporal 
and  the  eternal.  If  men  have  not  raised  artificial  bar- 
riers between  the  natural  and  the  spiritual,  they  have 
often  erred  in  their  emphasis  upon  the  one  or  the  other. 
Plainly,  a  philosophy  of  Spirit  must  be  concerned  with 
this  partly  solved  problem,  and  its  relation  to  practical 
life  cannot  be  ignored.  We  cannot  sweep  away  all  dis- 
tinctions between  the  natural  and  the  spiritual  any 
more  than  we  can  dispense  with  all  distinctions  between 
good  and  evil.  The  question  is,  Where  shall  the  line 
be  drawn? 

In  a  sense  all  these  questions  are  one  and  the  same, 
namely,  What  shall  we  do  with  the  self,  in  all  its  pride, 
its  independence,  its  assertiveness,  its  waywardness, 
and  its  doubts,  yet  with  all  its  innocence,  its  virtue, 
and  its  ability?  A  philosophy  of  Spirit  would  indeed 
be  simple  with  the  self  removed,  but  the  self — well, 
that  is  the  whole  problem.  How  to  set  the  self  aside 
is  one  half  of  the  question,  how  to  join  it  with  the 
Spirit  is  the  other  half.  We  could  believe,  have  faith, 
make  headway,  if  it  were  not  for  the  self.  But  we 


28  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

cannot  long  ignore  or  disparage  the  self.  If  its  facility 
for  getting  in  the  way  constitutes  the  great  difficulty, 
so  that  all  our  friction,  all  ennui,  all  distrust,  pessimism, 
misery,  is  chargeable  to  the  self,  it  is  nevertheless  this 
same  self  which  gives  us  the  direct  clue  to  the  divine 
nature.  We  may  build  up  the  self  to  our  undoing  or 
our  sanctification  according  as  we  regard  it.  At  any 
rate  there  is  no  vicarious  philosophising  possible  here. 
He  who  would  know  God  must  find  Him  through  his 
doubts,  his  conflicts,  and  his  tribulations,  or  fail  to 
discover  Him  in  the  profounder  sense.  A  philosophy 
of  Spirit  may  be  simple,  but  truth  is  not  easily  won,  and 
the  truth  concerning  the  Spirit  may  well  engage  a 
man  as  long  as  he  shall  have  power  to  think. 

Meanwhile  our  surest  clue  is  discoverable  through  the 
preservation  of  spontaneity.  Since  the  Spirit  is  a 
renewing  presence,  coming  in  its  own  way,  with  its 
own  high  purposes  to  fulfil,  our  part  at  its  best  is  un- 
doubtedly to  do  that  " lowly  listening"  which  invites 
"  the  right  word,"  to  maintain  an  attitude  of  ever- ready 
receptivity.  This  willingness  to  follow  wherever  the 
Spirit  leads  is  all  the  more  incumbent  upon  us  in  this 
age  inasmuch  as  we  have  indulged  in  individualism 
without  limit  and  taken  up  an  enormously  active  mode 
of  life.  If  we  are  to  have  a  philosophy  of  Spirit  we 
must  possess  the  Spirit,  live  by  it.  To  possess  it  we 
must  first  let  it  possess  us.  To  live  by  it  we  should 
await  its  leading,  give  untrammelled  expression  to  its 
revelations.  The  Spirit,  in  other  words,  must  write 
its  own  philosophy  in  our  minds  and  hearts.  On  the 
feminine  side  of  our  nature  we  cannot  be  too  open,  too 
willing  and  responsive,  when  it  is  a  question  of  the  com- 
ing of  the  Spirit.  To  maintain  in  advance  that  we 
know  the  ways  of  the  Spirit  or  that  we  can  regulate  its 


The  Scope  of  the  Inquiry  29 

influences  upon  us  is  to  exclude  its  presence  and  in- 
trude individual  thought.  To  watch  it  as  it  comes, 
noting  every  detail,  formulating  every  law,  would  be 
to  find  that  it  had  eluded  us.  When  it  breathes  upon 
us  it  is  time  for  humility,  for  reverent  acceptance,  not 
a  time  to  ask  questions  or  give  place  to  doubts.  If  the 
message  of  to-day  seemingly  contradict  the  message  of 
yesterday  or  last  year,  accept  it  no  less  reverently  and 
learn  the  deeper  consistency  which  the  Spirit's  own 
future  revelations  shall  make  known. 

The  Spirit  quickens  whom  it  will  and  when  it  will. 
The  Spirit  is  the  supreme  fact — let  this  be  recognised 
first  and  last.  Having  pleased  ourselves  with  the  fancy 
that  we  have  much  to  do  with  life,  it  is  time  to  know 
that  it  is  the  Spirit  which  works,  the  Spirit  that  lives 
in  us  and  gives  us  wisdom,  love,  and  power.  If  we  have 
been  taking  credit  to  ourselves,  thinking,  speaking,  and 
acting  as  if  the  life  and  light  within  us  were  our  own, 
then  let  us  cease  to  make  these  claims,  and  bow  the 
head  in  reverential  acknowledgment  of  the  life  that 
is  ours  only  by  divine  gift.  All  life,  all  power,  all  wis- 
dom, is  such  a  gift;  all  thinking  and  all  philosophy,  too, 
that  is,  all  spiritual  philosophy  that  is  true  and  carries  the 
weight  of  eternal  reality.  Therefore  if  we  are  to  possess 
a  philosophy  of  Spirit  we  must  gather  our  data  here  and 
there  as  the  Spirit  unfolds  its  laws  within  us,  as  it  illu- 
mines our  pathway.  By  thus  preserving  an  essentially 
receptive  attitude  we  shall  be  able  in  large  measure 
to  strike  at  the  root  of  what  I  have  called  the  real  prob- 
lem, namely,  the  relation  of  the  finite  self  to  the  Spirit. 
In  spontaneous  obedience  the  self  is  seen  at  its  best, 
or  may  soon  become  its  best,  for  only  by  being  ready 
to  follow  shall  man  receive  that  illumination  without 
which  all  his  endeavours  to  wrest  from  the  Spirit  its 


30  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

secrets  shall  come  to  naught.  Not  until  one  no  longer 
cares  either  to  wrestle  or  to  spy  shall  that  central 
message  be  given.  To  receive  the  message  is  indeed 
to  see  that  the  Spirit  is  a  renewing  presence,  for  in  a 
moment's  insight  all  the  universe  is  transformed,  all 
the  facts  are  made  beautiful  and  significant. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE   DEFINITION    OF   THE    SPIRIT 

ONE  of  the  profoundest  conclusions  at  which  the 
human  mind  has  arrived  is  the  conviction  that  the  uni- 
verse is  a  manifestation  of  Spirit.  From  the  dawn  of 
speculation  in  India  to  the  present  time,  in  the  works  of 
the  systematic  philosophers,  as  well  as  in  the  sacred 
literatures  of  all  ages  and  nations,  this  has  been  a  pre- 
vailing conception.  No  one  can  claim  the  idea  as 
original.  Yet,  because  of  the  wide  extent  of  the  con- 
ception, it  contains  so  much  philosophic  wealth  that 
seers  and  thinkers  who  hold  sharply  divergent  views 
lay  equal  claim  to  it.  In  the  case  of  Hindoo  specula- 
tion it  implies  spiritual  pantheism,  and  in  the  Western 
world  is  often  synonymous  with  various  forms  of  mysti- 
cism. It  might  be  supposed  to  involve  the  rejection  of 
all  forms  of  constructive  rationalism,  yet  it  might  well 
be  the  central  conception  in  a  system  of  critical  idealism. 
For  some  it  is  a  merely  practical  term.  Others  who 
in  general  accept  a  theory  of  Spirit  in  its  relation  to  the 
universe  at  large  would  find  it  extremely  difficult,  if 
questioned,  to  apply  this  general  philosophy  to  the 
problems  of  daily  conduct. 

Some  would  question  the  value  of  an  attempt  to 
define  what  they  mean  by  the  Spirit.  To  define  is  to 
limit,  it  is  repeatedly  said.  Do  we  not  all  know  in  a 
general  way  what  it  means  to  live  by  the  Spirit?  To 
insist  upon  a  more  explicit  statement  would  be  to  put 

31 


32  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

the  Spirit  far  from  us,  to  become  painfully  aware  how 
far  short  of  the  ideal  our  conduct  falls.  Moreover,  the 
Spirit  must  be  spiritually  discerned,  and  intellectual 
statements  are  futile. 

To  these  and  all  similar  objections  the  sufficient 
reply  is  that  any  fundamental  statement  with  respect 
to  the  Spirit  implies  a  rival  philosophy,  over  against 
which  we  may  place  the  splendid  results  of  those  who 
have  endeavoured  to  make  their  beliefs  explicit.  If 
the  Spirit  can  be  discerned  only  through  "spiritual 
intuition,"  we  may  well  develop  the  full  wealth  of 
such  intuition.  If  the  results  of  critical  idealism 
point  to  a  philosophy  of  Spirit  as  their  fulfilment,  let 
us  have  the  full  benefit  of  these  rich  gifts  of  human 
reason.  Having  once  accepted  the  conclusion  that  the 
universe  is  a  manifestation  of  Spirit,  any  scepticism 
with  regard  to  what  is  knowable  is  doubt  of  the  Spirit 
itself.  As  little  as  we  may  positively  know  about 
the  Spirit,  we  may  at  least  increase  our  knowledge 
indirectly  by  accepting  the  idea  in  all  seriousness  and 
by  acquiring  more  knowledge  about  the  world.  If 
Spirit  be  in  deepest  truth  the  ultimate  reality,  it  is  as 
surely  the  final  basis  of  reason  as  of  the  ineffable  ex- 
periences on  which  devotees  of  mysticism  place  em- 
phasis. It  may  well  be  that  Spirit  is  reason  itself. 
At  any  rate,  the  statement  that  the  universe  is  a 
manifestation  of  Spirit  is  a  rational  proposition,  and 
as  such  is  capable  of  rational  examination.  If  there 
are  rival  philosophies  of  Spirit,  only  by  their  rational 
comparison  may  we  hope  to  decide  between  them. 
If  to  define  be  to  limit,  the  limitations  relate  to,  hence 
throw  light  upon,  the  nature  of  Spirit.  If  there  be  a 
special  "faculty"  for  the  immediate  apprehension  of 
Spirit,  it  must  make  good  its  right  as  supremely 


The  Definition  of  the  Spirit  33 

authoritative  when  reason  has  done  its  utmost  through 
the  analysis  of  ordinary  mental  processes. 

It  is  worth  while,  then,  to  undertake  at  least  in  a 
general  way  to  determine  the  meanings  for  which  the 
term  "Spirit"  shall  stand  in  our  investigation.  It  is 
one  of  the  richest  words  in  our  philosophic  speech. 
Sometimes  it  is  used  as  a  synonym  for  the  term  God; 
again  it  refers  primarily  to  the  human  soul.  Now  it 
is  employed  as  if  signifying  a  union  of  God  and  man, 
and  now  it  is  a  collective  term  for  the  growing  life  of 
humanity.  Again,  the  term  is  connected  with  other 
conceptions;  hence  we  hear  of  the  "world-spirit,"  the 
"time-spirit,"  of  the  spirit  which  achieves  through 
human  history,  as  if  there  were  a  life  by  itself,  resident 
in  the  world,  neither  God  nor  man.  Then  there  is  the 
spirit  of  nature,  the  moral  spirit,  and  the  social  spirit; 
the  spirit  of  any  specific  undertaking,  its  underlying 
incentive,  the  carrying  power  which  makes  it  a  success. 
There  is  also  the  spirit  in  contrast  with  the  letter  or 
form,  the  spirit  versus  reason.  In  a  more  psychological 
sense,  there  is  the  life  of  spiritual  "feeling,"  the  spirit 
of  good  fellowship  and  cheer.  People  claim  in  a  fa- 
miliar way  to  be  "led"  or  "moved"  by  the  Spirit. 
But,  again,  the  Spirit  is  said  to  be  the  "Holy  Ghost," 
making  its  presence  known  in  a  less  familiar  way  by 
a  supernal  law,  overshadowing  the  minds  and  hearts 
of  men  as  if  by  a  miracle. 

Etymologically  the  term  "spirit"  refers  to  primitive 
notions  regarding  the  air  as  the  breath  of  life,  hence 
as  the  vital  principle  mediating  between  soul  and  body. 
Originally  taken  to  be  a  corporeal  thing,  but  invisible, 
the  spirit  was  in  course  of  time  regarded  as  a  portion 
of  the  divine  life  breathed  into  man.  Thus  in  its 
transformed  meaning  it  was  deemed  immaterial,  until 


34  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

in  due  course  it  was  practically  identified  with  the 
personality,  then  with  the  third  person  of  the  trinity. 
At  large,  the  term  covers  almost  anything  that  ani- 
mates or  is  animated,  from  a  liquid  to  a  disembodied 
soul,  and  from  an  evil  genius  to  the  noblest  inspiration. 
It  is  only  in  a  restricted  philosophic  sense  that  the 
word  has  value. 

In  its  theological  signification  the  term  is  denned 
in  Baldwin's  Dictionary  of  Philosophy  with  reference 
to  the  highest  energy  of  a  self-conscious  being  in 
the  sphere  of  moral  and  religious  experience.  "  Spirit 
is  conceived  as  an  entity  in  religious  thought  only 
when  it  is  identified  with  the  highest  activity  of  a 
self-conscious  personality.  In  this  sense  perdurable 
individuality  is  predicated  of  it.  The  definition  dis- 
tinguishes spirit  from  soul,  the  highest  activity  of 
which  is  in  the  moral  and  religious  sphere.  Spirit  is 
a  term  of  energy,  and  when  applied  to  God  involves 
the  idea  of  divine  energising  in  the  work  of  organising 
and  sustaining  the  higher  manifestations  of  life."1 
Thus  in  Dr.  W.  N.  Clarke's  Outline  of  Christian  Theology 
one  finds  the  following  comprehensive  definition; 
"God  is  the  Personal  Spirit,  perfectly  good,  who  in 
holy  love  creates,  sustains,  and  orders  all."2 

In  a  systematic  philosophical  sense  the  term  has 
been  given  precise  and  elaborate  usage  by  Hegel.  In 
the  first  place,  spirit  is  the  very  essence  of  man;  "it 
is  by  virtue  of  his  being  spirit  that  man  is  man." 
God  is  "  the  centre  which  gives  life  and  quickening  to 
all  things,  and  which  animates  and  preserves  in  ex- 
istence all  the  various  forms  of  being."3  More  speci- 
fically, Spirit  is  the  third  or  highest  manifestation  of 

1  ii-,  583-  2  P-  66- 

3  Philos.  of  Religion,  Eng.  trans,   i.,  2. 


The  Definition  of  the  Spirit  35 

God:  God  goes  forth  into  objectivity  and  attains 
fulness  of  expression  as  Spirit.  The  Absolute  Spirit 
is  God  not  merely  as  He  essentially  is  in  Himself,  but 
as  He  is  after  He  has  gone  forth  into  manifestation 
and  is  conceived  in  terms  of  his  objectivity. 

Nature,  finite  spirit,  the  world  of  consciousness,  of 
intelligence,  and  of  will,  are  embodiments  of  the  divine 
Idea,  but  they  are  .  .  .  special  modes  of  the  appear- 
ance of  the  Idea,  forms  in  which  the  Idea  has  not  yet 
[become]  Absolute  Spirit.  .  .  .  Spirit  is  regarded  as 
the  power  or  force  of  these  worlds,  as  producing  them  out 
of  itself,  and  out  of  them  producing  itself.  .  .  .  Spirit, 
in  so  far  as  it  is  the  Spirit  of  God,  is  not  a  spirit  beyond 
the  stars,  beyond  the  world.  On  the  contrary,  God  is 
present,  omnipresent,  and  exists  as  Spirit  in  all  spirits. 
God  is  a  living  God  who  is  acting  and  working.1 

Among  the  derived  meanings  of  the  general  term 
we  may  for  purposes  of  convenience  distinguish  the 
following:  (i)  the  finite  spirit,  man,  the  soul,  resident 
in  the  flesh  or  discarnate,  that  is,  the  individual,  per- 
sonal spirit;  (2)  the  impersonal  spirit,  that  is,  any 
principle,  force  or  activity  working  through  history 
or  through  the  world  at  large  but  not  yet  acknowledged 
as  divine;  and  (3)  God,  the  supreme  Spirit,  conceived 
in  personal  terms  by  theology,  and  impersonally  by 
philosophy  as  the  ultimate  efficiency  of  the  world,  the 
highest  embodiment  of  the  divine  Idea.  That  is> 
the  term  may  be  said  to  imply  a  definite  selfhood  in 
the  finite  sense,  a  bond  of  union  in  an  impersonal 
sense,  and  a  universal  life-giving  Personality. 

In  the  first  sense  of  the  word  as  thus  employed, 
the  future  state  of  man  is  often  thought  of,  as  if  man 

«  Op.  cit.,  pp.  26,  33 


36  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

were  to  become  a  spirit  when  he  ceases  to  be  a  being 
of  flesh  and  blood.  A  vague  notion  is  prevalent  that 
man  is  at  once  a  soul  and  a  spirit.  In  defence  of  this 
view  Dr.  Clarke  refers  to  scriptural  teaching  as  in- 
dicating that  the  spirit 

is  the  highest  in  man — the  organ  of  divine  life  and  com- 
munion with  God,  the  seat  of  the  divine  indwelling;  while 
the  soul  is  the  seat  of  the  natural  human  life,  where  dwell 
and  act  the  naturally  used  faculties  of  the  conscious  being. 
It  is  commonly  held  that  the  soul,  being  thus  intermediate 
between  the  body  and  the  spirit,  is  the  seat  of  personality; 
so  that  man  is  a  soul,  but  has  a  body  and  a  spirit.1 

But,  on  the  whole,  he  concludes  that  the  scriptural 
usage  implies  that  "soul"  and  "spirit"  are  names  for 

the  same  element  in  man  viewed  in  different  relations. 
The  non-bodily  part  of  man  may  be  viewed  in  its  relation 
to  God,  or  in  its  relation  to  the  life  that  it  is  living  in  the 
body  and  on  the  earth.  On  the  one  hand,  it  may  be  viewed 
as  coming  from  God,  akin  to  God,  adapted  to  communion 
with  God,  and  capable  of  His  indwelling;  and  in  this  highest 
relation  it  is  usually  called  spirit.  .  .  .  It  is  not  that  the 
lower  faculties  constitute  the  soul  and  the  higher  the  spirit, 
but  that  the  entire  non-bodily  part  bears  one  name  as 
inhabiting  the  body  and  related  to  the  present  world,  and 
the  other  as  kindred  to  God  and  capable  of  fellowship 
with  him. 

The  term  "spirit,"  then,  is  used  in  a  eulogistic  sense, 
or  with  reference  to  man's  higher  nature,  but  the  same 
selfhood  is  meant.  That  this  is  the  more  rational 
view  will  be  made  clear  in  subsequent  chapters.  We 
shall  use  the  terms  "spirit"  (spelled  with  a  small 
letter),  "soul,"  and  "self"  synonymously,  under- 
standing by  them  the  unitary  finite  personality.  We 

»  Op.  cit.,  p.  183. 


The  Definition  of  the  Spirit  37 

shall  ordinarily  employ  the  more  philosophical  term 
"  self, "  and  understand  by  it  not  only  man's  present 
selfhood,  with  its  natural  and  social  relationships,  but 
the  moral  and  religious  potentialities  of  a  future  life, 
and  the  power  to  commune  with  God. 

In  case  of  the  second  group  of  meanings,  it  is  prefer- 
able to  state  precisely  what  we  have  in  mind.  If  we 
mean  the  power  active  in  natural  evolution  and 
eternally  conserved,  it  is  better  to  employ  the  term 
"energy."  If  we  mean  humanity  in  a  collective 
sense,  there  are  serviceable  terms,  such  as  "  social 
consciousness,"  "the  achievements  of  history,"  or 
"factors  of  moral  evolution."  When  we  refer  to  the 
spiritual  as  opposed  to  the  intellectual  element  in 
human  life,  we  may  use  the  term  "religious  con- 
sciousness, ' '  or  employ  psychological  terms,  such  as 
feeling,  emotion,  or  sentiment.  By  "the  spirit,"  as 
opposed  to  the  "form,"  one  usually  means  the  moral 
or  religious  values,  the  intuitive  or  appreciative  ele- 
ment. In  each  case  there  would  be  an  advantage  in 
stating  the  explicit  meaning  in  question.  The  term 
Spirit,  capitalised,  might  then  be  used  as  a  synonym 
for  the  expression  "God  in  action."  It  would  be  a 
question,  therefore,  of  the  animating  or  purposive 
Power  in  all  its  modes  of  manifestation,  on  the  one 
hand;  and  of  the  various  facts,  events,  achievements 
in  nature,  in  human  history,  and  in  the  soul  of  man, 
which  give  evidence  of  the  presence  of  the  Spirit,  on 
the  other.  When  natural  forces,  historical  influences, 
human  powers,  attitudes,  and  principles  are  relatively 
in  question,  specific  terms  might  well  be  employed  to 
designate  the  particular  factor.  When  the  power  of 
God  is  distinctively  in  question,  the  term  Spirit  may 
be  intelligibly  employed. 


38  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

It  is  doubtful  if  people  seriously  believe  in  the  real 
existence  of  a  separate  "world-spirit"  for  each  planet, 
or  a  distinct  Weltgeist  which  assumes  successive  his- 
torical attitudes.  This  term,  like  a  number  of  others 
referred  to  above,  is  a  figure  of  speech.  The  real 
meaning  is  no  doubt  expressed  by  the  larger  term, 
Spirit,  regarded  as  the  efficient  cosmic  agency  or  cause 
of  all  world-life.  In  the  expression  "  the  spirit  of  the 
time"  there  also  appears  to  be  a  reference  to  the 
divine  agency.  The  "  Over-soul, "  of  Emerson,  is 
another  term  for  this  added  factor,  which  is  so  hard 
for  men  to  name  but  which  they  cannot  omit  when  they 
seek  to  be  loyal  to  all  that  human  experience  reveals. 
All  these  tacit  references  to  the  power  of  God  may  be 
said  to  point  to  the  meaning  which  we  here  give  to  the 
term  Spirit. 

Nevertheless  it  is  somewhat  arbitrary  to  limit  the 
term  Spirit  to  the  explicit  power  of  God,  for  the  word 
stands  for  partly  unknown  factors  and  its  ambiguities 
are  often  extremely  convenient.  The  spirit  in  man 
is  precisely  that  side  of  his  nature  in  which  no  sharp 
lines  can  be  drawn  between  the  human  and  the  divine. 
Whatever  it  is  that  works  through  the  world,  or 
through  humanity,  and  accomplishes  that  which  we 
are  unable  to  assign  to  specific  individuals  is  designated 
"the  spirit."  In  religion  it  is  that  which  is  most 
mysterious,  farthest  removed  from  what  we  commonly 
know  as  law.  A  distinctively  "spiritual"  point  of 
view  is  one  which  holds  great  value  for  man  until  he  is 
asked  to  state  in  what  respect  it  is  distinctive.  That 
which  is  spiritual  is  partly  that  which  lies  beyond  the 
realm  of  the  precisely  definable.  To  persist  in  robbing 
the  term  of  its  ambiguities  would  be  to  leave  us  without 
resource. 


The  Definition  of  the  Spirit  39 

Moreover,  there  is  profound  meaning  beneath  the 
ambiguities.  For  the  term  implies  both  the  conception 
of  essence  and  the  notion  of  union.  By  the  spirit  of  a 
thing  we  commonly  mean  its  essence,  that  without 
which  our  faulty  definitions  were  indeed  prosaic.  To 
discern  spiritually  is  in  very  truth  to  apprehend  the 
heart,  appreciate  the  soul.  On  the  other  hand,  that 
which  is  spiritual  is  that  which  harmonises,  unifies, 
brings  into  sympathy  even  where  sympathy  is  ap- 
parently impossible.  It  is  when  men  work  together, 
transcending  their  mere  finitude,  that  the  attainments 
of  the  social  spirit  are  achieved.  We  commonly  think 
of  no  higher  kind  of  union  than  one  that  is  spiritual. 
It  is  difficult  to  define  the  term  just  because  we  mean 
something  partly  human,  partly  divine. 

Restricting  the  term  "self,"  however,  to  man,  let  us 
endeavour  to  state  the  deeper  meanings  of  Spirit  from 
the  essentially  God- ward  side.  Spirit,  let  us  say,  is 
the  central  life,  the  inmost  activity  which  goes  forth 
from  the  Godhead,  the  world- will  which  manifests  the 
divine  purpose.  But  as  thus  constituting  the  central 
life  of  things,  Spirit  is  also  a  principle  of  union  into  a 
dynamic  system,  a  system  exhibiting  development. 
Hence  the  Spirit  may  be  characterised  (i)  as  unifying 
the  life  of  the  world,  or  of  all  worlds,  making  the  uni- 
verse one  system;  (2)  as  uniting  man  with  man  through- 
out all  history,  in  various  phases  of  social  evolution; 
and  (3)  as  the  principle  of  union  between  God  and 
individual  man  in  religious  and  other  experience.  The 
essence,  the  bond  of  union,  is  one  and  the  same;  the 
forms  are  many  and  diverse.  Although  many  terms 
may  be  used  to  characterise  the  various  forms  of  man- 
ifestation, the  principle  which  makes  them  possible  is 
Spirit,  and  that  is  precisely  what  Spirit  is.  When  we 


40  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

are  unable  to  discover  how  far  the  activity  in  a  given 
phase  of  life  is  human,  how  far  divine,  there  is  a  highly 
instructive  reason;  neither  factor  can  be  described  or 
formulated  by  itself.  In  our  inability  to  characterise 
the  Spirit  as  we  would  there  is  implied  a  profound 
knowledge  of  the  relationship  of  God  and  man.  It  is 
the  province  of  a  philosophy  of  Spirit  to  render  this 
knowledge  explicit. 

By  declaring  that  God  is  Spirit  one  means,  then,  more 
than  when  he  says  God  is  love  or  God  is  wisdom. 
Spirit  is  the  divine  essence  which  we  denominate  now 
will  or  love,  now  reason  or  wisdom;  in  Spirit  the  divine 
love  and  wisdom  are  inseparable.1  The  Spirit  in  us  is 
the  love  or  wisdom  which  makes  possible  yet  surpasses 
our  own,  environs  our  hearts  and  minds.  It  is  the 
power  that  underlies  all  finite  power  and  renders  our 
individual  activities  possible.  It  is  the  progressively 
manifested  principle  in  which  "we  live  and  move  and 
have  our  being."  It  is  the  creative  or  productively 
refashioning,  brooding,  up-building,  sustaining  life  of 
the  natural  universe  and  of  the  human  world.  It  gives 
life  and  power  to  form,  yet  is  itself  more  than  the  mani- 
festing forms  which  it  imbues.  Hence  Spirit  must  bear 
witness  to  Spirit,  for  its  ineffable  essence  cannot  be 
comprehended  in  terms  of  form  alone.  Thus  the  hu- 
man meanings  of  the  word  refer  to  the  divine  conception 
as  that  which  gives  them  significance.  God  is  Spirit, 
and  they  who  worship  in  deepest  truth  not  only  under- 
stand that  the  universe  is  a  revelation  of  God,  hence 
spiritual,  but  also  adore  in  heart,  in  response  of  soul 
to  soul,  of  soul  to  God.  All  forms  and  definitions  are 
inadequate,  yet  it  is  possible  to  make  appreciative 
allowance  for  that  which  we  cannot  wholly  describe. 

>  Swedenborg,  The  Divine  Love  and  Wisdom. 


The  Definition  of  the  Spirit  41 

If  the  Spirit  appear  to  be  essentially  impersonal,  it 
is  nevertheless  through  the  Spirit  that  God  becomes 
personal  to  and  for  the  individual  soul. 

It  might  appear  that  the  term  "spirit"  is  after  all 
a  mere  expression  of  worth  or  value,  without  ulterior 
reference.  No  doubt  some  will  still  prefer  so  to  regard 
it,  or  will  permit  the  ambiguities  to  remain.  Others 
may  deem  the  term  purely  eulogistic  or  gratuitous. 
To  a  materialist  the  term  doubtless  seems  entirely  super- 
fluous. But  for  those  who  take  it  seriously  it  is  plain 
that  the  idea  of  God  as  Spirit  is  a  very  workable  concep- 
tion. That  is,  Spirit  is  known  through  what  it  accom- 
plishes, by  what  it  is  now  doing,  together  with  the 
responses  aroused  within  the  human  heart.  Spirit  is  God 
made  concrete.  Thus  conceived,  Spirit  may  be  said  to 
possess  both  cosmological  and  human  significance.  Re- 
garded as  a  cosmological  power,  Spirit  is  the  creative 
life  which  proceeds  from  the  Godhead  as  the  orderly, 
continuously  active,  centralising  life  of  the  natural 
universe.  Spirit  is  the  essence,  the  uniting  ground  of 
all  physical  forces,  all  modes  of  physical  life,  the  ulti- 
mately efficient  energy  of  all  natural  evolution.  That 
is,  Spirit  is  the  universal  power,  while  natural  energy 
in  its  various  forms  is  the  cosmological  phase  which 
Spirit  assumes.  Spirit  is  not  the  mere  sum  of  all  nat- 
ural energy,  and  should  not  be  identified  with  the  total- 
ity of  physical  modes  of  motion.  For  Spirit  has  other 
modes  of  manifesting  itself.  Spirit  is  also  the  central 
principle  in  mental  life,  in  moral  and  religious  experi- 
ence. Spirit  is  in  an  intimate  way  not  only  the  essence 
but  the  uniting  principle  in  all  human  experience,  both 
natural  and  social,  both  in  the  world  of  conscience  and 
in  the  domain  of  ordinary  thought.  It  is  the  moving 
or  quickening  power  which  will  not  permit  us  to  rest, 


42  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

but  ever  sends  us  forward  in  pursuit  of  the  perfect. 
Hence  the  life  of  .the  Spirit  is  inwrought  with  all  human 
suffering  and  achievement.  As  expressive  of  the  di- 
vine love  and  the  divine  wisdom,  its  guidance  may  be 
characterised  as  perfect  in  wisdom  and  complete  in  love. 
Thus  regarded  it  is  the  ultimate  life  at  work  in  human 
society,  in  the  eternal  quest  for  the  beautiful,  the  true, 
and  the  good.  Regarded  as  the  divine  essence,  the 
Spirit  is  expressive  of  God's  nature  at  the  beginning  of 
all  productive  activity.  Regarded  as  the  uniting  power 
the  Spirit  is  the  life  that  achieves,  arrives.  In  any 
event  the  Spirit  is  rather  the  hidden  agency  than  the 
external  forms  which  every  one  may  gaze  upon.  Thus 
one  must  understand  the  sense  in  which  the  term  is 
employed. 

The  term  is  essentially  dynamic  in  character.  To 
say  that  the  universe  is  a  manifestation  of  Spirit  is 
therefore  to  speak  of  the  divine  nature  from  the  point 
of  view  of  its  activity.  Whatever  the  nature  or  being 
of  God,  regarded  in  the  most  transcendent  sense,  as 
infinite,  eternal,  or  immutable,  God  is  best  known  by  us 
through  His  creative  expression  in  and  through  the 
universe.  If  this  sel "-expression  be  the  activity  of  the 
divine  will,  the  embodiment  of  the  divine  love,  we  may 
well  speak  of  the  Spirit  as  will  or  love,  while  we  regard 
the  divine  reason  or  intelligence  as  the  stable  ground 
of  this  eternal  forthgoing.  However  we  express  it, 
the  result  is  the  same.  We  know  the  divine  reason 
through  the  divine  love,  and  the  divine  love  through 
the  divine  reason.  The  Spirit  is  the  life  and  love,  the 
heart  and  mind  of  God,  and  this  great  universe  of  ours 
is  the  perpetual  revelation  of  the  divine  mind  and 
heart. 

In  setting  aside  the  question  of  the  transcendent  side 


The  Definition  of  the  Spirit  43 

of  the  divine  nature  in  favour  of  the  concrete  concep- 
tion of  God  as  Spirit,  one  does  not  mean  that  an  idea 
of  God  regarded  as  absolute  is  impossible,  but  simply 
that  by  applying  negative  terms,  such  as  "inscrutable," 
men  have  speculatively  put  God  afar.  By  emphasising 
the  practical  aspect  of  the  life  of  the  Spirit  with  us,  one 
means  to  point  the  way  to  better  understanding  of  the 
divine  transcendency.  Before  we  can  give  to  the  con- 
ception of  the  Absolute  its  positive  content,  a  new 
attitude  is  called  for  both  as  regards  the  surpassing  per- 
fection of  the  divine  love  and  wisdom  and  with  respect 
to  the  factors  of  human  life  which  have  been  supposed 
to  involve  such  limitations  that  we  could  scarcely  know 
God.  We  have  assumed  too  much,  both  with  regard 
to  God  and  with  respect  to  man.  The  changed  atti- 
tude calls  for  recognition  of  the  Spirit  as  revealed  within 
us  in  ways  which  surpass  the  critical  philosophy  of 
human  relativity.  When  we  begin  to  acknowledge 
that  we  do  not  know  human  nature  so  well  as  we 
thought,  we  shall  be  ready  to  readjust  our  life  for  the 
coming  of  the  Spirit.  Experience  shall  reveal  that 
which  in  the  fmitude  of  our  reason  we  deemed  impos- 
sible. The  transcendency  of  God  is  precisely  this 
surpassing  love  and  wisdom  of  the  Spirit  which 
untrammelled  human  experience  reveals.  It  is  ex- 
perience which  prepares  the  way  for  thought. 

Hence  one  points  out  that,  having  so  emphasised  the 
finite  factors  that  we  have  become  impotent,  the  lesson 
of  the  hour  is  obedience,  and  withal  self-abandonment. 
We  have  so  dwelt  upon  the  facts  of  self-consciousness 
that  we  are  like  those  who  are  unable  to  see  the  wood 
because  of  the  trees.  The  great  need  is  to  withdraw 
the  self  from  all  interference  that  we  may  let  the  Spirit 
be  made  manifest  through  us.  As  difficult  as  it  may 


44  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

be  to  do  this,  after  we  have  so  long  dwelt  upon  our  lim- 
itations, we  advance  a  step  when  we  realise  that  we 
must  make  allowances  in  our  thinking  for  the  God-ward 
point  of  view,  for  the  coming  of  the  Spirit  through 
channels  of  its  own  seeking.  Only  through  this  hu- 
mility can  we  expect  to  solve  a  problem  which  eludes 
our  acutest  analysis  while  we  claim  to  know  so  much 
about  God.  For  we  have  been  blinding  our  eyes  to  the 
glory  of  the  Spirit  revealed  all  about  us.  The  Spirit 
has  been  achieving  its  ends  while  we  saw  only  the  frag- 
mentary means.  The  evidence  which  we  have  steadily 
rejected  is  now  to  be  the  source  of  our  illumination. 
The  real  situation  has  been  the  same  all  along.  The 
illusion  lay  in  the  interference  of  our  own  thought. 

If  it  be  asked,  What  right  have  you  thus  to  speak 
of  Spirit?  Where  is  this  Spirit  which  you  say  imbues 
and  renews  all  things?  the  reply  is  that  we  take  the 
clue  from  human  experience,  then  interpret  the  uni- 
verse in  terms  of  this  clue.  But  is  not  this  an  instance 
of  "the  pathetic  fallacy,"  namely,  the  projection  of 
human  sentiment  into  nature?  It  may  indeed  seem 
so  to  those  who  do  not  take  their  starting-point  from 
the  witness  of  the  Spirit.  We  have  already  admitted 
that  for  some  the  idea  is  perfectly  gratuitous.  But 
for  others  a  certain  inner  experience  is  said  to  afford  a 
direct  clue  to  the  ultimate  reality  of  life.  Hence  we 
begin  by  appealing  first  to  experience.  The  pragmatic 
value  of  the  doctrine  is  found  in  the  fact  that  it  is  more 
workable  as  a  conception  of  experience  than  one  in 
which  the  idea  of  Spirit  is  omitted.  Say,  if  you  will, 
that  man  in  his  spiritual  zeal  reads  his  own  experience 
into  the  world  and  sees  what  is  not  there.  One  points 
out  that  it  is  primarily  a  question  of  adequacy  of  ex- 
planation. If  you  can  account  for  experience  by  ref- 


The  Definition  of  the  Spirit  45 

erence  to  your  own  sentiments,  well  and  good;  do  not 
attribute  these  sentiments  to  the  universe.  But  if  it 
be  a  fact  of  experience  that  a  certain  type  of  conscious- 
ness stands  out  above  others  and  brings  belief  in  a 
renewing  presence,  be  loyal  to  that  presence  and  to  the 
thoughts  which  belief  in  it  inspires.  Were  it  not  for 
the  experience  the  philosophy  would  surely  never  arise. 

There  are  people  who  profess  no  interest  in  anything 
that  is  not  mundane.  For  them  a  philosophy  of  Spirit 
has  no  meaning.  But  there  are  those  who  insist  that 
for  them  this  world  of  things  is  unintelligible  unless  it 
be  regarded  as  a  manifestation  of  Spirit.  The  evidences 
they  give  are  no  doubt  in  the  first  instance  personal 
and  subjective.  That  is,  they  relate  how  they  have 
been  guided  by  "  the  inner  light,"  how  faith  has  sprung 
up  within  them,  how  tenderly  the  Father  has  cared  for 
them  in  His  all-seeing  wisdom  and  His  perfect  love. 
Ask  them  to  prove  that  God  was  really  present  and  they 
have  little  to  say.  But  approach  them  sympathetically 
and  they  will  reveal  an  impressive  conviction  that  the 
Father  guides  and  sustains  them.  The  question,  then, 
is,  What  type  of  life  shall  be  deemed  conclusive?  Shall 
those  who  have  discerned  a  spiritual  element  in  their 
experience  estimate  all  life  by  the  gifts  of  the  physical 
senses,  or  shall  they  take  their  clue  from  the  presence 
of  this  spiritual  element?  Shall  you  and  I  interpret 
what  we  take  to  be  spiritual  experience  by  the  fact  that 
such  experience  is  given  us  in  the  flesh,  or  shall  we  in- 
terpret the  life  of  the  flesh  by  the  light  which  shines 
from  within  ? 

In  the  present  discussion  the  die  is  cast  in  favour  of 
the  acceptance  of  spiritual  experience  as  central  in  au- 
thority, central  as  a  clue,  conclusive  in  the  face  of  all 
doubts.  And  the  practical  approach  to  the  conclusion 


46  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

is  here  chosen  because  it  is  in  workaday  experience 
that  the  conviction  is  realised.  Merely  from  the  point 
of  view  of  such  experience,  life  is  more  satisfactory, 
more  genuinely  successful,  if  we  act  on  the  belief  that 
the  Spirit  is  really  present  with  us,  actually  achieving 
purposes  through  us.  If  we  believe  in  God  in  practice 
even  when  we  are  intellectually  distressed  by  doubts, 
let  us  take  our  practical  life  more  in  earnest  and  de- 
velop its  implications.  If  the  witness  of  the  Spirit  is 
more  real  for  us  in  the  last  analysis  than  aught  else, 
let  us  take  our  clue  from  this  most  significant  fact. 
Evidently  we  have  lived  better  than  we  know.  Let 
us  now  know  what  we  live  by. 

We  submit  that  one  of  the  most  remarkable  facts 
in  human  life  is  the  triumph  within  it  of  a  renewing 
Spirit.  Nothing  is  more  common  than  complaints 
about  life.  We  hear  that  it  is  a  burden,  a  "grind." 
We  find  people  immersed  in  its  prosaic  details,  ready  to 
give  up  hope,  almost  completely  discouraged.  Yet 
everywhere  we  find  them  starting  forward  with  the 
most  remarkable  new  impetus.  Life  is  far  more  than 
our  prosaic  accounts  of  it  ever  express.  When  we 
seem  to  be  weakest  we  presently  become  strongest  as  if 
by  miracle.  Even  as  the  darkness  becomes  intolerable 
the  light  appears.  It  is  a  universal  confession  that  in 
moments  of  supreme  distress,  fear,  doubt,  or  weakness, 
the  presence  and  love  of  God  became  most  near.  When 
we  were  enveloped  by  fear,  when  we  doubted  and 
seemed  utterly  weak,  we  were  somehow  only  partly 
ourselves.  The  conviction  is  strong  that  in  the  renew- 
ing presence  of  the  Father's  love  an  element  is  added 
which  affects  all  the  rest.  It  is  this  wholeness,  this 
totality,  which  gives  the  clue.  Doubt  as  we  may,  we 
conclude  that  the  fault  lay  in  our  fragmentary  view. 


The  Definition  of  the  Spirit  47 

Finite  existence  seems  to  be  essentially  a  life  of  frag- 
ments. The  Spirit  gives  wholes,  inspires  confidence, 
brings  peace.  It  upsets  all  calculations  and  achieves 
the  impossible  through  us.  We  believe  because 
we  must. 

It  is  well,  therefore,  to  give  place  to  our  objections, 
to  accord  them  a  full  hearing  from  the  start.  For  it 
is  by  dialectic  analysis  of  precisely  such  objections  that 
one  discovers  the  deeper  truths  of  the  Spirit.  It  is  par- 
ticularly important  to  distinguish  between  subjective 
factors  which  we  may  have  attributed  to  nature,  and 
nature  as  revealed  in  the  glory  of  objective  existence 
in  space  and  time.  No  doubt  the  idea  of  the  Spirit  is 
profoundly  subjective  and  human  in  origin.  Without 
a  certain  experience  which  man  takes  to  be  funda- 
mental, he  would  not  think  of  conceiving  of  the  world 
as  a  manifestation  of  Spirit.  But  when  once  the  con- 
ception has  been  applied  to  the  universe  it  should  be 
defended  in  objective  terms,  and  freed  from  all  pa- 
thetic fallacies. 

To  say  that  the  universe  is  a  manifestation  of  Spirit 
does  not,  as  the  conception  is  here  employed,  signify 
that  the  universe  is  in  any  sense  a  shadow,  a  series  of 
filmy  pictures  or  visions,  portrayed  on  a  background  of 
the  imagination.  The  universe  here  in  question  is  no 
dream,  no  illusion  springing  from  our  ignorance,  not 
an  unsubstantial  pageant  which  clearer  light  may 
dispel.  By  the  term  "universe"  employed  in  its 
largest  sense  is  here  meant  the  total  eternal  universe, 
the  divine  order.  That  order  includes  the  heavens 
and  the  earth,  and  the  possible  future  abodes  of  the 
soul,  as  well  as  the  present  world.  This  fair  world 
of  ours  might  disappear  and  yet  the  divine  order  would 
conceivably  remain.  Worlds  may  come  and  go,  but 


48  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

the  universe  is  ever  here.  In  this  total  or  eternal 
sense,  the  universe  exists  in  order  and  degree,  from 
the  most  objective,  least  important,  or  most  epheme- 
ral manifestation  of  Spirit  to  the  most  significant  or 
permanent.  Everything  that  exists  reveals  the  Spirit. 
Everything  has  its  place,  its  meaning,  its  life.  But 
there  may  be  vast  differences  in  the  worths  or  values 
of  the  various  orders  and  degrees,  according  to  the 
level  of  manifestation,  the  degree  of  reality  and  life. 
In  part,  the  world  of  the  Spirit  is  just  this  solidly  sub- 
stantial world  of  ours,  with  its  vast  mountain  ranges, 
its  huge  seas,  and  its  cataclysmic  activities.  These 
are  very  real  and  nothing  should  be  said  in  disparage- 
ment of  their  reality,  as  perceived  or  experienced  from 
the  level  of  our  physical  life.  But  there  are  higher, 
more  significant  manifestations  of  Spirit.  From  the 
level  of  some  future  form  of  experience  this  solid 
world  of  ours  may  look  unsubstantial  in  the  extreme. 
But  let  us  frankly  recognise  its  present  reality. 

While,  then,  the  present  philosophy  of  Spirit  is 
idealistic,  it  is  not  idealistic  in  the  sense  in  which  the 
term  is  popularly  misunderstood.  The  world  of  the 
Spirit's  manifestation  is  not  "in"  the  mind  of  man, 
is  not  a  mere  representation  of  finite  consciousness, 
but  a  real  cosmos  of  beings  and  things.  Not,  then, 
by  some  mystic  self-absorption  into  superconsciousness 
are  we  to  discover  the  world  of  Spirit,  but  by  opening 
our  eyes,  looking  abroad  over  the  fields,  meeting  the 
stern  realities  of  our  physical  existence.  Visions  await 
us,  too,  and  there  is  reality  in  the  mystic's  insight. 
But  unless  we  begin  by  acknowledging  the  realities 
of  this  natural  world  and  adjusting  ourselves  to  them, 
we  are  not  likely  to  proceed  far  into  the  land  of  in- 
telligible visions.  It  is  modern  science  which  tells  us 


The  Definition  of  the  Spirit  49 

what  nature  is,  not  the  vision  of  the  seer  who  beholds 
it  as  a  subjective  panorama  passing  before  him.  The 
seer  is  perhaps  an  authority  in  his  own  domain,  but 
his  domain  is  not  nature. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  may  well  be  that  an  illumina- 
tion in  the  world  of  "cosmic  consciousness"  gives  us 
the  clue  to  the  ultimate  interpretation  of  nature.  It 
is  probable  that  many  of  us  are  idealists  because  of 
some  experience  of  a  spiritual  type,  not  merely  because 
we  have  reasoned  ourselves  into  idealism  by  an  analysis 
of  consciousness  or  through  the  refutation  of  ma- 
terialism. Having  found  the  spiritual  clue  we  may 
begin  at  the  beginning  and  study  nature,  develop  a 
system  of  idealism.  The  essential  is  to  possess  the 
central  clue. 

By  the  Spirit  we  mean  an  unqualifiedly  universal 
presence,  a  wisdom  that  is  for  all.  Spirit  is  neither 
a  vague,  formless  somewhat,  nor  an  agent  of  special 
favours.  If  the  Spirit  be  seemingly  partial,  it  is  merely 
that  it  may  presently  be  revealed  in  the  universal 
fulness  of  its  glory.  If  it  apparently  transcend  all 
forms,  so  that  no  particular  form  may  be  ascribed  to 
it,  nevertheless  it  is  the  form-giving  power  whereby  all 
beings  and  things  subsist  in  one  system.  It  is  not  a 
power  sent  forth  at  random,  not  a  capricious  will,  but 
the  mind  and  life  of  God  in  purposive  action.  If  it 
creates  anew,  there  is  nevertheless  a  central  ideal  in 
these  its  renewing  activities.  For  the  nature  of  God, 
whence  the  Spirit  springs,  is  orderly,  definite,  the 
height  of  all  organisation  and  unity. 

If,  then,  we  would  understand  any  aspect  of  the 
great  universe  of  manifestation,  we  should  start  aright 
by  recognising  that  the  divine  order,  the  eternal  cosmos 
of  which,  nature  is  merely  a  part,  is  founded  upon  the 


50  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

order  and  beauty,  the  love  and  wisdom  of  God.  Could 
we  see  the  whole  universe  at  once,  we  should  behold  its 
eternal  order  and  beauty.  We  experience  or  behold 
fragments  of  that  great  whole.  Absorbed  in  our 
thought  of  the  fragments,  we  are  oblivious  of  the  whole. 
It  seems  impossible  to  rise  to  the  point  of  view  of  the 
great  totality.  But  the  conception  of  Spirit  enables 
the  mind  to  grasp  as  a  process  what  it  cannot  compre- 
hend either  as  a  creative  plan  or  as  an  achieved  result. 
In  deepest  truth,  the  perfect  whole  is  just  this  tem- 
porally wrought  revelation  of  the  divine  love  and 
wisdom  extended  through  the  vast  aeons  of  eternity. 
At  any  given  moment,  the  Spirit's  achievements  are, 
if  you  please,  perfect;  for  the  given  moment  is  a  fresh 
revelation,  a  new  achievement,  exemplifying  an  aspect 
of  the  everlasting  reality  of  which  it  is  the  life,  the 
creative  efficiency.  If  we  could  enter  fully  enough 
into  the  revelation  of  the  moment,  we  should  undoubt- 
edly find  illimitable  perfection  there.  At  any  rate, 
we  need  not  search  anywhere  else  than  in  the  living 
moment  for  the  wisdom  and  perfection  of  God. 

Carrying  as  we  do  the  life  of  the  Spirit  with  us,  we 
may  cherish  in  memory  the  Spirit's  past  achievements 
and  gradually  build  in  thought  a  philosophic  structure 
more  worthy  of  this  perpetual  beauty.  We  may  thus 
make  our  conception  more  precise.  For  note  that  we 
have  two  clues.  First,  there  is  the  idea  of  the  achiev- 
ing Spirit.  Second,  there  is  the  world,  ever  wrought 
upon  anew,  with  fresh  human  accomplishments.  The 
laws  of  nature  are  also  laws  of  Spirit.  The  Spirit 
works  through  us  no  less  precisely.  If  men  of  science 
have  discovered  nature's  laws  by  careful  analysis  of 
nature's  ways,  the  hidden  laws  of  the  inner  life  can  no 
doubt  be  apprehended  by  equally  careful  analysis. 


The  Definition  of  the  Spirit  51 

We  insist  that  Spirit  is  not  a  life  or  power  by  itself, 
as  if  it  acted  outside  of  nature's  forces.  It  is  not 
describable  as  identical  with  the  inner  life  of  man. 
It  is  rather  the  underlying,  centralising  activity  within 
all  powers.  In  nature  we  behold  the  visible  results 
of  the  Spirit's  activity.  In  the  inner  world  we  appre- 
hend its  presence  more  directly.  Hence  the  more 
closely  we  enter  the  realities  of  the  inner  life  the  more 
intimately  may  we  know  the  life  of  the  Spirit.  Not 
that  Spirit  is  the  cause  and  human  life  the  effect,  but 
that  Spirit  is  the  guiding  principle. 

The  spiritual  life  of  man  is  the  accompaniment  of 
that  guiding  life.  We  are  apt  to  regard  the  human 
phase  of  life  by  itself,  hence  we  theoretically  put  the 
Spirit  far  from  us.  But  when  we  once  clearly  see  that 
the  way  to  understand  our  life  is  to  view  it  as  grounded 
in  Spirit,  we  also  find  ourselves  in  possession  of  the 
most  definite  sort  of  clue  for  the  interpretation  of  the 
relationship  of  Spirit  to  our  world.  To  become  aware 
of  the  point  where  we  stand,  to  know  our  position  in 
the  world  of  reality,  is  not  merely  to  attain  self- 
consciousness  but  to  view  life  in  the  light  of  that  which 
makes  its  existence  possible.  Every  moment  of 
feeling,  volition,  or  thought  is  a  clue  to  the  presence 
of  the  Spirit,  if  we  regard  that  moment  in  its  truth. 
If  no  moment  be  cut  off  from  the  Spirit,  the  under- 
standing of  all  moments  gives  us  an  orderly  clue  to 
the  total  life  of  the  Spirit  with  us.  Plainly  some  mo- 
ments are  more  authoritative  than  others.  The  laws 
of  some  of  our  experiences  we  understand  far  better 
than  the  laws  of  others.  In  part  our  life  is  enveloped 
in  mystery  where  no  laws  are  yet  seen.  But  the  known 
is  still  the  clue  to  the  unknown.  If  we  live  in  part 
by  clear  understanding  and  in  part  by  faith,  at  any 


52  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

rate  our  total  life  is  carried  forward  by  one  ascending 
reality  whose  meaning  with  us  we  are  ever  grasping 
more  and  more  clearly. 

It  hardly  seems  profitable  to  attempt  to  assign  a 
motive  for  the  manifestation  of  the  Spirit  in  the  world. 
There  may  never  have  been  a  beginning  of  such  mani- 
festation. The  universe  may  well  be  the  eternal 
expression,  outpouring,  externalisation  of  the  Spirit. 
At  any  rate  it  is  not  conceivable  apart  from  the  divine 
consciousness.  Not,  I  insist,  that  it  is  "  in  "that 
consciousness,  not  that  it  is  like  a  dream  or  vision,  but 
that  it  exists  for,  is  present  to,  manifests  the  mind  of 
God.  That  mind  may  be  in  a  measure  unlike  our 
own,  hence  its  objects  may  not  be  in  any  sense  remote 
but  possessed  as  one  whole.  But  the  conception  of 
an  all-inclusive  consciousness  at  least  suggests  the 
intimacy  of  relationship  between  God  and  His  universe. 
Since  the  universe  exists,  we  may  safely  assume  that  it 
fulfils  the  divine  nature.  Since  you  and  I  exist  as 
dwellers  in  this  divine  universe,  we  may  with  equal 
assurance  assume  that  we  meet  some  need  in  the  life 
of  God.  Whether  or  not  we  or  any  other  beings  save 
God  have  had  a  life  without  beginning  in  the  past,  here 
we  are,  members  one  of  another  in  the  great  universe 
which  reveals  the  majesty  and  wisdom,  the  beauty  and 
love  of  God. 

If  God  sends  His  life  forth  in  manifestation,  so  that 
the  universe  is  an  expression  of  His  mind  and  heart, 
so  do  we  in  a  measure  manifest  our  minds  in  a  world 
of  thought  and  conduct.  We  may  say  with  T.  H. 
Green  that  the  Spirit  "  reproduces  itself "  in  us.  Before 
the  mind  or  thought  of  God  the  entire  cosmos  is 
represented.  So  much  of  the  great  universe  as  my 
life  has  compassed  exists  for  me  as  my  reproduction, 


The  Definition  of  the  Spirit  53 

my  living  object  of  thought.  Before  me,  as  I  con- 
template, there  passes  as  in  a  panorama  the  daily 
round  of  nature,  the  successive  mutations  of  the  week, 
the  seasons,  and  the  years.  More  within  than  before 
the  mind  there  also  passes  the  panorama  of  thought  and 
will  which  is  contributed  to  by  the  conduct  of  my 
fellows,  and  expresses  my  own  interior  life.  To  this 
extent  all  finite  minds  may  be  said  to  be  alike.  But 
if  the  Spirit's  self-reproduction  within  and  before  us 
is  also  purposive,  so  that  each  occupies  a  relatively 
distinct  place  in  the  total  spiritual  cosmos,  it  may  be 
said  that  in  each  the  universe  is  not  only  beheld  from 
an  individual  point  of  view  but  that  through  this  ex- 
perience somewhat  is  added  to  the  divine  life.  This 
being  so,  the  highest  function  of  the  finite  self  may  be 
this  individual  participation  in  the  drama  of  the  Spirit, 
this  eternal  outpouring  of  the  love  and  wisdom  of  God. 
Yet  we  must  not  symbolise  the  universe  of  divine 
self-revelation  in  a  purely  passive  way,  as  if  God  were 
a  mere  observer  of  a  play.  The  very  life  of  the  drama, 
the  life  of  nature  in  all  the  fury  of  the  storm  as  well  as 
in  the  gradual  changes  of  organic  evolution,  is  also  a 
part  of  the  life  of  God.  Our  conception  of  the  universe 
as  the  manifestation  of  Spirit  will  be  incomplete  unless 
we  regard  the  Spirit  as  each  moment  proceeding  forth 
afresh.  The  creative  life  of  the  Spirit  is  the  involution 
which  precedes  all  evolution.  The  Spirit  not  only 
creates — that  is,  directs  and  completes,  through  all  the 
gradations  of  form,  but  also  sustains,  vivifies,  renews. 
One  moment  is  thus  as  vitally  significant  as  another. 
In  the  seeming  passivity  of  the  rock  and  the  massive 
constancy  of  the  mountains,  the  sustaining  life  is  as 
truly  present.  The  Spirit  is  above  all  active,  a  life, 
a  moving  principle. 


54  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

So  in  man's  case  it  is  the  thought  of  life,  life,  that 
makes  the  conception  complete.  If  on  the  universal 
side  man  is  a  participant  in  the  self -manifest  at  ion  of 
God,  on  the  individual  side  he  passes  through  a  con- 
crete experience  which  is  essentially  an  affair  of  con- 
duct. Otherwise  the  divine  purpose  could  not  be 
fulfilled  within  him.  Man  is  related  both  to  the  Spirit 
and  to  the  Spirit's  universe  at  large,  and  to  the  cosmos 
of  human  life  in  particular.  It  is  not  enough  merely 
to  reproduce  or  represent  the  universe  "  for  the  glory 
of  God."  It  does  not  suffice  merely  to  realise  the 
presence  of  God  in  a  contemplative  sense.  Unless  we 
carry  that  presence  in  our  hearts  and  make  it  known 
to  our  fellowmen  it  is  not  yet  thoroughly  real.  The 
proof  of  its  reality  is  found  not  merely  in  our  daily 
thoughts  but  most  of  all  in  the  deeds  we  do.  The 
Spirit  is  given  us  to  manifest.  For  that  is  its  essence, 
it  manifests,  accomplishes,  lives. 

The  idea  that  the  universe  is  a  manifestation  of 
Spirit  is  accordingly  one  which  the  mind  can  grasp 
only  through  gradual  realisation.  Those  who  are 
familiar  with  idealistic  arguments  will  find  it  easier  to 
begin  this  realisation  in  earnest,  for  they  will  already 
possess  what  may  be  called  the  mental  data — that  is, 
the  considerations  which  show  why  and  how  we  live 
a  mental  life,  and  apprehend  the  world  through  con- 
sciousness. The  spiritual  element  is  added  when  we 
realise  in  earnest  that  the  reproduction  of  the  universe 
within  us  is  not  merely  the  representation  of  the  world 
of  nature  but  literally  the  manifestation,  the  living 
presence  of  God  in  all  His  love  and  majesty.  The 
great  thought  must  be  regarded  in  a  multiplicity  of 
ways  before  we  really  begin  to  comprehend  it.  For 
there  is  the  universal  manifestation  and  the  individual, 


The  Definition  of  the  Spirit  55 

both  the  eternal  divine  ground  of  the  total  cosmos 
beyond  power  of  comprehension  in  its  fulness,  and 
God  the  Father.  The  one  conception  is  more  philo- 
sophical— that  is,  it  is  the  fruition  of  a  long  attempt 
to  think  the  universe  as  the  objectification  of  its  eternal 
Ground,  while  the  other  is  more  religious,  is  more  the 
outgrowth  of  sentiment  or  worship,  the  uplift  of  the 
heart  in  prayer  and  praise.  Fortunate  are  we  if  we 
detect  the  underlying  unity  between  serving  God  with 
the  heart  while  we  worship  and  while  we  serve,  and 
thinking  about  God  as  the  basic  reality  of  all  this 
wondrous  cosmos  spread  around.  If  we  have  made  any 
speculative  or  other  separation  between  these  two  ways 
of  serving  and  studying,  our  thought  will  be  marred 
through  and  through.  The  Spirit  is  a  whole,  a  unity, 
and  will  not  be  divided.  It  is  indeed  a  unity  amidst 
variety  and  the  source  of  all  variety,  indeed  of  varieties 
and  contrasts  so  great  that  it  taxes  our  faith  to  the 
utmost  to  reconcile  them.  But  the  Spirit  is  essentially 
one.  Essentially  one  must  our  life  be  if  we  would 
in  large  measure  realise  the  true  reality  of  the 
Spirit. 

I  say  "realise"  the  presence  of  the  Spirit,  because  I 
am  unable  to  sunder  the  experience  from  the  thought, 
the  life  from  the  reason.  The  world  is  a  manifestation 
of  Spirit  for  you  and  for  me.  When  you  have  let  this 
great  idea  so  take  hold  of  your  thought  that  you  are 
able  to  relate  every  moment  of  your  existence  to  the 
Spirit,  and  make  no  exception,  not  even  in  the  case 
of  passion,  then  indeed  you  are  ready  to  turn  to%the 
universe  of  your  fellows  and  the  world  of  nature, 
"red  in  tooth  and  claw, "  and  see  the  love  of  God 
therein.  And  finally  there  is  the  yet  greater  thought 
that,  call  it  what  we  may,  attribute  life  to  whatever 


56  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

source  we  may,  relatively  speaking,  it  is  the  Spirit 
that  lives  in  all,  does  the  work,  achieves  the  supreme 
purpose. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  STARTING-POINT 

A  COMPLETE  philosophy  of  Spirit  would,  we  have 
seen,  include  an  interpretation  of  all  natural  evolution 
from  the  point  of  view  of  its  ultimate  sources  and  ends, 
a  philosophy  of  history,  moral  life,  and  religion,  as 
well  as  a  systematically  reasoned  idealism.  But  at 
present  we  are  concerned  with  a  less  comprehensive 
inquiry.  That  is,  since  there  is  a  primary  witness  of 
the  Spirit  in  the  human  soul,  we  turn  first  to  that  and 
seek  its  reality  and  meaning.  Conceived  as  the  guiding 
principle  in  the  inner  life  of  man,  the  Spirit  may  be 
regarded  as  even  now  achieving  an  end,  as  an  activity 
accomplishing  a  purpose.  The  first  question  therefore 
is,  What  is  the  Spirit  accomplishing  through  us? 
How  is  its  activity  related  to  our  activity?  How  are 
its  ends  related  to  our  purposes? 

To  begin  the  inquiry  at  this  point  is  in  a  sense  to 
start  at  the  highest  level,  where  it  is  in  large  part  a 
question  of  the  Spirit  which  "  blow*eth  where  it  listeth," 
and  in  this  the  highest  province  of  our  life  "it  doth 
not  yet  appear  what  we  shall  be. "  Yet  by  proposing 
to  approach  the  Spirit  through  consideration  of  the 
spiritual  life  of  man,  we  are  taking  the  direct  pathway 
to  its  reality.  For,  in  the  last  analysis,  we  evaluate 
external  reality,  we  appreciate  the  beauty  and  goodness 
of  things  in  terms  of  inner  experience.  If  the  Spirit 
possesses  us  in  the  inner  world  in  such  wise  that  we 
speak  and  act  better  than  we  know,  we  shall  in  due 

57 


58  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

time  discern  the  universal  clue  by  pursuing  the  mean- 
ings of  this  interior  revelation.  The  truth  that  the 
world  is  a  manifestation  of  Spirit  has  special  signifi- 
cance in  reference  to  the  world  of  our  inner  life.  There, 
in  miniature,  the  great  Spirit  is  present.  He  who 
truly  apprehends  that  presence  may  indeed  find  God 
in  the  universe  at  large. 

Before  we  develop  this  principle  it  is  well,  however, 
to  note  that  there  are  at  least  three  points  of  view 
which  have  been  maintained  with  respect  to  the  re- 
lationship of  God  and  man.  There  is,  (i)  the  au- 
thoritative biblical  point  of  view,  the  theory  that  God 
is  directly  known  only  through  the  complete  and  final 
revelation  of  Himself  in  the  Hebrew  and  Greek  Testa- 
ments. In  behalf  of  this  position  it  is  maintained  that 
the  human  intellect  is  incapable  of  apprehending  God 
directly,  or  of  attaining  to  the  level  of  divine  thought 
through  the  use  of  reason.  Hence  it  was  necessary  that 
a  verbal  revelation  should  be  made,  and  that  God 
should  be  incarnated  in  the  flesh  in  the  unique  person 
of  Jesus  Christ.  In  pursuance  of  this  point  of  view 
it  is  further  contended  that  man  of  himself  can  do 
nothing,  but  that  salvation  is  by  divine  grace.  Hence 
it  would  be  futile  to  undertake  a  study  of  the  higher 
nature  of  man  with  the  hope  of  finding  out  things 
divine.  The  only  standard  of  appeal  is  to  the  revealed 
word.  (2)  From  a  sharply  opposed  point  of  view  it  is 
maintained  that  man  is  the  efficient  agent,  that  God 
is  essentially  each  man's  idea  of  Him,  and  that  so-called 
revelation  is  a  record  of  human  thoughts.  In  the  light 
of  this  self-laudatory  humanistic  point  of  view  so 
much  emphasis  is  placed  upon  the  relativity  of  human 
knowledge  that  it  becomes  practically  impossible  to 
believe  in  the  direct  agency  of  God.  But  (3)  there  is 


The  Starting-Point  59 

a  third  point  of  view  which  in  a  measure  includes  both 
of  these  positions.  From  this  point  of  view  God  is 
primary  and  supreme,  the  absolute  Being  without 
whom  none  of  us  would  exist,  yet  man  is  an  agent  of 
divine  power  and  life.  God  is  regarded  as  really 
present  to  all  men,  and  active  in  all,  hence  as  revealing 
Himself  universally,  yet  account  must  ever  be  taken  of 
the  instrumentalities  through  which  the  Spirit  is  made 
known.  From  this  point  of  view  no  exclusive  propo- 
sitions are  insisted  upon.  The  truths  of  human  reason 
are  the  same  as  those  of  divine  revelation.  Both 
through  the  scriptures  and  through  a  study  of  human 
nature  God  may  be  found.  Mere  human  reason  would 
be  incompetent  to  discover  the  infinite  perfection  of 
the  divine  nature;  but  there  is  in  reality  no  merely 
human  reason,  since  the  mind  of  man  is  not  separated 
from  the  mind  of  God.  This  does  not  imply  that  all 
ideas  are  equally  true,  but  that  the  standards  are  not 
merely  those  of  authoritative  revelation.  It  involves 
no  disparagement  of  the  Christian  scriptures,  surely 
none  of  the  surpassingly  spiritual  life  of  the  Master. 
But  neither  does  it  disparage  other  scriptures,  teachings, 
and  philosophies.  The  final  standard  of  appeal  is  to 
enlightened  reason. 

In  endeavouring  to  choose  between  these  hypotheses 
one  is  greatly  aided  by  the  fact  that,  whatever  the 
accepted  authority,  very  much  depends  upon  the  point 
of  view  of  approach,  the  judgments  whereby  the 
authority  is  accepted.  To  accept  the  strictly  biblical 
point  of  view  would  apparently  be  to  throw  human 
judgment  out  of  account,  as  if  individual  experience 
and  thought  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  matter.  Yet 
analysis  of  such  acceptance  shows  that  the  more  per- 
sistently we  attempt  to  centre  the  authority  elsewhere 


OP  THE 
/ERS/TY 


60  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

the  more  do  we  implicitly  confess  that  inner  experience 
is  the  first  measure  of  all  authority.  Only  by  remain- 
ing entirely  uninformed  and  wholly  uncritical  can 
one  in  these  days  maintain  the  merely  authoritative 
position.  It  is  reasonable  to  start  with  a  proposition 
which  may  be  sustained  to  the  end,  for  example  the  pro- 
position that  the  Spirit,  universally  revealed,  is  every- 
where made  known  by  its  own  evidence  and  in  the  light 
of  the  experience  and  the  thought  by  which  its  evidence 
is  accepted.  It  then  becomes  plain  that,  however 
special  or  authoritative  its  utterances  are  judged  to 
be,  it  is  the  universal  verification  which  proves  them 
true.  The  instruments  which  were  seemingly  chosen 
as  special  agents  of  authoritative  utterances  are  not 
thereby  proved  the  less  divine,  but  humanity  is  given 
its  rights  with  respect  to  the  Spirit.  The  teachings  of 
the  Master  are  not  underestimated,  but  proper  recog- 
nition is  given  to  the  conditions  of  their  acceptance. 

With  reference  to  the  argument  by  which  the  au- 
thoritative point  of  view  is  maintained,  Sabatier  says: 
"  All  reasoning  of  this  kind  avowedly  or  tacitly  implies 
on  the  part  of  the  thinking  subject  a  declaration  of 
incompetence,  and  as  a  consequence  a  conscious  or 
unconscious  act  of  abdication."1  The  alternative 
position  is  that  in  which  the  mind  asserts  its  autonomy. 
"To  say  that  the  mind  is  autonomous  is  not  to  hold 
that  it  is  not  subject  to  law;  it  is  to  say  that  it  finds  the 
supreme  norm  of  its  ideas  and  acts  not  outside  of  itself, 
but  within  itself,  in  its  very  constitution.  It  is  to  say 
that  the  consent  of  the  mind  to  itself  is  the  prime  con- 
dition and  foundation  of  all  certitude."2 

»  Religions  of  Authority  and  the  Religion. of  the  Spirit,  Eng.  trans., 
p.  xvi. 

*Op.  cit.,  p.  xvi. 


The  Starting-Point  61 

As  matter  of  fact,  no  one  ever  accepts  a  thing  as 
real  or  a  proposition  as  true,  except  on  the  basis  of 
individual  judgment.  The  reference  to  experience 
may  be  implicit  and  the  judgment  thoroughly  con- 
cealed, but  the  reference  and  the  judgment  are  in- 
evitably there..  The  degree  of  acceptance  or  rejection 
depends  on  the  degree  of  understanding.  Experience 
comes  first,  then  the  inferences  to  which  it  gives  oc- 
casion, and  finally,  the  accepted  principle  of  interpre- 
tation. Deny  as  we  may  the  right  of  private  judgment, 
we  act  in  accordance  with  it  whenever  we  accept  a 
teacher  or  a  doctrine,  however  authoritative.  Lose 
the  self  as  we  may  in  the  thought  of  "the  point  of  view 
of  God, "  the  self  is  still  actively  judging,  so  deeply 
convinced  of  the  verity  of  its  own  experience  that  on 
the  mere  basis  of  that  experience  it  dares  to  speak 
for  God.  The  man  who  totally  rejects  the  idea  of 
the  presence  of  Spirit,  who  explains  the  idea  as  the 
"pathetic  fallacy"  of  a  weak  sentimentalist,  no  more 
positively  emphasises  personal  experience  and  the 
judgments  founded  upon  it  than  the  one  who  ignores 
that  experience  altogether  and  assumes  to  speak  for 
God.  The  human  equation  is  simply  unescapable. 

The  ultimate  basis  of  acceptance  of  spiritual  author- 
ity is  the  presence  in  us  of  the  witness  of  the  Spirit, 
namely,  as  Hegel  puts  it, 

the  religious  content  shows  itself  in  the  spirit  itself,  that 
Spirit  manifests  itself  in  Spirit,  and  in  fact  in  this  my 
spirit  .  .  .  this  faith  has  its  source,  its  root  in  my 
deepest  personal  being  .  .  .  it  is  what  is  most  pe- 
culiarly my  own,  and  as  such  is  inseparable  from  the 
consciousness  of  pure  Spirit  .  .  .  what  is  to  be  of 
value  to  me  must  have  its  verification  in  my  own  spirit, 
and  in  order  that  I  may  believe  I  must  have  the  witness 


62  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

of  my  spirit.  It  may  indeed  come  to  me  from  without, 
but  any  such  external  origin  is  a  matter  of  indifference; 
if  it  is  to  be  valid,  this  validity  can  only  build  itself  up 
upon  the  foundation  of  all  truth,  in  the  witness  of  the 
Spirit. 1 

Every  man  may  be  classified  in  the  light  of  his  judg- 
ments with  respect  to  the  witness  of  the  Spirit.  Argue 
as  you  will  to  convince  a  man  of  spiritual  verities, 
until  he  has  had  direct  evidence  of  such  verities,  which 
he  either  accepts  as  strongly  probable  or  conclusive, 
all  your  reasoning  counts  for  naught.  You  might  as 
well  eulogise  the  beauty  and  the  ineffable  joys  of  love 
for  the  benefit  of  one  whose  heart  has  never  been  deeply 
touched.  As  much  or  as  little  credit  as  we  appear 
to  bestow  upon  others  or  upon  ourselves  by  passing 
such  judgments,  we  are  constrained  to  classify  all 
men  as  either  quickened  or  unquickened.  Those 
who  for  a  time  have  dwelt  in  an  ideal  region  respond, 
when  you  narrate  your  experiences,  and  those  who  have 
not  dwelt  there  give  no  answering  sign.  Spirit  either 
bears  witness  to  Spirit,  or  it  does  not.  If  it  fail  to 
respond,  all  communication  is  by  means  of  the  letter. 
If  there  be  a  quickening  response,  there  is  a  standard 
by  which  to  estimate  the  reality  and  worth  of  the  ex- 
periences in  question. 

Whether  the  experiences  possess  the  reality  and 
authority  which  seem  to  belong  to  them  is  of  course 
another  matter.  But  actual  reference  to  human  re- 
lationships is  sufficient  to  show  that  men  constantly 
fall  back  upon  what  for  them  is  the  sole  ultimate  test, 
namely,  individual  experience.  If  two  men  are  of  the 
same  faith,  if  they  have  both  experienced  "a  change 

J  Philos,  ofRel,  Eng.  traji§,  i.,  43. 


The  Starting-Point  63 

of  heart,"  communication  is  easy.  The  hints  they 
give  may  appear  to  relate  to  a  supposed  miraculous 
power  by  whose  efficacy  they  have  been  converted. 
But  these  signs  are  not  the  less  significant  from  the 
point  of  view  of  human  judgments. 

The  acceptance  of  a  revelation,  a  bible  or  teacher, 
as  authoritative,  implies,  for  example,  a  series  of 
previous  judgments  in  regard  to  the  divine  "plan" 
as  manifested  in  the  giving  of  revelations,  the  possi- 
bility that  man  is  able  to  receive  and  impart  unspoiled 
such  authoritative  pronouncements,  that  there  is  but 
one  sacred  text,  which  has  been  preserved  intact,  and 
that  we  have  not  only  the  very  words  of  God  but  the 
words  of  those  whose  lives  and  teachings  are  portrayed 
in  the  biblical  narrative.  On  whose  authority  does 
one  make  these  judgments?  On  that  of*  biblical 
scholars?  Relatively  speaking  it  may  be  so.  But 
ultimately  these  judgments  mean  that  we  accept  our 
own  estimates  of  the  integrity  of  these  men,  that  we 
believe  in  the  power  of  man  to  be  an  untrammelled 
agent  of  "the  Holy  Spirit";  and  how  could  we  venture 
to  make  all  these  judgments  unless  we  had  already 
accepted  the  witness  of  the  Spirit?  Martineau  ex- 
presses himself  very  strongly  on  this  point.  He  insists 
that  "Second-hand  belief,  assented  to  at  the  dictation 
of  an  initiated  expert,  without  personal  response  of 
thought  and  reverence  in  myself,  has  no  more  tincture 
of  religion  in  it  than  any  other  lesson  learned  by 
rote.  MI 

Generally  speaking,  the  more  deeply  concealed  the 
tacit  acceptance  of  objective  authority  the  easier  it 
is  for  people  to  believe  on  the  basis  of  such  acceptance. 
A  naive  faith  is  founded  on  total  unawareness  that 

*The  Seat  pf  Authority  in  Religion,  p.  vi. 


64  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

personal  experience  and  thought  have  anything  to  do 
with  the  acceptance  of  the  Bible  as  the  word  of  God. 
It  is  easy  for  those  who  have  never  learned  to  think 
to  delegate  all  the  rights  of  judgment  to  priest  or 
church,  without  knowing  that  they  have  thereby 
committed  themselves  to"  inconsistency.  The  vested 
authorities  jealously  guard  the  privileges  bestowed 
upon  them,  and  it  has  been  by  sheer  struggle  on  the 
part  of  a  few  that  modern  criticism  has  at  last  shown 
where  the  seat  of  authority  in  religion  really  lies.  The 
emphasis  was  put  upon  the  letter  up  to  the  last  possible 
limit.  The  unquestioned  authority  of  institutions 
depended  upon  this  emphasis.  For  as  soon  as  men 
see  that  experience  comes  first,  in  time,  and  stands  first 
in  authority,  the  fate  of  external  authority  is  sealed. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  the  decay  of  external  au- 
thority seems  for  the  moment  to  be  the  death  of  religion. 
Yet  modern  criticism  merely  brings  to  the  fore  the 
judgments  which  men  have  made  on  inner  authority 
from  the  dawn  of  theology,  of  belief  in  holy  scriptures 
and  in  a  divinely  instituted  church.  Students  of  such 
criticism  need  only  awaken  to  knowledge  of  the  powers 
they  have  long  employed  to  see  that  the  real  situation 
is  in  no  wise  changed.  No  revelation  ever  created 
truth,  any  more  than  the  truth  that  four  is  the  sum  of 
two  and  two  was  the  invention  of  the  man  who  first 
learned  to  add.  The  men  who  have  most  deeply 
believed  in  themselves  are  the  ones  who  have  most 
profoundly  believed  in  and  made  known  the  presence 
of  God.  It  is  the  universal  evidence  of  the  existence 
of  religious  consciousness  which  has  convinced  mankind. 

When  we  discover  that  the  Bible  has  a  thousand 
meanings  for  as  many  persons  it  is  no  doubt  bewilder- 
ing, for  in  our  unquestioning  faith  we  had  supposed 


The  Starting-Point  65 

it  held  but  one.  But  when  we  meet  any  one  of  the 
thousand  persons  and  compare  experiences  until  we 
penetrate  beneath  the  letter  we  find  it  possible  to  agree 
on  important  points.  We  then  turn  to  the  Bible,  as 
to  any  other  record  of  experience,  with  the  illuminating 
insight  that  the  real  revelation  is  the  common  or 
universal  experience  out  of  which  psalms  and  bibles 
grow.  Interpretations  inevitably  differ.  Manifold  il- 
lusions centre  about  the  creeds  of  men,  creeds  sunder 
men  and  are  occasions  for  hatred;  it  is  the  Spirit  that 
unites,  that  inspires  love. 

When  unanimity  seems  impossible,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  belief  or  interpretation,  there  is  one  resource 
that  is  unfailing.  Men  may  dispute  as  they  will, 
profess  with  their  lips  what  they  may;  but  when  it  is 
a  question  of  character,  of  the  kind  of  life  they  lead, 
they  come  into  possession  of  a  standard.  Appearances 
may  be  deceptive  here,  too.  But  more  and  more  we 
hear  men  confessing  that  this  is  the  true  test.  We 
know  very  well  in  our  hearts  that  this  is  the  standard 
by  which  we  are  sooner  or  later  to  be  estimated.  When 
we  are  wholly  honest  with  ourselves  we  apply  this 
standard.  When  we  earnestly  seek  to  advance  it  is 
with  the  desire  that  above  all  else  we  may  lead  better 
lives.  To  live  the  life,  achieve  the  type — this  is  our 
highest  aspiration,  this  is  the  incentive  which  brings 
men  together  to  study  the  relationship  of  the  Spirit  to 
human  life.  But  the  mere  acceptance  of  this  standard 
implies  that,  wittingly  or  unwittingly,  we  admit  the 
supremacy  of  our  human  insight. 

Sabatier  holds  that 

the  Gospel,  in  its  very  principle,  implied  the  abrogation 
of  religions  of  authority,  and  inaugurated  as  a  fact  the 


66  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

religion  of  the  Spirit.  The  religious  relation  which  it 
instituted  between  God  and  man  was  not  determined  by 
the  necessary  mediation  of  a  priest,  nor  by  the  obligatory 
letter  of  a  law,  but  by  the  inner  bond  of  love,  by  the  con- 
sciousness of  a  filial  relation  between  child  and  father. 
Thus  the  centre  of  gravity  of  the  religious  life  was  changed 
from  without  to  within,  from  the  institution  to  the  con- 
science. .  .  .  What  guide,  what  support,  what  strength 
did  Jesus  give  to  his  disciples?  Not  one  other  than  the 
Spirit  of  his  Father,  which  abode  in  him  and  would  abide 
in  them.  He  promised  it  without  a  single  exception  to  all 
who  would  ask  the  Father  for  it.1 

Without  fear,  then,  that  we  are  either  placing  too 
much  stress  on  the  inner  life  or  departing  from  the 
teachings  of  Jesus,  we  may  freely  and  fully  accept 
the  witness  of  the  Spirit  in  the  individual  guise  in 
which  it  is  directly  made  known.  It  may  well  be  that 
we  at  once  pass  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Spirit  itself 
is  far  more  real  than  this  witness  within  us,  that  we 
place  more  reliance  on  social  than  on  private  con- 
sciousness, that  we  turn  with  new  admiration  to  the 
Bible,  to  the  church  and  the  Master.  But  if  so  we 
now  judge  without  misconception,  we  never  leave  the 
human  equation  out  of  account.  It  may  be  that  we 
exclaim  in  deepest  humility,  It  is  not  I  who  achieved, 
but  a  wonder  was  wrought  within  me.  The  assent 
on  our  part,  the  victory  of  the  will,  the  triumph  over 
circumstance,  may  well  seem  secondary  in  our  eyes. 
But  the  point  is  that  the  co-operative  attainment 
wherein  the  union  of  the  human  will  with  the  Spirit  is 
made  known  is  for  us  the  test  of  all  spiritual  truth 
and  conduct.  We  have  travelled  a  certain  distance 
along  the  pathway  of  the  soul,  we  have  attained  a 

1  Op.  cit,  pp.  283,  298. 


The  Starting-Point  67 

certain  level  of  development.  From  this  level,  some 
things  are  already  behind  us,  some  are  before;  we  un- 
derstand a  few  great  laws,  we  have  glimpses  of  a  few 
ideals.  What  we  understand  clearly  we  grasp  with  a 
power  of  conviction  similar  to  that  which  arises  when 
we  learn  once  for  all  that  two  and  two  make  four.  We 
know  that  these  principles  will  hold  under  all  con- 
ditions. The  present  level  of  development  thus  in- 
volves a  certain  permanent  possession,  an  attitude 
or  outlook  upon  the  world. 

The  statements  just  made  seem  for  the  moment  in 
conflict.  For,  in  Chapter  I  we  maintained  that  man 
failed  to  find  the  Spirit  because  he  placed  such  em- 
phasis on  the  limitations  of  human  nature,  and  now 
we  point  out  that  man  always  accepts  anything  divine 
on  the  authority  of  his  own  judgment.  But  we  are 
still  calling  attention  to  the  witness  of  the  Spirit.  We 
have  had  that  witness  with  us  all  along,  and  on  (the 
basis  of  it  we  have  passed  judgments.  But  we  have 
ignored  this  inner  witness  to  a  considerable  extent 
and  apparently  accepted  divine  revelation  on  the  basis 
of  some  external  authority,  as  if  our  human  judgments 
had  nothing  to  do  with  such  acceptance.  The  critics 
have  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  only  on  our  own 
authority  do  we  ever  accept  anything.  This  being 
so,  it  is  well  to  look  to  the  sources  of  authority  within. 
Had  the  Spirit  not  resided  there  we  would  never  have 
known  it  as  revealed  in  a  book.  The  inner  witness  is 
primary  in  reality  and  in  authority.  Having  accepted 
it  uncritically  we  may  now  accept  it  in  all  its  fulness. 
A  certain  mode  of  life  has  always  accompanied  that 
acceptance.  By  leading  that  life  more  seriously  we 
may  become  the  instrument  of  greater  revelations. 

Since  everything  centres  about  the  point  which  the 


68  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

Spirit  has  now  achieved  in  the  life  of  each  of  us,  the 
prime  need  is  for  a  more  intimate  acquaintance  with 
the  laws  and  conditions  of  the  Spirit's  progressive 
presence.  The  reality,  I  say,  is  here,  "the  kingdom 
is  at  hand,"  it  is  within  and  around  every  human 
soul.  If  by  any  theological  or  other  device  we  have 
put  the  Spirit  far  from  us,  as  if  it  spoke  ages  ago,  then 
ceased  to  reveal  itself,  we  must  first  remove  this 
speculative  barrier.  This  does  not  mean  that  revela- 
tions and  prophets  are  unnecessary,  but  that  these 
acquaint  us  with  realities  which  we  already  possess. 
The  response  we  are  called  upon  to  make  is  not  to 
cleave  to  the  distant  manifestation  of  the  Spirit,  but 
to  prove  our  faith  by  turning  to  the  Spirit  and  living 
in  accordance  with  it  to-day.  As  little  inclined  as  we 
may  be  to  raise  personal  experience  to  the  centre  of 
thought,  that  is  what  we  really  have  done  all  along. 
Nothing  is  so  real  for  us  as  this  present  moment  of 
experience,  say  what  you  will  about  the  realities  of 
the  past  or  those  that  are  far  distant.  No  soul  is  so 
real  for  you  as  your  own.  You  are  a  soul,  looking 
forth  upon  the  world  of  your  own  conscious  experience. 
In  present  actuality  or  in  memory,  everything  that 
constitutes  the  universe  for  you  is  related  to  you,  this 
present  soul.  Now,  where  do  you  stand,  how  clearly 
do  you  see  the  way?  What  opportunities  lie  open 
before  you? 

The  extent  to  which  individual  experience  can  be 
trusted  is  not  yet  in  question.  For  the  moment,  we 
point  out  that  the  starting-point  of  a  philosophy  of 
Spirit  is  found  through  the  analysis  of  self-conscious- 
ness. To  arrive  at  years  of  discretion  in  the  philosophic 
sense  is  to  be  able  not  only  to  evaluate  present  ex- 
perience, but  on  the  basis  of  such  evaluation  to  see  why 


The  Starting-Point  69 

authority  has  been  delegated  to  institutions,  why 
external  authority  has  so  often  been  reckoned  above 
internal.  One  sees,  for  example,  that  there  is  a  path- 
way of  the  Spirit.  It  is  a  question  what  that  course 
is  and  how  man  takes  it.  The  answer  at  any  given 
period  of  the  world's  history  depends  upon  the  de- 
gree of  reflective  self -consciousness  attained. 

For  instance,  there  is  a  period  of  innocence  when 
the  soul  receives  remarkable  first  impressions  and  gives 
expression  to  spontaneous  works  of  genius.  Then 
there  is  the  transition  to  manhood  with  its  new  ex- 
periences, hence  new  thoughts  and  questionings,  doubts 
and  conflicts,  criticism  and  agnosticism.  Or  this 
period  may  be  described  as  the  one  in  which  man  tries 
to  be  something  of  and  by  himself,  in  which  he  asserts 
his  independence.  Hence  this  becomes  the  period 
of  darkness  known  as  evil.  The  majority  remain  so 
long  in  this  transitional  stage  that  to  them  the  exist- 
ence of  evil  becomes  the  great  mystery.  But  all 
through  the  ages  there  have  been  those  who  have 
entered  a  third  period,  an  epoch  of  enlightenment  in 
which  there  are  relatively  few  mysteries.  Such  men 
not  only  see  why  human  life  begins  as  it  does  and 
passes  through  the  stage  of  darkness  and  struggle,  but 
they  see  the  outcome,  see  the  hand  of  God  where  other 
men  behold  only  the  malicious  works  of  man's  hands. 
These  men  live,  as  it  were,  in  the  realm  of  causes, 
grasp  the  implied  principles  and  discern  the  lessons 
which  human  life  teaches.  They  cannot  be  really 
troubled  over  the  problem  of  evil,  since  they  plainly 
see  its  origin,  perceive  the  love  and  purpose  of  God. 
What  gives  them  concern  is  man  in  his  ignorance  and 
sin,  the  difficulty  of  making  plain  even  in  slight  measure 
the  truths' of  the  divine  vision. 


70  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

Such  men  have  usually  been  seers,  prophets,  poets, 
who  were  unable  to  state  in  scientifically  precise  lan- 
guage the  realities  they  beheld.  Hence  they  have 
symbolised  the  divine  vision.  Hence  the  literature  of 
allegory,  the  religious  poems  and  sacred  books  of  the 
ages.  Hence,  too,  the  misunderstandings  of  men  who 
mistook  the  symbol  for  the  Spirit,  hence  the  misunder- 
standings which  cling  about  our  own  Bible.  If  we 
are  to  succeed  where  others  have  failed  we  must  in 
each  case  put  ourselves  in  the  position  of  those  who 
have  the  witness  of  the  Spirit  and  sometimes  bear 
imperfect  testimony.  We  shall  follow  a  safe  clue  if 
we  recollect  that  the  man  of  the  Spirit  does  not  first 
speculate,  then  produce  a  dogmatic  doctrine  or  alle- 
gorical poem,  but  writes  as  he  does  because  he  has 
first  had  experiences  which  so  far  possessed  him  that 
he  could  hardly  have  done  otherwise.  He  does  not 
start  to  prove  the  existence  of  God  because  of  some 
theoretic  need,  but  writes  his  essay  or  sings  his  hymn 
because  God  lives,  moves,  stirs  within  him.  Pos- 
sessing the  eternal  verities  as  first-hand  gifts,  his 
characterisation  is  necessarily  at  second-hand.  The 
confidence  he  displays  is  not  the  mere  assurance  of 
reason,  that  is,  not  dependent  on  the  force  of  his  argu- 
ment, but  springs  from  the  everlasting  possession. 
It  is  this  power  behind,  this  overmastering  sense  of 
reality,  which  gives  his  writing  such  force  and  compels 
others  to  believe. 

There  are  various  degrees  of  insight  and  inspiration, 
hence  varying  degrees  of  convincing  literature.  One 
seer's  writings  may  carry  conviction  because  of  the 
beauty  and  directness  of  his  figures,  his  poetic  symbols, 
while  another  is  able  to  scrutinise  his  experience  so 
carefully  that  nearly  all  traces  of  the  original  vision 


The  Starting- Point  71 

are  absorbed  into  his  highly  rational  account.  The 
seer  may  also  become  the  philosopher,  eliminate  all 
mysticism,  and  propound  a  philosophy  of  Spirit.  But 
the  point  is  that  the  philosophy  springs  from  the 
spiritual  consciousness,  not  that  the  conception  of  the 
Spirit  is  a  merely  logical  need.  The  merely  speculative 
philosopher  proceeds  from  an  analytically  defined 
basis  to  a  clearly  wrought  formal  or  logical  conception. 
But  the  philosopher  of  the  Spirit  begins  with  experience, 
and  carries  along  an  element  which  may  never  wholly 
yield  to  precise  analysis.  This  accompanying  element 
which  gives  life  to  the  whole  is  precisely  that  element 
which  is  known  through  the  witness  of  the  Spirit. 

Hence  in  our  investigation  of  the  Spirit's  course  in 
human  life  we  have  as  sources  the  Bible  and  other 
religious  and  poetic  literature,  the  literature  of  criticism 
and  philosophy,  and  personal  experience  with  its 
corroborative  testimony,  its  inner  witness,  and  its 
individuality.  For  many,  the  Bible  will  always  stand 
first  in  authority.  For  others,  the  realities  of  personal 
experience  will  rank  first,  the  Bible  and  other  sacred 
literature  will  be  confirmatory.  Some  will  start  with 
the  divine  point  of  view,  some  with  the  human.  In 
any  case  the  authority  is  partly  that  of  personal  ex- 
perience, however  high  the  origin  attributed  to  the 
revelations  of  which  it  is  the  channel.  We  shall  do 
right,  then,  if  we  give  primary  allegiance  to  the  direct 
testimony  of  the  soul,  the  first-hand  experiences  of 
those  who  dwell  nearest  the  Spirit.  For,  originally, 
there  is  but  one  source  and  that  is  the  Spirit.  If  the 
medium  be  so  transparent  that  the  Spirit  shines 
through,  mayhap  the  spoken  or  written  word  will  be 
for  us  "the  word  of  God."  But  let  us  not  confuse 
that  which  is  primary  with  that  which  is  secondary. 


72  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

The  form  is  not  the  Spirit,  nor  is  it  wholly  equal  to  it. 
The  form  is  by  and  for  and  from  the  Spirit,  through  it 
the  Spirit  is  made  complete.  The  more  nearly  ade- 
quate the  form  the  more  directly  it  will  send  us  to 
the  Spirit  which  imbues  it.  The  Spirit  is  the  essential. 

If,  then,  we  are  to  overcome  the  agnosticism  of  the 
age  and  prepare  the  way  for  a  renewing  revelation  of 
the  Spirit  we  must  meet  modern  criticism  on  its  own 
ground.  That  criticism  has  centred  about  the  con- 
ditions and  factors  of  human  nature.  It  has  em- 
phasised the  relativity  of  human  knowledge,  and 
pointed  out  that  the  direct  object  of  experience  is 
man's  own  consciousness.  As  opposed  to  unscrutinised 
belief  in  objective  authority  it  has  pointed  out  that 
man  accepts  all  reality  and  all  authority  on  the  basis 
of  individual  judgment.  All  this  has  come  to  stay. 
It  is  impossible  to  ignore  it.  To  find  the  way  back 
again  to  reality  constructive  thought  must  assimilate 
these  results,  not  pass  by  or  reject  them.  Hence  we 
must  give  modern  criticism  the  fullest  recognition. 
But,  reserving  the  right  of  more  careful  interpretation, 
we  may  well  pass  from  the  point  of  view  of  human 
relativity  to  that  of  the  realities  which  that  relativity 
makes  known. 

Criticism  tends  to  reduce  life  to  the  dullest  prose 
by  introducing  minute  self -consciousness  and  by 
directing  attention  to  the  way  in  which  the  mind 
works.  The  result  is  a  doctrine  concerning  the  ma- 
chinery of  human  existence,  to  the  neglect  of  its  pro- 
ductions. But  the  machinery  is  only  a  means  to  an 
end.  Mere  consciousness  of  the  way  in  which  the 
mind  works  is  of  small  value,  while  self-consciousness 
may  be  a  positive  hindrance.  Nevertheless  only 
through  self -consciousness  shall  the  truth  be  known. 


The  Starting-Point  73 

The  ideal  is  not  only  to  understand  how  the  machinery 
is  constructed  but  to  master  it,  and  mastery  comes 
through  the  highest  use.  Those  only  are  likely  to 
understand  the  function  of  criticism  who  have  at  times 
been  in  danger  of  becoming  a  slave  to  it.  If  we  have 
lived  too  much  with  the  critics,  the  resource  is  to  live 
with  the  poets,  the  artists,  and  musicians.  We  also 
lose  besetting  self-consciousness  by  returning  to  nature 
and  by  associating  with  children.  When  spontaneity 
returns  we  may  rightly  estimate  the  period  of  enslaving 
criticism  through  which  we  have  passed. 

Only  through  fluctuation,  contrast,  criticism,  and 
through  dialectic  is  the  truth  finally  discoverable, 
not  through  first  thoughts  simply.  It  is  difficult  enough 
to  discover  the  exact  facts  of  life,  and  one  is  ready 
to  become  unduly  critical  for  the  sake  of  discovering 
them.  But  priceless  as  facts  are  they  are  not  the  only 
possessions  of  value.  Fortunate  are  we  if  in  the  pur- 
suit of  facts  we  are  inspired  by  the  thought  of  the 
Spirit.  Persuaded  that  the  fruits  of  the  Spirit  are  love 
and  peace  and  wisdom,  that  the  Spirit  is  more  than 
the  mechanism  of  its  manifestation,  we  may  well  settle 
down  to  the  most  prosaic  analysis  of  its  instrumen- 
talities. If  through  man  there  is  a  Life,  moving  towards 
the  achievement  of  certain  purposes,  accompanying 
this  Life  there  is  a  life  of  thought.  It  is  out  of  this 
thought  that  a  philosophy  of  the  Spirit  grows.  The 
starting-point  is  this  Life,  with  its  reproduction  in 
human  thought,  and  no  philosophy  of  the  Spirit  is 
adequate  which  fails  to  take  account  of  both  the  Life 
and  the  thought. 

If  in  the  endeavour  to  take  account  of  both  the 
Spirit  and  the  consciousness  which  accompanies  its 
presence  we  lose  sight  now  of  the  Spirit  and  now  of  the 


74  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

conditions  of  its  presence,  the  reconstructive  clue  is 
found  in  the  fact  that  the  Spirit,  not  the  letter,  is  the 
real  revelation.  The  resource,  therefore,  is  to  return 
in  spontaneous  receptivity  to  the  Life  that  ever  moves 
forward  within.  The  Life  is  the  carrying  power,  while 
the  dialectic  of  thought  properly  follows  and  makes 
explicit  the  Life.  Practically  speaking,  our  whole 
problem  is  one  of  adjustment  to  this  advancing  Life; 
theoretically,  it  is  a  question  of  the  interpretation  of 
the  Life.  However  we  put  it,  then,  the  Life  stands 
first.  There  may  be  human  defects  without  limit  to 
make  allowances  for;  the  crucial  point  is  that  the 
Spirit  is  present,  despite  the  imperfections  of  its  in- 
strument. Here  is  the  starting-point  of  our  philo- 
sophy. This  is  the  point  we  insist  upon.  Beginning 
with  that,  insisting  upon  the  witness  of  the  Spirit, 
we  may  trustfully  pass  through  the  fires  of  the  severest 
criticism,  confident  that  the  dearest  reality  will  be 
unharmed. 

That  it  is  one  thing  to  start  with  the  Spirit  and 
another  to  say  indubitably  what  is  real,  what  true, 
in  the  inner  life,  will  become  more  and  more  clear  as  we 
proceed.  It  may  seem  clear,  for  example,  that  the 
Spirit  is  revealed  through  intuition,  yet  our  investi- 
gation of  the  nature  of  intuition  will  show  how  difficult 
it  is  to  discover  the  intuitively  revealed  certainties 
of  the  Spirit.  It  is  plain  that  the  Spirit  is  apprehen- 
sible through  emotion,  yet  we  must  analyse  the  emo- 
tions in  the  most  careful  sort  of  way  to  learn  how  far 
they  may  be  trusted.  Our  study  of  the  various  chan- 
nels of  the  Spirit  may  lead  us  so  far  afield  into  mere 
relativities  that  we  shall  appear  to  have  made  no 
headway.  Yet,  once  more,  such  is  the  pathway  of 
the  Spirit.  Criticism  must  do  its  utmost,  then  give 


The  Starting- Point  75 

us  the  opportunity  to  reconstruct  if  we  can.  The 
dialectic  through  which  our  investigation  is  compelled 
to  pass  is  precisely  the  philosophic  exercise  which  leads 
unmistakably  to  the  truth.  We  must  doubt  in  order 
to  know,  there  is  no  other  sure  way.  Thus  to  be  fore- 
warned is  to  be  prepared  to  lose  sight  of  the  wood  for 
the  trees,  yet  with  an  unfailing  constancy  of  hope, 
inasmuch  as  we  possess  the  witness  of  the  Spirit. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  ETERNAL  TYPE  OF  LIFE 

IN  the  foregoing  discussions  we  were  chiefly  con- 
cerned with  preliminary  definitions  of  the  Spirit, 
regarded  as  God  in  action,  manifested  in  the  total 
universe,  and  typified  by  the  renewing  life  of  nature 
We  endeavoured  in  some  measure  to  view  human  life 
from  above,  as  if  from  the  standpoint  of  the  Spirit, 
manifesting  its  love  and  wisdom  through  the  pro- 
gressive achievements  of  men.  While  it  seemed 
difficult  thus  to  transcend  human  experience,  we 
found  reason  to  believe  that  even  our  limited  know- 
ledge is  knowledge  of  the  presence  of  the  Spirit.  We 
found  it  possible  to  unify  ambiguous  and  apparently 
inconsistent  meanings  of  the  term  Spirit  by  restricting 
the  term  in  its  primary  significance  to  the  concrete 
life  of  God  regarded  as  at  once  the  eternal  essence  and 
the  uniting  power.  Thus  regarded,  we  began  to  look 
for  clues  to  the  purposes  of  the  Spirit,  not  in  the  re- 
moter precincts  of  the  infinitude  of  God,  but  in  the 
near-by  events  of  the  world,  and  in  the  actual  ex- 
periences of  men.  We  placed  the  Spirit  first  and  all 
modes  of  apprehension,  description,  or  expression  in 
the  second  place.  This  led  to  emphasis  on  the  kind 
of  life  man  lives,  the  witness  of  the  Spirit  in  the  in- 
dividual case.  Such  emphasis  seems  to  imply  the 
superiority  of  personal  experience  over  authoritative 
revelation.  Yet  we  shall  find  increasing  evidence 
that  individual  experience  is  rather  the  starting-point 

76 


The  Eternal  Type  of  Life  77 

than  the  goal  of  spiritual  thought,  hence  that  the  test 
of  authority  is  not  merely  individual. 

Pursuing  the  clues  of  practical  life  first,  therefore, 
we  may  now  consider  the  attitude  which  one  may  best 
maintain  while  seeking  the  eternal  verities.  This 
attitude  we  may  characterise  in  terms  of  an  ideal  of 
the  Eternal  Type  of  Life.  That  is,  it  is  not  primarily 
a  question  of  time,  of  the  present  or  remote  activity 
of  the  Spirit,  but  of  understanding  of  the  eternal  con- 
ditions and  laws  of  spiritual  existence.  To  begin 
wherever  we  are,  however  situated,  to  live  for  the 
eternal  values,  is  the  best  way  to  adapt  our  conduct 
to  the  presence  of  the  Spirit  and  to  grow  in  knowledge 
of  the  conditions  under  which  it  is  manifested.  First 
in  importance  is  the  ideal  which  lifts  the  mind  to  the 
level  of  universal  consciousness,  then  comes  the  ap- 
preciative reconstruction  of  the  facts  and  principles 
implied.  If  the  ideal  attitude  be  partly  a  product  of 
the  Spirit,  it  is  also  in  part  the  result  of  adaptation  to 
the  details  of  everyday  existence.  In  the  latter  sense 
the  attitude  is  rightfully  a  subject  for  precise  analysis. 

Here  you  are,  for  example,  engaged  in  your  daily 
labour  and  so  far  absorbed  that  there  is  no  centre  of 
reserve- power,  no  ideal  outlook.  For  the  time  you 
are  simply  your  organism,  working.  All  your  life 
flows  into  one  channel  and  your  thoughts  are  also 
concentrated  there.  Now,  concentration  is  no  doubt 
of  great  value,  but  the  question  is,  are  you  swept 
along  by  the  flood-tide  of  your  energy,  or  are  you 
occupied  in  your  little  world  of  successful  work  while 
living  above  it  in  a  larger  world  of  eternal  idealism? 
Upon  this  distinction  much  depends.  For  the  way  one 
works  is  indicative  of  the  end  for  which  life  is  believed 
to  exist.  If  life  be  consistent,  instead  of  being  a 


78  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

perpetual  compromise  with  circumstance,  there  would 
appear  to  be  one  ultimate  principle  of  such  consistency, 
that  is,  the  ideal  of  life  in  and  for  the  ends  that  are 
permanently  worth  while.  To  learn  to  live  for  these 
high  ends  we  must  repeatedly  ask,  Am  I  putting 
emphasis  on  the  appropriate  place?  Am  I  seeking 
the  real  essence  of  life,  or  dwelling  upon  appearances? 
To  live  for  the  eternal  verities  means  that,  whereas 
experience  was  once  a  single  stream  in  which  we  were 
confusedly  immersed,  it  is  now  twofold  and  we  move 
with  an  upper  current  of  life,  from  the  view-point  of 
which  we  behold  the  life  below.  It  is  this  relative 
transcendence  of  routine  conditions,  while  still  taking 
advantage  of  them,  which  best  accords  with  the  in- 
terests of  the  present  inquiry.  The  prime  consideration 
is  the  new  consciousness  apprehended  when  we  cross 
the  line,  as  it  were,  between  this  our  mundane  realm 
and  the  higher  order  of  eternal  values,  and  behold 
the  familiar  scenes  of  natural  life  in  a  different  light. 
To  contrast  the  eternal  and  the  temporal  is  perhaps 
to  suggest  various  historic  attempts  to  realise  a  Utopian 
type  of  life,  and  the  critic  may  ask,  What  have  we  in 
these  enlightened  days  to  do  with  other- world  schemes? 
In  order  to  avoid  all  misconception,  it  is  well  to  say 
a  word  or  two  in  justification  of  the  point  of  view. 
As  members  of  a  physical  world-order  we  are  compelled 
to  devote  most  of  our  thought,  our  deeds  of  kindness 
and  love,  to  mundane  things.  This  is  of  course  right 
and  natural,  for  man's  first  privilege  is  to  lead  a 
thoroughly  natural  life.  There  has  been  a  vigorous 
reaction  from  the  old-time  notion  that  natural  exist- 
ence is  simply  meant  to  fit  man  for  heavenly  abodes. 
The  thoughtful  man  of  to-day  believes  that  natural 
ends  are  to  a  large  extent  ends  in  themselves,  and 


The  Eternal  Type  of  Life  79 

therefore  need  not  be  connected  with  ulterior  purposes. 
Physical  exercise,  for  example,  is  an  end  in  itself; 
so  is  the  enjoyment  of  natural  existence  and  the  earthly 
interests  that  comport  with  true  manhood  and  woman- 
hood. If  a  happy  earthly  home,  where  love  abides, 
be  not  an  end  in  itself,  it  would  be  difficult  to  find  such 
an  end.  In  family  life  ideals  attain  a  legitimate  goal, 
whatever  other  purposes  such  life  may  subserve.  Man 
not  only  has  a  right  to  be  genuinely  natural  before  he 
is  spiritual,  but  it  might  almost  be  said  that  this  is 
the  only  sure  way:  the  spiritual  life  must  have  its 
roots  deep  within  the  soil  of  a  reasonable  earthly 
existence. 

Natural  ends  may,  however,  fulfil  more  than  tem- 
poral purposes.  If  heaven  be  not  a  place  but  a  state, 
attainable  by  righteous  conduct,  the  way  to  win  it  is 
to  live  any  life  well  in  which  the  participant  finds 
himself  rightfully  engaged.  Heaven  may  as  truly 
be  founded  upon  things  natural  as  upon  things  singled 
out  as  spiritual.  Heaven  begins  with  the  discovery 
of  that  which  is  eternal.  Yet  this  discovery  is  merely 
an  awakening  to  realities  which  reside  in  the  living 
present.  Really  to  know  the  present  and  to  live  in  it 
is  heaven.  Thus  the  acceptance  of  the  standard  for 
which  we  are  pleading,  namely,  conduct  as  a  test  of 
belief  and  a  clue  to  reality,  tends  to  centre  interest 
upon  this  present  life.  Man  has  laboured  for  so  many 
centuries  for  the  right  to  be  natural  that  he  may  well 
complain  when  devotees  of  the  supernatural  insist 
that  our  life  below  is  but  a  beginning  for  a  life  above. 
One  sometimes  looks  back  to  the  golden  days  of  Greece 
as  to  a  time  when  it  was  really  possible  to  lead  a  natural 
life,  unharassed  by  doctrines  in  regard  to  sin,  the 
devil,  and  the  implied  supernatural  scheme  of  salvation. 


8o  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

Yet  one  may  as  readily  err  in  emphasis  on  our 
natural  existence  as  in  stress  upon  the  one-sided  idea 
of  heaven  which  once  prevailed.  It  was  no  doubt  a 
joy  to  be  merely  natural  in  the  days  before  man  began 
to  be  self-consciously  subjective.  But  having  once 
attained  self-consciousness  there  is  no  turning  back. 
If  the  early  Christians  were  preternaturally  unworldly, 
the  time  is  at  hand  to  be  natural  Christians.  To  lead 
a  merely  natural  life  may  mean  that  we  are  self- 
satisfied  in  our  physical  contentment.  If  we  pine 
for  the  care-free  days  of  old,  when  individual  self- 
realisation  was  the  ideal,  we  have  now  the  inspiration 
of  the  ideals  of  self-sacrifice,  service,  and  love  which 
came  in  with  Christianity.  If  it  was  once  easy  to  be 
natural,  it  may  now  be  said  to  be  a  virtue,  one  that 
enlists  all  our  powers,  as  we  throw  off  the  restraints 
of  an  artificial  society  and  look  out  over  the  fair  fields 
of  our  earthly  environment  in  intelligent  adoration. 
It  is  one  of  the  ends  we  may  well  put  before  us  as  most 
worth  while,  this  endeavour  to  regain  nature,  but  a 
nature  transfigured  by  the  nobler  ideals  of  our  modern 
time. 

In  this  discussion  we  are  not,  then,  advocating  an 
other-world  scheme.  Our  plea  for  the  eternal  type  of 
life  is  above  all  a  plea  for  a  principle  of  life  which  shows 
man  how  to  live  more  wisely  and  happily  in  this 
natural  world,  with  greater  enjoyment  of  nature's 
beauty  and  closer  kinship  with  natural  conditions. 
There  is  something  at  fault  in  any  mode  of  conduct 
which  unfits  man  to  live  this  natural  life.  If  we  cease 
to  take  interest  in  earthly  things,  the  truth  probably 
is  that  we  are  not  yet  rightfully  through  with  them, 
that  we  are  trying  to  outwit  our  own  spiritual  evolu- 
tion. To  be  spiritual,  let  us  now  say  unqualifiedly, 


The  Eternal  Type  of  Life  81 

is  first  of  all  to  be  natural,  normal,  physically  and 
mentally  equipped  to  live  this  splendid  earthly  exist- 
ence of  ours,  and  enthusiastic  in  our  love  for  it. 

On  the  other  hand,  since  we  are  children  of  the  eter- 
nal Spirit  we  should  hardly  expect  to  be  genuinely 
natural  beings  except  by  taking  constant  account  of 
what  we  are  as  eternal  souls.  A  broadly  inclusive 
eternal  type  of  life  fits  us  equally  well  for  life  here  and 
beyond.  Or,  rather,  there  is  no  "here"  and  no  "be- 
yond"; for  it  is  primarily  a  question  of  present  states, 
laws,  and  conditions.  We  are  never  in  a  position  truly 
to  enjoy  even  the  most  subordinate  phases  of  our 
natural  life  while  we  are  immersed  in  the  fluctuations 
and  relativities  of  sensuous  existence.  Nor  may  we 
become  genuinely  spiritual  while  we  sunder  the  spiritual 
from  the  natural.  We  truly  live  so  far  as  we  discover 
ends,  apprehend  laws,  cleave  to  values,  worths,  ideals. 
If  we  begin  here  below  to  comprehend  laws,  purposes, 
and  verities,  no  future  experience  can  ever  take  us 
wholly  by  surprise.  To  begin  to  seek  essences,  abiding 
realities,  is  already  to  become  members  of  an  eternal 
order  of  existence.  Thus  the  eternal  type  of  life  is 
one  of  philosophic  independence  of  circumstance. 
Just  as  one  lives  in  thought  in  an  ideal  world,  while 
engaged  in  daily  toil,  so  from  week  to  week,  from  year 
to  year,  one  may  live  in  remembrance  of  the  kingdom 
which  cannot  pass  away. 

When  friends  pass  from  our  sight,  and  the  great 
questions  in  regard  to  the  future  life  become  vital 
issues  for  us,  the  central  query  is  likely  to  be,  ShallVe 
recognise  our  friends  in  that  far-off  world?  If  we 
could  have  assurance  of  this  we  would  be  content. 
But  how  can  this  assurance  be  more  directly  gained 
than  by  considering  how  we  truly  know  our  friends 


82  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

while  here?  For  it  may  well  be  that  the  basis  of 
knowledge  and  recognition  is  everywhere  the  same. 

It  is  plain  that  merely  external  signs  do  not  carry 
us  very  far.  Why  are  we  drawn  to  some  people  and 
repelled  by  others?  What  is  the  real  principle  of 
friendship?  Were  we  to  begin  with  the  person  with 
whom  we  are  in  closest  affinity  and  with  this  friendship 
as  a  centre  describe  all  our  relationships  in  terms  of 
spiritual  nearness  or  harmony  of  character,  we  might 
arrange  a  scale  of  real  values.  The  closer  the  inner 
ties  the  less  possible  it  would  be  to  describe  the  friend- 
ship in  terms  of  physical  appearance.  The  truest 
friendship  is  a  companionship  of  souls  founded  on 
reality,  not  on  appearance.  The  more  remote  the 
acquaintance  the  more  it  is  a  question  of  external 
characteristics.  It  is  conceivable  that  the  same 
relationship  will  hold  in  the  future,  that  those  who  are 
nearest  in  this  natural  existence  are  the  friends  whom 
we  will  most  readily  recognise,  namely,  by  that  subtle 
tie  that  binds  soul  with  soul.  If  so,  we  have  assurance 
at  the  point  where  we  wish  it  most,  in  regard  to  those 
we  love.  To  these  we  shall  most  directly  be  drawn, 
and  we  shall  be  least  likely  to  recognise  those  whom 
we  knew  least  from  the  point  of  view  of  character. 

If  this  be  the  true  principle,  it  is  plainly  not  an  affair 
of  space  and  time.  The  friend  whom  we  have  scarcely 
known  a  year  may  already  be  nearer  than  the  person 
whom  we  have  constantly  been  associated  with  for 
a  life-time.  One  often  seems  to  be  as  near  a  friend 
who  is  many  miles  away  as  if  the  friend  were  present 
in  the  same  room,  so  close  is  the  union  of  heart  and 
mind.  When  the  friend  is  absent  it  is  sometimes 
easier  to  dissociate  the  personality  from  the  usual 
objective  signs  and  apprehend  the  inner  bond.  This 


The  Eternal  Type  of  Life  83 

recognition  of  the  inner  affinity  may  be  typical  of  the 
non-spatial  recognitions  of  the  future  life.  If  we 
already  know  our  friends  by  their  spiritual  quality 
we  are  already  judging  by  standards  that  obtain  both 
in  the  fleshly  life  and  beyond.  In  any  case  it  is  not 
primarily  a  question  of  that  which  transiently  pertains 
to  a  person. 

If,  then,  you  would  know  your  friends  in  the  future, 
live  in  recognition  of  that  which  is  most  deeply  char- 
acteristic of  them  here  and  now.  It  is  possible  really 
to  know  two  or  three  people  in  the  course  of  one's 
life-time.  The  relationship  that  holds  where  love 
deeply  abides  is  typical  of  all  our  best  social  ties.  For 
example,  you  have  been  drawn  to  a  little  group  of 
people  at  what  proves  to  be  a  fitting  time.  What  most 
attracted  you  was  nothing  merely  external.  You  were 
attracted  by  inner  needs  and  spiritual  states.  You 
have  many  interests  and  ideals  in  common,  and  you 
discern  this  implicitly  long  before  the  ties  of  sympathy 
are  made  explicit  through  mutual  service.  Here, 
again,  is  one  who  seeks  your  aid  in  the  solution  of  a 
problem  of  the  inner  life.  Why  you  were  chosen  can 
hardly  be  told.  But  it  transpires  that  you  once  had 
experiences  which  throw  light  on  this  person's  problem, 
and  you  understand  your  experiences  uncommonly 
well.  The  further  you  compare  notes  the  more  points 
you  discover  in  common,  until  finally  you  become 
fast  friends:  whatever  the  other  does,  you  know  the 
signs,  apprehend  the  inner  meaning.  Again,  you  are 
prompted  to  go  to  some  one  in  need  and  later  discover 
a  particular  fitness  in  the  prompting.  Of  many  of 
these  deeper  relationships  we  are  merely  able  to  say 
that  they  began.  But  whether  or  not  we  are  able  to 
explain  them,  their  occurrence  is  the  great  fact.  It  is 


84  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

not  necessary  to  look  for  anything  occult  in  them; 
the  ties  that  thus  bind,  the  attracting  powers  that 
operate,  are  as  natural  as  the  forces  of  physical  passion. 
Yet  their  very  naturalness  is  an  earnest  of  the  eternal. 
Hence  we  may  regard  the  higher  friendships  as  typical 
of  the  superior  relationships  of  the  soul  in  general. 

Whether  our  friends  are  absent  from  the  body  or 
absent  merely  because  they  are  not  in  the  same  house 
or  country,  there  is  a  sweet  community  of  soul,  a  sense 
of  priceless  possession  which  bespeaks  that  which  is 
eternal.  The  nearer  in  affinity  the  less  difference  it 
makes,  from  one  point  of  view,  whether  or  not  our 
friends  are  present  with  us.  To  say  farewell  to  an 
emotional  friend  is  perhaps  to  be  emotionally  torn 
asunder,  or  to  be  miserable  so  long  as  the  loved  one 
is  absent;  but  emotional  friendships  are  scarcely  to  be 
taken  as  standards.  If  the  friendship  has  risen  above 
the  emotional  level  there  is  no  such  rude  tearing  apart. 
When  the  dear  one  leaves  for  the  distant  town  or 
country,  he  is  still  here;  for  the  tie  is  an  interior  one, 
the  friendship  is  one  of  peace  and  rest.  One  would 
fain  continue  to  be  by  the  loved  one's  side.  But  dis- 
tance does  not  mean  separation,  and  the  reunion  brings 
no  inward  excitement.  It  is  the  outer  or  emotional 
man  who  becomes  excited.  What  the  soul  calls 
love  is  far  above  ordinary  emotion. 

Again,  there  is  the  joy  of  doing  things  together. 
The  immediate  work  at  hand  for  each  may  be  widely 
different.  One  may  be  the  mother's  work  of  caring 
for  the  children  and  presiding  over  the  home,  while 
the  other  is  the  father's  labour  of  providing  for  the 
daily  bread.  The  work  of  each  may  necessitate  their 
physical  separation  during  the  day.  Yet  all  along 
there  is  a  consciousness  that  each  is  working  for  the 


The  Eternal  Type  of  Life  85 

same  end,  namely,  the  larger  welfare  of  the  soul  and 
of  the  family.  Now  and  then  there  is  opportunity 
for  a  quiet  evening  together,  for  the  comparison  of 
notes  regarding  that  which  is  most  worth  while.  Cer- 
tain points  will  bear,  for  example,  upon  the  realisation 
of  ideals,  the  need  of  adjustment  to  the  conditions  of 
life  as  now  found,  yet  of  constant  fidelity  to  interests 
which  call  for  a  higher  social  environment.  Other 
points  relate  to  the  gro\vth  of  character  in  each,  the 
faults  to  be  eliminated,  the  energies  to  be  quickened 
or  transmuted.  Again,  it  is  a  question  of  the  amount 
of  time  to  be  apportioned  to  social  life.  All  this  may 
be  said  to  pertain  to  the  eternal  life  inasmuch  as  it 
relates  to  that  which  is  spiritually  worth  while. 

Again,  it  is  an  instance  of  two  friends  who  work  at 
their  art  side  by  side,  who  pursue  truth  together,  or 
labour  in  common  in  some  form  of  social  service.  Most 
of  the  details  considered  may  be  temporal  and  trivial. 
Yet  withal  there  is  an  underlying  interest  in  ends  that 
endure,  an  interest  which  gives  life  to  all  the  rest. 
There  is  need  of  perspective;  for  example,  of  a  larger 
view  of  beauty,  truth,  or  goodness.  The  common 
details  can  hardly  be  seen  in  their  true  light  without 
this  larger  vision  of  the  eternal  whole.  To  do  things 
together  is  to  express  the  inmost  soul,  and  the  soul  is 
not  content  until  the  implied  eternal  principles  have 
been  brought  into  view. 

Or,  it  may  be  the  relationship  of  one  who  has  gained 
some  understanding  of  the  laws  of  life  and  of  another 
who  is  eager  to  follow  where  the  maturer  soul  leads. 
It  matters  not  so  much  what  the  common  interest 
is  as  the  spirit  in  which  the  study  is  pursued.  For 
the  relationship  of  teacher  and  pupil  may  well  be  one 
of  the  noblest  in  human  life.  The  one  seeks  above 


86  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

all  else  to  be  the  true  friend,  to  be  disinterested,  eager 
to  call  out  the  other's  best  self  and  to  find  for  that  self 
the  highest  object  of  interest;  while  the  pupil  is  no 
less  eager  to  attain  a  high  ideal,  that  is,  to  display  that 
delightful  confidence  which  enables  the  teacher  to 
guide  and  instruct  in  the  best  way. 

Those  who  thus  work  together  need  not  of  course 
think  of  their  united  pursuit  in  eternal  terms.  Yet 
there  is  an  advantage  in  doing  so,  for  in  the  eternal 
ideal  one  sees  the  ideals  both  of  self-realisation  and  of 
service  fulfilled  without  conflict.  To  express  oneself 
for  the  sake  of  the  eternal  values  is  at  the  same  time 
to  serve,  for  no  one  can  give  adequate  expression  to 
the  self  without  manifesting  the  larger  purpose  for 
which  the  soul  exists.  Likewise  to  aid  another  to 
express  the  eternal  values  is  the  better  to  express 
oneself. 

Moreover,  there  is  a  fine  quality  in  the  eternal  type 
of  consciousness;  the  desires,  hopes,  aspirations  are 
of  another  sort.  It  is  no  longer  a  question  of  mere 
self-control,  of  poise  in  self  or  merely  mental  composure. 
The  eternal  type  of  composure  is  not  put  on  for  the 
occasion,  and  one  can  hardly  possess  it  without  also 
possessing  a  deep-seated  faith  in  the  everlasting 
integrity  of  things.  There  is  no  longer  any  need  to 
hold  oneself  in  an  attitude  of  calmness,  since  this  sort 
of  composure  is  a  matter  of  habit.  There  is  a  sense 
of  rest  in  a  mode  of  life  which  gives  peace,  freedom 
from  worry  and  strife.  The  sense  of  restraint  which 
attended  one's  years  of  training  has  given  place  to  an 
abandonment  of  self  to  that  which  is  more  than  one's 
mere  self.  There  is  also  an  absence  of  intensity,  there 
is  no  eagerness  to  hold  an  experience  or  a  vision  lest 
it  cease  without  yielding  its  utmost  blessing.  For  the 


The  Eternal  Type  of  Life  87 

eternal  experience  remains,  the  divine  vision  continues 
—why  should  one  hold  it?  One  now  possesses  the 
reality  itself,  and  to  possess  is  no  longer  to  be  under 
the  necessity  of  holding  or  even  affirming.  This 
experience  of  rest  in  the  eternal  is  well  suggested  by 
Amiel's  sentence,  "To  possess  God  is  the  one  thing 
needful. " 

That  the  experience  is  one  which  brings  a  sense  of 
rest  in  a  larger  Reality  is  also  expressed  by  the  fact 
that  one  instinctively  speaks  of  it  as  a  gift.  Whether 
this  rest  in  the  peace  of  eternity  comes  in  solitary 
worship  of  the  divine,  or  through  the  sweet  communion 
of  friendship,  one  regards  the  experience  as  coming  by 
its  own  laws.  The  usual  world  is  round  about,  the 
ordinary  activities  go  on  as  usual,  but  somewhat  is 
added — another  and  more  beautiful  world.  The  test 
of  the  sanity  of  this  experience  lies  in  the  fact  that  one 
has  no  desire  to  flee  the  world,  to  disparage  natural 
reality:  nature  seems  more  real  and  human  life  more 
interesting.  The  higher  experience  is  added,  and 
nothing  is  taken  away.  It  is  as  if  one  had  never 
appreciated  nature's  beauty  before,  never  seen  the 
worth  of  human  life. 

Realising  that  such  experiences,  together  with  the 
friendships  they  bring,  the  visions  that  unfold,  are 
gifts  of  the  Spirit,  one's  constant  prayer  is  for  guidance 
and  power  to  permit  these  gifts  to  develop  in  their  own 
way.  For  the  great  difficulty  is  that  man  so  readily 
interferes,  tries  to  coerce  events  according  to  his  pri- 
vate desires,  to  possess  things  and  people  for  himself. 
It  requires  constant  vigilance  to  avoid  this  interfer- 
ence of  the  finite  will.  Not  until  we  have  repeatedly 
essayed  our  own  way  are  we  persuaded  that  there  is  a 
way  of  the  Spirit  where  one  can  at  best  merely  walk 


88  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

in  reverential  listening,  watching  the  play  of  the 
eternal  tides. 

Sometimes  a  noble  friendship  is  marred  because  the 
partners  to  it  are  unable  or  unwilling  to  let  it  develop 
in  its  own  way.  But  this  is  true  of  much  that  is  best 
in  human  life.  Whether  in  friendship  or  not,  our 
lesson  is  to  permit  the  Spirit  to  develop  within  us 
according  to  its  own  laws,  reveal  its  own  gifts,  and 
reveal  them  unto  the  end,  without  hindrance.  When 
the  gift  is  really  ours  we  may  philosophise  as  we  will, 
learning  whatever  additional  lesson  our  reason  may 
teach.  Here  is  the  test  of  human  patience,  and  here 
once  more  the  eternal  standard. 

It  is  important,  then,  to  recognise  that  in  beginning 
to  attain  the  eternal  type  of  life  one  crosses  a  line  from 
the  region  where  one  seems  to  be  merely  poised  in  self 
to  the  realm  where  one  rests  in  the'  Spirit.  In  the 
realm  of  the  mere  self  there  is  solicitude  lest  what  one 
seeks  elude  pursuit.  There  is  pushing  and  striving, 
there  are  manifold  endeavours  to  outwit  people. 
There  is  also  a  tendency  to  claim  things  or  ideas  as 
one's  own,  a  desire  for  praise,  a  longing  to  have  credit 
bestowed  where  it  is  due.  But  to  enter  the  realm  of 
the  eternal  values  is  to  realise  that  whatever  accords 
with  the  soul  will  come  as  a  divine  gift;  hence  that 
pressure,  enterprise,  is  not  only  unnecessary  and  in- 
appropriate but  a  positive  interference.  A  vast  load 
of  misplaced  responsibility  falls  when  one  attains  this 
stage.  Everybody  is  welcomed  and  recognised  as 
having  place  in  the  eternal  kingdom,  and  there  is 
no  wish  to  crowd  or  to  outwit.  Truth  is  sure  to 
prevail.  Each  man  will  be  valued  for  what  he  is  worth. 
Nothing  can  prevent  the  fulfilment  of  the  eternal  laws. 

Again,  we  have  a  clue  to  the  eternal  type  of  life 


The  Eternal  Type  of  Life  89 

in  the  ideal  occupations  which  some  men  pursue.  It 
has  long  been  recognised  that  to  seek  the  beautiful, 
the  true,  and  the  good  is  to  devote  life  to  ends  that  are 
of  worth  in  themselves.  To  dedicate  life  to  one  of 
these  ends  is  already  to  live  for  that  which  is  eternal, 
mayhap  to  live  for  it  as  well  in  this  natural  world  as 
one  could  in  any  other  sphere.  That  which  is  true, 
like  the  statement  that  two  and  two  are  four,  is  true 
in  its  own  right,  for  angels  and  for  men,  throughout 
all  time.  The  scholar  has  scarcely  dedicated  his  life 
to  truth  until  he  eliminates  time,  until  he  is  ready 
to  follow  as  far  and  as  long  as  truth  may  lead.  To 
be  in  haste  is  to  that  extent  not  to  love  the  truth, 
that  is,  when  it  is  a  question  of  learning  the  nature  of 
things. 

But  one  naturally  thinks  rather  of  the  artist,  in  the 
days  "when  art  was  still  religion, "  painting  his  picture, 
carving  his  statue,  or  building  a  great  cathedral,  not 
to  win  fame,  nor  to  make  as  much  money  as  possible, 
surely  not  to  break  any  records  in  rapidity  of  con- 
struction, but  to  produce  or  construct  as  well  as  it  could 
be  done,  however  long  it  might  take,  whatever  he 
might  be  paid  for  it,  out  of  pure  love  for  his  art.  The 
pursuit  of  beauty  thus  becomes  typical  of  all  quest 
for  that  which  is  eternal.  It  is  a  matter  of  ideals,  not 
of  circumstances.  One  conceives  of  an  ideal  attitude 
accompanying  such  work  as  the  artist's,  an  attitude 
of  peace  and  rest,  of  entire  absorption  and  consecration, 
yet  deeply  related  to  life  in  this  natural  world,  inas- 
much as  the  artist  works  with  his  hands  and  his  pro- 
ductions are  results  of  the  most  practical  skill. 

Picture  a  company  of  lovers  of  the  true,  the  beauti- 
ful, and  the  good,  conferring  at  their  leisure  on  the 
eternal  principles  of  beauty,  surrounded  by  works 


go  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

of  their  own  hands,  now  this  one  taking  the  lead,  and 
now  that,  and  you  have  a  still  better  conception  of  the 
ideal  of  devotion  to  the  eternal.  Here  is  the  poet, 
for  example,  who  expresses  in  easy-flowing  verse  his 
appreciation  of  the  beautiful,  leading  all  to  wonder 
at  the  power  of  his  art  to  express  what  neither  chisel 
nor  brush  could  portray.  Here  is  the  painter,  who 
draws  aside  a  curtain  and  displays  the  latest  product 
of  his  brush,  and  points  out  what  he  has  striven  to 
attain  yet  partly  failed  to  express.  Here  is  the  man 
of  science,  who  explains  the  discovery  of  an  unsus- 
pected element,  or  his  demonstration  of  a  natural  law, 
a  demonstration  which  delights  him  as  much  as  the 
painter's  achievement  delights  the  artist.  There  is 
also  present  an  ethical  philosopher  who  makes  plain 
the  relationship  of  beauty  and  goodness,  and  the 
aesthetic  philosopher  who  proposes  a  theory  of  the 
apprehension  of  beauty.  Then  the  musician  steps 
to  the  piano  and  lifts  his  companions  to  a  region  where 
they  apprehend  an  element  of  beauty  which  no  other 
of  its  devotees  could  convey.  Each  lover  of  the  beauti- 
ful must  indeed  confess  the  limitations  of  his  art,  yet 
somehow  each  knows  what  beauty  is  through  these 
its  varied  manifestations.  Each  prefers  his  own  art 
and  admits  his  inability  to  understand  all  that  tech- 
nically pertains  to  the  others.  Yet  one  and  all  ex- 
press the  same  principles,  all  are  lovers  of  the  same 
ideal,  and  all  manifest  a  delightful  remoteness  from 
the  sordid  world  of  temporal  life  which  bespeaks  their 
devotion  to  the  eternal. 

In  other  words,  there  are  people  who  have  attained 
the  level  of  the  universal,  and  when  universal  souls 
meet  they  utter  the  same  great  message  in  varied 
forms.  There  are  few  such  souls  in  the  world,  for 


The  Eternal  Type  of  Life  91 

the  majority  of  men  have  not  yet  learned  what  is 
worth  while.  Sometimes  they  are  mistakenly  called 
"impersonal."  Again  they  are  misjudged  as  "im- 
practical." But  they  are  the  most  truly  personal  of 
men,  inasmuch  as  they  see  beyond  and  around  the 
personal.  And  they  alone  are  truly  practical,  for 
they  labour  for  the  things  that  endure.  Some  enter 
the  universal  region  through  the  doorway  of  art  —  that 
is,  they  produce  before  they  understand.  Others 
enter  it  by  thinking  out  the  great  principles  which 
alike  underlie  all  beauty,  all  truth  and  goodness. 
Still  others  dwell  in  that  ideal  world  only  in  part,  for 
they  hold  the  erroneous  doctrine  that  an  object  can 
be  beautiful  without  inspiring  goodness  and  truth;  or 
they  cleave  to  truth  as  if  beauty  were  a  thing  of  the 
past,  or  goodness  for  children.  Those  who  dwell  there 
in  full  right  know  that  the  artist  paints  his  picture, 
the  sculptor  carves  his  statue,  the  composer  writes 
his  symphony,  the  author  his  book,  the  poet  his  poem, 
by  the  same  great  principles.  Granted  that  I  am 
producing  a  genuine  book,  I  already  know  by  what 
delicate  skill  the  painter  develops  his  colour-scheme,  or 
the  musician  the  theme  of  his  symphony.  The  iden- 
tity of  principles  may  not  appear  at  first  sight.  But 
every  artist  in  so  far  as  he  is  also  philosopher  sees  this 
identity  and  expresses  it  in  his  own  terms,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  his  particular  art. 

But  there  are  also  those  who  enter  the  eternal  realm 
by  the  aid  of  others,  and  one  can  scarcely  read  Plato, 
for  example,  without  catching  the  spirit  of  the  universal 
region.  The  artist,  the  poet,  musician,  or  philosopher 
is  more  likely  to  aid  the  mind  to  ascend  to  the  eternal 
realm  than  the  moralist  or  the  minister ;  for  the  devotee 
of  the  good  is  apt  to  preach  too  much.  The  devotee 


92  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

of  the  inner  life  also  readily  errs  by  analysing  too 
minutely,  or  by  placing  too  much  stress  on  emotion 
and  various  conditions  which  make  his  account  of  the 
spiritual  life  too  subjective.  That  which  truly  lifts 
the  mind  to  the  abode  of  the  eternal  takes  away  the 
thought  of  conditions,  subjectivities,  and  the  like. 
Only  when  we  move  in  the  free  atmosphere  of  the 
ideal  are  we  truly  there.  Hence  the  artist  has  an 
advantage,  for  he  paints  for  all  time,  carves  his  statue 
as  an  end  in  itself.  The  philosopher  who  dwells  upon 
a  point  until  there  is  nothing  more  that  is  worth  while 
to  say  about  it,  also  illustrates  this  freedom.  To  the 
uninitiated  he  is  tiresome,  to  the  one  who  understands 
he  is  enlightening  because  thorough.  The  listener 
would  fain  sit  back  in  his  chair  with  equal  ease,  equal 
forgetfulness  of  the  lapse  of  time,  as  eager  to  attain 
mastery  in  a  field  that  is  worth  while. 

But  every  genuine  worker  might  lift  others  to  the 
level  of  the  eternal  by  dwelling  on  the  ideal  totality 
of  his  labour,  instead  of  living  in  the  prosaic  details 
as  they  pass.  The  true,  the  beautiful,  and  the  good 
are  unlimited  in  scope  and  application.  If  a  task  be 
worth  doing  it  is  worthy  of  being  reared  into  a  fine 
art,  an  illuminative  fact,  a  sermon.  In  the  common 
walks  of  life,  as  well  as  in  the  studio  and  the  labora- 
tory, one  finds  those  who  are  thus  aspiring.  One  finds 
them,  for  example,  among  those  who  are  fond  of  work, 
for  only  those  who  greatly  laboured  ever  entered  the 
realm  of  the  eternal.  Time  is  of  little  moment  to  the 
man  who  is  striving  to  do  his  work  as  well  as  it  can  be 
done,  and  the  devotee  of  eternal  ideals  spares  neither 
time  nor  labour. 

The  eternal  type  of  life  is  first  of  all  a  matter  of 
experience.  Certain  contrasts  enter  into  life,  after  a 


The  Eternal  Type  of  Life  93 

time,  certain  phases  of  consciousness  are  differentiated 
from  the  rest,  and  one  is  aware  that  in  these  moments 
one  lives  a  completer  life.  The  theory  or  ideal  of  an 
eternal  type  of  life  does  not  induce  the. life,  but  the 
life  comes  and  the  ideal  insensibly  takes  shape.  It 
becomes  clear  that  a  certain  mode  of  life  best  accords 
with  such  experiences,  and  by  giving  heed  to  the  con- 
ditions one  learns  to  increase  the  experiences.  The 
theory  then  follows  as  a  matter  of  course. 

It.  is  clear,  on  the  one  hand,  that  there  are  higher 
factors  at  work,  else  there  would  not  be  this  added 
sense  of  life,  this  unwonted  presence  which  comes 
as  a  gift.  It  appears  that  if  in  deepest  truth  the  soul 
already  partakes  of  an  eternal  life  as  a  divine  gift  it 
pertains  to  the  eternal  order.  The  existence  of  powers 
within  the  soul  which  make  such  experiences  possible 
is  also  plain.  There  seem  to  be  higher  senses,  higher 
powers  of  love  and  self-expression,  a  higher  type  of 
receptivity  or  spontaneity  through  which  spiritual 
guidances  come.  All  these  require  special  inves- 
tigation, but  for  the  moment  we  chronicle  the  mere 
appearance. 

The  life  that  is  demanded  of  us  is  not  a  life  of  ex- 
clusion from  practical  interests,  but  rather  a  life  of 
relative  detachment  from  mundane  possessions  and 
desires.  A  certain  freedom  from  binding  engagements, 
for  example,  best  accords  with  this  mode  of  life,  es- 
pecially in  the  case  of  those  who  are  engaged  in  creative 
work.  One  who  has  felt  the  sense  of  perennial  freshness 
of  the  eternal  life  awakens  into  the  new  day  eager 
for  whatever  it  may  bring  by  way  of  moral  opportunity 
or  spiritual  benefit.  Every  belief  is  in  a  sense  held  in 
solution — except  the  belief  that  the  Spirit  is  present 
to  guide  the  soul  throughout  the  course  of  life.  There 


94  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

is  a  habit  of  pausing  for  leadings,  to  dedicate  the  soul 
afresh.  There  may  be  abundant  plans  for  the  present 
day  and  the  ensuing  weeks,  but  one  is  ready  to  put 
these  aside.  There  are  duties  waiting  to  be  performed, 
but  the  renewed  prompting  more  surely  leads  the  way 
to  the  fulfilment  of  these. 

The  implication  is  that  at  each  hour  of  the  spiritual 
day  there  is  an  activity,  a  deed  of  love,  a  service  for 
truth,  more  important  than  aught  else.  The  de- 
sideratum is  to  learn  what  is  for  to-day.  If  we  are 
not  sufficiently  alive  to  the  spiritual  purpose  of  the 
hour  to  perceive  a  distinct  leading,  the  first  requisite 
is  belief  that  guidance  is  for  us  and  will  presently  be 
revealed.  Plainly,  a  certain  expectant  adaptation  of 
life  is  imperative.  We  cannot  serve  two  masters. 
One  must  become  a  single,  unified,  consistent  self, 
ready  to  do  the  Father's  will,  go  where  the  Spirit 
leads.  One  must  be  ready  to  yield  all  to  possess  all. 

That  is,  there  are  times  when  it  is  profitable  to  put 
oneself  through  certain  tests.  Is  one  willing  to  forego 
personal  plans,  hopes  and  pleasures,  to  sunder  ties 
and  relationships,  mayhap  leave  the  home-environment, 
and  those  who  are  nearest  and  dearest,  even  the  one 
whom  the  heart  loves  most?  That  is  a  hard,  hard 
question.  But  some  ask  it  many  times,  as  the  years 
pass,  and  to  ask  is  to  discover  how  nearly  ready  one 
is  to  leave  all  for  the  Father.  But  to  be  ready  is  to 
discover  that  no  such  sundering  of  the  heart's  closest 
ties  is  required  of  us.  These  ties  are  already  of  the 
eternal,  have  come  to  abide.  It  is  the  secondary  things 
which  we  must  forego,  not  the  primary,  and  the  re- 
lationships of  the  heart  are  primary  ties.  It  is  pre- 
cisely that  the  primary  relationships  may  be  deepened 
that  we  offer  ourselves  to  the  Father. 


The  Eternal  Type  of  Life  95 

To  be  eager  to  live  more  faithfully  by  the  Spirit  is 
to  see  that  life  must  be  simplified,  hence  that  there  is 
no  longer  time  for  many  demands  which  society  puts 
upon  us;  for  instance,  to  write  letters  or  make  calls 
when  there  is  nothing  in  particular  to  say.  This  does 
not  mean  that  one  will  be  drawn  further  from  people 
who  have  no  aim  in  life  save  to  exist.  On  the  contrary, 
one  will  be  drawn  nearer  to  all  people,  and  human 
life  in  all  its  relationships  will  become  more  beautiful. 
The  joys  we  are  prompted  to  enter  into  will  be  more 
joyous,  to  work  will  be  to  labour  with  greater  zest. 
There  will  be  no  time  for  mere  superficiality  or  empty 
formality:  the  son  of  God  must  be  mindful  of  his 
Father's  business. 

In  such  a  life  there  will  be  a  delightful  leisure  com- 
bined with  a  productive  activity  that  will  fill  the  hour. 
That  is,  there  must  be  time  for  receptivity,  silence, 
rest,  contemplation,  profound  reflectiveness;  time  for 
the  intellect  to  make  plain  the  implications  of  experi- 
ences already  enjoyed,  and  for  active  study  of  present 
conditions  and  the  laws  of  spiritual  progress;  and 
abundant  room  for  the  unexpected.  But  the  moments, 
hours,  and  days  of  leisure  will  be  mingled  with  days 
and  hours  of  labour. 

It  is  astonishing  how  much  time  and  energy  are 
gained  for  repose  and  reflection  when  one  ceases  to 
worry,  when  one  gives  up  the  attempt  to  manage 
people.  There  is  never  a  genuine  reason  for  alleging 
that  we  have  no  time  for  repose  and  quiet  study. 
It  is  a  question  not  of  time  but  of  the  mode  of  life  we 
lead.  Free  yourself  from  the  little  interior  frictions 
which  work  such  mischief,  give  over  the  habit  of 
anticipating  unpleasant  contingencies  and  planning 
far  in  advance,  cease  all  effort  to  shape  the  world  for 


96  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

your  own  benefit,  live  a  life  of  faith;  and  you  will 
discover  that  there  is  abundant  time  both  to  do  your 
work  well,  to  accomplish  more,  and  to  step  aside  from 
the  great  on-rush  and  meditate  as  if  time  were 
naught. 

The  more  deeply  and  constantly  one  enters  into 
the  moments  of  unusual  repose  and  freedom  from 
care,  the  more  steadily  the  eternal  life  will  win  its  way 
into  the  mundane,  so  that  one  will  live  in  both  worlds 
at  once.  It  is  not,  I  repeat,  the  occasional  composure 
which  we  put  on  because  of  imperative  need,  but  the 
reserve  power  of  the  spiritual  life  which  we  may  depend 
upon  as  a  permanent  possession.  Poise  is  hardly 
poise  unless  it  be  matter  of  habit,  and  it  is  still  ex- 
perimental until  it  be  produced  in  us  by  the  larger 
Life  that  possesses  us.  Having  won  the  possession, 
fortunate  are  we  if  we  adapt  the  conscious  part  of 
daily  conduct  to  the  conditions  and  laws  of  the  coming 
of  the  Spirit. 

There  are  conflicts,  to  be  sure,  between  the  ideals 
and  activities  of  the  eternal  type  of  life  and  the  de- 
mands of  ordinary  existence;  but  were  it  not  for  these 
one  could  hardly  realise  the  type.  There  are  times, 
for  instance,  when  the  consciousness  of  eternal  prin- 
ciples is  so  greatly  quickened  that  one  would  gladly 
give  every  day  and  hour  to  the  spontaneous  play  of 
thought.  But  it  may  be  that  the  present  duties  are 
such  that  one  can  merely  make  a  few  notes  and  pass 
on  to  the  given  duty.  Sometimes  the  change  to  the 
task  at  hand  is  indeed  a  rude  one,  and  worldly  life 
appears  to  be  wholly  out  of  accord  with  the  eternal. 
But  the  conflict  is  not  so  great  as  it  seems.  For  how 
could  the  law  of  faith  ever  be  proved  unless  one  were 
so  situated  as  frequently  to  be  compelled  to  undergo 


The  Eternal  Type  of  Life  97 

its  tests,  to  adjust  oneself  to  practical  needs  such  as 
earning  a  living? 

There  is  a  strong  temptation  to  condemn  the  world 
as  selfish  and  materialistic,  to  renounce  it  in  favour 
of  solitude  or  ascetic  simplicity.  But  one  learns 
rather  to  judge  by  the  relative  values  of  the  natural 
and  the  spiritual,  and  the  cowardly  ways  of  seeking 
the  ideal  life  have  been  tried  in  the  past  and  been 
rejected.  To  eliminate  from  life  anything  that  makes 
it  human  is  to  that  extent  to  deprive  it  of  the  Spirit. 
One  might  indeed  buy  temporary  repose  and  freedom 
from  annoyance,  but  the  experiences  which  might 
thereby  be  gained  would  lack  the  social  element.  To 
achieve  the  simple  life  amidst  the  complexities  of  a 
mode  of  existence  which  seems  to  be  fatal  to  it  is  in- 
deed to  possess  that  simplicity  which  after  all  is  a 
spiritual  state,  not  an  affair  of  circumstance.  The 
conditions  of  life  as  we  find  it  are  not  unfriendly, 
provided  we  have  the  courage  to  make  the  venture. 
The  ideal  world  is  just  this  present  world  seen  in  its 
eternal  guise.  There  is  no  aspiration  which  we  may 
not  begin  to  realise  even  here.  To  place  the  first 
emphasis  upon  environment  were  to  be  disloyal  to 
the  Spirit. 

Not,  then,  in  absence  from  pain  and  conflict  does 
one  find  the  larger  realities  of  the  Spirit,  but  in  and 
through  the  travail  of  the  soul.  Not  by  running  away 
does  one  truly  escape  from  the  situation  which  seems 
too  hard,  but  by  learning  what  the  present  situation 
really  is  and  discerning  the  wisdom  of  it.  We  shall 
not  always  suffer,  and  never  beyond  what  we  are  able 
to  endure  with  spiritual  benefit.  To  welcome  the 
present  conditions,  to  seek  their  beauty,  and  the 
evidences  they  contain  of  the  divine  love,  is  already 


98  The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

to  win  freedom  in  some  measure.  It  matters  much 
whether  we  regard  the  present  merely  as  present  or 
whether  we  take  the  long  look  ahead.  The  seemingly 
impossible  problem  which  we  bear  about  with  us 
begins  to  be  solved  the  moment  we  quietly  regard  it 
as  implying  the  soul's  immediate  need.  The  un- 
yielding circumstance  which  we  face  day  by  day 
becomes  plastic  before  us  when  we  view  it  in  the  light 
of  spiritual  evolution.  The  present  circumstance  is 
not  here  through  any  chance  occurrence,  but  through 
law.  It  bears  immediate  relation  to  the  soul;  our 
pathway  lies  through,  not  around  it. 

There  is  a  vast  difference  between  subordination  to 
circumstance  and  that  commanding  attitude  in  which 
we  see  that  the  Spirit  makes  circumstance.  To  be- 
lieve in  the  Spirit  is  to  think  and  act  in  accord  with 
it  while  it  creates  the  living  present.  There  are  not 
two  powers,  as  if  some  other  being  had  created  this 
natural  world,  while  God  had  made  the  spiritual.  The 
one  ultimate  power  is  God's  life  and  love,  the  one 
universe  is  the  eternal  order.  The  ultimate  ends  for 
which  all  things  exist  are  spiritual.  Nothing  in  the 
natural  world  exists  independently  or  apart  from  the 
spiritual.  The  continuous  manifestation  of  spiritual 
life  is  essential  to  the  continued  existence  of  the  nat- 
ural world. 

To  grasp  this  and  live  by  it,  we  must  transfer  our 
point  of  view  from  the  merely  natural  to  the  spiritual. 
Then  we  shall  be  able  to  assign  the  forces  of  environ- 
ment to  their  proper .  places  in  the  light  of  the  pur- 
poses which  they  subserve.  The  difficulty  ordinarily 
is  that  while  we  are  able  to  analyse  the  conditions  of 
natural  life,  to  introspect  and  study  the  phenomena 
of  self-consciousness,  we  are  unable  to  produce  a 


The  Eternal  Type  of  Life  99 

sufficiently  large  synthesis.  The  facts  which  we 
discover  may  indeed  be  true  as  far  as  they  go,  we  may 
have  before  us  the  elements  of  daily  life  as  the  natural 
man  sees  it;  but  we  lack  the  illuminating  principle, 
the  point  of  view  of  the  Spirit. 

In  other  words,  there  is  a  truth  of  fact,  and  a  truth 
of  hope,  or  values.  Men  live  less  in  a  matter-of-fact 
world  than  they  suspect.  It  is  the  scientific  man 
rather  than  the  man  of  common  sense  who  really 
knows  what  a  fact  is.  Our  ambitions,  ideals,  hopes, 
are  so  inwrought  with  the  routine  facts  of  life  that 
few  of  us  possess  the  insight  to  draw  the  distinction. 
Our  ideal  world  is  insensibly  taking  shape  amidst  the 
world  of  prosaic  details.  We  live  upon  hope  to  a  very 
large  extent;  we  possess  beliefs  without  number  for 
which  we  could  give  no  reason,  or  only  a  poor  reason. 
It  seldom  occurs  to  us  to  offer  any  reason,  inasmuch 
as  the  world  of  our  customary  life,  intermingled  with 
its  ideals,  is  our  real  world. 

Not  until  some  one  undertakes  to  reduce  life  to  mere 
prose  is  there  any  reason  to  protest.  That  which  is 
reducible  to  precise  factual  analysis  is  oftentimes  the 
least  important.  Real  life  is  known  by  experience; 
each  man  must  possess  in  order  to  appreciate  it.  It  is 
in  part  prose,  but  also  in  part  poetry.  Either  the 
prose  or  the  poetry  alone  is  a  fragment;  the  whole 
is  knowable  through  experience,  carefully  interpreted. 
Man  is  what  he  would  be  as  well  as  what  he  is.  For 
the  most  of  us  the  truth  of  hope  is  every  whit  as  real 
as  the  truth  of  fact.  Our  conviction  in  regard  to 
immortality,  for  example,  is  a  truth  of  hope.  Our 
conception  of  the  soul  is  an  ideal  construction  inwrought 
with  manifold  hopes.  Asked  to  state  precise  evidences 
we  are  nonplussed.  But  we  need  not  be  concerned: 


ioo         The  Philosophy  of*  the  Spirit 

the  truths  of  values  and  ideals  are  the  real  truths  of 
human  life- 

The  eternal  type  of  life  for  which  we  are  pleading 
is  one  which  takes  the  conviction  of  the  soul's  im- 
mortality, the  environing  existence  of  a  spiritual 
world,  in  utmost  seriousness,  and  finds  in  our  higher 
human  experiences  firm  evidence  of  the  quickening 
presence  of  the  Spirit.  The  distinction  between  facts 
and  ideals  is  not  primarily  between  that  which  exists 
and  that  which  does  not,  but  is  made  because  of  the 
inadequacy  of  all  merely  descriptive  language.  The 
soul  is  too  rich  to  be  fully  analysed,  its  immortality 
is  verifiable  by  the  immortal  life  itself.  The  life  in 
quest  for  ideals  is  grounded  both  in  facts  and  in  hopes, 
and  the  total  truth  about  such  life  must  take  account 
of  both.  The  eternal  ends — beauty,  truth,  the  good 
— are  realities  in  the  ultimate  order  of  being.  It  is 
because  the  eternal  order  exists  that  we  give  it  place 
in  our  thought,  not  that  we  conceive  of  it  because  of 
speculative  needs.  It  is  because  God  lives  that  we 
believe  in  Him,  not  that  we  postulate  the  divine 
existence  because  of  theoretic  interests.  God  may 
indeed  be  a  logical  necessity,  also;  but  He  is  first  of 
all  a  necessary  being. 

These,  then,  are  a  few  hints  in  regard  to  an  ideal 
attitude  which  each  of  us  may  endeavour  to  attain 
while  we  meet  the  usual  conditions  of  existence.  It 
is  an  attitude  that  is  inspired  by  the  frankest  recog- 
nition both  of  the  natural  world  of  facts  and  the  eter- 
nal world  of  hopes  and  values.  For  the  lover  of  the 
beautiful,  the  true  and  the  good,  the  ideal  world  is  no 
less  real,  no  less  existent,  than  the  visibly  tangible 
world  of  nature.  Indeed  he  passes  from  the  one  to  the 
other  and  is  aware  of  no  break.  The  natural  world 


The  Eternal  Type  of  Life  101 

exists  for  ideals;  it  is  the  field  wherein  the  ideals  find 
their  external  expression.  Directly  out  of  this  field 
grows  the  life  that  is  eternal.  He  who  is  well  grounded 
there  is  the  one  who  most  sanely  and  productively 
mounts  to  the  skies.  He  is  no  dreamer.  He  has  no 
baseless  visions.  Nor  does  he  wander  about  in  ab- 
straction, to  the  neglect  of  the  common  duties  of  life. 
He  is  no  doubt  absorbed  in  thought,  but  it  is  thought 
that  is  worth  while.  His  life  is  characterised  by  that 
noble  detachment  which  enables  him  to  be  very  much 
alive  in  the  natural  world  yet  independent  of  it.  His 
are  the  noblest  friendships,  and  his  the  greatest  oppor- 
tunities for  service  which  human  life  affords. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE    NATURAL    AND    THE    SPIRITUAL 

IN  the  preceding  chapter  we  were  concerned  with 
some  of  the  interests  and  tendencies  which  make  for  a 
more  ideal  type  of  life.  We  found  reason  to  maintain 
the  firmest  belief  in  the  truths  of  hope,  since  it  is 
through  such  truths  that  man  gradually  transforms 
the  actual  into  the  heavenly,  the  temporal  into  the 
eternal.  This  insistence  upon  the  truths  of  hope 
implies  a  distinction  between  the  facts  of  life  and  the 
meanings  or  values  assigned  to  them.  These  values 
are  indeed  assigned  by  human  reason,  but  by  those 
who  bear  the  witness  of  the  Spirit  within  them  they  are 
assigned  not  for  speculative  reasons  but  because  the 
Spirit  coming  as  a  gift  makes  its  presence  known. 
Hence  the  essential  is  to  see  the  facts  and  values  in 
the  right  relation.  In  practical  life,  one  is  greatly 
aided  by  maintaining  an  attitude  which  is  inspired  by 
contemplation  of  these  values  while  by  no  means 
neglecting  the  details  which  give  them  content.  Such 
an  attitude  we  characterised  as  embodying  a  new  type, 
the  eternal  type  of  life.  We  found  this  to  be  a  life 
of  trust,  of  repose,  not  in  self  but  in  the  Spirit,  not  in 
the  passing  moment  but  in  the  divine  order.  We  found 
it  to  be  also  a  life  of  quest  for  the  true,  the  beautiful, 
and  the  good,  commingled  with  the  choicest  friend- 
ships and  the  best  sort  of  productivity. 

We  might  further  characterise  this  attitude  by 
reference  to  the  process  of  thought  of  one  who  is  en- 

102 


The  Natural  and  the  Spiritual        103 

gaged  in  developing  a  philosophy  of  the  Spirit.  Here 
we  are,  already  in  possession  of  certain  general  prin- 
ciples. We  have  a  working  faith  which  we  have  not 
as  yet  fully  developed.  In  brief  it  is  this:  the  Spirit 
manifests  itself  in  the  world  and  reproduces  itself  in 
man,  the  Spirit  pursues  a  certain  course  through  us, 
and  reveals  its  laws  and  purposes  through  the  develop- 
ment of  the  soul.  When  a  new  situation  presents 
itself  we  are  not  disconcerted,  well  knowing  that  it  is 
a  revelation  of  the  same  Spirit.  We  are  not  hurried, 
since  all  eternity  is  ours.  We  need  not  go  elsewhere 
in  quest  for  a  clue.  The  new  experience  brings  its 
own  clue.  It  is  the  spiritual  law  which  explains  the 
temporal  event.  Let  us  then  reflect,  discern  the  law. 
If  it  be  given  us  to-day  to  discern  this  law,  we  will 
gladly  learn.  If  not,  another  day  will  be  the  better 
inasmuch  as  we  are  now  for  some  reason  unprepared. 
What  you  and  I  desire  above  all  else  is  the  development, 
steadily,  day  by  day,  of  that  calmly  reflective  life 
within  us  which  shall  eventually  reveal  the  divine 
law.  The  mind's  province  is  to  relate  the  natural 
to  the  spiritual,  see  how  the  Spirit  is  working  itself 
out  in  and  through  the  given  event.  By  thus  regarding 
life  as  it  passes,  ever  seeking  the  divine  meaning,  only 
secondarily  concerned  in  the  events  themselves,  one 
acquires  in  the  course  of  time  a  sense  of  detachment, 
with  deepening  repose  in  the  eternal  order.  Freedom 
from  the  life  of  sense  is  not  attained  by  trying  to 
escape  from  one's  problem,  but  by  seeking  the  univer- 
sal amidst  the  particular.  One  does  not,  then,  mean 
detachment  in  the  Oriental  sense,  but  detachment 
through  insight,  through  the  light  that  is  thrown  upon 
life  by  the  study  of  universal  principles. 

The  ideal  is  to  reach  a  point  where  nothing  that 


104          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

happens  shall  seem  obscure,  where  everything  may  be 
philosophically  related  with  what  has  occurred  before. 
It  is  this  relating  of  event  with  event — the  discovery 
of  types,  uniformities,  and  illuminating  contrasts — 
which  in  due  course  brings  the  understanding  that 
gives  detachment  from  mere  circumstance.  In  so 
far  as  the  mind  is  thus  illumined  it  becomes  a  life-giv- 
ing centre,  so  that  other  people  gather  round  about  to 
hear  the  law  expounded,  or  to  compare  notes.  By 
a  further  extension  of  this  development  we  have  the 
seer,  the  prophet,  the  sage.  It  is  a  question  of  large- 
ness of  point  of  view,  scope  of  thought,  as  well  as 
depth  of  experience.  The  great  teachers  and  leaders 
are  those  who  dwell  so  near  the  original  sources  that 
they  are  able  to  aid  others  to  seek  the  first-hand  real- 
ities of  the  spiritual  life. 

Another  line  of  approach  to  the  same  end  is  found 
by  considering  the  various  attitudes  which  man  has 
assumed  towards  the  world,  in  contrast  with  which 
this  faith  in  the  eternal  type  of  life  stands  out  in  large 
relief.  For  the  present  we  may  confine  our  attention 
to  three  of  these  attitudes. 

In  the  first  the  prevailing  emphasis  is  put  upon  man . 
Having  learned  that  the  world  is  for  us  what  we  men- 
tally make  it,  certain  theorists  endeavour  to  make  it 
what  they  happen  to  please  by  declaring  that  events 
shall  yield  to  their  will.  If  they  pray  to  God  it  is  to 
the  God  of  their  own  caprice,  who  is  supposed  to 
change  His  plans  to  suit  their  convenience.  Or,  the 
point  of  view  is  expressed  in  some  form  of  salvationism 
in  accordance  with  which  man  seeks  to  save  his  soul 
for  the  sake  of  a  promised  reward  of  "  bliss  in  heaven." 
This  doctrine  may  assume  a  theosophic  form  and 
relate  to  the  accumulated  burdens  of  ' "Karma,"  which 


The  Natural  and  the  Spiritual        105 

must  be  worked  off  in  order  to  escape  from  the  ne- 
cessity of  a  round  of  rebirths.  Again,  the  tendency 
assumes  a  more  romantic  form  and  is  on  the  whole 
highly  entertaining  in  its  lightly  won  idealism.  Some- 
times it  involves  a  complete  denial  of  the  nature  of 
things,  as  if  all  law  and  order  were  established  by 
human  thought,  and  all  man  need  do  were  to  seek  his 
own  pleasure  while  defying  the  conditions  of  rest  and 
good  health.  Emerson  refers  to  people  of  this  class 
when  he  insists  that  life  is  "invested  with  inevitable 
conditions  which  the  unwise  seek  to  dodge."  For 
all  who  thus  scorn  the  conditions  of  life  in  this  natural 
world  there  is  no  lesson  so  effective  as  a  rude  awakening 
to  the  laws  of  natural  prudence  after  an  absurd  at- 
tempt to  outwit  nature.  In  our  day  there  are  nu- 
merous theorists  who  by  their  folly  are  preparing  to 
learn  this  lesson.  Finally  this  tendency  assumes  the 
agnostic  form  already  mentioned,  that  is,  by  em- 
phasising the  factors  of  human  nature  and  human 
thought  in  such  wise  that  the  realities  lying  beyond 
these  relativities  are  lost  to  view.  To  this  class  be- 
long the  devotees  of  pale  values  who  have  lost  the 
power  of  belief  in  a  real  eternal  order  which  fulfils  the 
truths  of  hope.  Over  against  all  this  philosophising  is 
to  be  placed  the  great  and  sublime  fact  of  the  Nature 
of  Things,  the  world-order  which  no  man  created,  the 
provisions  for  earthly  existence  with  which  no  human 
thought  ever  had  the  slightest  thing  to  do. 

In  the  second  stage  of  belief,  man  becomes  pro- 
foundly reasonable,  and  instead  of  imposing  his  creed 
and  his  demands  upon  nature  frankly  admits  the 
existence  of  a  hard-and-fast  world-order  and  seeks  in 
all  seriousness  to  discover  what  that  world-order  is. 
It  is  primarily  a  question  of  the  sort  of  universe  we 


io6          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

live  in,  what  its  laws  and  conditions  are,  that  we  may 
conform  thought  and  conduct  to  the  nature  of  things. 
In  theoretical  matters  there  is  a  desire  to  be  thoroughly 
scientific,  to  eliminate  prejudices  and  allow  for  all 
preconceptions,  take  into  account  the  personal  equa- 
tion. The  scientific  theory  may  assume  the  form  of 
some  sort  of  realism,  or  it  may  become  constructively 
idealistic.  In  practical  affairs  it  is  a  matter  of  ad- 
justment, the  desire  to  learn  the  province  of  human 
will  and  activity,  that  man  may  know  what  is  within 
his  power.  Ultimately  the  question  becomes  this — 
What  is  the  nature,  scope  and  reality  of  consciousness? 
The  profoundest  interest  is  to  discover  an  adequate 
Ground  for  the  realities  and  events  of  the  physical 
universe  and  the  world  of  human  conduct.  The 
history  of  Western  philosophy  at  its  best  is  the  record 
of  man's  endeavours  to  find  such  a  Ground. 

There  is  nothing  to  say  in  objection  to  this  philosophy 
as  far  as  it  goes.  All  sound  philosophy  begins  with 
an  attempt  to  describe  and  understand  the  nature  of 
things.  But  philosophy  is  apt  to  end  with  an  account 
of  the  natural  order  of  things.  There  is  much  more 
than  this  to  be  accounted  for  in  human  experience. 
If  man  be  more  than  a  creature  of  passing  desires, 
emotions  and  thoughts,  if  the  universe  be  more  than 
the  stars  and  planets,  the  beings  and  things  which  we 
behold  about  us,  the  question  arises,  what  is  the  total 
nature  of  things,  not  from  the  temporal  point  of  view 
alone,  but  in  the  eternal  order?  Obviously,  if  the 
physical  universe  be  merely  part  of  an  invisible,  eternal 
order,  if  nature  and  man  exist  for  eternal  ends,  we 
cannot  understand  either  man  or  nature  from  a  merely 
temporal,  physical  point  of  view.  A  philosophy  of 
Spirit  is  essentially  an  interpretation  of  existence  from 


The  Natural  and  the  Spiritual        107 

this  larger  point  of  view.  It  is  concerned  with  modes 
of  life  and  ideals  which  are  conceivably  as  well  adapted 
to  one  sphere  of  existence  as  to  another.  Hence  this 
point  of  view  is  not  presently  to  be  set  aside  because 
the  centre  of  interest  has  changed.  It  implies  the 
existence  of  an  eternal  order  of  realities  and  ideals, 
an  order  which  is  the  permanent  basis  of  the  changing 
world  of  sense-experience.  If  the  implications  be 
sound,  if  this  higher  order  of  reality  be  the  clue  to  all 
reality,  there  is  every  reason  to  ask,  What  is  the 
ultimate  nature  of  things? 

All  this  is  implied  in  one  of  the  great  typical  atti- 
tudes which  men  maintain  toward  the  universe.1 
When  we  pause  to  reflect  what  manner  of  being  man 
is,  why  'he  exists,  what  is  permanent  and  genuinely 
worth  while,  we  realise  that  it  is  not  merely  a  question 
of  the  hard-and-fast  world  of  things,  but  of  the  highest 
aspirations  and  beliefs  of  the  soul.  We  do  not  or- 
dinarily question  the  validity  of  our  belief  in  nature. 
Why  should  we  not  take  in  as  good  faith  our  belief 
in  an  invisible  order  in  the  heavens?  It  is  surely  an 
essential  postulate  of  Christian  faith.  It  may  be  said 
that  we  never  question  the  existence  of  an  invisible 
order  round  about  us  until  some  theorist  or  sceptic 
undertakes  to  reduce  our  belief  to  a  system  of  values 
without  objective  correspondence. 

It  is  well  to  be  forewarned  against  the  inroads  of 
the  scepticism  which  undertakes  to  reduce  all  belief 
in  an  eternal  spiritual  world  to  a  series  of  lifeless 
values,  like  a  row  of  algebraic  symbols.  This  re- 
duction does  not  spring  from  the  distinction  between 
the  truth  of  fact  and  the  truth  of  hope,  but  is  in  reality 

1  I  have  discussed  some  of  these  larger  world-conceptions  in 
Man  and  the  Divine  Order,  New  York,  1903. 


io8          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

expressive  of  deep-lying  scepticism  in  regard  to  the 
existence  of  anything  save  physical  facts,  and  it  con- 
ceals a  profound  disbelief  even  in  the  present  existence 
of  a  soul.     This  disbelief  in  a  real  spiritual  world  is 
apt  to  arise  through  scepticism  in  regard  to  immor- 
tality.    It  is  alleged  that  "immortality"  is  the  earthly 
survival  of  our  achievements,  handed  down  through 
those  whom  we  have  helped  to  educate,  or  through  the 
production  of  works  of  genius.     If  there  be  no  im- 
mortality there  is  of  course  no  "soul"  in  the  popular 
sense  of  the  word.     What  we  denominate  "soul"  is 
a  theoretic  synthesis  of  certain  persistent  phases  of 
consciousness  which  we  single  out  and  eulogise.     That 
is,  the  soul  is  a  convenient  "fiction"  of  poetic  thought. 
But  if  there  be  no  soul  there  is  no  reason  for  the  ex- 
istence of  a  real  higher  order  of  being.     What  man 
worships  indeed  has  value  for  him,  while  he  lives  this 
physical  life.     But  art,  the  pursuit  of  truth,  the  cere- 
monials of  the  church — what  are  they  other  than  just 
so  many  aesthetic  or  other  values  which  are  not  to 
be  taken  too  seriously?    One  may  well  attend  mass, 
bring  offerings  to  the  virgin,  adore  the  saints.     It  is  a 
harmless  delusion  for  the  plain  man  to  believe  that 
these  things  really  exist.     But  we  who  are  enlightened 
would  never  think  of  taking  them  seriously.     Heaven 
is  just  your  hypothetical  ideal  realm,  needed  to  com- 
plete the  poetic  picture  of  life,  just  as  the  conception 
of   the   devil   fulfils   a   theoretic    function.     Likewise 
even  in  profound  systems  of  philosophy  the  conception 
of  God  plays  a  prominent  part  which  upon  inspection 
proves  to  be  merely  formal.     That  is,  the  philosopher 
does  not  necessarily  believe  that  just  his  God  has  being, 
but  he  has  theoretic  need  of  such  a  God  in  order  to 
complete  the  logical   structure   of   his   system.     The 


The  Natural  and  the  Spiritual         109 

ultimate  doubt  is  this  doubt  whether  God  exists.  For, 
why  may  it  not  be  that  God  is  simply  the  expression 
of  man's  belief?  Once  doubt  the  existence  of  the 
soul,  and  it  is  an  easy  step  to  this  last  doubt. 

Now  all  this  comes  about,  in  the  last  analysis,  in  one 
of  two  ways.  Either  man  has  not  the  witness  of  the 
Spirit  within  him  as  a  conscious  possession,  or  he 
devotes  so  much  care  to  the  analysis  of  the  evidences 
for  the  existence  of  physical  reality  that  he  has  no 
time  left  for  the  investigation  of  the  existence  of 
higher  grades  of  reality.  Whatever  the  reason  for 
neglect,  we  have  precisely  the  same  reason  for  the 
existence  of  invisible  reality  that  we  have  for  the  exist- 
ence of  the  physical  world.  That  is  to  say,  on  the 
evidence  of  our  senses  and  the  inferences  founded  upon 
their  deliverances  we  believe  in  the  existence  of  nature. 
We  believe  in  nature  partly  because  of  unscrutinised 
experience,  partly  through  reason,  and  partly  because 
of  practical  faith.  That  is,  there  is  a  certain  demand 
that  nature  shall  be  real,  which  underlies  our  longing 
for  continued  existence.  Likewise  we  believe  in  a 
superior  order  of  reality  partly  through  experience, 
partly  because  our  moral  reason  demands  such  belief, 
and  partly  as  a  matter  of  religious  faith.  Moral  and 
religious  conduct  would  be  robbed  of  most  of  its  zest 
without  this  belief.  On  the  mere  basis  of  conduct, 
that  is,  for  pragmatic  reasons,  men  are  willing  to  ven- 
ture the  assumption  that  the  higher  order  is  real. 
If  belief  in  the  existence  of  nature  is  a  necessity  of 
thought,  belief  in  a  superior  order  of  being  is  no  less 
so.  The  reason  this  is  not  at  once  plain  is  found  in 
the  fact  that  we  devote  most  of  our  philosophic  en- 
deavours to  the  interpretation  of  nature,  to  the  neg- 
lect of  the  eternal  order. 


no          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

One  should  beware,  then,  of  the  sort  of  philosophising 
that  regards  the  plain  man  pityingly  and  "the  ever- 
lasting realities  of  religion"  as  so  many  pale  con- 
ceptions, lifeless  shades,  survivals  from  the  childhood 
of  the  world.  It  is  of  consequence  to  point  out  that 
our  conceptions  of  the  everlasting  realities  are  in  one 
sense  ideal  constructions  of  human  reason.  But  the 
prime  consideration  is  that  enlightened  reason  would 
never  have  reared  its  structures  out  of  thin  air.  It  is 
no  doubt  an  act  of  faith  to  believe  in  the  real  existence 
of  the  objects  of  spiritual  idealism,  after  the  devotees 
of  the  critical  philosophy  have  made  clear  the  results  of 
their  acute  analysis.  But  such  faith  finds  its  jus- 
tification through  the  fact  that  it  more  completely 
accords  with  the  data  of  human  existence.  If  it  be 
purely  a  pragmatic  assumption,  at  first,  in  the  end  it 
has  the  support  of  constructive  idealism. 

In  the  present  investigation,  we  are  taking  in  entire 
seriousness  this  belief  in  the  existence  of  a  real  in- 
visible order  of  being  with  which  the  soul  is  in  direct 
relation.  That  is  to  say,  we  start  with  the  belief  that 
there  is  a  higher  realm  of  being,  a  real  world,  a  portion 
of  the  total  universe,  as  real,  yes,  far  more  real  than 
the  world  of  physical  objects  about  us.  For  the  ulti- 
mately real  universe  is  in  truth  the  divine,  eternal 
order,  and  the  world  of  visible  things  is  the  most  ob- 
jective portion  of  that  universe.  The  starting-point 
is  the  divine  order,  the  Spirit  in  its  varied  forms  of 
manifestation,  the  cosmos  of  souls.  Nature  is  second- 
ary, exists  for  the  sake  of  the  eternal.  Unless  we  start 
with,  postulate,  assume  the  existence,  and  constantly 
take  account  of  the  eternal  order  in  this  large  sense  of 
the  word,  we  will  never  be  able  to  put  the  temporal 
order  in  its  true  light.  Part  of  man's  theoretical  and 


The  Natural  and  the  Spiritual         in 

practical  difficulty  all  along  is  due  to  his  failure  to 
begin  with  this  the  truly  universal  world. 

If  it  seem  remote  from  life  as  we  ordinarily  cognise 
it  to  speak  of  an  eternal  order  of  being,  "invisible  in 
the  heavens,"  and  if  the  question  arise,  How  are  we 
to  know  that  this  superior  world  is  aught  more  than 
a  mere  postulate  of  our  belief?  the  answer  is  the  one 
already  indicated.  That  is,  we  are  to  know  it  in  the 
same  way  in  which  we  know  of  the  order  and  reality 
of  the  natural  world,  first  by  experience,  then  by 
rational  reconstruction  of  the  established  facts  and 
laws  of  carefully  observed  experience.  The  reality 
of  nature  is  by  no  means  obvious,  although  it  seems 
so  to  the  naive  realist.  We  are  far  more  directly 
aware  of  the  reality  of  mind  than  that  of  matter.  To 
start  with  the  given  facts  of  consciousness  and  thence 
to  emerge  into  belief  in  an  objective  nature  is  not  half 
so  easy  at  it  appears.  Such  emergence  is  necessary, 
in  the  first  place,  to  account  for  certain  persistent 
factors  of  consciousness.  We  need  not  seek  new 
types  of  experience  in  order  to  find  data  which  no 
less  surely  compel  the  mind  to  believe  in  a  higher 
order  of  objectivity  corresponding  to  man's  moral  and 
spiritual  beliefs.  The  eternal  kingdom  is  not  far 
from  us.  We  already  dwell  within  it.  The  essential 
is  to  discover  the  attitude  in  which  the  real  evidence 
may  be  discerned. 

One  of  the  chief  reasons  why  it  is  difficult  to  realise 
the  nature  of  the  eternal  world  is  found  in  the  fact  that 
we  import  the  terms  of  space  and  time,  and  try  to 
think  about  the  everlasting  realities  in  the  language 
of  the  things  that  perish.  Let  us  reverse  the  order 
and  begin  with  that  which  is  eternal,  remembering 
Swedenborg's  insistent  proposition,  "The  divine  is 


ii2          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

not  in  space. "  l  Let  us  divest  the  mind  of  all  thought 
of  spatial  forms  and  relationships,  and  endeavour  to 
penetrate  even  beyond  the  ordinary  figures  of  speech. 
To  think  of  the  being  of  God  is  not,  then,  to  ask,  "  Where 
does  He  exist?"  It  is  not  even  to  declare,  "God  is 
here."  For  when  we  thus  .characterise  the  divine 
being  we  limit  our  thought  to  the  conditions  of  our 
natural  existence.  We  should  think  rather  of  God 
as  the  central  reality  without  which  there  would  be 
neither  a  natural  nor  a  spiritual  world,  neither  spatial 
nor  eternal  existence;  hence  as  the  reality  which  is 
fundamental  alike  to  the  world  of  things  and  to  the 
world  of  consciousness.  As  the  central  reality  of  all 
existence,  God  is  of  course  the  ultimate  source  of 
all  power  and  life,  and  the  fundamental  ground  of  all 
substance  and  form.  As  the  basis  of  our  own  mental, 
moral  and  spiritual  existence,  He  is  the  central  per- 
sonality, hence  the  eternal  basis  of  all  inner  activity 
and  thought,  the  constant  principle  of  all  thought  and 
love.  Hence  we  speak  of  Him  as  the  divine  wisdom 
and  love,  we  call  Him  Father,  declare  that  all  men 
are  His  children. 

To  apply  such  adjectives  as  "infinite"  (in  the 
popular  sense),  "omnipotent,"  "inscrutable,"  would 
be  for  the  most  part  to  permit  our  thought  to  run  off 
into  the  vague  and  undefined.  As  already  implied, 
God  is  nothing  if  not  definite,  the  most  highly  organised 
of  all  beings.  To  put  our  thought  in  positive  terms 
would  be  to  speak  more  in  this  fashion :  There  is  nothing 
beyond  or  outside  of  God,  for  it  is  not  a  question  of 
without  and  within,  but  of  the  power  that  is  active  in 
this  our  universe.  God  is  all  the  ultimate  power  there 
is;  there  is  no  hostile  principle.  It  is  a  question  of 

»  Divine  Love  and  Wisdom,  sec.   7. 


The  Natural  and  the  Spiritual         113 

states,  realities  and  conditions.  When  power  is  man- 
ifested, that  power  is  of  and  from  God,  it  reveals  the 
purposes  of  God;  whenever  life  is  discovered,  that  life 
pertains  to  the  divine  life.  In  so  far  as  there  are  pur- 
poses in  the  universe,  these  purposes  are  divine.  When 
wisdom  is  made  manifest,  that  wisdom  would  be  im- 
possible without  God.  When  love  is  displayed,  that  love 
is  of  Him  who  has  been  said  to  be  love  itself.  Hence  it 
is  always  some  positive,  definite  clue  that  leads  to  the 
nature  of  God.  To  possess  the  essence  of  all  such 
concrete  realities,  to  be  the  actual  source  of  the  perma- 
nent states  and  conditions  which  we  find  in  the  total 
universe,  is  precisely  what  it  means  to  be  God.  Surely 
it  would  be  absurd  to  call  this  Being  "  inscrutable,"  or 
apply  any  similar  negative  term.  The  moment  we 
depart  from  the  clues  of  actual  existence  we  depart 
from  the  reasons  for  believing  that  God  exists.  God 
is  the  Being  whose  eternal  existence  makes  possible 
just  this  our  world. 

This  is  of  course  very  far  from  saying  that  we  know 
the  divine  perfection  in  its  entirety.  But  just  the  or- 
der, beauty,  and  wisdom  which  we  do  apprehend  are 
parts  of  that  perfection.  In  so  far  as  you  and  I  know 
somewhat  about  the  permanent  laws  and  conditions 
of  the  universe  we  are  already  partakers  of  that  know- 
ledge wherewith  God  knows  the  universe  of  His  own 
manifestation. 

We  do  not,  when  we  think  carefully,  regard  our  real 
self  as  "  a  thing"  existing  in  space.  The  largeness,  the 
depth,  the  scope  of  the  self  is  not  the  length,  breadth, 
and  thickness  of  space,  but  the  extent  of  wisdom  and 
other  mental  possessions.  We  well  know  that  the 
more  receptivity  and  readiness  to  do  the  Father's  will 
we  display  the  greater  the  extent  to  which  God  enters 


ii4          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

into  us.  Hence  what  we  try  to  say  when  we  say  that 
God  is  "here"  is  that  with  the  increase  in  love  and 
wisdom  on  our  part  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  the 
increase  of  the  divine  principle  within  us.  All  of  God 
is  "here"  in  this  sense  of  the  word.  He  is  everywhere 
for  those  who  think  deeply  and  love  truly;  He  is  no- 
where for  those  who  are  absorbed  in  the  thought  of 
self,  for  those  who  hate.  Yet  God  on  His  part  is 
literally  everywhere  for  all  His  children's  sake,  even 
in  the  hearts  and  minds  of  those  who  know  Him 
not. 

Start,  then,  with  the  conception  of  God  as  the  central 
reality,  the  eternal  basis  of  all  that  lives  and  thinks, 
and  regard  Him  as  the  abiding  essence  within  and  be- 
hind both  the  inner  world  of  states  and  the  world  of 
things.  Just  as  He  is  the  ultimate  principle  of  our 
thought  and  our  love,  so  He  is  the  reality  manifested 
in  all  physical  forms  and  modes  of  motion.  Space,  in 
other  words,  exists  for  the  sake  of  God ;  not  that  God 
is  "in"  space.  To  say  that  He  "fills  all  space"  is  to 
think  of  Him  as  within  a  certain  vague  something,  as 
if  space  were  larger.  It  would  be  more  accurate  to  say, 
All  space  is  within  Him;  for,  what  is  space  if  not  the 
objective  relationship  of  natural  forms,  that  is  to  say, 
the  system  of  outlines  and  connections,  limitations  and 
measured  conditions  of  God's  most  external  mode  of 
manifestation  ?  We  hardly  gain  a  comprehensive  view 
of  the  natural  world  as  a  whole  until  we  regard  it  as 
revealing  certain  purposes.  Whether  or  not  the  nat- 
ural world  exists  for  God  in  the  way  it  exists  for  us, 
namely,  as  a  realm  which  appears  to  be  wholly  outside 
of  us,  at  any  rate  our  philosophical  way  of  thinking  of 
it  is  comparable  to  a  vision,  all  of  which  is  seen  at  once. 
To  think,  then,  of  God  as  fundamental  to  nature  would 


The  Natural  and  the  Spiritual        115 

be  to  start,  as  I  have  said,  with  the  thought  of  God  as 
eternal,  non-spatial,  as  a  mind,  a  being  of  love  and  wis- 
dom; then  to  behold  as  it  were  in  a  vision  the  divine 
Spirit  going  forth  in  creative  activity,  assuming  definite 
directions  and  shape,  let  us  say,  by  means  of  the  ether, 
and  out  of  this  elemental  natural  energy  or  substance 
causing  all  forms  and  forces  to  appear.  The  point  of 
view  is  all  along  that  of  the  eternal  thought  which 
possesses  and  transcends  the  natural  forms  and  modes 
of  motion.  The  process  of  evolution  is  long  because 
it  is  purposive,  adequate,  complete.  All  the  details  of 
a  thousand  million  years  are  implied  within  a  single 
aspect  of  an  all-inclusive  purpose.  That  purpose  as 
such  is  eternal ;  it  does  not  begin  or  cease  to  be.  Nor  does 
it  attain  fulfilment  in  the  temporal  sense  of  the  word. 
It  is  always  being  fulfilled.  To  say  that  once  it  did  not 
exist  would  be  equivalent  to  alleging  that  once  God 
had  no  purpose.  For  the  purpose  is  not  a  product  of 
temporal  thinking,  like  a  plan  which  you  and  I  decide 
upon  in  preference  to  some  other  plan  of  natural  ex- 
istence. The  purpose  of  God  is  the  eternal  expression 
of  the  being  of  God.  Whether  the  world  of  nature 
ever  had  a  beginning  in  the  temporal  sense  is  another 
matter.  The  main  point  is  that  the  world  of  nature 
regarded  as  expressive  of  the  divine  purpose  is  one 
system,  from  the  timeless  point  of  view — one  whole. 
God  is  still  superior  to  space  and  time.  He  is  not  down 
here  subordinate  to  the  world  of  His  own  manifested 
life.  The  reality  which  natural  beings  know  through 
temporal  and  spatial  details  God  knows  as  one  world- 
order,  progressively  achieving  a  purpose.  The  cen- 
tral purpose  is  the  eternal  whole  or  unit;  the  various 
natural  purposes,  together  with  the  forms  and  forces, 
the  domains  and  orders,  species  and  varieties  implied, 


n6          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

constitute  the  details,  the  multiplicities  which  we 
know  in  terms  of  space  and  time. 

Still  following  the  clue  which  the  thought  of  the  eter- 
nal reality  of  the  universe  suggests,  we  therefore  repeat 
that  the  divine  order  is  the  total  system  of  divine  self- 
manifestation.  The  divine  order  includes  not  only 
nature,  with  all  its  meanings,  but  the  moral  and  spirit- 
ual cosmos,  whether  in  the  natural  world  or  the  spirit- 
ual. The  question  What  is  the  reality  or  purpose  of 
nature?  is  one  which  can  be  truly  answered  only  in 
terms  of  the  divine  order  of  which  it  is  a  part.  That 
the  moral  order  is  part  of  the  eternal  system  of  things 
is  especially  clear  from  the  fact  that  we  are  aware  of 
the  entire  inadequateness  of  our  natural  existence  to 
fulfil  the  moral  ideal.  We  insist  that  there  must  be 
an  eternal  world  in  which  justice  shall  be  done  at  last. 
Of  the  moral  world  we  may  in  fact  say,  it  is  eternal, 
not  an  affair  of  time.  What  we  achieve  is  what  counts ; 
not  the  time  taken  in  achieving  it.  It  is  what  we 
would  be  that  avails,  not  what  we  have  been.  Nor 
would  many  of  us  be  satisfied  with  a  mundane  immor- 
tality. The  moral  life  must  indeed  go  on  working  itself 
out  here  below.  But  the  moral  person  is  also  of  worth. 
The  moral  order  would  not  be  complete  unless  the 
individual's  work  should  also  be  complete. 

The  moral  cosmos,  let  us  say,  exists  wherever  moral 
individuals  exist.  It  is  not  a  place,  it  is  not  in  space. 
In  a  sense,  it  is  in  time,  for  moral  beings  are  all  about 
us  achieving  in  the  world  of  time.  But  the  real  moral 
relationship  is  the  bond  which  is  constituted  by  fellow- 
ship in  the  moral  order.  Likewise  with  what  we  may 
call  the  spiritual  cosmos  or  heaven  at  large.  Heaven 
is  constituted  of  God  and  of  all  enlightened  souls.  So 
far  as  God  is  concerned  heaven  has  no  beginning;  the 


The  Natural  and  the  Spiritual        117 

eternal,  divine  order  is  its  basis,  its  home.  So  far  as 
we  are  concerned,  it  begins  either  with  enlightenment 
or  with  righteous  conduct,  or  with  both.  To  reflect 
upon  the  laws  and  conditions  of  eternal  life  is  to  enter 
heaven  from  the  point  of  view  of  truth,  understanding ; 
to  labour  for  the  permanent  good  of  others  is  to  enter 
it  with  the  heart,  the  will.  Strictly  speaking,  we  begin 
to  enter  heaven  in  earnest  and  to  abide  there  when  we 
not  only  display  love,  but  when  we  see  the  meaning  of 
life,  apprehend  the  divine  purpose  of  our  existence. 

Just  as  the  natural  world  exists  in  orders  and  degrees, 
from  lowrest  to  highest,  so  undoubtedly  the  spiritual 
world  is  graduated  according  to  the  state  of  develop- 
ment and  enlightenment  of  those  who  belong  to  it. 
The  basis  of  distinction  is  not  temporal  and  spatial. 
It  is  not  a  question  whether  one  is  in  the  body  or  out 
of  it,  but  of  the  stage  of  development  attained.  Some 
who  are  in  the  flesh  may  have  advanced  far  beyond 
many  who  have  cast  it  off.  To  begin  to  attain  the 
spiritual  life,  to  enter  heaven,  is  unwittingly  to  ally 
oneself  with  all  who  belong  to  the  same  stage  of  attain- 
ment, wherever  they  are.  Hence  we  should  disabuse 
ourselves  of  the  notion  of  spatial  separateness,  and  put 
in  its  place  the  thought  of  spiritual  nearness.  It  is  the 
special  merit  of  Swedenborg  that  he  has  strenuously 
insisted  on  a  doctrine  of  degrees  which  is  not  primarily 
dependent  on  spatial  considerations. 

There  may  well  be  other  modes  of  manifestation  of  the 
spiritual  life,  conditions  of  which  we  do  not  even  dream. 
I  am  not  now  concerned  with  the  conditions  which 
lie  beyond,  but  with  our  relationships  as  souls  to  the 
central  Personality  within  the  divine  order.  To  realise 
the  realities  of  the  eternal  order  means  in  some  measure 
to  begin  to  live  a  new  mode  of  life,  and  it  is  in  that  mode 


nS          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

of  conduct  that  we  are  at  present  interested.  To  live 
for  the  eternal  ideal  is  to  be  relatively  free,  unattached, 
to  postpone  nothing  that  is  worth  while  to  a  future 
state,  yet  to  understand  far  more  truly  the  most  trivial 
aspects  of  this  our  natural  world.  From  first  to  last, 
the  clue  to  this  state  of  life  is  found  in  the  life  of  the 
eternal  Spirit,  going  forth  from  the  Godhead  and  carry- 
ing forward  all  manifested  life.  The  question  of  the 
source  of  the  Spirit  is  of  consequence.  So  is  the  ques- 
tion of  the  goal  towards  which  the  Spirit  is  moving. 
But  the  direct  clue  is  the  life  of  the  Spirit  just  now; 
and  the  life  that  just  now  is,  is  eternal.  It  is  what  the 
Spirit  achieves  along  the  way  that  gives  us  opportunity 
for  adjustment  and  co-operation.  If  we  are  eager  to 
know  what  the  present  achievement  is,  to  live  in  and 
for  that,  we  are  not  likely  to  have  room  for  thought  of 
some  far-off  achievement. 

We  found  it  difficult  to  break  away  from  the  limita- 
tions of  time  and  space,  and  look  down,  as  it  were, 
from  the  central  reality  of  things  upon  the  world  of 
nature.  It  is  no  less  difficult  to  take  the  point  of  view 
of  the  achieving  Spirit,  instead  of  that  of  achieving 
man.  But  it  is  important  to  try  to  regard  our  human 
existence  from  the  upper  or  divine  side,  that  we  may 
obtain  the  eternal  perspective.  From  this  vantage- 
point  we  may  restate  the  principles  and  values  of  the 
spiritual  life.  We  then  see  that  the  Spirit  always 
works  through  some  agency,  does  not  function  in  the  air. 
We  realise  that  the  spiritual  life  is  a  perpetual  gift,  the 
prime  condition,  the  absolute  essential.  Granted  the 
knowledge  of  this  gift,  we  are  in  a  position  rightly  to 
estimate  the  human  and  temporal  factors.  It  is  well, 
then,  to  habituate  ourselves  to  the  eternal  point  of 
view,  to  epter  into  it  reflectively  and  consider  in  some 


The  Natural  and  the  Spiritual        ng 

detail  what  its  significance  is.  It  is  on  account  of  this 
intellectual  need  that  I  speak  first  of  the  Spirit  in 
the  general,  eternal  sense,  rather  than  of  the  specific 
guidances  by  which  we  apprehend  it.  Granted  the 
life  of  the  Spirit  at  large,  granted  that  it  is  purposively 
present,  it  is  of  course  to  be  expected  that  in  the  whole 
life  of  each  soul  God  has  an  individual  purpose.  The 
eternal  part  is  the  established  end  or  aim;  the  em- 
pirical part  is  the  working  out  in  the  details  of  our  own 
consciousness  of  the  progressive  steps  of  that  purpose. 
The  conclusive  evidence  for  you  and  for  me  is  the 
actual  presence  of  divine  guidance. 

We  accustom  ourselves  to  these  principles  in  so  far 
as  we  break  away  from  the  illusions  implied  in  our 
ordinary  speech,  modes  of  thought,  and  conduct.  We 
so  readily  speak  of  other  people  and  of  ourselves  as 
if  we  were  these  fleshly  forms  that  it  requires  much 
persistence  to  make  the  term  "soul"  mean  anything 
real  for  us.  Even  then  we  are  apt  to  speak  as  if  man 
possessed  a  soul,  or  would  become  immortal  at  death. 
But  if  there  be  a  soul  at  all  man  is  that  soul,  now.  If 
man  was  born  a  child  of  God,  he  is  even  now  such  a  being. 
If  to  be  immortal  means  to  be  without  beginning  or  end 
in  point  of  time,  we  are  already  immortal,  howbeit 
this  may  not  be  the  correct  conception  of  the  immortal 
life.  At  any  rate,  there  is  good  reason  to  reconstruct 
our  thought  in  so  far  as  we  have  permitted  it  to  be 
limited  by  temporal  considerations.  If  men  be  already 
immortal  souls  now — that  is,  such  men  as  may  have 
attained  the  level  of  conscious  purposes — they  already 
dwell  in  the  eternal  world.  This  physical  experience 
is  then  man's  most  external  mode  of  existence.  We 
are  here  to  learn  its  degree  of  reality,  its  worth  and 
place.  It  may  well  be  that  it  is  right  for  the  most  part 


120          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

to  live  for  natural  ends.  But  even  then  such  ends 
may  be  pursued  in  a  manner  worthy  of  spiritual  beings. 

The  significant  distinctions,  therefore,  are  not  those 
by  which  we  separate  the  natural  from  the  spiritual, 
but  those  that  relate  to  various  types  of  human  con- 
sciousness. It  is  possible  to  be  sundered  in  conscious- 
ness, though  not  in  fact,  from  God.  It  is  possible  to 
be  absorbed  in  our  natural  existence  so  that  there 
seems  to  be  no  other.  It  is  possible,  too,  to  be  in  a 
state  so  ignorant,  so  far  removed  from  insight  into 
the  spiritual  life,  that  existence  appears  to  be  a  hopeless 
conflict  between  good  and  evil  forces.  But  we  must 
constantly  distinguish  between  appearance  and  reality 
in  the  spiritual  world.  The  world  of  the  eternal  order 
remains  the  same  all  along.  It  is  a  fatal  mistake  in 
our  theory  if  we  sunder  anything  in  the  natural  world 
from  its  constant  relationship  with  that  which  is 
spiritual. 

The  habit  of  speaking  of  God  as  if  He  dwelt  apart 
from  the  world,  of  referring  to  eternity  as  if  we  were 
sometime  to  " enter"  it,  and  characterising  the  im- 
mortal life  as  it  if  were  to  begin  in  the  future,  is  so 
strong  that  it  requires  the  utmost  persistence  to  over- 
come all  sense  of  separateness.  Out  of  this  habit  of 
making  a  separation  in  our  thought  has  grown  the 
notion  that  God  works  upon  the  world  from  outside, 
as  if  a  divine  act  required  no  antecedent  but  could  take 
form  out  of  nothing,  give  shape  to  something  in  a  mere 
void.  The  philosophy  of  evolution  has  accomplished 
a  great  deal  towards  the  demolition  of  this  artificial 
distinction,  for  it  has  taught  us  that  all  power  is  resident, 
concrete,  that  all  changes  occur  in  that  which  already 
exists.  But  this  same  philosophy  came  near  giving 
rise  to  a  still  more  artificial  distinction  by  characterising 


The  Natural  and  the  Spiritual        121 

natural  evolution  as  if  it  were  self-operative.  Properly 
speaking,  the  philosophy  of  evolution  has  made  room 
for  the  conception  of  the  divine  creative  power  re- 
garded as  distributed  all  along  the  line  from  the  lowest 
form  of  life  to  the  highest.  It  has  now  become  difficult 
to  conceive  of  the  divine  life  in  its  relation  to  nature  in 
any  other  light  than  that  of  continuous  creation. 
There  may  indeed  be  beginnings  of  new  epochs,  trans- 
itional stages  and  flowering  periods  when  there  is  a 
more  apparent  display  of  the  divine  power.  But  if 
that  life  be  not  active  all  along  the  line,  in  minute 
degree,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  it  could  be  present 
at  all. 

There  is  need  of  constant  reminder  that  when  God 
creates  He  moves  upon  and  through  that  which  is  here, 
alive,  existent ;  that  when  His  providence  is  displayed  it 
is  made  known  amidst  natural  forces  and  laws,  not  in 
contravention  of  law;  and  that  when  He  guides  or 
inspires  it  is  through  the  instrumentality  of  some  en- 
lightened soul.  But  even  this  is  not  enough,  for  the 
event  which  we  single  out  as  illustrative  of  the  divine 
activity  is  merely  one  in  a  series,  in  a  system,  every 
moment  of  which  is  also  fraught  with  divine  power. 
No  moment,  no  event,  is  sundered  from  the  divine 
life.  The  most  commonplace  experience  is  a  revelation 
of  the  divine  beauty,  the  divine  justice,  the  divine 
love.  If  certain  events  stand  out  above  others  it  is 
because  of  what  went  before,  or  because  of  some  special 
significance  which  in  our  finitude  we  assign  to  it. 

We  are  most  likely  to  sunder  our  conception  of 
natural  life  from  the  idea  of  God  when  it  is  a  question 
of  the  existence  of  evil.  Indeed  the  fact  of  evil  is  to 
some  the  most  absorbing  fact  of  life,  and  God,  if  men- 
tioned at  all,  is  put  in  a  decidedly  subordinate  position. 


122          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

But,  once  more,  the  idea  of  Spirit  must  be  the  starting- 
point,  if  we  are  to  make  philosophic  headway.  If 
God  is  the  ground  of  the  total  universe,  inner  and 
outer,  spiritual  and  natural,  the  power  of  evil  is 
grounded  in  Him,  too.  If  it  be  His  life  that  is  man- 
ifested through  the  forces  of  nature  and  reproduced 
in  the  moral  consciousness  of  man,  it  is  impossible  to 
consider  evil  by  itself.  Granted  that  Spirit  is  the 
one  ultimate,  original  power,  it  indubitably  follows 
that  there  is  no  real  hostile  power,  no  other  principle 
of  life.  God  and  the  universe  of  His  manifestation 
is  all  the  universe  there  is.  The  logic  of  the  situation 
is  unmistakable. 

Nor  is  it  possible  to  explain  evil  by  resorting  to  the 
hypothesis  that  the  world  is  an  illusion,  due  to  the 
waywardness  or  fall  of  the  divine  life  from  a  state  of 
reality  or  perfection;  for  we  have  already  concluded 
that  the  manifestations  of  Spirit  are  real.  The  natural 
world  is  real,  in  its  appropriate  place.  So  are  the  forces 
which  play  upon  man  and  arouse  him  to  passion,  so 
is  the  passion  that  is  rampant  within  him.  It  is 
inevitably  a  question  of  the  meaning  that  is  assignable 
to  the  facts  of  evil  when  viewed  in  the  light  of  the 
Life  from  which  they  cannot  be  sundered.  Evil  no 
doubt  exists.  On  the  other  hand,  the  universe  is 
sound,  remains  unhurt.  The  explanation  of  evil  must, 
then,  be  found  within  the  universe,  that  is,  by  reference 
to  the  mistaken  deeds  and  misdirected  energies  of 
unenlightened  man.  However  difficult  it  may  be  to 
develop  this  explanation  in  detail,  the  first  need  is  to 
preserve  the  primary  considerations,  namely,  the 
ultimacy  of  the  Spirit,  the  essential  divinity  of  man. 

Evil  is  nothing  if  not  separateness,  the  endeavour 
of  misguided  man  to  be  something  by  himself.  In 


The  Natural  and  the  Spiritual         123 

Hegelian  terms,  evil  is  the  setting  of  the  particular 
over  against  the  universal.  It  is  the  assertion  of  one's 
mere  finitude,  the  struggle  of  the  individual  will. 
But  if  there  be  no  such  separateness  from  the  universal, 
if  the  individual  cannot  be  understood  apart  from 
God,  why  should  one  expect  to  explain  evil  by  itself? 
It  is  this  speculatively  assumed  isolation  of  man  and 
his  evil  deeds  from  God  that  causes  a  large  part  of  the 
difficulty.  If  we  are  ever  to  solve  the  problem  of 
evil,  man  must  be  regarded  in  the  light  of  his  relation- 
ship with  God,  with  the  divine  power  which  he  has 
misused,  the  promptings  to  which  he  has  been  untrue, 
and  the  results  that  are  wrought  within  him  morally 
because  of  his  sin.  Not  even  the  worst  evil  deed  that 
was  ever  wrought  was  accomplished  apart  from  the 
presence  of  God.  No  such  sundering  is  possible, 
whatever  the  appearances  may  be.  The  fact  that 
God  so  manifests  Himself  through  man  as  to  grant 
him  liberty  to  do  what  he  will — within  narrowly  as- 
signed limits — by  no  means  implies  that  man  is  sepa- 
rated in  will  from  God ;  and  the  very  power  man  uses 
when  he  acts  is  of  and  from  the  Spirit.  The  moral 
cosmos  is  no  doubt  in  part  made  possible  by  an  ap- 
parent self-dependence  of  man,  yet  man  even  in  his 
moment  of  greatest  independence  is  fulfilling  the 
purposes  of  just  that  cosmos.  The  struggle  of  the 
righteous  with  evil  no  more  truly  implies  the  love  of 
God  than  the  fact  of  evil  itself.  It  is  because  God  so 
loves  man  that  He  grants  him  the  liberty  to  sin. 

We  forget  that  even  the  devil — the  symbolical  per- 
sonification of  man's  wilfulness — is  himself  a  fallen 
angel  who,  according  to  the  book  of  Job,  must  report 
to  the  Father.  It  is  impossible  to  state  the  existence 
of  an  evil  power  whose  reality  we  can  defend  as  in- 


124          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

dependently  evil.  There  is  no  independent  reality, 
good  or  bad.  Everything  is  related,  everything  has 
its  existence  on  one  eternal  Ground,  and  the  existence 
of  evil  is  no  exception.  Whether  we  reduce  evil  to 
man's  inner  consciousness,  subjectively  minimise  its 
reality  and  power,  or  objectify  and  personify  it,  the 
result  is  the  same.  To  change  its  name,  or  classify 
it  as  illusory,  is  still  to  admit  it  as  a  fact,  to  be  ex- 
plicated with  other  facts  in  the  total  system.  If  man 
sinned  and  fell,  if  evil  be  relatively  human  in  origin* 
so  that  man  is  accountable  for  it,  it  is  nevertheless 
true  that  God  is  in  some  sense  finally  accountable. 
Evil  is  for  ever  confined  within  limits  and  these  are 
limits  of  the  divine  purpose. 

To  be  sure,  in  speaking  thus  positively  we  are  tacitly 
accepting  a  monistic  philosophy  of  the  universe  and 
ruling  out  pluralism,  and  this  would  seem  to  be  to 
prejudge  a  fundamental  issue.  But  monism  is  one 
of  the  assumptions  of  our  philosophy  of  Spirit.  We 
start  with  the  assumption  that  Spirit  is  one.  We  also 
assume  that  the  eternal  universe  of  its  manifestation 
is  one.  Whatever  life  or  power  man  has  he  possesses 
because  of  his  sonship;  he  has  no  independent  life  or 
power,  either  of  will  or  of  action,  either  of  feeling  or 
of  thought.  The  problem  of  evil  is  but  one  aspect 
of  the  general  question  of  man's  relationship  to  God. 
We  must  grasp  the  general  philosophy  in  order  to 
solve  the  particular  problem. 

If  you  would  prove  this,  no  longer  hold  up  the  fact 
of  evil  as  a  dark  thing  to  be  explicated  by  itself,  a 
source  of  distress  by  day  and  a  mystery  by  night. 
Begin  with  a  closer  study  of  your  own  life,  its  play  of 
forces,  its  aspirations  and  gradual  achievements. 
You  know  very  well  what  you  would  be,  and  you  wish 


The  Natural  and  the  Spiritual         125 

to  be  judged  by  your  ideals.  Now  turn  to  the  people 
round  about  and  regard  them  no  less  charitably.  See 
whither  they  are  tending,  take  the  long  look  ahead. 
Move  forward  with  the  pulse  of  moral  evolution. 
Refer  once  more  to  the  witness  of  the  Spirit.  Cherish 
this  witness  as  a  faith  until  it  becomes  a  reasoned 
philosophy.  When  you  are  able  to  look  within  upon 
the  darkest  moments  of  the  soul's  struggle,  those  in 
which  you  seem  most  surely  the  victim  of  an  evil  power, 
and  behold  the  love  of  God  within  and  behind  the 
struggle,  then  you  will  be  able  in  very  truth  to  turn 
to  the  world  at  large  and  see  the  solution  of  the  great 
problem.  Had  you  not  sundered  certain  instincts 
and  passions  from  the  divine  love,  you  would  never  have 
known  such  struggles.  You  by  no  means  declare  that 
all  these  promptings  are  equally  noble,  that  all  the 
moments  of  your  life  have  the  same  value  in  relation 
to  the  divine  love.  But  now  at  last  you  behold  the 
divine  order  which  obtains  within  them,  their  relative 
value  and  authority.  Hence  the  sometime  duality 
of  self  gives  place  to  its  unity,  the  warfare  between 
lower  and  higher  ceases,  and  the  divine  purpose  becomes 
the  sole  clue. 

Constantly  do  we  need  to  remind  ourselves,  there- 
fore, that  we  possess  no  power  or  life,  no  instinct  or 
prompting,  wholly  our  own,  merely  human.  We 
readily  believe  this  in  regard  to  our  higher  powers, 
we  know  that  there  is  but  one  Love  in  which  we  are  all 
sharers.  But  we  should  be  as  ready  to  acknowledge 
it  in  regard  to  every  power  that  is  within  us. 

If  we  have  sundered  our  own  nature  into  an  evil 
world  and  a  spiritual,  the  probability  is  that  we  have 
as  greatly  excluded  the  thought  of  God  from  that  part 
of  our  nature  which  we  denominate  evil  as  the  old-time 


i26         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

theology  excluded  God  from  nature.  Some  traces 
still  linger  of  the  medieval  belief  that  the  body  is  vile 
and  the  material  world  evil.  We  must  expurgate  the 
last  lingering  suspicion  of  this  doctrine.  To  exclude 
the  idea  of  God  from  our  thought  of  the  flesh  is  to  set 
the  flesh  apart  as  worthy  of  suppression.  Long  ago 
man  learned  that  suppression  is  as  disloyal  to  life  as 
indulgence.  But  not  yet  has  he  fully  learned  that 
the  true  nature  and  life  of  the  flesh  is  seen  in  expression, 
in  activity,  freedom.  The  clue  to  free  expression  of 
every  bodily  activity  is  found  in  the  fact  that  every- 
thing God  has  created  exists  in  order  and  degree. 
That  is,  every  instinct,  every  force,  has  its  place  and 
its  purpose.  A  given  force,  for  example,  is  good  when 
employed  with  respect  to  the  end  which  it  harmoniously 
fulfils  in  the  light  of  its  relative  place  in  the  kingdom 
or  organism  to  which  it  belongs.  Put  it  out  of  its 
place,  use  it  in  excess,  and  ill  results  follow.  Hence 
it  is  once  more  the  point  of  view  of  the  whole  which 
gives  the  clue.  Nothing,  no  part,  no  power,  is  to  be 
understood  alone.  Nothing  is  good  alone.  Nothing 
is  rightly  used  when  viewed  or  used  out  of  organic 
relation.  Hence  it  is  that  each  man  is  likely  to  under- 
stand the  play  of  forces  at  large  in  so  far  as  he  has 
gone  in  the  righteous  organisation  of  his  own  forces. 

As  constantly  do  we  need  to  remind  ourselves  that 
the  Spirit  is  with  us  as  a  perpetual  presence.  For  we 
are  apt  to  flee  to  God  in  the  hour  of  our  peril  only  and 
forget  Him  at  other  times.  The  Spirit  is  not  merely 
the  guiding  power  which  leads  us  through  the  darker 
places  of  life,  but  the  sustaining  presence  without 
which  our  most  lightsome  hours  would  be  impossible. 
We  do  not  always  know  when  the  Spirit  is  most  active 
within  us,  when  it  is  most  directly  achieving  its  pur- 


The  Natural  and  the  Spiritual         127 

poses  through  us.  Hence  there  is  all  the  more  reason 
to  base  our  philosophy  on  the  perpetual  presence. 
Hence  there  is  every  moment  a  good  reason  for  re- 
ceptivity and  readiness. 

If  we  are  not  then  to  assume  any  sundering  of  the 
natural  from  the  spiritual,  let  us  say  that  every  moment 
of  our  natural  life  is  made  possible  by  the  presence  of 
the  Spirit.  A  natural  event  is  not  an  isolated  oc- 
currence. The  pulsations  of  the  natural  are  the  outer 
or  visible  manifestations  of  the  rhythms  of  the  Spirit. 
That  the  Spirit  pursues  a  certain  course,  begins  at  a 
purposive  point  and  moves  systematically  towards 
an  ideal  end,  that  the  Spirit  moves  from  within  and 
modifies  that  which  is  without — this  is  the  prime 
consideration.  Our  part  is  to  become  more  and  more 
intimately  aware  of  the  inner  rhythms,  that  we  may 
take  our  clues  from  and  move  with  them.  This  it  is 
to  discover  the  kingdom  of  God  to  which  "all  things 
shall  be  added,"  This  it  is  to  awaken  into  fulness 
of  life,  in  keeping  with  the  kingdom  "which  cometh 
without  observation. "  And  this  means  far  more  than 
merely  to  become  centred  or  adjusted  within  ourselves 
in  an  individual  sense  of  the  word.  For  it  is  the 
adjustment  of  the  eternal  type  of  life,  which  includes 
both  the  inner  and  the  outer,  both  the  individual  and 
the  social,  both  the  temporal  and  that  which  knows  no 
time. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  CHANNELS  OF  THE  SPIRIT 

HAVING  overcome  some  of  the  barriers  by  which 
man  has  theoretically  sundered  the  Spirit  from  the 
world,  we  are  ready  to  consider  the  question  of  the 
direct  relationship  of  the  Spirit  to  the  human  soul. 
As  this  important  subject  will  concern  us  at  length, 
we  may  first  approach  it  from  the  point  of  view  of 
man,  leaving  the  God -ward  side  to  come  into  the  fore- 
ground gradually.  That  is,  our  first  question  is,  How 
does  man  apprehend  the  Spirit,  what  form  does  the 
experience  of  communion  assume? 

It  might  seem  incumbent  upon  us  to  prove  that  the 
Spirit  is  really  present,  before  we  inquire  into  the 
nature  of  that  presence.  But  this  could  not  be  done 
apart  from  a  study  of  the  experience  in  which  man 
believes  the  Spirit  to  be  present.  The  proof  lies  in 
the  interpretation  of  religious  and  other  experience. 
If  such  experience  cannot  be  accounted  for  except  by 
reference  to  a  Being,  for  convenience  denominated 
the  Spirit,  we  have  thus  much  evidence  that  such  a 
Being  exists.  The  proof  lies  in  the  use  to  which  the 
conception  is  put. 

Again,  it  might  be  said  that  our  inquiry  should  be- 
gin with  a  study  of  social  observances,  such  as  worship 
and  prayer.  But  if  worship  possess  meaning  with 
reference  to  what  is  real  it  is  real  for  the  individual 
and  the  question  then  becomes,  What  is  the  inner 
experience  known  as  worship?  Again,  prayer  to  be 

128 


The  Channels  of  the  Spirit  129 

of  genuine  worth  is  an  experience  into  which  each 
individual  enters,  even  when  it  is  externally  uttered 
by  a  clergyman  or  repeated  by  a  congregation.  What, 
then,  is  active  within  us  when  we  pray,  or  when  we 
participate  in  prayer?  So  with  all  other  observances, 
the  first  question  pertains  to  inner  experience  and 
human  faculty.  The  evaluation  of  worship  or  of 
prayer  belongs  more  specifically  to  the  study  of  re- 
ligion. Here  our  problem  is,  Granted  the  belief  that 
God  is  present  in  certain  of  our  experiences,  or  is  at 
least  a  real  object  of  reference  within  religious  ex- 
perience, what  values  shall  be  assigned  to  those  powers 
within  us  which  are  most  active  in  the  communion 
of  man  with  God? 

In  one  respect  it  seems  inconsistent  to  ask  what 
guise  the  presence  of  God  assumes,  after  we  have 
maintained  that  God  is  in  everything  and  broken  down 
the  barriers  by  which  He  has  been  excluded.  Without 
doubt  the  goal  of  our  inquiry  is  the  realisation  of  God 
in  every  thought  and  deed.  But  inasmuch  as  He  has 
been  theoretically  separated  from  the  world  we  must 
begin  at  the  most  favourable  point  and  gradually 
realise  the  divine  presence.  Moreover,  the  belief 
prevails  that  His  presence  means  a  very  special  ex- 
perience. Indeed  we  are  most  apt  to  hold  that  the 
seers  and  prophets  of  the  far  past  held  direct  com- 
munion with  God,  while  we  enjoy  their  inspiration  at 
second  hand,  or  only  through  the  general  experience 
of  worship.  Surely,  there  is  evidence  that,  con- 
sciously speaking,  some  have  dwelt  much  nearer  God 
than  others.  There  is  a  type  of  mind  and  life  which 
seems  especially  adapted  for  communion  with  the 
divine.  There  have  been  enlightened  men  in  all  ages 
who  believed  in  the  direct  presence  and  inspiration 


130         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

of  God,  despite  all  arguments  to  the  contrary.  To  these 
we  naturally  turn  for  light.  Yet  what  was  true  in  a 
past  age  may  be  true  now.  If  some  souls  have  been 
like  great  lights  leading  men  on  it  is  only  that  we  may 
also  enter  consciously  into  £he  domain  of  the  Spirit. 
The  essential  is  a  clue  which  we  can  so  far  follow  that 
the  entire  universe  of  our  experience  shall  be  for  us 
a  revelation  of  the  Spirit. 

We  may  therefore  regard  the  moments  of  unusual 
realisation  of  the  presence  of  God  as  particularly 
fruitful  clues.  We  turn  to  these,  not  because  the 
Spirit  is  absent  from  any  phase  of  our  experience,  but 
because  these  experiences  show  us  how  to  be  receptive, 
how  to  follow  where  the  Spirit  leads.  It  is  reasonable 
to  believe  that  as  the  Spirit  assumes  higher  and  finer 
forms  of  manifestation,  from  the  apparently  lifeless 
rock  to  the  living  animal,  from  the  slowly  vibrating 
atmosphere  to  the  vibrations  of  light  and  other  motions 
in  the  ether,  so  in  the  inner  world  a  point  is  reached 
where  the  Spirit  is  more  immediately  active.  All 
men  may  be  at  least  dimly  aware  of  these  finer,  more 
interior  manifestations  of  the  Spirit,  whatever  they 
may  call  them.  But  while  some  mistake  them  for 
signs  of  physical  life  and  some  interpret  them  in  ob- 
jective terms,  there  are  men  of  a  more  subjective 
type. who  are  able  more  accurately  to  read  the  signs 
of  direct  presence  and  inspiration.  This  does  not 
mean  that  some  men  are  gifted  while  others  are  left 
without  guidance,  but  that  types  differ,  and  just  as 
men  of  science  can  more  truly  interpret  the  signs  of 
a  past  geologic  age  than  can  the  unlearned  man,  so 
the  inwardly  illumined  man  can  best  explain  the 
conditions  under  which  the  Spirit  is  most  directly 
known. 


The  Channels  of  the  Spirit  131 

By  the  very  term  "  Spirit "  we  most  deeply  mean  a 
presence,  a  sustaining,  guiding  power,  known  above 
all  by  persons,  implying  a  love  that  is  unfailing,  a 
wisdom  that  compasses  every  need.  The  conception 
moreover  implies  a  sense  of  union,  an  experience  which 
brings  peace  and  rest,  one  that  inspires  faith.  Again, 
we  find  that  the  life  of  the  Spirit  with  us  is  progressive. 
We  believe  in  being  "born  of  the  Spirit."  We  find 
also  that  the  Spirit  is  essentially  a  gift,  a  somewhat 
to  be  cherished,  a  presence  that  is  revealed  in  its  own 
way,  not  a  power  to  be  controlled  or  used.  In  our 
life  there  are  hours  that  stand  out  as  more  directly 
expressive  of  the  Spirit's  presence.  Even  the  words 
in  which  we  clothe  our  thought  at  such  a  time  assume 
a  tone  of  sacredness.  For  all  these  reasons  it  would 
seem  justifiable  to  give  special  consideration  to  the 
experience  known  as  the  direct  presence  of  God. 

A  word  of  reminder  is  needed,  however,  before  we 
proceed.  It  is  not  necessarily  when  we  are  actively 
conscious  of  the  divine  presence  that  the  Spirit  most 
fully  possesses  us.  In  our  daily  life,  when  we  are 
absorbed  in  serving  our  fellows  and  have  no  time  to  be 
self-conscious,  when  we  are  doing  a  piece  of  work 
which  engages  our  complete  attention,  we  may  be 
most  truly  inspired.  Hence  in  the  long  run  it  may  be 
that  the  everyday  experiences  will  afford  the  surest 
clues.  Plainly,  we  never  know  when  we  are  most 
receptive.  It  is  only  in  retrospect,  in  the  light  of  the 
fruits  of  the  Spirit  that  we  discern  the  presence  of  a 
superior  wisdom  and  power.  Not  even  in  the  case  of 
those  who  have  specially  devoted  their  lives  to  the 
realisation  of  the  presence  of  God  may  we  always 
find  an  entirely  trustworthy  clue.  For,  inasmuch  as 
they  are  specialists,  they  are  likely  to  over-estimate 


132         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

the  importance  of  their  visions.  Hence  the  mystic 
with  his  pantheistic  tendencies  may  not  be  half  so 
safe  a  guide  as  the  man  who  has  a  moderate  experience 
of  what  he  believes  to  be  the  divine  presence  and  is 
able  to  characterise  it  in  temperate,  rational  terms. 
To  some  people  it  might  seem  the  acme  of  human 
experience  to  be  caught  up  into  the  seventh  heaven 
in  such  wise  that  they  could  hardly  tell  whether  they 
were  in  this  world  or  some  other.  But  some  men  who 
have  had  a  single  all-compelling  illumination  have 
been  compelled  to  depend  on  that  experience  the 
remainder  of  their  lives,  and  there  are  many  possibili- 
ties of  illusion  and  misconception  when  this  is  the  case. 
If  one  cannot  tell  where  one  is  the  probability  is  that 
one's  recollection  of  the  experience  will  be  extremely 
faulty.  It  would  seem  far  more  desirable  to  have  the 
vision  of  glory  trailed  all  along  the  way..  Possibly 
it  were  better  still  to  have  no  visions.  To  confirm 
one's  account  of  the  divine  presence  one  needs  new 
experiences  with  which  to  compare  it.  He  is  indeed 
well  prepared  who  has  frequent  consciousness  of  the 
presence  of  God. 

There  is  value  in  silence  and  meditation.  As  life  is 
at  present  constituted  one  can  hardly  expect  to  make 
decided  headway  without  observing  special  conditions. 
Yet  it  is  forever  true  that  the  special  experience,  how- 
ever austere,  is  a  means,  not  an  end.  If  adverse 
conditions  weigh  us  down,  if  people  oppress  us,  it  may 
be  necessary  to  go  away  for  a  season  in  order  to  receive 
a  new  impetus.  But  eventually  we  must  face  pre- 
cisely those  conditions  and  find  God  there,  too.  We 
must  learn  the  meaning  of  the  persistent  atmospheres 
and  win  freedom  from  the  oppressive  persons.  Like- 
wise if  the  pleasures  of  the  world  are  too  enticing, 


The  Channels  of  the  Spirit  133 

these  experiences  must  have  their  place  and  be  ad- 
justed in  relation  to  the  spiritual  ideal.  Whatever 
we  care  more  for  than  for  the  Spirit  will  intrude  until 
we  reckon  with  it.  If  to  conquer  the  adverse  con- 
dition it  is  necessary  to  absent  ourselves  from  it,  we 
must  presently  return. 

It  is  the  more  necessary  to  insist  upon  all  this  be- 
cause of  the  special  methods  and  conditions  on  which 
various  teachers  have  insisted.  The  carefully  chosen 
condition  may  readily  become  a  hindrance.  No  one 
has  a  monoply  of  the  power  of  God.  To  insist  upon 
one's  own  way  is  to  intrude  the  self.  The  devoted 
parent  who  scarcely  ever  thinks  of  God  may  far  more 
truly  reveal  Him  than  the  theologian  who  thinks  of 
little  else,  or  the  mystic  who  claims  to  "feel"  the 
divine  presence  in  a  familiar  way.  You  and  I  can 
realise  the  presence  of  God  as  truly,  as  fully,  as  any 
person,  any  saint  or  seer  who  ever  lived  upon  this 
earth  in  any  age  or  clime.  To  you  and  me  no  door 
whatever  is  closed.  For  it  is  not  primarily  a  question 
of  age  or  nation,  or  of  environment.  It  is  a  question 
of  earnestness,  consecration,  humility,  willingness  to 
follow  wherever  the  Spirit  may  lead,  readiness  to  live 
by  the  Spirit,  to  show  by  every  thought  and  deed  that 
one  really  believes  in  the  love  of  God. 

We  may  well  disabuse  our  minds  of  the  notion  that 
there  is  an  experience  peculiar  to  a  few  souls,  an  experi- 
ence which  we  can  never  have.  There  is  no  wall  of  sepa- 
ration between  the  genius,  the  saint,  the  seer,  on  the  one 
hand ;  and  the  so-called  plain  man,  on  the  other.  Human 
nature  is  the  same  the  world  over.  There  is  likely  to 
be  more  misconception  to  allow  for  in  the  case  of  the 
man  who  appears  to  be  divinely  favoured.  If  we 
adore  him  and  put  him  in  a  category  by  himself  we 


134         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

erect  an  artificial  barrier  to  our  own  detriment.  He 
may  indeed  be  a  specialist  from  whom  we  may  learn 
principles  which  pertain  to  one  side  of  human  nature. 
But  when  all  allowances  for  mystical  exaggeration 
are  made  what  we  have  as  remainder  is  a  universal 
element  which  all  men  may  possess.  The  intermediate 
man  has  an  advantage  over  the  genius  and  the  plain 
man.  For,  as  purveyor  of  the  fruits  of  genius,  he  is 
able  to  comprehend  both  the  genius  and  the  supposed 
inferiority  of  the  plain  man.  Making  due  allowances, 
he  finds  that  as  much  misconception  pertains  to  the 
one  as  to  the  other.  There  are  so  many  respects  in 
which  the  genius  fails  to  understand  himself  that, 
when  his  message  is  plainly  stated,  it  is  found  to  con- 
tain little  that  is  unusual. 

Some  men  of  genius  owe  part  of  their  reputation  to 
the  haze  of  obscurity  which  their  own  dulness  creates. 
Know  them  intimately  and  you  find  them  not  only 
as  human  as  other  people,  but  at  least  as  deficient  in 
some  of  the  commonest  virtues.  A  man  must,  in  the 
first  place,  care  a  great  deal  for  himself  to  permit 
people  to  regard  him  as  a  genuis.  It  is  entirely  within 
a  man's  power  to  regulate  the  admiration  of  the  public. 
It  is  one  of  the  great  tests  of  the  spiritual  life,  this 
possession  of  something  that  the  people  want,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  temptation  to  allow  oneself  to  be 
regarded  as  of  some  account,  on  the  other.  Time  and 
again  we  see  people  who  have  so  permitted  themselves 
to  be  regarded  as  public  personalities  that  they  never 
do  a  genuine  act,  but  are  always  posing  as  a  learned 
genius,  a  divine  artist,  or  a  constant  giver  of  sweet 
smiles.  There  are  people  who  know  these  celebrated 
personalities  so  well  that  they  could  tear  off  the  mask. 
These  who  are  able  to  unmask  are  the  intermediate 


The  Channels  of  the  Spirit  135 

men.  It  is  they  who  have  opportunity  really  to  know 
human  nature  and  human  truth.  They  seldom  re- 
ceive the  credit  which  is  their  due.  If,  for  example, 
they  have  translated  the  wise  sayings  of  a  genius  into 
intelligible  speech  they  are  regarded  as  mere  instru- 
ments. But  the  man  who  can  develop  meaning  out 
of  a  great  poem,  or  translate  into  clear  language  the 
work  of  a  great  philosopher,  may  well  be  the  really 
great  man.  All  these  reflections  suggest  that  there 
might  well  be  a  reassessment  of  the  relationships  of 
great  men  and  their  interpreters.  After  all,  the  real 
genius  is  a  modest  man,  of  deep  humility,  greatly 
impressed  by  the  scope  of  what  his  thought  cannot  yet 
adequately  compass.  He  well  knows  that  his  life 
contains  little  that  is  not  found  in  the  plain  man's 
experience,  but  that  he  has  made  utmost  use  of  his 
opportunities  while  others  were  idle. 

The  same  is  true  in  part  of  givers  of  so-called  sacred 
literature,  men  of  scant  intelligence  who  intermingled 
the  ridiculous  with  the  sublime.  Because  of  the 
sublime  element  the  plain  man  deems  the  entire  work 
inspired,  and  labours  to  bring  meaning  out  of  a  confused 
metaphor  or  obscure  passage.  But  the  intermediate 
man,  knowing  human  nature  better,  sees  the  weakness 
of  the  scribe  and  labels  it  as  such.  As  matter  of  fact, 
that  scripture  is  inspired  which  proves  to  be  of  high 
value  when  tested  by  human  conduct  and  thought. 
The  fact  that  a  passage  occurs  in  a  sacred  text  in  itself 
signifies  nothing.  Men  have  applied  the  belittling 
epithets  "profane,"  "heathen,"  and  "pagan"  to  so- 
called  uninspired  writings.  But  these  epithets  are 
no  more  justifiable  than  the  term  "barbarian"  used 
more  than  two  thousand  years  ago  by  the  Greeks. 
Such  terms  put  those  who  use  them  in  an  unenviable 


136         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

light.  He  who  would  truly  know  the  Spirit  must  rid 
his  mind  of  such  expressions,  together  with  their 
implications. 

Some  one  has  well  said  that  the  notion  that  God 
inspired  only  the  seers  and  prophets  of  whom  the 
Bible  speaks  is  as  narrow  as  would  be  the  belief  that 
the  sun  shines  only  in  Palestine  and  nowhere  else  on 
the  face  of  the  earth.  If  the  sun  of  God's  love  and 
wisdom  shines  for  all,  we  must  start  with  that  as  a 
universal  premise  and  make  sure  that  all  our  conclusions 
follow  in  accordance  with  it.  On  the  other  hand,  we 
may  indeed  take  our  clues  from  the  positive  utterances 
of  those  who  believed  themselves  specially  chosen  of 
God.  If  we  seize  upon  the  universal  element  and  de- 
velop its  implications  we  shall  discover  in  due  course 
that  it  is  identical  with  the  revelations  of  common 
sense.  The  homely  conclusions  at  which  the  man  of 
common  sense  modestly  arrives,  without  any  display, 
are  the  teachings  which  in  the  end  rule  the  world. 
One  could  ask  for  no  greater  evidence  of  the  truth  of  a 
profound  doctrine  than  its  acceptance  by  the  plain 
man  who  should  deem  it  in  no  way  unusual  but  simply 
regard  it  as  reasonable.  The  man  of  common  sense 
is  far  more  likely  to  be  many-sided  than  the  man  who 
is  admired  as  a  genius. 

If  we  have  theoretically  removed  some  people  be- 
yond the  range  of  possibility  on  our  part  we  have 
surely  cast  an  illusion  about  them.  The  individual 
peculiarities  of  their  experiences  are  indeed  unique, 
but  the  significant  portion  of  their  teaching  is  universal. 
The  important  fact  is  not  that  the  individuality  of  a 
man  concealed  a  great  truth,  but  that  despite  his 
personality  a  great  truth  was  revealed.  Temperament 
no  doubt  counts  for  very  much,  more  than  the  above 


The  Channels  of  the  Spirit  137 

statements  would  appear  to  imply.  In  case  of  the 
mystic,  the  seer  and  the  prophet,  temperament  is  even 
more  consequential  than  in  case  of  the  philosopher. 
But  if  by  emphasis  upon  temperament  we  exclude 
ourselves  from  the  truths  which  men  of  various  types 
make  known,  we  thereby  put  the  stress  in  the  wrong 
place.  That  which  is  of  importance  is  universal,  and 
there  are  innumerable  temperamental  pathways  to  it. 

The  genius  has  insights,  but  may  not  see  their  logical 
significance.  The  plain  man  possesses  the  evidence, 
but  is  unable  as  yet  to  rationalise  it.  But  the  inter- 
mediate man  is  the  one  who  has  the  ability  to  combine 
the  evidences.  The  philosopher  of  the  Spirit  consults 
both  the  inspired  text  and  the  "  profane, "  and  finds  the 
same  truth  in  each.  Knowing  that  truth  is  universal, 
he  is  unable  to  be  a  mere  devotee  of  one  sect  or  of  one 
doctrine.  He  is  more  interested  in  tracing  the  con- 
firmations or  variations  of  truth  in  all  teachings.  The 
moral  for  the  plain  man  is,  Begin  where  life  is  now 
active  and  collect  the  evidences,  seek  the  universal 
elements. 

We  maintain,  then,  that  the  realisation  of  the  pres- 
ence of  God  which  brings  permanent  satisfaction  is 
founded  on  the  philosophic  recognition  of  God  in 
everything,  the  realisation  which  grows  out  of  the 
study  of  human  life  all  along  the  line.  Any  book  or 
deed,  any  person's  life,  will  afford  a  revelation  of  the 
Spirit,  if  we  have  the  eyes  to  read.  If  we  approach  a 
person  with  belittling  preconceptions  we  shall  find 
what  we  anticipate.  If  we  regard  all  men  as  sons  of 
God  we  shall  be  in  the  kingdom  of  heaven.  "The 
kingdom  cometh  without  observation." 

Hence  our  inquiry  once  more  resolves  itself  into 
the  witness  of  the  Spirit.  For  example,  whether  or 


138         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

not  one  sees  that  there  is  but  one  ultimate  power  in 
the  universe,  hence  no  final  principle  of  evil,  depends 
upon  the  presence  or  absence  of  the  witness  of  the 
Spirit,  that  is,  the  interior  evidences  made  known 
through  individual  experience  and  moral  victory. 
The  witness  of  the  Spirit  may  come  as  a  consciousness 
of  divine  guidance,  the  presence  of  "the  inner  light," 
or  it  may  voice  itself  in  creative  work  of  various  kinds ; 
hence  it  may  be  intimately  related  to  individuality 
and  genius.  Again,  it  may  be  revealed  as  the  divine 
love  made  triumphant  through  the  transmutation 
of  passion  and  brought  into  our  consciousness  through 
supreme  moments  of  suffering.  In  the  larger  sense, 
to  bear  the  witness  of  the  Spirit  means  to  possess  the 
divine  essence,  the  central  insight  which  enables  the 
mind  to  grasp  the  laws  of  travail  of  the  soul  and  the 
progressive  presence  of  God.  Those  who  possess  this 
essence  are  the  truly  independent  people  of  the  world. 
They  do  not  first  consult  books  or  other  sources  of 
authority,  then  refer  to  the  Spirit;  they  are  not  first 
children  of  their  age,  then  exponents  of  it,  nor  need 
they  wait  till  they  have  personally  passed  through  all 
forms  of  spiritual  experience.  Bearing  the  witness 
of  the  Spirit  within  them  they  then  find  it  in  books 
and  in  the  age;  the  essence  they  bear  is  the  adequate 
clue  to  all  truth  and  reality.  A  certain  amount  of  ex- 
perience is  required  to  develop  this  essence.  Thought 
is  needed  to  make  it  explicit.  But,  possessing  the 
eternal  clues,  they  are  able  to  explain  what  is  unin- 
telligible to  other  men.  They  are  not  disconcerted 
by  anything  that  occurs,  but  are  able  to  discern  laws 
and  even  foresee  results  in  the  lives  of  people  around 
them. 

The  point  of  view  is  not  that  of  human  speculation, 


The  Channels  of  the  Spirit  139 

starting  from  the  meagre  facts  of  finite  consciousness 
and  accounting  for  those  facts  in  their  own  terms,  but 
the  point  of  view  of  the  Spirit  looking  down  upon 
finite  life.  The  interest,  the  vantage-point  has  been 
so  enlarged  that  only  by  thus  regarding  human  ex- 
perience in  the  light  of  the  Spirit  is  one  able  to  be 
true  to  the  experience.  Hence  it  is  that  one  insists 
so  much  upon  the  eternal  type  of  life  as  a  gift,  the 
gift  of  interior  friendship,  spiritual  love,  quiet  joy, 
calm,  comprehensive  insight.  While  each  soul  would 
bear  witness  to  the  Spirit  in  an  individual  way,  and 
find  others'  accounts  faulty,  for  example,  the  account 
here  given,  all  would  no  doubt  acknowledge  the  un- 
mistakable sense  of  superior  reality,  and  the  develop- 
ment according  to  ways  of  its  own  of  the  gift  of  the 
Spirit. 

Here  is  no  doubt  the  truth  in  the  old-time  doctrine 
of  the  grace  of  God.  Not  that  some  souls  are  specially 
favoured,  not  that  it  is  solely  by  the  grace  of  God  that 
you  and  I  have  glimpses  of  these  holy  principles,  but 
that  the  divine  grace  is  in  some  sense  for  all,  the  eternal 
type  of  life  is  for  every  one,  and  some  have  come  to 
consciousness  of  the  divine  presence  by  which  all  souls 
are  environed.  If  the  divine  presence  means  for  one, 
or  a  few,  what  it  is  said  to  mean,  all  human  beings 
are  likewise  related  to  it;  the  course  of  events  in  the 
eternal  world  is  of  the  sort  which  tends  to  lead  all  men 
into  consciousness  of  it. 

The  least  that  can  be  said  is  that  there  are  different 
interpretations  of  the  spiritual  life.  If  some  interpret 
it  from  an  exclusive,  aristocratic  point  of  view;  if 
some  reduce  it  to  a  system  of  lifeless  values  to  which 
no  eternal  realities  correspond,  and  whatever  other 
alternatives  there  may  be,  at  any  rate  the  present 


140          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

interpretation  is  one  which  begins  with  the  reality 
of  the  eternal  world,  the  purposive  presence  of  the 
Spirit,  as  the  supreme  gift,  the  prime  fact,  and  explains 
human  experience  with  reference  to  that  fact.  This  is 
a  proposition  to  be  defended,  namely,  that  a  real 
spiritual  order  not  only  exists  in  correspondence  with 
our  spiritual  beliefs,  but  produces  in  us  those  beliefs. 
The  foregoing  is  particularly  significant  in  reference 
to  the  experience  known  as  the  immediate  presence  of 
God.  The  prevalent  theories  of  that  experience 
have  mostly  been  reared  in  accordance  with  a  one- 
sided view  of  human  nature.  Believing  that  certain 
texts  are  sacred  men  have  argued  that  these  texts 
must  have  been  given  by  special  providence.  Holding 
that  certain  men  were  set  apart  as  scribes  they  have 
contended  that  the  scribes  possessed  a  unique  endow- 
ment. Even  the  mystic  has  been  revered  as  somehow 
different  from  other  men.  But  the  philosopher  of 
the  Spirit  must  so  far  tear  away  the  illusions  as  to 
see  that  even  the  calmest,  most  intellectual  endeavour 
to  carry  out  the  conception  of  God  regarded  as 
present  in  all  things  is  also  a  realisation  of  the  divine 
presence.  It  is  an  entire  misconception  to  exclude 
God  from  thought  and  assign  His  presence  to  the  realm 
of  emotion.  It  is  a  question  of  types  of  experience 
with  the  value  belonging  to  each,  and  all  types  have 
their  place.  If  we  have  excluded  God  from  a  part  of 
our  life  and  relegated  Him  to  another,  we  are  sure  to 
leave  Him  out  of  a  part  of  our  thought.  Likewise  our 
life  is  affected  by  our  theory.  The  ideal  attitude  is 
not  one  of  exclusiveness,  as  if  Sunday  were  the  only 
"Lord's  Day"  and  a  certain  building  the  only  "house 
of  God,"  but  an  attitude  of  detachment  in  which  we 
seek  to  realise  the  eternal  type  of  life.  It  is  not  a 


The  Channels  of  the  Spirit 

question  of  Sunday  now  and  week-day  to-morrow, 
but  of  constant  worship  of  God  in  the  heart,  continuous 
endeavour  to  see  God  in  everything.  It  is  the  in- 
tellectual power  in  us  which  gives  stability,  knowledge 
of  God  through  experience  ripened  by  thought  that 
gives  constancy.  Hence  we  must  be  prepared  to 
disagree  with  nearly  all  the  accepted  beliefs  concerning 
the  superiority  of  emotion.  If  we  are  to  find  God  in 
everything,  behold  all  this  universe  as  a  constantly 
renewed  revelation  of  the  Spirit,  we  may  well  expect 
to  find  the  most  profitable  clues  in  regions  where  the 
divine  has  been  excluded  most. 

Do  not  misunderstand.  One  has  nothing  to  say  in 
disparagement  of  the  pioneers  of  the  Spirit,  nor  of  the 
people  who  have  been  taken  to  be  the  special  objects 
of  God's  choice.  One  may  continue  to  believe  in  the 
superiority  of  the  Bible  and  the  surpassing  beauty  of 
the  life  of  Jesus,  together  with  such  divine  purposive- 
ness  as  these  beliefs  seem  rightfully  to  imply.  But 
the  difficulty  is  that  other  books,  other  peoples  and 
teachers  have  been  disparaged  in  order  to  exalt  these. 
The  more  we  know  about  other  sacred  literatures  the 
less  able  are  we  to  sustain  the  special  claims.  If  the 
Hebrews  were  a  wonderful  people,  so  were  the  ancient 
Hindoos  and  the  surpassingly  remarkable  Greeks.  If 
Jesus  is  in  truth  the  master  prophet  it  is  because  he 
stands  out  above  a  multitude,  many  of  whom  were 
revered  in  other  lands  as  we  revere  our  Christ.  For 
the  philosopher  of  the  Spirit  the  prophet  is  one  who 
sets  an  example  for  those  who  later  seek  to  realise  his 
type  of  thought  and  life.  Such  a  pioneer  was  Aristotle 
in  the  field  of  science.  There  are  respects  in  which  it 
is  extremely  difficult  to  be  original  after  Aristotle's 
time.  But  Aristotle  was  the  first  to  mark  out  territory 


142          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

which  is  now  trodden  by  multitudes,  and  by  men 
who  come  much  nearer  nature  than  he.  Had  Aristotle 
never  been  revered  as  an  authority  the  growth  of  sci- 
ence would  have  been  far  more  rapid. 

Our  concern  is  with  the  universal  element,  not  with 
the  particular  medium  of  its  discovery.  If  some  one 
pays  attention  to  phenomena  which  previously  had 
remained  unnoticed,  these  phenomena  presently  be- 
come realities  for  the  world,  because  any  man  may 
discern  them.  The  alleged  specially  gifted  man  is 
for  the  moment  absorbed  in  details  to  which  he  is  able 
to  call  attention  because  of  this  absorption.  He  is 
like  the  man  who  is  made  more  sensitively  self-con- 
scious by  illness  and  who  therefore  makes  some 
discovery  in  regard  to  the  inner  life.  All  new  develop- 
ments begin  in  a  small  way,  or  in  the  minds  of  one  or 
two  men  who  live  at  about  the  same  time,  and  then 
spread  into  the  realm  of  the  universal.  The  special 
claims  that  are  made  in  behalf  of  these  men  are  not 
made  by  themselves,  but  by  people  who  do,  not  culti- 
vate their  own  talents.  It  is  a  striking  fact  that  even 
the  chief est  of  prophets,  Jesus,  indicated  the  way  in 
which  he  said  all  might  follow  him  and  do  the  works 
which  he  performed. 

We  may  still  consult  these  pioneers,  as  we  would 
any  master  in  his  special  field.  But  let  us  seriously 
consult  them  as  examples,  not  hold  them  up  as  alleged 
examples  and  then  cover  them  with  qualifications  so 
that  they  are  removed  from  the  range  of  possibility. 

It  has  seemed  necessary  to  dwell  upon  this  point 
because  of  numerous  preconceptions  in  regard  to 
spiritual  gifts.  These  preconceptions  are  like  the 
notion  that  we  must  take  ourselves  as  we  are,  or  that 
man  is  a  creature  of  habit,  and  cannot  change  his 


The  Channels  of  the  Spirit  143 

habits.  That  there  are  gifts  of  the  Spirit  is  indeed 
true.  That  people  will  always  differ  in  type  is  no  less 
true.  But  there  are  no  people  who  cannot  have  gifts. 
And  gifts  are  apt  to  be  exceedingly  small  at  the  outset. 
They  are  much  like  capital  which  is  skilfully  used. 
If  we  do  not  respect  our  talents,  if  we  do  not  follow 
seemingly  insignificant  clues,  we  are  little  likely  to 
win  possessions  which  people  will  value.  Say  if  you 
will  that  to  see  the  significance  of  evidence  which  all 
men  possess  is  a  gift.  But  there  are  other  gifts  no 
less  important  which  you  possess,  too. 

In  primitive  times  men  doubtless  dwelt  nearer  God 
in  a  naive  sort  of  way,  whereas  we  have  interposed 
the  obstacles  of  self-conscious  thought.  Hence  in 
the  primitive  utterances  of  men  one  frequently  finds 
more  faithful  records  of  the  presence  of  God.  But 
one  would  hardly  look  back  to  those  times  for  a  phi- 
losophy of  the  Spirit.  We  in  our  self-conscious  age 
have  a  work  to  perform  which  the  seers  and  hymn- 
makers  of  old  could  not  have  accomplished.  It  should 
give  us  pause,  when  we  learn  that  relatively  simple, 
if  not  credulously  childlike,  men  could  respond  to  the 
presence  of  the  Spirit  as  we  cannot,  or  as  we  thus  far 
have  not.  The  gift  to  be  cherished  above  all  others  is 
receptivity,  that  is,  willingness  to  follow  where  the 
Spirit  leads  and  to  utter  what  we  believe  the  Spirit 
says,  though  it  conflict  with  our  most  cherished  no- 
tions and  with  all  conventional  belief.  The  real  gift, 
in  fact,  is  childlikeness.  Those  whom  we  revere  have 
this  gift.  But  in  themselves,  in  the  finite  part,  they 
may  possess  as  little  as  we.  The  point  is  that  whatever 
they  are,  whatever  they  possess,  that  they  dedicate 
to  the  uses  of  the  Spirit,  and  there  is  not  a  man  so 


144         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

humble  that  he  cannot  become  such  an  instrument 
of  the  Spirit. 

One  would  not,  then,  ignore  the  teachings  of  the 
prophets,  of  those  who  had  the  courage  to  voice  their 
convictions  while  others  remained  silent.  Had  these 
men  not  gone  before  we  might  not  have  been  able  to 
follow.  But  we  now  have  before  us  the  possibility  of 
attaining  amidst  our  self-consciousness  the  gifts  which 
were  once  bestowed  upon  these  scattered  pioneers. 
We  have  more  reason  to  revere  our  own  age  than  any 
age  in  the  past.  The  history  of  religious  thought  is 
in  part  a  record  of  failures  and  we  may  profit  by  these 
failures.  We  need  not  in  our  day  try  the  monastic 
experiment,  we  need  not  be  hermits  or  ascetics,  we 
need  not  mortify  the  flesh.  We  need  not  go  apart  in 
any  exclusive  sense.  It  may  be  said  that  all  the  ex- 
periments of  the  excluding  type  have  been  tried  and 
pronounced  failures,  like  the  attempts  to  organise  an 
ideal  community  away  from  the  temptations  of  urban 
life.  There  have  been  many  attempts  to  achieve  the 
moral  ideal,  to  find  God,  by  giving  up,  by  reacting 
against  civilisation  and  discarding  its  refinements. 
It  is  now  very  generally  recognised  that  it  is  cowardly 
to  run  away.  If  the  temptations  are  greatly  multi- 
plied in  our  day,  so  that  it  is  difficult  indeed  to  live 
in  our  complex  civilisation,  with  its  record-breaking 
pace  and  its  luxuries,  and  yet  preserve  the  simplicity 
of  the  Spirit,  the  possibilities  of  achievement  are  now 
greater. 

The  refinements  of  life,  for  example,  do  not  neces- 
sarily prevent  us  from  finding  the  Spirit ;  good  form  is 
not  necessarily  a  hindrance.  Our  conventionality  is 
indeed  very  likely  to  be  a  hindrance.  Few  observers 
of  good  form  are  free  from  it.  But  one  need  not  be 


X 

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£5        The  Channels  of  the  Spirit  145 

enslaved.  The  more  highly  cultivated  the  instrument 
the  better,  provided  it  be  recognised  as  an  instrument. 

It  is  easy  to  be  good  where  everybody  is  harmonious 
and  smiling.  It  is  too  easy  to  preserve  our  temper 
where  there  is  naught  to  disturb  it.  As  Emerson 
reminds  us,  the  test  of  the  genius  of  solitude  is  the 
noisy  disturbance  of  the  city  thoroughfare.  One  need 
not  indeed  spend  all  one's  days  amidst  these  noisy 
complexities.  The  devotee  of  the  Spirit  will  inevitably 
elect  the  simple  life,  in  due  course.  But  first  let  him 
earn  the  right  to  it.  To  renounce  the  world  is  to  maim 
the  self,  and  how  fortunate  that  we  really  cannot  run 
away  from  the  self. 

To  be  sure,  the  devotee  of  the  Spirit  who  seeks  God 
everywhere  and  in  everything,  instead  of  condemning 
civilisation,  will  attract  little  attention  to  himself. 
The  way  to  make  a  stir  in  the  world  is  to  indulge  in 
sweeping  condemnation,  cultivate  peculiarity  in  dress 
and  promulgate  an  unsound  doctrine.  But  in  the  end 
those  who  go  quietly  about  what  they  deem  their 
Father's  business  will  triumph.  The  Spirit  does  not 
call  attention  to  itself,  is  not  peculiar,  affects  no  out- 
landish manners.  The  good  sense  of  the  community 
is  a  far  better  judge  than  the  admirers  who  gather 
around  the  so-called  spiritual  genius. 

The  man  who  draws  people  about  him  because  of 
real  merit  is  he  who  has  the  courage,  wherever  he  is, 
whoever  he  may  be,  to  believe  in  the  Spirit.  Those 
whose  power  is  reared  on  the  mere  self  shall  be  for- 
gotten as  if  the  days  of  their  glory  had  never  been. 
They  who  live  for  the  Spirit  shall  find  little  glory  coming 
to  themselves.  But  thus  inexorable  is  the  life  of  the 
Spirit  with  men.  One  must  choose  whom  to  serve. 
Choose  the  Spirit,  and  it  will  not  matter  where  you  are, 


146         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

or  however  slight  your  original  gifts.  The  way  will 
open  before  you,  and  you  shall  be  led  as  the  prophets 
of  old  were  led. 

Do  not,  then,  in  your  zeal  to  realise  the  presence  of 
the  Spirit,  make  a  hobby  of  freedom  and  cut  yourself 
aloof  from  the  world.  This  means  that  you  deem 
yourself  a  little  better  than  the  world.  It  is  easy  to 
condemn  the  world.  But  this  same  world  is  God's 
world,  and  it  is  high  time  to  cease  this  blasphemy. 
He  who  would  be  free  must  find  his  freedom  in  the  life 
of  the  Spirit,  and  the  Spirit  is  in  all  things.  Therefore 
discard  nothing  as  a  mere  thing,  as  if  it  were  dead  and 
God  lived  not  therein.  Select  you  must,  but  let  your 
selection  be  in  keeping  with  the  growth  of  the  Spirit, 
and  when  the  time  comes  to  leave  old  haunts  go  quietly 
away.  Be  positive,  not  negative,  constructive,  not 
iconoclastic.  For  if  you  reject  before  you  understand, 
and  tear  down  instead  of  transmuting,  you  will  be 
compelled  to  return  to  the  discarded  circumstance  and 
be  taught  to  love  what  you  once  hated. 

He  who  finds  love  finds  the  Spirit,  and  where  is 
love  if  not  in  the  homely  things  of  life,  in  the  passions 
of  men  and  in  the  world  we  so  readily  condemn?  The 
love  that  people  prate  of  who  teach  ascetic  doctrines, 
and  claim  that  it  is  strictly  universal,  knows  no  persons, 
is  an  artificial  thing.  Love  mounts  to  the  skies  through 
the  amours  of  men,  it  moves  in  persons  and  is  graded 
in  accordance  with  affinities.  The  Spirit  does  not 
reduce  men  to  a  dead  level.  To  love  universally  is 
to  see  the  beauty  of  all  things  in  their  place. 

Our  times  call  for  a  new  estimate  of  the  channels 
through  which  the  Spirit  is  revealed.  It  is  safe  to  say 
that  the  most  immediate  channels  for  you  and  me  are 
those  which  now  give  us  our  experience,  even  if  there 


The  Channels  of  the  Spirit  147 

are  elements  in  that  experience  which  make  us  eager 
to  run  away  from  them.  We  must  indeed  enjoy  the 
benefits  of  a  change  of  scene,  of  contact  with  other 
minds,  of  freedom  from  constant  work.  But  the  real 
clues  are  those  of  the  nearest  problems.  Hence  it  is 
that  the  prime  requisite,  if  we  would  realise  the  presence 
of  the  Spirit,  is  to  meditate  on  the  given  situation,  re- 
gard that  as  a  gift  of  the  Spirit. 

But  if  it  be  not  our  environment  which  is  at  fault, 
what  is  it  from  which  we  must  escape?  From  our 
mere  selves.  Here  we  are,  engaged  in  active  pursuit 
of  plans,  endeavouring  to  coerce  people  and  things  to 
go  our  way.  We  are  trying  to  possess,  to  master,  to 
regulate.  We  are  anxious,  we  over-strain.  We  look 
out  for  "Number  One."  But  he  alone  who  "loseth 
his  life  shall  find  it."  If  we  would  find  the  Spirit  we 
must  be  willing  to  forego  all  plans,  so  far  as  they  are 
merely  personal.  We  must  cease  all  coercion,  all 
endeavour  to  manage  people,  all  effort  to  possess,  to 
make  gains  for  the  mere  self.  We  must  no  longer  be 
troubled  lest  that  which  is  for  us  go  to  some  one  else. 
We  should  be  restful  where  we  once  strained.  As  for 
"Number  One" — he  shall  be  last  indeed. 

If  we  are  neither  to  renounce  the  world  nor  run 
away  from  it,  neither  to  manage  nor  to  condemn  it, 
we  may  well  accept  it,  let  it  come  and  unfold  before  us. 
It  is  astonishing  how  richly  beautiful  the  world  be- 
comes \vhen  we  thus  give  it  an  opportunity  to  reveal 
its  reality  and  meaning.  Likewise  with  regard  to  our 
own  little  section  of  it.  Possibly  if  we  cease  all  effort 
to  manipulate  it,  the  world  will  regulate  itself  very  well. 

It  may  seem  like  reducing  the  spiritual  life  to  the 
most  commonplace  level  when  one  counsels  the  setting 
aside  of  all  coercive  plans  and  doing  that  which  lies 


148         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

nearest  at  hand  as  a  divine  deed.  Yet  this  is  an  ex- 
cellent way  to  begin.  That  which  lies  at  hand  may 
not  be  the  sort  of  thing  one  prefers.  But  it  happens 
to  be  a  piece  of  work  which  was  begun  in  one's  less 
enlightened  days  and  duty  bids  its  completion.  There 
may  be  a  hundred  undertakings  which  more  forcibly 
appeal  to  the  mind,  and  one  may  be  very  eager  to 
begin  a  bit  of  work  which  one  has  very  much  at  heart. 
But,  directly  in  one's  pathway  there  lie  trivial  things 
to  be  done,  and  it  is  well  to  take  them  up  as  if  nothing 
were  more  divine. 

But,  after  all,  one  can  spend  a  delightful  day  doing 
what  is  at  hand.  Even  more  delightful  is  a  day  in 
which  one  lays  down  all  occupations  and  ventures 
forth  at  random,  into  the  city  or  the  country,  or  where 
thoughtful  friends  abide.  For  it  is  not  our  self- 
conscious  days  which  reveal  the  profounder  clues.  To 
meditate  in  carefully  selected  silence,  to  concentrate 
by  rule,  to  worship  by  rote,  may  be  to  find  the  Spirit. 
But  better  is  it  to  let  the  Spirit  discover  itself.  A 
random  walk  over  the  hills  may  be  far  richer  in  result 
than  a  carefully  planned  day.  To  stroll  through  a 
book-shop,  or  wander  up  and  down  a  city  street,  with 
no  destination  in  mind,  may  be  to  detect  an  exceptional 
gleam  of  light  flashing  across  the  mind  in  the  most  in- 
cidental way.  One  who  has  the  power  thus  to  absent 
himself  in  this  busy  world  may  find  the  Spirit  where 
it  is  ordinarily  least  expected. 

The  ideal  for  those  who  would  dedicate  their  lives 
to  the  coming  of  the  Spirit  would  appear  to  be  this: 
to  arise  each  day  without  a  fixed  plan  for  the  entire 
day,  then  follow  the  leading  which  applies  to  that  day 
and  that  especially.  Now,  at  first  thought  this  might 
seem  like  doing  merely  what  one  wants  to  do.  Yet 


The  Channels  of  the  Spirit  149 

the  leading  of  the  Spirit  is  as  likely  to  be  the  reverse  of 
this.  The  deed  at  hand  is  not  necessarily  either  the 
hardest  or  the  easiest  thing.  The  majority  of  us 
awaken  into  the  spiritual  life  so  late  that  there  are 
enough  undertakings  on  hand  to  last  for  several  years 
before  our  life  is  to  any  extent  free  from  plans.  The 
readjustment  of  life  may  come  slowly.  But  it  will 
come  with  a  new  zest  if  we  permit  each  day  to  be  a 
fresh  creation  of  the  Spirit. 

The  sort  of  withdrawal  from  the  world  which  we  now 
countenance  is  the  momentary  elevation  of  mind  and 
heart  which  all  may  practise  amidst  the  complexities 
of  just  this  busy  life  of  ours.  Special  modes  of  life 
were  indeed  necessary  when  men  sought  the  Spirit 
in  desert  places  and  in  the  hermit's  cell,  through 
Oriental  contemplation  or  mystic  absorption.  But 
we  who  seek  God  in  the  daylight  need  no  special  gifts. 
What  we  need  is  earnestness  of  mind  and  heart.  The 
prophets  of  old  have  made  clear  the  way.  The  time 
has  come  for  the  social  revelation  of  the  Spirit. 

The  first  point  I  wish  to  establish,  then,  concerning 
the  experience  of  the  presence  of  God  is  that  there  are 
no  real  barriers  in  our  nature,  whatever  the  artificial 
obstacles  which  thought  has  put  in  the  way.  The 
question  of  the  nature  and  place  of  gifts  is  difficult.  We 
must  do  justice  to  our  teachers  and  our  sacred  litera- 
ture as  well  as  to  universal  human  nature  and  to  our- 
selves. There  is  much  still  to  be  said  in  regard  to 
particularly  authoritative  experiences,  the  nature  and 
scope  of  guidance,  and  the  immediate  apprehension 
of  the  Spirit.  It  must  long  remain  a  significant  fact 
that  it  is  the  childlike  man  who  is  our  guide  rather 
than  the  man  who  is  older  in  experience  but  confused 
by  his  self-consciousness.  For  us  there  is  no  road 


1 50         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

back  to  a  supposed  golden  epoch.  We  must  find  God 
in  our  own  time.  Hence  it  behooves  us  to  reconstruct 
our  belief  with  regard  to  the  coming  of  the  Spirit. 

The  first  great  fact  is  that  God  is  present  to  all  men, 
without  hindrance.  This  means  that  He  has  always 
given  revelations,  though  unheeded.  Our  philosophy 
must  be  broad  enough  to  take  account  of  these  revela- 
tions, in  the  face  of  the  fact  that  counter-claims  in 
favour  of  special  revelations  have  been  made  all  through 
the  ages.  This  reconstruction  of  belief  in  regard  to 
the  coming  of  the  Spirit  involves  a  no  less  radical 
change  in  regard  to  human  nature.  For  we  have 
made  claims  in  our  pride  which  have  blinded  us  to  the 
real  character  of  men. 

For  example,  if  all  men  really  have  access  to  the 
Spirit  one  would  reasonably  expect  enormous  differ- 
ences in  modes  of  speech,  forms  of  worship,  in  creeds, 
doctrines,  and  types  of  social  service.  Expecting 
differences,  one  would  be  on  the  alert  to  learn  their 
significance,  where  formerly  one  would  have  con- 
demned. Hence  there  must  be  an  enormous  change 
of  front,  in  place  of  the  sometime  attitude  of  theolog- 
ical superiority.  Where  we  once  saw  only  paganism, 
we  will  perhaps  discover  an  element  of  the  universal 
revelation  of  the  Spirit.  With  the  growth  of  this 
tolerance  will  come  a  more  outgoing  spirit,  an  attitude 
of  belief  in  our  fellows,  of  whatever  race  or  clime. 

All  this  will  mean  actual  recognition  of  the  truth 
of  the  well-known  saying  that  human  nature  is  the 
same  the  world  over.  The  rigid  barriers  between 
sacred  and  profane  broken  down,  the  heathen  no 
longer  aristocratically  condemned,  it  will  be  necessary 
to  alter  our  attitude  with  regard  to  the  sinner,  and 
even  the  criminal.  Where  shall  the  change  end  ?  Will 


The  Channels  of  the  Spirit  151 

the  revolution  be  so  great  that  everything  and  every- 
body will  be  reduced  to  the  same  level,  and  the  Spirit 
become  as  commonplace  as  the  sunset  which  nobody 
notices?  Not  so.  The  levelling  must  go  on  until  the 
last  artificial  barrier  has  been  removed  and  the  sun 
of  the  Spirit  shines  upon  all.  We  must  overcome  our 
exclusiveness  in  minutest  degree.  Then,  these  changes 
made  in  thought,  we  shall  be  in  a  position  to  readjust 
our  views  of  human  nature  and  the  divine  presence  in 
terms  of  genuinely  universal  principles.  If  we  have 
been  in  the  habit  of  excluding  God  from  the  common- 
place, it  is  high  time  to  find  Him  there.  If  we  have 
been  "too  refined"  to  mix  with  the  uncouth,  we  must 
see  God  there,  too,  in  the  rough  exteriors  of  the  common 
people.  If  we  have  been  "  too  good"  to  associate  with 
the  sinner,  lest  our  reputation  be  lost,  we  may  well 
recollect  the  example  which  Jesus  long  ago  set  mankind. 
Every  man  is  guilty  in  some  respect.  No  man  can 
first  cast  the  stone,  when  it  is  a  question  of  exclusive- 
ness,  and  the  rearing  of  artificial  barriers.  In  the 
spiritual  world  there  are  no  barriers;  there  every  man 
is  a  son  of  God,  and  there  is  no  exception. 

The  Spirit  condemns  not  at  all.  It  comes  to  uplift, 
to  guide  and  to  sustain.  He  who  would  experience 
its  coming  in  large  measure  must  open  wide  his  heart 
for  the  coming  of  sympathy,  of  charity  and  love, 
where  misjudgment,  condemnation  and  hatred  reigned 
before.  Every  man  is  striving  towards  the  Spirit,  and 
every  man  deserves  to  be  recognised  as  thus  striving. 
Hence  our  least  thought  about  our  fellows  as  well  as 
our  greatest  must  be  brought  in  line  with  our  philos- 
ophy of  the  Spirit. 

Our  philosophy  would  appear,  then,  to  require 
entire  toleration  of  other  points  of  view,  and  other 


152          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

types  of  conduct,  so  far  as  they  may  be  judged  to 
spring  from  upright  motives.  Absolute  charity  is 
demanded,  entire  belief  in  people  so  far  as  their  heart 
of  hearts  is  concerned,  coupled  with  the  forgiveness 
which  cherishes  no  lingering  thought  of  unkindness. 
Another's  method  may  not  be  ours,  but  if  it  sincerely 
spring  from  belief  in  God  it  is  thus  far  genuine.  To 
become  an  instrument  of  the  Spirit  one  must  eliminate 
all  sarcasm,  all  unrighteous  judgment,  all  exclusiveness 
and  pettiness,  by  cultivating  the  most  generous 
attitude.  The  ideal  is  to  be  outgoing  to  everybody, 
with  no  condemnation  of  persons — however  much 
objection  there  may  be  to  particular  deeds.  In  such 
an  attitude  there  can  be  no  bitterness,  no  hatred,  no 
sentiment  of  jealousy  or  envy.  The  spiritual  life  is 
a  life  of  giving,  not  of  bartering;  of  doing,  not  merely 
saying ;  of  being,  not  alone  of  doing.  One's  experience 
becomes  a  channel  of  the  Spirit  by  "living  the  life." 

Does  this  call  for  perfection?  Well,  the  pathway 
of  the  Spirit  is  discovered  through  the  quest  for  just 
these  ends.  It  is  no  doubt  attained  at  first  through 
manifold  conflicts,  illusions,  deviations,  and  simula- 
tions. When  we  are  really  on  the  way  we  are  buffeted, 
tried,  tested,  according  to  our  eagerness.  There  are 
"ups  and  downs,"  alternations,  openings  and  shut- 
tings. But  withal  there  is  progress.  The  essential  is 
to  accept  the  Spirit  as  a  gift  and  await  developments. 

How  far  should  one  merely  accept,  merely  express 
the  Spirit?  The  ideal  is  complete  acceptance,  full 
expression.  But  inasmuch  as  the  human  factors 
always  enter  in  it  is  important  to  consider  how  to 
better  the  various  modes  of  acceptance  and  forms 
of  expression.  A  doctrine  of  mere  expression  may 
readily  lead  to  a  life  of  license,  in  which  the  inclinations 


The  Channels  of  the  Spirit  153 

i 

of  selfish  desire  are  put  in  the  place  of  the  leadings  of 
the  Spirit.  This  is  an  .abuse  of  the  proposition  that 
ultimately  there  is  but  one  power  in  the  universe. 
With  that  power  it  is  first  of  all  a  question  of  measured, 
orderly  expression.  Mere  expression  is  chaos.  The 
more  delicately  attuned  the  instrument  the  nobler 
the  music.  The  instrument  of  expression  may  either 
mar  or  aid.  The  greater  the  spiritual  possibilities 
the  greater  may  be  the  temptations,  the  struggle  of 
contending  forces  to  control.  There  are  struggles,  for 
example,  in  regard  to  worldly  possessions,  standards 
and  authorities;  contentions  with  the  intellect  in  its 
ambition,  its  pride,  and  its  lordly  power  of  criticism; 
and  wrestlings  with  selfishness  in  many  forms.  Merely 
to  express  what  arises  within  one,  merely  because  it 
arises,  and  because  there  is  said  to  be  "  but  one  power, " 
is  to  make  the  barest  beginning.  It  is  primarily  a 
question  of  direction  and  of  fitness  of  the  end  to  be 
attained  and  the  means  that  lead  to  it.  The  mere  life  of 
the  moment  is  not  the  life  of  the  Spirit,  for  the  Spirit 
takes  thought,  is  for  the  morrow  as  well.  The  life 
of  the  Spirit  is  rather  the  life  in  the  eternal  present, 
the  deep,  philosophical  present,  as  we  shall  see  more 
explicitly  in  the  following  chapters. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE   IMMEDIACY  OF  THE  SPIRIT 

WE  have  now  to  consider  the  question  of  the  special 
authority  assignable  to  certain  types  of  activity 
viewed  in  relation  to  the  experience  of  communion  with 
God.  There  are  several  hypotheses  which  might  be 
maintained,  some  of  which  we  may  profitably  examine 
in  detail,  (i)  It  might  be  held,  for  example,  that  there 
is  a  special  faculty  for  the  direct  apprehension  of  the 
divine  presence,  not  that  the  soul  becomes  one  with 
God,  but  that  revelations  are  directly  made  through 
this  "faculty."  (2)  It  might  be  held  that  God  is  not 
revealed  through  one  faculty  alone,  but  through  man's 
higher  nature  as  a  whole,  that  is,  through  "  the  inner 
voice,"  through  conscience,  intuition,  emotion,  feeling, 
and  guidance.  (3)  Or,  it  might  be  maintained  that 
God  is  not  directly  apprehensible  at  all,  but  is  know- 
able  through  thought,  that  is,  by  means  of  criticism 
of  the  so-called  immediate  gifts  of  the  Spirit,  through 
progressive  inference.  (4)  Again,  it  might  be  con- 
tended that  God  is  neither  apprehensible  through 
higher  faculties  nor  knowable  through  reason,  but  is 
directly  possessed  amidst  an  experience  in  which  the 
soul  becomes  mystically  one  with  Him.  (5)  Finally, 
one  might  insist  that  there  is  truth  in  all  these  theories, 
hence  it  is  impossible  to  decide  wholly  in  favour  of  any 
one  of  them.  That  is  to  say,  it  might  well  be  admitted 
that  God  is  apprehensible  through  immediate  ex- 
perience, but  is  knowable  through  reason;  that  He  is 

154 


The  Immediacy  of  the  Spirit          155 

revealed  through  pain,  guidance,  faith,  communion, 
also  through  those  aspects  of  the  mystic  experience 
which  withstand  the  test  of  criticism,  above  all  through 
enlightened  reason. 

It  is  plain  that  in  the  choice  between  these  hypoth- 
eses much  depends  upon  what  proves  to  be  an  accept- 
able conception  of  God,  the  implied  theory  of  human 
nature,  the  theory  of  immediate  experience  and  of 
reason.  If  we  confine  our  investigation  at  the  outset 
to  a  study  of  human  faculty  and  experience,  we  may 
first  consider  the  alleged  supremacy  of  the  spiritual 
"sense"  or  "faculty,"  then  the  power  or  activity 
known  as  intuition,  the  emotions,  and  mystic  ex- 
perience. The  foregoing  discussions  point  to  the 
conclusion  that  our  entire  nature  is  a  channel  of  the 
Spirit.  Still  we  cannot  escape  the  conviction  that  a 
certain  side  of  our  nature  is  supreme.  It  would  be 
well,  therefore,  to  examine  the  various  special  claims 
with  particular  care  in  order  to  determine  the  place 
assignable  to  the  faculties  or  experiences  in  question. 

Is  there  within  man  a  special  sense  or  faculty  for 
the  immediate  apprehension  of  the  Spirit?  Some 
have  believed  so  and  have  reared  a  philosophy  of 
religion  on  this  hypothesis.  Such  an  assumption 
has  seemed  necessary  to  account  for  divine  revelation 
and  for  the  mystic's  experiences.  It  is  plain  that  if 
there  be  such  a  faculty  what  we  have  said  about  gifts 
and  revelations  will  stand  in  need  of  revision.  If  there 
be  no  such  "  God-sense, "  the  analysis  of  the  hypothesis 
will  at  any  rate  disclose  additional  evidence  that  the 
Spirit  is  actively  present  on  all  sides  of  our  nature. 

So  far  as  psychological  considerations  are  concerned 
there  would  appear  to  be  no  reason  for  assuming  the 
existence  of  a  special  faculty.  The  term  "faculty" 


156          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

at  once  reminds  us  of  the  old-time  psychology,  which 
described  the  mind  as  if  it  were  divided  into  com- 
partments, one  for  the  reception  and  display  of  feeling, 
one  for  will,  and  a  third  for  the  activities  of  thought. 
Present-day  psychology,  with  more  careful  analysis, 
describes  the  mind  in  accordance  with  the  type  of 
experience  that  is  uppermost  at  the  time;  but  finds 
no  experience  that  is  devoid  of  elements  derived  from 
sensation,  none  without  will,  none  without  thought. 
Nor  is  any  absolute  separation  made  between  active 
and  receptive  mental  states.  There  is  one  mind, 
functioning  in  various  ways,  hence  variously  describ- 
able.  The  existence  of  this  mental  unity  amidst 
variety  is  inferred  from  the  study  of  the  various  types 
of  mental  experience. 

Taking  our  clue  from  this  more  accurate  description 
of  mental  life,  we  conclude  that  there  is  no  reason  to 
draw  sharp  lines  of  distinction  between  ordinary  mental 
experience  and  experiences  known  as  moral  or  re- 
ligious. When  we  apprehend  the  beautiful,  commune 
with  our  fellow-men,  or  worship,  we  use  the  same  mind, 
the  difference  being  that  in  each  case  different  objects 
engage  our  attention.  Esthetic  values,  for  instance, 
are  added  to  a  multitude  of  other  interests  when  we 
contemplate  the  beautiful.  Our  experience  of  beauty 
is  partly  a  sense-experience,  partly  a  product  of 
thought.  In  the  same  way  our  religious  life  has 
grown  out  of  and  is  commingled  with  our  mental  life 
at  large.  Sometimes  the  experience  is  one  of  rela- 
tive quiescence  of  the  reasoning  powers  and  chiefly 
contemplative.  Again,  active  processes  of  reason  pre- 
dominate and  we  no  sooner  pass  through  the  ex- 
perience than  we  begin  to  interpret  it.  To  certain 
of  our  sentiments,  emotions,  desires,  aspirations,  and 


The  Immediacy  of  the  Spirit          157 

activities  we  have  attributed  special  values.  Hence 
we  speak  as  if  we  possessed  a  distinctively  religious 
nature.  But  this  is  figurative  language,  like  our 
references  to  personality  when  we  speak  as  if  we  pos- 
sessed several  selves.  There  may  be  the  greatest 
sort  of  contrast  between  emotions  and  moods,  all 
within  one  self.  Even  when  we  speak  of  a  "subcon- 
scious mind"  we  are  simply  making  certain  distinctions 
within  a  single  mental  life;  there  is  not  an  iota  of 
evidence  in  favour  of  the  existence  of  subconsciousness 
that  is  not  founded  on  distinctions  drawn  within 
consciousness. 

It  is  true,  we  often  refer  to  the  soul  as  distinctively 
spiritual,  as  specially  active  or  peculiarly  exempli- 
fied in  prayer,  as  the  recipient  of  guidance,  il- 
lumined from  above,  "born  again,"  as  essentially 
pertaining  to  the  immortal  life.  Yet  it  is  this  same 
soul  that  receives  sensation,  that  is  tempted  from 
beneath,  stirred  by  animal  impulses,  imprisoned 
by  emotions.  Whatever  the  experience  of  the  soul, 
high  or  low,  spiritual  or  natural,  it  is  capable  of  being 
impressed  and  of  reacting,  of  deriving  data  from 
without  and  proposing  theories  in  explanation  thereof. 
In  all  its  relationships  the  soul  is  undoubtedly  many- 
sided.  This  many-sidedness  functions  in  numerous 
ways,  hence  is  the  recipient  of  a  multitude  of  objects. 
It  may  be  so  far  immersed  in  the  life  of  the  physical 
senses  as  seemingly  to  possess  no  other  mode  of  life. 
Again,  the  life  of  the  senses  may  be  largely  quiescent, 
so  that  there  is  scarcely  a  discernible  sensation.  In  a  state 
which  is  chiefly  characterised  as  subconsciousness  there 
may  be  a  relatively  large  degree  of  receptivity.  But  again 
there  may  be  a  fixed  idea  so  persistent  that  no  external 
experience  can  arouse  the  mind  from  its  servitude. 


158         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

It  may  be,  however,  that  in  some  of  our  experiences 
mental  life  more  nearly  approximates  to  a  condition 
of  discarnate  existence.  For  example,  the  experience 
in  which  a  distant  friend  seems  to  be  as  near  as  if 
bodily  present  in  the  same  room,  or  the  experience  in 
which  a  sentiment  or  thought  is  apparently  transmitted 
to  one  who  is  absent.  Again,  clairvoyance  seems  to 
imply  a  higher  mode  of  mental  apprehension  akin  to 
what  is  conceivably  a  non-fleshly,  purely  spiritual 
vision  of  the  soul.  These  and  other  experiences  may 
be  typical  of  the  soul's  future  existence  when  it  shall 
be  freed  from  the  flesh  and  perceive  without  the 
medium  of  the  physical  senses.  On  the  basis  of  such 
experiences  some  people  believe  that  man  possesses 
an  inner  or  spiritual  system  of  senses,  corresponding 
to  the  organs  of  physical  sensation.  Hence  there  may 
be  reason  to  hold  that  certain  experiences  are  more 
specifically  spiritual.  Yet,  granted  these  higher  senses 
and  their  deliverances,  these  powers  function  amidst 
the  usual  activities  of  sensation,  attention,  volition, 
and  thought.  They  neither  imply  a  separate  soul  nor 
the  separateness  of  the  soul  from  the  ordinary  con- 
ditions of  psycho-physical  life.  It  is  still  a  question 
of  types  of  experience  of  the  same  soul. 

That  souls  differ  in  experience  there  can  be  no 
question.  Some  are  almost  wholly  dependent  on 
inferences  drawn  from  natural  experience,  while 
others  seldom  arrive  at  any  important  result  through 
conscious  reasoning,  but  receive  "impressions"  of 
various  sorts,  guidances,  leadings,  intuitions.  There 
are  some  whose  experience  may  be  characterised  as 
relatively  passive,  while  others  have  a  decidedly 
active,  positive  experience.  Again,  there  are  souls  that 
are  describable  as  subjective,  while  others  live  largely 


The  Immediacy  of  the  Spirit          159 

in  an  objective  world.  .Some  seem  to  be  especially 
gifted,  illumined  within,  inspired  by  a  consciousness 
of  the  immediate  presence  of  God.  Yet  in  all  these 
cases  we  are  speaking  of  different  types  of  experience 
which  arise  out  of  diversities  of  temperament,  varieties 
of  interest.  The  mere  fact  that  experiences  radically 
differ  is  in  itself  no  proof  of  the  existence  of  other 
faculties  or  senses,  to  be  specially  differentiated  as 
"spiritual."  In  general,  those  who  have  "spiritual 
experiences,"  and  who  therefore  believe  in  the  ex- 
istence of  special  faculties,  live  more  in  their  instincts 
and  emotions  and  hence  analyse  less  carefully.  Con- 
sequently their  theories  of  human  nature  are  less 
trustworthy.  Moreover,  it  is  noticeable  that  these 
people  differ  radically  among  themselves,  while  the 
pronouncements  which  they  make  in  the  name  of 
intuition  are  profoundly  in  conflict.  The  reasons  for 
this  will  be  made  plain  when  we  discuss  the  nature 
of  intuition. 

If  by  the  term  "spiritual  faculty"  or  "God-sense" 
such  powers  are  in  question  as  the  physical  sense  of 
sight  or  touch,  there  would  appear  to  be  no  reason  on 
psychological  grounds  to  believe  in  the  existence  of 
any  such  faculty.  That  is,  there  is  no  distinct  or 
separate  faculty.  Every  sense  may  deliver  to  us  what 
we  take  to  be  spiritual  data.  Many  activities  may 
combine  to  yield  what  is  judged  to  be  the  essentially 
spiritual  experience.  Hence  the  experience  of  the 
divine  presence  may  be  precisely  as  real  as  if  there 
were  a  special  sense.  Revelation  may  be  precisely 
as  real  and  as  true.  But  all  the  evidences,  textual  as 
well  as  psychological,  indicate  that,  however  high  or 
unusual  the  experience,  whatever  the  mind  in  question 
contains  is  likely  to  be  not  only  present  but  active 


160         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

in  the  experience.     Hence  man's  religious  experience 
is  interpretable  with  reference  to  his  whole  nature. 

If,  however,  there  be  no  reason  to  assume  the  ex- 
istence of  a  special  faculty,  there  is  abundant  reason 
for  believing  in  distinct  types  of  spiritual  experience 
in  which  various  phases  of  our  nature  predominate 
in  different  order  at  various  times.  That  is,  it  is  not  a 
question  of  partiality  or  of  separate  endowment,  but 
of  difference  of  emphasis,  according  to  the  character 
of  the  experience  and  the  type  of  person.  There  is  as 
good  reason  to  cultivate  receptivity,  to  preserve 
spontaneity,  or  believe  in  seership,  as  there  would 
be  were  we  to  believe  in  special  endowments.  All 
along  in  these  discussions  we  have  distinguished  be- 
tween people  who  dwell  near  the  immediate  sources 
of  religious  experience  and  those  who  know  such 
sources  only  at  second  hand.  The  seers  and  prophets 
are,  if  you  please,  divinely  gifted.  But  the  distinction 
would  appear  to  be,  not  between  some  power  which 
they  possess  while  others  do  not,  but  that  in  them 
powers  which  are  common  to  all  are  more  highly  de- 
veloped, so  that  the  test  is  that  of  direct  seership  while 
less  enlightened  people  appeal  to  secondary  authorities. 
If  some  are  alive  to  that  which  is  non-existent  for 
others,  it  is  partly  because  their  attention  has  been 
called  to  that  which  exists  for  all.  But  this  is  true 
throughout  life.  Some  men  have  an  eye  for  the  sig- 
nificant features  of  a  landscape,  the  indications  of 
geologic  formations,  while  others  see  merely  prosaic 
details.  Some  think  for  themselves,  while  others 
never  lift  the  events  of  life  into  the  sphere  of  the 
intellect.  The  independent  and  the  dependent  are 
everywhere  found.  So  are  people  of  an  objective 
type  and  those  of  a  subjective.  Difference  in  tern- 


The  Immediacy  of  the  Spirit         161 

peramental  experience  leads  to  difference  of  emphasis, 
hence  to  the  acceptance  of  various  authorities.  He 
who  is  able  to  go  to  the  original  sources  in  any  depart- 
ment of  human  knowledge  is  particularly  fortunate. 
But  in  religion  as  elsewhere  it  is  an  instance  of  dis- 
covery and  use  of  that  which  exists  for  all. 

The  same  conclusions  would  follow  were  we  to 
examine  in  detail  the  reasons  for  belief  in  the  existence 
of  a  special  faculty  in  the  moral  sense  of  the  word, 
the  faculty  known  as  "conscience."  It  would  not 
then  be  so  much  a  question  of  the  presence  of  God  in 
the  form  of  experience  as  of  His  supposed  authoritative 
utterance,  His  command  to  do  this  or  refrain  from 
that  deed  said  to  be  right  or  wrong.  No  doubt  the 
majority  of  men  believe  in  the  existence  of  conscience 
as  an  inner  voice  which  tells  them  what  is  right  or 
wrong,  as  if  righteousness  depended  on  the  particular 
utterance.  It  seems  a  pity,  in  one  sense  of  the  word, 
to  reject  this  notion;  for  it  is  very  serviceable  in  child- 
hood and  implies  a  convenient  theory  of  human  nature. 
Yet  there  is  no  defensible  evidence  in  its  support. 

It  would  be  extremely  convenient  if  there  were  an 
ever  ready  voice  to  tell  men  positively  what  is  right, 
what  wrong.  We  would  then  be  absolved  from  re- 
sponsibility and  spared  a  deal  of  worry.  But  human 
life  is  not  constituted  on  that  basis.  Sometimes  one 
sees  clearly  what  is  wrong  or  right — that  is,  what  one 
judges  to  be  wrong  or  right.  Again,  one  cannot  see  at 
all,  and  one  listens  in  vain  for  a  "voice."  In  any 
event,  one  must  pass  judgment  on  the  deliverances 
of  consciousness.  Thus  to  judge  is  to  make  oneself 
responsible.  One  must  learn  from  experience,  by 
comparing  or  discarding,  that  which  the  authoritative 
"voice"  is  supposed  to  declare.  Analysis  shows  that 


1 62          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

the  "voice"  is  an  extremely  complex  product  of  many 
sides  of  our  nature. 

If  the  particular  utterances  of  what  is  popularly 
taken  to  be  conscience  were  one  and  all  direct  from 
God  and  in  themselves  constituted  the  right,  one  would 
reasonably  expect  them  to  be  uniform,  consistent. 
But  every  student  of  history  knows  that  the  judgments 
pronounced  and  the  deeds  wrought  in  the  name  of 
f  conscience  differ  enormously,  are  hopelessly  in  conflict, 
and  vary  with  the  age.  The  moral  constant  or  in- 
variant is  not  the  pronouncement  or  the  deed.  Par- 
ticular actions  do  not  in  themselves  constitute  what 
is  right.  There  is  no  consistency  or  uniformity  here. 
Conscience  is  neither  a  voice  nor  a  sense,  neither  a 
faculty  nor  a  special  power.  The  permanent  or  in- 
variable element  is  the  moral  principle  or  law,  im- 
plied in  the  fact  that  all  men  make,  and  are  obliged 
to  make,  moral  judgments.  That  is  to  say,  conscience 
is  the  universal  principle  of  moral  thought  or  reflection. 
The  necessity  which  man  is  under  to  make  judgments 
and  to  act  on  his  own  responsibility  is  what  constitutes 
conscience.  Hence  the  authority  of  conscience  is  the 
authority  of  law.  It  is  because  we  possess  a  law-giving 
nature,  because  it  is  an  inherent  principle  of  our  entire 
being  that  conscience  shall  rule,  that  we  are  under 
moral  obligation,  not  because  of  any  particular  judg- 
ment assumed  to  be  right.  One  would  expect  men's 
judgments  to  differ. 

It  is  inevitable  that  conscience  should  imply  an 
activity  of  man's  whole  nature,  for  it  is  precisely  the 
principle  which  brings  order  into  his  nature.  If  it 
implies  a  hierarchy  of  powers,  it  is  primarily  because 
human  nature  is  ideally  one,  is  not  divided  into 
compartments.  The  history  of  English  ethics  from 


The  Immediacy  of  the  Spirit          163 

Shaftesbury  to  Martineau  confirms  these  conclusions. 
The  critical  philosophy  has  not  changed  the  situation, 
but  has  made  the  sense  of  obligation  even  more  august 
by  pointing  out  that  our  entire  nature  underlies  it. 
The  authority  of  conscience  has  not  been  taken  away 
but  has  been  strongly  emphasised  anew.  It  is  the 
integrity  of  our  nature  that  assures  for  us  the  divine 
character  of  that  authority. 

We  reject  the  hypothesis,  therefore,  that  there  is  a 
distinct  faculty  or  voice  in  favour  of  the  theory  that 
there  is  a  hierarchy  of  closely  united  human  powers 
over  which  conscience  is  supreme  and  in  relation  to 
which  religious  experience  has  special  significance. 
Man's  higher  nature  is  indeed  authoritative  over  the 
rest,  but  for  this  authority  there  is  a  firmer  basis  than 
the  popular  belief  in  a  " sense"  or  "voice"  would 
imply.  That  there  is  an  experience  popularly  at- 
tributable to  a  voice  is  another  matter.  The  reality 
of  the  experience  does  not  imply  the  existence  of  an 
organ  of  utterance.  The  experience  must  take  its 
place  amidst  many  others  that  await  the  scrutiny 
of  constructive  thought. 

We  here  accept  the  theory  of  human  nature  for 
which  there  is  the  best  psychological  evidence,  namely, 
that  in  all  mental  operations  our  "powers"  or  "facul- 
ties" are  more  or  less  active.  That  is  to  say,  sensi- 
bility of  some  sort  always  enters  into  the  experience, 
however  noble  and  however  great  the  power  of  the 
central  idea;  attention  is  present,  also  desire,  thought, 
and  will.  This  means  that  in  the  experience  of  com- 
munion with  God  the  total  mind  is  so  far  active  that 
the  experience  cannot  be  accurately  described  as  if 
it  were  a  mere  vision,  for  example,  objectively  pro- 
duced and  passively  perceived,  apart  from  the  partici- 


1 64          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

pation  of  the  intellect  or  other  powers.  On  the  spiritual 
side,  the  mind  meets  no  experience  with  entire  passivity, 
but  here  as  elsewhere,  wittingly  or  unwittingly,  in- 
terprets, sees  in  the  experience  the  confirmation  of  a 
cherished  hypothesis  or  the  fulfilment  of  a  desire. 
Inasmuch  as  volitional  and  intellectual  elements  have 
entered  in,  the  experience  must  be  described  and 
interpreted  accordingly.  Allowances  must  be  made 
for  the  factors  which  the  personality  brings  to  the 
experience,  allowances  for  the  principles  of  interpre- 
tation, the  individual  ambition,  the  type  of  thought, 
the  degree  of  emotion. 

This  sounds  like  an  innocent  statement,  which  every 
one  would  accept  as  matter  of  common  sense.  But  its 
logical  implications  strike  at  the  root  of  many  cherished 
beliefs,  and  we  must  establish  it  on  a  firm  foundation. 
If  the  whole  mind  be  subject  to  the  presence  of  God, 
we  must  carefully  examine  the  special  claims  in  behalf 
of  what  is  vaguely  denominated  "feeling."  If  God 
be  thus  present,  the  appropriate  distinctions  are  not 
between  faculty  and  faculty,  as  if  emotion  were 
separate  from  thought,  but  those  which  show  the 
order  and  degree  in  which  the  Spirit  is  manifested — 
most  objectively  in  nature,  more  intimately  in  the 
human  soul,  more  authoritatively  in  moral  judgments, 
and  more  immediately  in  religious  experience. 

To  dismiss  the  theory  of  the  existence  of  a  peculiar 
faculty  and  of  partiality  in  the  distribution  of  gifts 
is  to  be  prepared  to  admit  that  people  differ  enormously 
in  temperament.  There  are  some,  for  example,  who 
possess  the  power  of  self-abandonment  to  a  remarkable 
degree,  in  contrast  with  those  who  are  too  self-con- 
scious to  do  a  genuinely  spontaneous  act.  Some  are 
able  to  enter  sympathetically  into  another's  experience, 


The  Immediacy  of  the  Spirit          165 

or  portray  dramatically  various  types  of  character; 
while  others  have  no  such  ability.  Some  stand  aloof 
and  study  their  fellows,  seek  causes,  laws,  and  con- 
ditions; while  others  confess  to  a  love  of  mystery  and 
care  not  at  all  for  science.  The  successful  artist  is 
likely  to  be  the  one  who  becomes  so  filled  with  a  certain 
ideal,  a  theme,  picture,  or  character,  that  he  is  fairly 
carried  away  by  it.  But  the  philosopher  cannot  allow 
himself  to  be  entirely  "carried  away."  The  contrasts 
between  the  creature  of  emotions  and  the  man  of 
reason  are  striking  and  almost  beyond  belief.  The  one 
person  can  hardly  understand  or  tolerate  the  other. 
Yet  neither  is  wholly  devoid  of  that  which  he  despises 
in  the  other. 

It  is  plain  that  in  the  seer  and  the  mystic,  the  power 
of  spiritual  self-abandonment  is  very  great.  The  one 
who  enjoys  the  mystic  experience  is  usually  not  intellec- 
tually developed  to  a  high  degree.  Hence  the  vagaries 
and  the  fallacies  of  mysticism,  of  which  more  anon. 
But  it  is  important  to  distinguish  between  the  religious 
experience  which  in  a  measure  may  be  common  to  all 
men — differing  only  in  degree,  not  in  kind — and  the 
account  which  is  given  of  it.  The  experience,  we  have 
seen,  is  the  primary  reality  without  which  men  would 
never  have  believed  in  the  existence  of  spiritual  beings 
and  a  spiritual  world  environing  the  natural,  nor  would 
they  have  given  forth  revelations.  The  immediate 
experience,  the  illumination,  is,  strictly  speaking,  the 
revelation,  and  the  account  given  of  it  is  at  best  a 
report.  The  revelation,  for  example,  is  made  in  the 
language  which  the  seer  happens  to  know,  is  conditioned 
by  his  type  of  life,  his  mental  activity,  the  age  in 
which  he  lives.  Hence  even  a  sacred  or  inspired  book 
is  a  report  of  the  experience  and  thought  of  those  who 


i66         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

wrote  it,  and  the  best  verification  of  its  truth  or  au- 
thority would  be  similar  experiences  on  the  part  of 
those  who  read  it. 

It  may  well  be  that  in  rare  cases  inspiration  is  akin 
to  mediumship,  so  that  the  scribe  interposes  no  ob- 
stacle between  the  Spirit  and  the  word.  At  any  rate, 
it  is  well  not  to  be  dogmatic  on  this  point.  But 
however  successful  the  verbal  reproduction  of  the 
Spirit's  "utterances,"  it  is  still  plain  that  the  prime 
reality  is  the  spiritual  union  of  God  and  man,  the  im- 
mediacy of  the  Spirit's  presence.  Hence  the  qualifi- 
cations that  are  afterwards  made  apply  to  the  letter 
and  not  to  the  Spirit.  The  real  utterances  of  the 
Spirit  are  "words  of  life,"  too  perfect  to  be  reported 
in  the  languages  of  earth.  The  actual  report  that  is 
made  is  a  united  product  of  the  Spirit  and  of  the 
instrumentality  through  which  it  receives  expression. 
Most  modern  scholars  would  agree  that  not  even  in  the 
most  authoritative  statement  of  the  Bible  have  we 
the  literal  words  of  God.  If  the  Bible  be  in  any  sense 
"  the  word  of  God, "  its  consistency  is  surely  that  of  the 
one  Wisdom  behind  its  particular  utterances.  The 
authority  is  not  of  the  letter  but  of  the  Spirit.  Spir- 
itually to  discern  that  authority  is  above  all  to  possess 
the  Spirit  as  inner  witness. 

A  religious  experience  may  be  wholly  genuine  yet 
be  very  crudely  reported.  There  is  constant  need 
of  distinguishing  between  the  experience  and  the 
terms  in  which  it  is  mediated.  This  distinction  between 
immediacy  and  mediation,  between  experience  in  its 
initial  guise  and  the  account  given  of  it,  is  funda- 
mentally important,  and  we  shall  make  use  of  it  from 
this  point  on.  In  brief,  it  is  never  a  question  of  dis- 
tinct faculties  or  special  endowments,  but  always  of 


The  Immediacy  of  the  Spirit          167 

immediacy  and  its  interpretation  in  all  types  of  ex- 
perience and  character.  There  may  be  immediacy 
of  sensibility,  of  impulse,  emotion,  desire,  feeling, 
will,  and  of  thought.  Immediacy  is  in  itself  purely 
general,  as  Hegel  long  ago  showed  conclusively,  and 
all  that  can  be  said  of  it  in  the  first  instance  is  that 
it  exists.  It  is  the  first  moment,  the  first  guise  of  any 
experience  or  mental  activity,  any  appearance,  any 
phenomenon.  The  immediacy  of  any  experience  is  its 
givenness,  as  a  presentation,  before  the  experience 
is  identified.  For  example,  the  inrush  of  an  impulse 
which  meets  no  obstacle  and  is  expressed  in  action 
almost  before  we  are  aware.  The  immediacy  of  a 
thought  is  its  sudden  flashing  through  the  mind  into 
execution — that  is,  without  deliberation.  On  the 
other  hand,  we  have  what  we  call  "sober  second 
thoughts."  We  set  portions  of  our  consciousness  to 
watch,  to  give  warning  when  impulses  rush  in,  that 
we  may  stem  the  impulsive  tide,  deliberate  upon  and 
inhibit  or  express  the  impulse  as  the  case  may  be. 
The  immediacy  of  an  experience  is  akin  to  impulse, 
instinct,  emotion,  and  will;  while  the  thought  which 
deliberates  upon  it  is  derived,  is  of  the  nature  of  judg- 
ment, inference,  criticism. 

It  is  not  now  a  question  of  truth  or  reality.  It  may 
well  be  that  the  impulse  acted  upon  without  delibera- 
tion is  later  judged  to  be  the  truer  guide.  It  may 
be  that  when  we  feel  deeply  we  come  nearest  to  the 
supreme  reality.  One  should  not  permit  the  dis- 
criminations here  made  to  interfere  in  any  sense  with 
the  higher  spontaneities.  We  must  be  true  to  human 
experience,  and  men  very  generally  accord  a  superior 
place  to  certain  of  their  impulses  and  emotions.  The 
popular  distinction  between  feeling  and  thought  stands 


i68          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

for  a  real  distinction  in  human  experience.  But  the 
question  is  whether  the  distinction  has  been  intelli- 
gently made  and  whether  the  theories  founded  upon 
it  will  bear  the  test  of  careful  examination.  For  it  is 
plainly  one  thing  to  have  an  emotion  which  is  judged 
to  be  true  or  authoritative  and  another  to  develop  the 
implications  of  that  judgment. 

If  there  be  no  one  power  for  the  direct  apprehension 
of  the  Spirit,  all  sides  of  our  nature  may  be  said  to 
possess  an  immediacy,  from  our  passions  to  our  noblest 
virtues,  from  our  most  sensuous  feelings  to  our  most 
exalted  thoughts ;  nay,  must  have  an  immediate  relation 
with  God  if  all  life  be  a  manifestation  of  Spirit,  and  if 
that  manifestation  be  said  to  attain  self-consciousness 
in  man.  At  any  rate,  there  is  no  sure  ground  for  the 
admission  of  our  aspirations  and  the  exclusion  of  our 
passions.  It  is  no  doubt  easy  to  see  God'  when  we 
aspire,  difficult  when  we  are  tempted.  But  psy- 
chologically it  is  not  a  matter  of  aspiration  or  of 
temptation,  but  of  immediacy  of  experience  and  its 
description.  The  passion  is  as  directly  present  as 
the  aspiration.  The  mere  immediacy  of  the  experi- 
ence tells  us  very  little.  If  one  man  sees  the  power 
of  an  evil  spirit  in  his  passion,  while  another  declares 
that  it  manifests  the  love  of  God,  the  difference  is  in 
the  interpretation,  not  in  the  immediacy  of  the  temp- 
tation. The  belief  in  an  uninterpreted  immediacy 
has  as  little  foundation  as  the  notion  that  there  is  in 
man  a  special  spiritual  "faculty." 

These  conclusions  do  not,  one  insists,  take  from  the 
value  assigned  to  certain  of  our  experiences  esteemed 
because  of  their  fruits,  any  more  than  they  deprive 
meditation  or  prayer  of  its  worth.  But  they  show 
us  that  the  value  is  assigned,  is  attributed,  and  not 


The  Immediacy  of  the  Spirit          169 

original,  hence  that  more  depends  upon  our  principles 
of  interpretation  than  we  suspected.  This  does  not 
imply  that  all  experiences  are  when  given  qualitatively 
alike,  but  that  even  the  quality  as  we  know  it  has 
undergone  mediation.  There  is  as  good  reason  as  ever 
to  seek  distinct  experiences,  such  as  those  of  prayer 
and  solitude,  but  precisely  because  one's  principles 
of  interpretation  are  highly  selective.  It  will  be  all 
the  more  clear  that  the  immediacy  of  the  uplifting 
experience  is  contributed  to  by  whatever  has  gone 
before  of  a  similar  nature. 

The  distinction  between  the  immediacy  and  the 
interpretation  of  an  experience  comes  plainly  into 
view  in  cases  where  people  of  varied  types  have  what 
appears  to  be  the  same  sort  of  religious  experience 
but  where  the  experience  is  variously  described.  One 
man,  for  example,  will  tell  you  what  he  "saw"  and 
insist  that  he  literally  saw  it;  another  what  he  "  felt, " 
without  reference  to  mental  imagery;  while  a  third 
will  give  a  straightforward  rationalistic  account,  devoid 
of  symbols  and  with  no  reference  to  visions  or  feelings. 
To  the  one  who  received  the  experience  in  the  form 
of  a  vision,  the  wondrous  pictures  he  beheld  may 
appear  to  be  every  whit  as  real  as  the  truths  they 
symbolise,  yet  for  the  emotionalist  these  pictures  might 
have  no  significance.  The  one  whose  emotions  reached 
the  point  where  he  seemed  to  be  identical  with  God 
may  have  been  no  more  deeply  moved  in  a  significant 
sense  than  the  calm  rationalist  who  avoids  all  pan- 
theistic terminology.  To  allege  that  one  "felt"  the 
presence  of  exalted  beings,  as  if  one  touched  the  hems 
of  their  garments,  may  appear  to  imply  a  more  correct 
portrayal  of  the  experience.  Yet  there  will  always 
be  those  who  contend  that  more  careful  interpretation 


1 70         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

of  the  experience  is  demanded,  that  the  particular 
elements  may  be  separated  from  the  universal. 

An  endless  number  of  interpretations  of  religious 
experience  may  be  found  in  the  history  of  thought. 
If  we  contrast  the  primitive  accounts  with  those  of  the 
intelligent  seers  of  a  later  time,  we  have  no  hesitation 
in  judging  in  favour  of  monotheism  as  compared  with 
polytheism.  The  difficulty  begins  in  earnest  when 
we  find  equally  gifted  people  indulging  in  rival  inter- 
pretations on  good  grounds.  To  one  a  religious  ex- 
perience will  come  in  what  he  takes  to  be  the  form  of 
exalted  souls  who  have  a  great  message  to  communicate 
through  him  to  the  world.  Another  will  insist  that  the 
living  Christ  came  to  him,  that  he  saw  the  face  of  the 
man  of  peace  and  heard  his  gentle  utterance.  But  a 
third  will  contend  that  God  spoke  to  him  directly. 
Neither  one  will  perhaps  be  aware  that  he  is  inter- 
preting his  vision  or  experience,  but  all  will  insist 
that  the  experience  was  the  coming  of  exalted  souls, 
was  the  real  Jesus,  was  the  living  God.  It  is  not 
for  us  who  hear  these  diverse  accounts  to  disparage 
the  experience,  or  even  the  interpretations  of  it,  but 
to  point  out  that  besides  having  a  superior  origin  it  was 
also  the  expression  of  the  man  who  had  the  experience. 
The  interpretation  put  upon  the  experience  serves  its 
purpose  for  the  man  who  is  in  that  stage  of  thought. 

It  is  a  significant  fact  that  man's  early  accounts 
of  his  religious  experience  are  apt  to  be  in  terms  of 
emotions,  while  as  he  advances  from  primitive  life 
into  civilisation,  from  childhood  to  manhood,  his 
account  becomes  more  and  more  intellectual.  Thus 
we  find  people  insisting  that  they  "felt"  the  divine 
presence  as  they  might  speak  of  tactual  or  visual  sen- 
sations, while  others  regard  this  as  so  crude  an  account 


The  Immediacy  of  the  Spirit          171 

of  religious  experience  that  it  repels  them.  Hence 
some  critics  hold  that  mysticism  is  a  reversion  to  the 
sensuous  plane. 

It  would  indeed  seem  inappropriate  to  say  that  one 
"senses"  the  divine  presence,  "feels"  the  Spirit,  or 
the  environing  presence  of  God's  kingdom,  as  if  one 
could  actually  touch  the  divine  Personality,  "sense" 
the  proximity  of  heaven.  If  one  can  find  no  more 
fitting  terminology  than  this  it  would  be  better  to 
employ  a  merely  general  term,  such  as  "experience," 
and  say  nothing  further.  Strictly  speaking,  what  is 
perceived  is  an  experience  too  wealthy  to  be  described 
as  one  might  describe  a  sensation  of  warmth  or  colour. 
Although  sensibility  is  undoubtedly  a  part  of  the  ex- 
perience, there  is  much  more  in  it  than  a  mere  sense- 
uplift  or  feeling.  If  we  must  be  literal  and  exact,  let 
us  first  be  faithful  to  the  ideal  meaning,  the  poetic  or 
religious  value.  The  element  of  sensibility  is  little 
likely  to  be  a  significant  part  of  the  experience.  The 
mere  sentiency  of  the  experience  is  by  no  means  suf- 
ficient to  differentiate  it,  or  show  that  the  experience 
is  of  particular  value. 

This  is  not  to  exclude  the  Spirit  from  human  sensi- 
bility, for,  as  we  already  have  seen,  man  may  so 
interpret  even  his  basest  sensation  as  to  find  the 
presence  of  God  therein.  But  in  any  event  it  is  the 
interpretation  that  gives  the  experience  its  value.  So 
far  as  the  mere  sensation  is  concerned,  every  man  in  the 
wide  universe  might  experience  its  like  and  see  nothing 
in  it.  It  is  the  consciousness  with  which  we  enter 
into  experience,  or  what  it  suggests  to  us,  that  makes 
experience  significant.  The  moment  our  interest  is 
transferred  from  mere  sentiency  to  the  value  accredited 
to  it,  we  depart  from  the  point  of  view  of  immediacy 


172          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

to  that  of  interpretation.  If  one  is  to  depart  from 
mere  sentiency  in  any  sense  of  the  word,  it  would  seem 
reasonable  to  undertake  as  complete  an  interpretation 
as  possible.  Probably  every  believer  in  the  spiritual 
life  would  devote  his  interest  to  the  interpretation 
were  it  not  that  custom  has  placed  undue  emphasis 
upon  the  mere  experience. 

What  the  immediacy  of  the  Spirit  is  from  the  God- 
ward  side  only  the  Spirit  knows.  On  this  side  we 
may  well  leave  the  field  absolutely  open,  without 
dogmatism  and  without  any  attempt  at  speculative 
description.  What  channels  of  communication  the 
Spirit  has  with  the  sons  of  Spirit  we  do  not  know. 
Judging  by  the  accounts  which  seers  and  prophets 
have  given  of  their  visions,  or  the  revelations  which 
were  made  through  them,  we  may  conclude  that  in  the 
first  instance  there  is  an  ineffable  union  between  God 
and  the  soul,  an  ineffable  nearness  which  may  only 
be  appreciatively  interpreted,  since  the  expenence  is 
incommunicable.  What  the  experience  is  said  to  be, 
other  than  this  mere  immediate  union,  is  a  matter  of 
interpretation  in  which  all  men  may  take  part.  The 
ineffable  union  is  private,  particular;  the  interpretation 
is  an  affair  of  judgment,  hence  is  capable  of  logical 
examination.  The  most  general  statement  that  can 
be  made  at  the  outset  is  that  the  ineffable  union  is 
for  all  a  matter  of  immediacy,  therefore  in  itself  merely 
a  universal  form.  The  content  which  the  form  is  said 
to  hold  is  dependent  upon  the  individual  theorist. 
That  is  to  say,  the  interpretation  put  upon  the 
experience,  whether  swift  and  relatively  unconscious, 
hence  made  without  awareness  that  one  is  judging, 
or  slow  and  careful,  depends  upon  the  theological 


The  Immediacy  of  the  Spirit          173 

or  other  principles  which  the  recipient  happens  to  hold. 
The  mind  so  readily,  instantly,  and  insensibly  judges, 
interprets,  that  almost  invariably  what  a  man  says 
he  " feels,"  "sees,"  or  experiences,  is  what  he  takes 
the  experience  immediately  to  be,  apart  from  all  in- 
terpretations. If  man  were  wholly  naif,  responsive, 
a  mere  impressionist,  we  might  have  a  fairly  good 
account  of  the  direct  experience.  That  this  is  never 
the  case  is  obvious  to  all  who  make  comparison  of  the 
varied  descriptions  which  seers  of  different  types  have 
offered. 

The  ineffable*  union  may  seem  to  imply  a  direct 
relationship  with  a  higher  order  of  being,  may  be 
accompanied  by  an  awareness  of  superior  power,  may 
be  interpreted  in  a  wholly  personal  way  or  appear  to 
bear  no  reference  to  persons.  Hence  some  would 
characterise  their  upliftment  as  "cosmic  emotion," 
or  the  attainment  of  "cosmic  consciousness,"  while 
others  would  regard  this  as  an  entirely  vague  account 
of  the  experience  and  interpret  it  in  personal  terms. 
Some  claim  that  God  spoke  to  them  as  a  man  might 
speak,  that  God  "came"  and  bestowed  His  grace  upon 
them.  But  others  insist  that  it  was  because  they 
attained  a  higher  level  that  the  union  came,  not  that 
the  great  God  of  this  vast  universe  actually  spoke  or 
came.  The  elements  common  to  all  these  interpre- 
tations seem  to  be  an  uplifting  emotion  coupled  with 
a  sense  of  enlargement  or  freedom.  In  other  words, 
the  mind  is  lifted  from  the  mundane  level,  above  the 
thought  of  self,  to  a  superior  level  of  consciousness, 
and  this  marked  expansion  of  consciousness  carries 
with  it  a  certain  sense  of  blessedness,  hence  a  sentiment 
of  freedom.  One  insists  upon  these  bare  universal 


1 74         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

elements  in  order  to  be  loyal  to  all  types  of  interpre- 
tation. To  speak  of  the  visions  which  in  some  cases 
accompany  the  upliftment  would  be  to  depart  from 
the  universal  characteristics,  for  some  do  not  behold 
the  visions,  and  probably  no  two  people  have  identical 
visions.  To  state  what  one  "feels"  other  than  the 
state  of  blessedness  or  cosmic  upliftment,  would  also 
be  to  depart  from  the  universal.  Some  would  say  that 
they  "feel"  nothing  but  have  insights,  catch  illumi- 
nating clues.  The  only  universal  manner  of  relating 
the  upliftment  with  the  idea  of  the  Spirit  would  appear 
to  be  this,  that  the  Spirit  is  manifested  to  man  in 
various  forms,  both  through  persons  and  through 
emotions  or  insights.  For  one  has  no  right  to  restrict 
the  presence  of  God  to  one  form  of  manifestation. 
At  best  it  would  appear  to  be  a  question,  not  of  the 
pure  light  of  the  Spirit,  but  of  such  light  as  our  eyes 
can  bear.  At  best  the  Father's  love  and  wisdom  are 
mediated  to  us.  To  some  that  love  and  wisdom  would 
have  no  meaning  apart  from  the  thought  of  Christ. 
To  others  those  qualities  would  be  regarded  as  appre- 
hensible in  the  form  of  specific  guidances.  To  a  few 
the  presence  of  God  would  never  be  regarded  as  an 
object  of  experience,  but  always  as  an  object  of  thought. 
That  is,  God  would  be  figuratively  spoken  of  as  "  pres- 
ent" because  one  had  accepted  an  idealistic  argument 
for  His  existence.  In  this  way  the  philosophic  thinker, 
engaged  in  developing  a  system,  is  as  truly  aware  of 
the  presence  of  God  as  the  most  devoted  mystic. 
Indeed  it  may  be  said  that  for  him  the  presence  of 
God  is  far  nearer. 

One  of  the  most  significant  considerations  for  our 
purposes  is  the  conclusion  that  there  is  no  separation 


The  Immediacy  of  the  Spirit          175 

between  the  natural  and  the  spiritual,  no  wall  between, 
no  abrupt  change.  There  may  not  be  a  " blending" 
of  soul  with  Spirit.  It  may  be  inappropriate  to  say 
"  I  became  one  with  the  universe, "  "  I  became  one  with 
God. "  But  at  least  there  is  a  nextness  of  the  natural 
and  the  spiritual,  and  the  Spirit  is  the  bond  of  union. 
If  there  be  no  passing  of  power  between,  there  is  surely 
response  on  the  human  side.  One  at  least  ascends  the 
heights  sufficiently  far  to  look  over  into  another  region, 
the  land  of  eternal  life,  of  limitless  love  and  wisdom. 
To  apprehend,  to  behold,  is  to  receive  a  new  impetus. 
It  is  the  subsequent  experience  that  shows  the  value 
of  the  insight  for  practical  life. 

Another  important  result  of  our  inquiry  is  that  we 
place  the  authority  with  the  rational  or  interpretative 
element,  rather  than  with  the  merely  sentient  or 
particular.  To  discard  the  hypothesis  of  the  ex- 
istence of  a  specially  authoritative  faculty,  such  as  a 
"spiritual  sense"  or  conscience  regarded  as  a  "voice," 
is  not  then  to  reject  either  the  reality  or  the  impera- 
tiveness of  moral  and  spiritual  truth.  If  there  were 
only  the  special  spiritual  experience  or  the  particular 
"voice,"  there  could  be  no  authority  at  all,  but  only 
the  endless  conflict  of  utterances  made  in  the  hollow 
name  of  conscience.  The  voice  is  always  particular, 
it  is  through  reflection  that  the  universal  element  is 
discovered. 

If  God  be  present  to  our  entire  nature,  spiritual 
reality  as  we  know  it  is  a  co-operative  product,  partly 
sentient,  partly  intellectual.  From  this  point  of  view 
the  greater  emphasis  is  put  rather  upon  interpreted 
and  verified  experience  than  upon  experience  in  its 
first  form.  The  first  or  immediate  experience  is  given 


176         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

back  enriched  by  the  thought  which  has  discerned  in 
it  that  which  is  universally  significant.  At  the  mo- 
ment of  experience  one  is  not  thinking  of  the  principle 
of  union,  the  basis  of  obligation.  Thus  to  reflect  would 
be  to  alter  the  experience.  But  what  was  experienced 
cannot  be  told  in  terms  of  mere  experience.  It  is 
philosophic  after-thought  which  shows  that  there 
must  have  been  unwonted  communion  of  the  soul 
with  God. 

Hence  we  plead,  not  for  mere  experience,  but  for 
the  collection  and  interpretation  of  all  experiences 
which  make  for  belief  in  the  presence  of  God.  We 
question  no  authority.  We  doubt  no  reality.  But 
we  would  clear  away  the  illusions  that  beset  all  special 
claims  for  the  merely  immediate,  or  the  mere  faculty. 
It  is  primarily  a  question  of  our  ability  to  read  the 
evidence.  The  evidence  is  for  all.  The  presence  of 
God  is  in  some  sense  existent  for  all.  But  the  clue 
is  often  missing.  There  are  religious  people  without 
number  who  profess  to  believe  that  God  is  in  every- 
thing but  who  show  neither  by  their  conduct  nor  by 
their  thought  that  they  really  believe  it.  There  are 
people  who  claim  to  experience  the  presence  and  who 
manifest  it  in  their  conduct  who  have  not  made  even 
the  beginning  of  a  philosophy  of  Spirit.  It  is  difficult 
to  find  any  description  comprehensive  enough  to 
include  all  the  types  of  evidence.  Plainly,  our  clues 
must  be  now  empirical,  now  rational,  while  both  ex- 
perience and  thought  must  be  tested  by  further  thought 
and  experience.  The  largest  reservation  must  be 
made  in  favour  of  the  Spirit  which  "  bloweth  where  it 
listeth."  Into  one's  thought,  as  well  as  into  one's 
experience,  the  Spirit  is  likely  to  enter,  adding  an 


The  Immediacy  of  the  Spirit          177 

element  which  was  missed  in  the  most  careful  in- 
vestigation, transforming  scepticism  into  conviction 
and  uniting  apparently  paradoxical  fragments  into 
a  harmonious  whole.  For  it  is  not  a  question 
of  our  own  consciousness  but  of  that  which  our 
consciousness  reveals,  not  a  mere  affair  of  faculties 
but  of  that  which  the  Highest  achieves  through 
them. 


za 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  VALUE  OF  INTUITION 

IN  the  preceding  discussion,  we  concluded  that  the 
question  of  the  experience  of  the  presence  of  God  does 
not  turn  upon  the  existence  of  a  supposed  faculty  but 
centres  about  the  distinction  between  immediate 
experience  and  its  interpretation.  This  distinction 
between  immediacy  and  mediation  appeared  at  first 
to  be  a  verbal  subtlety,  but  presently  began  to  prove 
extremely  fruitful.  One  can  hardly  draw  the  dis- 
tinction without  bringing  the  question  of  the  immediacy 
of  the  Spirit  down  from  the  miraculous  to  the  level 
of  intelligible  human  experience.  The  supposably 
exclusive  gift  of  the  mystic  or  prophet  thus  becomes  at 
least  the  possible  possession  of  all  mankind,  with  the 
balance  in  favour  of  a  common-sense  principle  of 
rational  interpretation.  As  our  investigation  pro- 
ceeds we  shall  find  increasing  evidence  in  favour  of 
such  a  principle. 

But  the  conclusion  above  indicated  cannot  be  es- 
tablished without  sharply  encountering  various  popular 
beliefs.  For  example,  our  results  strike  at  the  root 
of  long-cherished  convictions  in  regard  to  intuition, 
a  term  which  is  ordinarily  used  as  vaguely  as  the  term 
conscience,  and  with  an  implication  of  direct  authority 
or  infallibility.  Our  best  course  will  be  to  investigate 
the  nature  of  intuition  in  general,  that  we  may  clear 
away  the  popular  misconceptions. 

We  first  note,  however,  that  to  call  these  popular 

178 


The  Value  of  Intuition  179 

beliefs  in  question  is  very  far  from  denying  the  reality 
for  which  the  term  intuition  was  meant  to  stand.  We 
have  already  stated  that  the  immediacy  or  intuitive 
experience  of  the  religious  life  is  the  reality  without 
which  there  would  be  no  religious  beliefs.  There  is  no 
reason  to  question  the  genuineness  of  the  intuitive 
experience  as  such.  The  problem  is,  how  to  state  the 
value  of  such  experience  without  attributing  too  much 
to  the  mere  unscrutinised  intuition.  The  term  is 
ambiguous,  and  is  now  employed  as  if  with  reference 
to  a  special  faculty  and  now  with  reference  to  the 
products  of  that  faculty.  In  what  sense  shall  the 
term  be  understood? 

It  is  commonly  supposed  that  intuition  tells  us 
directly  or  infallibly  what  is  true  or  right,  as  if  truth 
and  reality  sprang  from  a  high  source  straight  into 
the  mind  without  mediation  of  any  sort.  As  thus  em- 
ployed, the  term  implies  both  the  existence  of  a  perfect 
"faculty"  and  the  deliverance  of  infallible  utterances. 
The  hypothesis  that  there  is  a  distinct  faculty  au- 
thoritative in  itself,  we  have  already  examined  and 
rejected.  If  intuition  be  in  any  sense  a  faculty,  its 
activity  implies  a  certain  relatedness  of  the  mind  to 
its  objects,  whether  or  not  there  be  any  consciousness 
of  the  mediating  conditions.  It  would  be  more 
reasonable  to  contend  that  the  mind  has  in  general  an~ 
intuitive  aspect,  namely,  the  immediacy  of  any  ex- 
perience, sentiency,  volition,  feeling,  or  thought.  But 
we  have  seen  that  the  mind's  immediacy  conveys  very 
little  information  save  that  of  mere  existence. 

It  must  be  then  that  the  value  of  intuition  belongs 
rather  to  the  immediate  products  of  the  mind.  The 
assumption  of  the  infallibility  of  intuitive  utterances 
implies  the  absolute  distinction  of  truth  from  error, 


180         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

and  this  assumption  is  not  confirmed  by  what  we 
know  about  truth  and  error.  The  difficulty  here  is 
that  by  an  unwitting  judgment  authority  has  been 
accredited  to  intuition  which  belongs  in  part  elsewhere 
— for  example,  to  the  Spirit.  It  is  perhaps  admitted 
that  human  powers  are  imperfect,  but  the  admission 
is  forgotten  and  an  utterance  is  revered  as  if  it  had  not 
been  mediated  through  a  human  personality. 

Pronouncements  have,  for  example,  been  accepted 
as  unqualifiedly  true,  as  constituting  the  right,  the 
moral  law;  while  the  code  or  creed  of  another  religion 
has  been  spurned  as  wholly  false.  But  the  assumption 
that  no  human  factors  vitiated  the  alleged  authori- 
tative utterances,  while  the  others  were  nothing  if 
not  human,  is  totally  unwarranted.  The  examination 
of  sacred  texts,  as  well  as  the  study  of  human  knowledge 
generally,  shows  that  there  are  degrees  of  truth  and 
error  in  all  documents,  even  those  once  supposed  to  be 
verbally  inspired,  hence  that  no  absolute  line  can  be 
drawn.  It  is  a  question,  not  of  the  unimpeachable 
authority  of  an  intuitive  utterance,  but  of  the  utter- 
ances which  most  successfully  bear  the  test  of  criticism 
and  the  application  to  life.  "By  their  fruits  ye  shall 
know  them."  Once  discover  that  the  authority 
springs  from  the  principle  of  interpretation  and  the 
gain  is  very  great.  For,  instead  of  uncritically  falling 
back  upon  the  merely  verbal  form  of  the  pronounce- 
ment, its  devotees  will  begin  to  examine  and  improve 
the  principle  of  interpretation.  It  will  then  be  found 
that  genuine  intuition  is  that  which  can  withstand 
criticism. 

Another  misconception  is  due  to  the  assumed 
identity  between  intuition  and  the  higher  sensibilities, 
more  vaguely,  " feeling."  The  difficulty  here  is  that 


The  Value  of  Intuition  181 

the  nature  of  truth  is  not  understood.  Here  is  a  man, 
for  example,  who  professes  great  love  for  truth.  Truth 
is  for  him  not  an  affair  of  discursive  thinking,  of  corre- 
spondence between  idea  and  reality,  but  an  object  of 
"sight"  or  "sense."  Consequently,  when  a  doctrine 
appeals  to  his  "sense  for  truth,"  he  accepts  it  as  true, 
declares  it  true  merely  because  it  "appeals"  to  him, 
because  he  "  feels  "  it  to  be  true.  On  the  same  grounds 
he  rejects  teachings  which  do  not  appeal  to  him.  The 
immediacy  of  his  "sense"  for  truth  is  to  him  the  only 
test.  There  are  many  people  who  can  give  no  better 
account  of  what  they  believe  than  this.  Their  attitude 
is  similar  to  that  of  people  who  dogmatically  accept 
the  theories  of  a  teacher  whose  personality  is  emo- 
tionally persuasive.  If  we  can  give  no  reason  for  our 
confidence  other  than  to  allege  that  the  teacher  or 
doctrine  is  "appealing,"  the  chances  are  that  our 
confidence  is  bestowed  at  random.  It  would  surely 
be  unfair  to  attribute  either  the  " sense  for  truth"  or 
the  "  truth- feeling  "  to  intuition. 

The  subtle  misconception  involved  is  this:  When  the 
new  doctrine  is  presented  and  forthwith  accepted  be- 
cause one  "feels"  it  to  be  true,  there  is  nothing  in  the 
mind  to  offer  resistance.  That  type  of  doctrine  has 
not  been  met  before  and  one  is  unable  for  the  moment 
to  relate  it  to  other  teachings.  The  hidden  assumption 
is  this :  inasmuch  as  one  is  ardently  in  quest  for  truth 
one  cannot  be  misled ;  one  has  long  been  a  truth-seeker 
and  by  this  time  the  love  for  truth  is  so  deeply  rooted 
that  truth  must  be  recognised  when  presented;  this 
doctrine  appeals  to  the  deep-seated  love,  therefore 
it  is  true.  Another  assumption  is  that  truth  is 
so  easily  won  that  by  mere  "feeling"  one  can  dis- 
tinguish it  from  error.  It  escapes  notice  that  truths 


182          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

accepted  on  the  basis  of  "  feeling"  are  enormously  in- 
consistent. 

When  this  same  doctrine  is  presented  to  a  man  who 
has  acutely  investigated  the  field  in  question,  one 
who  knows  the  facts  and  is  able  to  make  valid  inferences, 
the  alleged  truth  does  not  make  its  appeal  in  any 
direct  sense  of  the  word.  This  man  has  no  "feeling" 
either  for  or  against  it,  for  he  knows  that  emotions 
are  as  illusory  as  the  persuasiveness  of  a  magnetic 
personality.  He  is  able  either  to  argue  in  its  favour 
or  to  raise  objections  against  it.  Or  perhaps  he  merely 
takes  the  doctrine  under  advisement,  well  knowing 
that  no  doctrine  is  acceptable  until  it  meet  the  tests 
of  controversy  and  of  time. 

Truth  becomes  such  when  it  is  separated  not  only 
from  prejudice  but  from  all  other  personal  or  emotional 
factors  and  is  based  on  universal  grounds.  The 
truth-seeker  who  supposes  he  cannot  be  misled  knows 
not  the  way  of  truth.  The  emotion  which  seemingly 
guarantees  the  truth  of  a  doctrine  very  likely  springs 
from  a  certain  harmony  of  temperament  between 
theorist  and  believer.  Or,  more  vaguely,  it  is  accepted 
because  there  is  the  proper  proportion  of  ignorance 
and  this  ignorance  fulfils  itself  in  the  new  teaching. 

Again,  we  may  have  had  such  acquaintance  with  a 
person  as  to  know  him  to  be  thoroughly  sincere  and 
because  we  have  found  him  genuine  we  are  inclined 
to  believe  whatever  he  says  and  accept  his  teachings 
as  true.  That  is,  merely  because  we  "like"  a  person, 
because  he  chances  to  be  a  friend,  tried  and  tested,  we 
hold  that  integrity  of  character  means  soundness  of 
intellect;  and  all  this  on  the  authority  of  "intuition." 
If,  afterwards,  we  find  this  person's  teachings  unsound 
we  are  apt  to  disparage  intuition.  But  it  is.  not  in- 


The  Value  of  Intuition  183 

tuition,  it  is  unsound  inferences  that  have  led  to  this 
result.  Hence  intuition  may  once  more  be  dismissed 
as  guiltless. 

One  should  be  able  to  distinguish  between  persons 
and  truths.  A  truth  may  well  be  promulgated  by  a 
person  whom  we  love,  and  we  may  be  eager  to  believe, 
even  willing  to  believe,  whatever  the  loved  one  accepts. 
But  it  is  not  the  emotion  felt  in  the  other's  presence 
that  makes  the  doctrine  true.  All  truth  is  true  in  its 
own  right.  One  might  well  accept  a  teacher  or  love 
a  friend  yet  utterly  reject  his  teaching.  A  teacher  is 
acceptable  on  one  basis,  a  friend  on  another,  truth  on 
a  third.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  doubtless  a  fact  that 
purity  of  character  and  love  for  truth  go  together. 
Once  test  each  separately  and  you  may  well  be  pre- 
pared to  follow  the  lead  of  a  teacher  who  has  proved 
to  be  genuine  both  in  character  and  as  a  lover  of  truth. 

Sometimes  it  happens  that  a  greatly  revered  person 
whose  intuitions  we  accepted  as  practically  infallible 
becomes  chronically  ill,  so  that  the  once  clear  vision  is 
steadily  clouded.  The  shock  is  no  doubt  great  at  first, 
and  one  may  momentarily  reject  all  intuition  as 
spurious.  But,  once  more,  it  is  not  intuition  that  is  at 
fault.  The  same  mind  that  is  on  occasion  illumined 
is  also  conditioned  by  physiological  processes.  Any 
person  who  ordinarily  discerns  with  unusual  keenness 
may  on  occasion  be  subject  to  nervous  or  other  patho- 
logical conditions  which  impede  the  organism  for  the 
time  being.  On  the  other  hand,  some  people  are 
gifted  with  unprecedented  discernment  when  ex- 
ceedingly ill  or  when  the  body  is  weakest.  Sometimes 
personal  desire  works  its  way  in  so  subtly  that  in  the 
given  case  desire  takes  the  place  of  intuition,  although 
the  integrity  of  intuition  is  still  unquestionable.  The 


1 84         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

fact  that  desire  leads  astray  proves  nothing  against 
intuition,  but  merely  shows  that  one  must  learn 
by  experience  to  distinguish  between  desire  and 
intuition. 

The  fact  that  a  person  possesses  clear  insight  in  one 
direction  does  not  guarantee  unequivocal  discernment 
in  any  other  direction.  An  intuitive  person  is  as 
likely  to  be  a  specialist  as  any  other.  One  grows  more 
sceptical,  as  the  years  pass,  of  people  of  an  intuitive 
type  who  are  also  impulsive  or  managerial  in  tempera- 
ment. The  personal  equation  here  plays  much  mis- 
chief, and  should  be  sharply  separated  from  intuition. 
The  fact  that  a  person  is  strongly  intuitive  may  imply 
a  temperament  that  is  overbearing,  one  for  which  con- 
stant allowance  must  be  made.  It  is  no  doubt  dis- 
tressing to  pass  through  a  period  of  doubt  with  regard 
to  intuition — a  doubt  which  later  proves  to  be  scepti- 
cism with  respect  to  persons  or  in  regard  to  physiological 
conditions — but  one  can  hardly  hope  to  discern  the 
truth  without  such  doubt.  Intuitively  inclined  per- 
sons are  sometimes  the  most  readily  misled — that  is,  in 
fields  where  they  are  uninformed,  or  because  the  habit 
of  trusting  intuition  has  bred  a  certain  credulity.  As 
we  have  already  seen,  there  is  no  miraculous  faculty 
within  us  which  works  upon  demand  to  tell  us  positively 
what  is  right  or  true,  and  thereby  spare  us  the  lessons 
of  experience.  Our  intuitions  do  not  come  to  order, 
for  exhibition  purposes.  Failure  to  obtain  an  intuition 
when  desired  should  not  be  attributed  to  intuition  as 
such.  If  people  who  once  depended  almost  solely 
upon  intuition  become  so  sceptical  that  they  do  not 
trust  it,  the  probability  is  that  they  have  mistaken 
intuition  for  somewhat  else.  What  is  all  this  but  a 
confession  that  intuition  is  given  amidst  conditions, 


The  Value  of  Intuition  185 

that  one  must  distinguish  between  conditions  and 
insights  ? 

The  same  conclusions  hold  in  regard  to  what  appear 
to  be  intuitive  precepts  of  various  types,  words  of 
counsel  which  are  put  forth  as  guides  to  moral  or 
other  conduct.  The  fact  that  such  clues  to  action  are 
accepted  may  simply  mean  that  the  one  who  accepts 
them  is  unable  to  weigh  the  case  pro  and  con.  For 
example,  take  the  advice  sometimes  given  in  love 
affairs.  It  is  said  to  young  people  who  have  had 
various  affairs  and  who  are  in  doubt  about  true  love: 
"  When  the  feeling  is  irresistible  you  may  know  that  it 
is  a  case  of  true  love.'*  In  other  words,  the  mere  fact 
of  sentient  immediacy  is  said  to  be  wholly  authoritative. 
Against  this  view  it  might  be  urged  that  the  irresistible 
impulse  indicated  that  the  person  in  question  was 
being  swept  forward  by  a  violent  amour.  Hence  some 
have  said :  "  When  you  find  yourself  falling  in  love,  go 
far  away  that  you  may  return  to  yourself."  Plainly, 
an  impulse  is  not  necessarily  an  intuition. 

Yet  further,  the  term  intuition  is  frequently  em- 
ployed when  impression  or  emotion  is  meant,  and 
without  first  distinguishing  impression  from  guidance. 
An  "impression"  may  be  a  mere  sense-impression, 
or  the  prompting  of  instinct.  It  may  be  taken  to 
imply  the  existence  of  higher  types  of  intelligence, 
hence  to  convey  warnings  of  danger  for  which  no 
reason  can  be  assigned.  In  any  case  it  is  appreciable 
in  accordance  with  judgments  regarding  its  origin  and 
its  fruits.  If  I  am  willing  to  act  on  an  impression  in 
regard  to  a  danger  that  threatens  me,  the  probability 
is  that  I  have  a  general  belief  in  divine  or  other  "  guid- 
ance. "  The  question  of  guidance  will  concern  us  in 
another  chapter.  An  impression  is  in  general  a  mere 


1 86          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

leading,  or  clue,  a  hint  which  may  or  may  not  be 
followed,  according  to  the  character  assigned  to  it. 
An  impression  is  decidedly  empirical.  But  an  intuition 
is  commonly  regarded  as  cognitive,  as  conveying  ideas 
or  truths  independently  of  reasoning  processes  and  of 
greater  value  than  mere  experiences  or  clues. 

If  it  be  a  first  "impression"  of  human  character, 
the  mere  impression  is  only  an  immediate  clue  which 
may  or  may  not  be  verified  when  one  has  had  sufficient 
acquaintance  with  the  person  to  form  a  sound  judg- 
ment. One  may  be  drawn  to  or  repelled  by  a  man 
on  first  meeting  him.  If  so,  the  meaning  of  this  im- 
pression will  doubtless  appear  in  due  course  and  may 
be  supplemented  by  intuition.  An  impression  re- 
garding character  is  simply  an  experience  demanding 
interpretation.  The  mere  "feeling"  fails  to  tell  the 
whole  story.  Whether  or  not  the  impression  be  in 
itself  a  guide  depends  upon  the  degree  of  self-  knowledge 
one  possesses  and  the  degree  of  acquaintance  with  the 
world.  The  absence  of  negative  impressions  may 
imply  credulity,  lack  of  knowledge  of  human  nature. 
It  may  mean  that  the  other's  mind  is  positive  in  re- 
spects in  which  the  recipient's  is  undeveloped  or  too 
receptive.  The  mere  feeling  of  harmony  with  another 
may  signify  much  or  little.  In  itself  it  is  but  a  single 
item. 

If  impulse  be  not  intuition  but  far  more  questionable, 
how  happens  it  that,  with  intuitive  certainty,  some  of 
the  noblest  deeds  are  done  and  some  of  the  best  results 
occur  in  instances  where  the  recipients  acted  upon 
impulse?  For  example,  the  person  who  rushes  to  save 
another's  life  when  deliberation  might  be  fatal,  or  the 
impulse  which  springs  from  love?  There  is  surely 
much  to  be  said  in  behalf  of  such  leadings'  We  have 


The  Value  of  Intuition  187 

not  denied  the  efficacy  of  impulse.  The  problem  is 
to  recognise  the  sort  of  impulse  that  is  worth  acting 
upon.  We  have  learned  by  observation  and  ex- 
perience that  some  promptings  are  worth  acting  upon. 
We  also  know  from  experience  that  some  impulses  are 
our  undoing.  It  is  impossible  to  accept  all  impulses  as 
eligible.  Moreover,  as  we  have  seen  above,  mere  ex- 
pression counts  for  very  little;  it  is  a  question  of  fitness, 
appropriateness.  An  impulse  is  good  in  its  place,  and 
if  .not  carried  to  excess.  An  impulse  to  rush  to  an- 
other's rescue  may  lead  to  good  results  if  it  spring 
from  a  well-ordered  life.  It  is  of  small  value  if  it 
spring  from  "a  creature  of  impulse." 

It  is  plain  that  we  judge  impulses  according  to  their 
ground,  the  way  in  which  they  are  mediated,  by  their 
fruits.  As  such,  they  are  merely  empirical,  immediate; 
as  acted  upon,  they  are  already  partly  intellectual. 
Even  when  there  is  not  a  moment  to  spare  we  swiftly 
weigh  alternatives  and  reach  a  decision.  The  sweeping 
judgment  of  the  driver  of  a  fire  engine  who  decides 
between  running  into  and  killing  several  people  and 
making  straight  for  the  plate-glass  window  through 
which  he  and  his  horses  dash  to  death,  as  he  skilfully 
avoids  an  approaching  carriage  and  steers  his  machine 
to  the  side-walk,  shows  how  mediation  and  immediacy 
play  their  mutual  parts.  The  fact  that  we  do  not 
weigh  all  the  pros  and  cons  does  not  prove  that  we 
do  not  judge.  The  mere  immediacy  of  the  impulse 
is  not  sufficient  to  account  for  all  the  good  that  follows. 
We  sometimes  conclude  not  to  follow  the  strong  im- 
pulse to  risk  our  lives.  We  follow  selected  impulses 
without  conscious  deliberation  because  we  have  so 
learned  their  value  by  carefully  interpreted  experience 
that  they  have  become  matters  of  habit.  Such  im- 


1 88          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

pulses  speak  to  us  with  an  authority  which  no  mere 
reference  to  the  given  prompting  could  explain.  They 
have  become  intuitions  in  the  best  sense  of  the  word. 
The  fact  that  impulses,  impressions,  and  the  like 
are  productive  of  good  results  when  given  in  a  desirable 
context  is  simply  one  of  many  facts  of  our  common 
human  experience.  Cool  deliberation  has  its  place, 
guessing  another. 

Over  immense  departments  of  our  thought  [says  Pro- 
fessor James  *]  we  are  still,  all  of  us,  in  the  savage  state. 
Similarity  operates  in  us,  but  abstraction  has  not  taken 
place.  We  know  what  the  present  case  is  like,  we  know 
what  it  reminds  us  of,  we  have  an  intuition  of  the  right 
course  to  take,  if  it  be  a  practical  matter.  But  analytic 
thought  has  made  no  tracks  and  we  cannot  justify  ourselves 
to  others.  .  .  .  The  well-known  story  of  the  old  judge 
advising  the  new  one  never  to  give  reasons  for  his  decisions 
— "the  decisions  will  probably  be  right,  the  reasons  will 
surely  be  wrong" — illustrates  this.  The  doctor  will  feel 
that  the  patient  is  doomed,  the  dentist  will  have  a  pre- 
monition that  the  tooth  will  break,  though  neither  can 
articulate  a  reason  for  his  foreboding.  The  reason  lies 
embedded,  but  not  yet  laid  bare,  in  all  the  countless 
previous  cases  dimly  suggested  by  the  actual  one,  all 
calling  up  the  same  conclusion,  which  the  adept  thus  finds 
himself  swept  on  to,  he  knows  not  how  or  why. 

If  the  discovery  that  misconceptions  cluster  about 
what  is  popularly  but  often  erroneously  taken  to  be 
intuition  gives  rise  to  temporary  scepticism,  it  is  only 
that  one  may  pass  forward  to  newly  grounded  belief 
in  the  intuition  which  is  produced  under  favorable 
conditions.  All  experiences  are  profitable  in  the  more 
or  less  devious  pathway  that  leads  to  truth.  The  one 

»  Psychology,  ii.,  365. 


The  Value  of  Intuition  189 

who  accepts  intuition  because  of  its  assumed  alliance 
with  emotion  possesses  a  meagre  principle  of  interpre- 
tation,— that  is  the  difficulty.  An  emotion  is  an  ex- 
perience of  a  certain  type,  intelligible  with  reference 
to  other  experiences  of  its  class.  So  are  many  ac- 
tivities of  a  spiritistic  type,  those  that  imply  medium- 
ship  or  "uncanny"  psychic  power — that  is,  power  on  a 
lower  level  than  that  of  intuition.  When  people 
insist  that  they  " feel"  this  or  that  to  be  true  they  are 
still  dwelling  in  the  haze  where  nothing  in  particular 
is  as  yet  either  true  or  real. 

What,  then,  is  intuition?  Briefly  speaking,  it  is 
an  immediacy  or  first  gift  of  experience  containing 
implicit  reality  or  truth  and  requiring  to  be  made  ex- 
plicit before  either  the  reality  or  the  truth  is  intelligible. 
It  is  not  the  mere  immediacy  that  is  significant  but 
the  content  which  is  afterwards  made  explicit.  That 
is  to  say,  the  important  point  is  not  that  I  directly 
"  felt"  a  thing  to  be  real,  or  a  doctrine  to  be  true,  but 
that  through  my  feeling,  or  whatever  the  personal 
reaction,  I  acquired  that  which  has  meaning  for  my 
life.  I  accept  the  intuitive  utterance  because  of  its 
inherent  worth  when  put  with  other  utterances,  when 
attributed  to  a  high  source,  or  because  of  its  con- 
formability  to  an  accepted  principle  of  interpretation. 
It  is  not  authoritative  alone  but  because  of  judgments 
with  respect  to  origin  or  workability.  As  such  it 
stands  out  in  a  clear  light  of  conviction  differing  from 
that  of  conscious  argument.  If  I  believe,  for  example, 
that  I  possess  what  the  Germans  call  an  "  intellectual 
intuition  of  God,"  the  significant  fact  is  that  this  in- 
tuition implies  an  immediate  relation  of  my  soul  with 
God,  as  opposed  to  an  argument  for  the  existence  of 
God  founded,  not  on  direct  experience,  but  on  merely 


i  go          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

logical  considerations.  The  argument  for  the  being 
of  God  is  founded  on  previous  arguments,  and  that 
on  preceding  data,  and  so  on;  whereas  the  intuition 
is  supposed  to  require  nothing  prior  save  God's  im- 
mediate existence.  That  is,  one  passes  immediately 
from  experience  to  conviction.  The  experience  is 
taken  to  be  directly  cognitive.  Or,  again,  it  is  so  far 
unconscious  that  the  percipient  thinks  only  of  the 
utterance  accepted  as  divine  and  not  at  all  of  the 
channels  of  communication. 

Although  intuition  is  supposed  to  imply  this  direct 
cognition,  one  may  well  challenge  its  devotees  to  point 
to  a  single  instance  in  which  no  interpretation  has  been 
read  into  the  intuition.  The  more  strenuously  a 
man  insists  that  his  intuition  is  absolute,  the  less  con- 
scious he  is  likely  to  be  of  the  implied  judgments.  To 
become  aware  of  the  judgments  is  not  to  disparage 
intuition  but  to  put  it  on  a  more  secure  foundation. 

In  ethical  philosophy  the  term  intuition  is  some- 
times employed  to  signify  the  direct  apprehension, 
apart  from  all  moral  experience,  of  moral  qualities 
and  principles  of  action.  The  same  usage  appears  with 
respect  to  religious  intuition.  But  inasmuch  as  in- 
tuitive theories  of  the  moral  and  religious  life  are 
primarily  interpretations  of  experience,  it  would  seem 
more  reasonable  to  connect  the  intuitions  directly 
with  the  experiences  in  question — that  is,  to  regard 
intuition  empirically.  Carefully  denned,  intuition 
means  both  the  immediate  or  direct  apprehension, 
perception,  judgment,  cognition,  and  the  results  of 
such  processes.  Hence  the  basic  idea  is  that  of  im- 
mediacy.1 On  the  question  of  immediacy  we  shall 
presently  have  more  to  say. 

'  Cp.  Baldwin's  Dictionary  of  Philosophy,  i.,   568. 


The  Value  of  Intuition  191 

As  we  advance  in  experience  and  knowledge  we 
do  not  necessarily  depend  any  less  upon  intuition, 
but  our  intuitions  are  of  a  higher  type  and  we  assign 
better  reasons  for  them.  With  most  of  us  they  become 
more  intellectual,  are  more  carefully  discriminated 
from  emotion,  prejudice,  and  the  personal  equations 
which  were  once  well-nigh  indistinguishable.  The 
man  who  is  naturally  very  intuitive — that  is,  receptive, 
susceptible — no  doubt  possesses  a  gift,  a  spontaneity, 
that  is  worth  preserving  at  all  costs.  But  the  preser- 
vation of  it  means  that  it  is  more  steadily  directed 
to  the  highest  sources.  The  same  receptivity  which 
once  involved  us  in  the  most  unpleasant  experiences 
of  life  may  become  the  channel  of  the  noblest  gifts 
when  we  have  learned  more  about  the  illusions  of 
emotion,  and  more  about  our  fellow-men.  It  is  still 
worth  while  to  yield  ourselves  completely  to  an  ex- 
perience or  insight,  provided  we  judge  the  source  to 
be  the  highest  which  human  experience  affords.  To 
tamper  with  spiritual  intuition  in  process,  to  examine 
our  gifts  as  they  come,  is  indeed  to  close  the  door  to 
that  which  is  noblest.  The  rule  is,  first  receive  your 
gift,  give  willing  ear  to  the  Spirit,  interpose  no  ob- 
stacle. But  do  not  hesitate  to  learn  what  you  may 
from  critical  study  of  the  results  and  the  endeavour 
to  overcome  the  imperfections  of  your  own  instrument. 

It  is  the  type  of  life  and  thought  that  avails.  There 
are  people  whose  first  impressions  are  almost  uniformly 
correct,  whose  intuitions  are  well-nigh  infallible,  and 
we  readily  follow  their  lead.  But  such  acceptance 
springs  from  careful  discrimination.  We  accept  the 
lead  of  such  people  because  of  the  purity  and  con- 
secration of  the  life  through  which  the  intuitions  are 
mediated.  We  are  still  suspicious  of  the  majority  of 


192          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

teachings  which  are  said  to  be  intuitional.  We  are 
especially  suspicious  if  urgent  claims  are  made  in  their 
behalf. 

For  instance,  there  are  writers  who,  uneducated  in 
the  broader  intellectual  sense,  set  forth  what  they 
claim  to  be  a  series  of  intuitively  discerned  truths  in 
contrast  with  and  to  the  disparagement  of  "intellec- 
tual truth. "  Hence  intuition  is  exalted  above  intellect 
as  a  superior  guide  to  truth  and  reality.  It  is  pointed 
out  that  the  intellect  is  cold,  makes  claims  in  behalf 
of  itself,  is  proud,  paradoxical.  Again,  it  is  said,  and 
said  truly,  that  one  can  establish  any  conclusion  one 
will  by  argument.  The  devotee  of  this  type  of  in- 
tuition makes  equally  proud  claims,  but  he  is  not  now 
thinking  of  them.  He,  too,  delights  in  paradoxes, 
but  never  mind  those.  He  forcefully  contends  for 
his  own  position,  but  that  position  is  forsooth  "in- 
tuitive." In  short,  he,  too,  is  "intellectual,"  but 
incompletely  so.  He  is  ignorant  of  the  fact  that  he  is 
merely  offering  a  rival  theory  of  the  human  intellect, 
supported  by  a  faulty  theory  of  intuition.  Deprive 
him  of  his  special  "intuitions"  and  his  occupation 
would  be  gone. 

The  truth  is  that  intuition  as  this  man  uses  the  term 
signifies  insight.  Now,  insight  is  apt  to  come  before 
explicit  reason  and  is  often  superior  in  value.  All 
our  profitable  theories  grow  out  of  initial  insights. 
Hence  an  insight  is  a  gift  to  be  cherished  and  to  be 
faithfully  reported.  But,  in  the  first  place,  an  insight 
is  a  culmination  of  experience  and  thought,  of  numer- 
ous inferences;  and,  in  the  second  place,  its  develop- 
ment in  the  form  of  a  doctrine  is  necessarily  intellectual. 
For  that  is  precisely  what  the  intellect  is — the  process 
of  reproducing  and  making  explicit  that  which  intuition 


The  Value  of  Intuition  193 

and  other  immediacies  have  given.  The  intellect 
does  not  claim  to  be  first,  cannot  create,  but  must  take 
its  data  from  experience.  An  insight,  then,  is  like  any 
experience,  compacted  with  meaning  and  waiting  to 
be  developed.  There  is  no  reason  to  set  up  claims 
in  behalf  of  either  intuition  or  intellect,  for  their 
functions  are  different  and  neither  is  independent. 
There  is  no  intuition  devoid  of  intellect,  and  intellect 
is  never  divorced  from  intuition.  All  the  special 
claims  run  back  to  the  ill-founded  notion  that  there 
is  a  separate  faculty  of  intuition  sundered  from  the 
intellect.  No  doubt  those  who  make  these  claims 
would  be  astonished  were  they  to  learn  how  slight  is 
the  intuitive  element  in  the  insights  which  they  set 
over  against  the  teachings  of  those  who  are  conde- 
scendingly called  "  intellectual. " 

No  doubt  there  are  methods  of  thought  and  work 
which  may  properly  be  denominated  intuitive,  and 
this  is  partly  what  the  devotees  of  intuition  mean  by 
their  criticisms.  Some  men,  the  intellectualists,  ar- 
rive at  their  conclusions  through  successive  inductions, 
just  as  some  men  write  an  essay  or  a  book  by  consciously 
developing  every  detail  of  a  carefully  chosen  argument. 
There  are  others  who  suddenly  arrive  at  conclusions, 
or  produce  an  essay  which  second  thought  can  scarcely 
improve.  The  one  supplements  the  other  admirably. 
For  the  devotee  of  intuition  probably  sees  too  much 
in  his  data,  while  the  careful  reasoner  overlooks  some- 
thing. Both  are  reasoners,  but  in  a  different  way.  To 
jump  to  a  conclusion  is  often  to  attain  a  better  one 
than  conscious  reason  could  produce,  but  it  is  ra- 
tionalised experience  which  confirms  it.  "Seeing  is 
believing,"  and  our  rational  expectations  are  con- 
stantly upset  by  the  entrance  of  new  factors  which 


194          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

we  did  not  foresee,  or  which  we  argued  against  as 
impossible.  But  this  simply  means  that  experience 
comes  first  and  reason  is  helpless  before  it.  But 
granted  the  new  element,  it  is  reason  which  relates  it 
to  the  elements  already  classified. 

The  controversy  between  intuition  and  intellect, 
faith  and  reason,  is  one  of  the  great  conflicts  of  the 
spiritual  life,  and  every  devotee  of  the  philosophy  of 
the  Spirit  must  pass  through  it.  But  there  need  be 
no  conflict.  It  is  a  question  of  order  of  function,  and 
a  few  principles  in  regard  to  the  human  mind  afford 
the  central  clue,  some  of  which  we  came  in  sight  of 
when  we  distinguished  between  immediacy  and  medi- 
ation. Other  principles  will  appear  when  we  consider 
the  sphere  of  faith. 

To  cleave  to  what  we  uncritically  denominate  in- 
tuition and  pursue  the  spiritual  life  by  crucifying  the 
intellect  is  in  part  to  deny  the  Spirit.  Spirit  is  reason 
as  well  as  love.  If  love  is  the  motive,  reason  is  the 
law.  If  we  are  unable  to  decide  which  is  fundamental 
within  us,  love  or  reason,  it  may  be  because  the  whole 
question  is  as  futile  as  that  of  the  supremacy  of  man 
or  woman.  Man  sometimes  leads,  and  sometimes  it 
is  woman.  Each  typifies  a  principle  which  we  judge 
to  be  divine.  The  masculine  is  not  less  eternal  than 
the  eternal  feminine.  The  divine  nature  is  dual  and 
all  life  is  dual  too.  To  possess  the  Spirit  is  to  apprehend 
their  union. 

It  is  the  witness  of  the  Spirit,  then,  that  is  our  guide 
and  ultimate  test.  This  witness  is  a  co-operative 
product,  springing  from  the  interaction  of  the  self  and 
its  varied  experiences  or  powers.  Its  evidence  in 
regard  to  ^he  presence  of  the  Spirit  is  not  the  evidence 
of  one  side  of  our  nature  alone,  but  is  at  least  three- 


The  Value  of  Intuition  195 

fold  in  character.  It  partakes  both  of  the  immediacy 
of  experience,  whatever  the  type  of  experience,  and 
the  process  of  reflection  or  intellection,  which  in  turn 
is  expressive  of  foregoing  experiences  and  thoughts. 
A  spiritual  experience,  however  exalted,  is  neither 
real  nor  true  until  confirmed  by  further  experience, 
and  confirmation  is  necessarily  intellectual.  An-  in- 
tuition, however  noble,  is  given  as  an  item  to  be  put 
with  other  items;  it  acquires  significance  when  put, 
as  it  were,  in  a  fitting  environment.  If  intuition 
somehow  brings  us  nearer  reality  it  is  only  by  stand- 
ing off  that  we  detect  the  reality  of  that  which  was 
just  now  so  near.  The  witness  of  the  Spirit  is,  in 
fine,  a  conviction  that  gradually  develops  within  our 
inmost  selfhood.  We  did  not  consciously  draw  the 
inferences  which  led  to  it.  We  are  unaware  of  the  pre- 
mises from  which  we  started.  But  insensibly  the  mind 
gathered  its  data,  selected  the  evidence,  and  un- 
wittingly arrived  at  its  conclusions.  The  product 
therefore  seems  like  the  gift  of  one  side  of  our  nature 
when,  as  matter  of  fact,  all  that  we  wrought  and 
suffered  has  entered  in. 

Without  disparaging  either  intuition  or  the  spon- 
taneity whence  it  springs,  we  have  been  gradually  led 
in  our  investigation  to  adopt  the  intellectualists' 
account  of  intuition.  Knowledge  of  human  nature 
compels  us  to  reject  the  popular  view  as  not  reared  on 
facts.  Intuition,  either  as  an  activity  or  as  a  product, 
is  one  of  many  phases  of  mental  life  in  which  whatever 
life  contains  is  likely  to  participate.  Its  authority 
is  the  authority  given  it  by  the  principle  of  interpreta- 
tion in  question.  To  reject  the  view  that  its 
authority  is  unique  is  to  arrive  at  the  profoundly 
suggestive  conclusion  that  our  total  nature  in  some 


196         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

measure  possesses  the  value  formerly  bestowed  upon 
intuition. 

What  bearings  these  conclusions  have  on  the  con- 
ception of  reality  implied  in  these  discussions  will 
begin  to  appear  later  when  we  consider  the  nature  of 
mystic  experience.  The  conclusion  which  most  di- 
rectly relates  to  the  subject  in  hand  is  this,  that  while 
it  is  immediate  experience  which  gives  us  the  first  data 
of  spiritual  thought,  and  hence  the  reality  of  intuition 
is  not  to  be  denied,  the  value  of  intuition  is  found  in  its 
use,  the  authority  is  mediate,  and  it  is  reason  which 
shows  what  is  true.  This  conclusion  does  not  make 
against  the  value  of  immediate  experience.  It  takes 
account  of  the  judgments  and  inferences  based  on  it, 
and  the  principles  in  accordance  with  which  it  is  in- 
terpreted, together  with  the  illusions  involved. 

The  great  consideration  is  that,  despite  the  allow- 
ances which  must  be  made  for  the  illusions  of  "  feeling" 
and  the  misconceptions  of  intuitionism,  devotees  of 
the  Spirit  are  still  able  to  believe  that  the  soul  is  in 
immediate  relation  with  a  higher  order  of  being,  a 
real  spiritual  world.  Experience  may  in  fact  be  said 
to  bring  us  into  such  direct  relation  that  our  descriptions 
are  utterly  inadequate.  The  accounts  which  devo- 
tees of  intuition  give  of  immediate  spiritual  experience 
are  often  misleading,  as  compared  with  the  descriptions 
of  those  who  have  put  intuition  through  the  critical 
test.  That  is  to  say,  all  accounts  of  direct  experience 
are  so  far  matters  of  interpretation  that  we  might 
well  interpret  in  earnest,  when  we  have  taken  due 
account  of  the  factors  involved.  A  merely  "  intuitive" 
statement,  in  the  popular  sense  of  the  word,  is  worth 
extremely  little.  But  the  larger  the  variety  of  in- 
tuitive utterances  the  better  prepared  we  are  to  arrive 


The  Value  of  Intuition  197 

at  their  common  truth.  What  is  needed,  therefore, 
is  not  so  much  "intuition"  as  insight,  discernment, 
ability  to  see  to  the  end,  analyse  to  the  foundation; 
and  insight  is  less  a  "gift"  than  many  imagine.  To 
have  intuition  is  not  necessarily  to  possess  wisdom. 
Insight  implies  wisdom,  cannot  be  had  without  ex- 
perience. 

Intuition  does  not  exist  by  itself.  Akin  to  that 
which  is  immediate,  first,  original  in  the  self,  in  con- 
trast with  that  which  comes  by  reflection,  intuition 
is  intelligible  only  in  the  light  of  all  other  immediacies. 
When  produced  most  spontaneously  it  no  doubt  Qarries 
with  it  a  sense  of  authority  which  tends  to  overthrow 
doubt.  At  its  best  it  strikes  at  the  heart  of  things, 
reveals  inner  causes,  discerns  character,  is  prophetic, 
synthetic.  But  on  its  lower  levels  it  arises  amidst 
emotions  and  personal  equations  for  which  abundant 
allowance  must  be  made.  It  is  so  true  at  its  best  that 
reason  is  taxed  to  the  utmost,  when  it  undertakes  to 
make  its  content  explicit.  It  is  so  fallible  on  its  lower 
levels  that  only  by  sceptically  testing  it  can  one  discern 
any  authority  in  it  at  all. 

The  question,  How  far  is  intuition  a  guide?  we  may 
well  leave  unanswered  for  the  moment,  except  so  far 
as  the  foregoing  analysis  already  answers  it  by  showing 
that  it  is  a  matter  of  progress  from  uncritical  accept- 
ance to  rational  reconstruction.  For  our  first  task 
was  to  clear  away  some  of  the  misconceptions  for 
which  intuition  itself  is  not  responsible.  Under  the 
head  of  "guidance"  we  shall  return  to  the  subject 
of  intuition,  practically  considered.  For  the  moment 
we  chronicle  the  fact  that  intuition  is  susceptible, 
readily  tinged  with  emotion.  The  fault  lies  rather 
with  the  emotion  and  the  judgments  that  are  based 


ig8          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

upon  it.  Without  the  accompanying  emotion  and  the 
illusory  spells  it  casts,  intuition  might  reveal  pure 
truth,  might  proceed  in  its  development  and  become 
illumined  reason.  Since  it  is  chiefly  emotion  for 
which  allowances  must  be  made,  it  behooves  us  to 
investigate  the  emotions,  before  we  undertake  to 
follow  the  clues  which  intuition  reveals.  On  the  whole 
intuition  has  triumphed,  and  the  critical  examination 
to  which  we  have  subjected  it  should  make  it  the  safer 
guide  for  firm  believers  in  it.  For  practical  purposes 
it  is  a  guide  which  approaches  infallibility  in  value. 
Hence  one  returns  to  its  immediacies  with  fresh  con- 
viction, after  criticism  has  done  its  utmost.  For 
scientific  purposes  intuition  is  valuable  rather  as  a 
culmination  than  as  immediate.  From  a  religious 
point  of  view  intuition  is  of  more  consequence  than 
"feeling,"  while  from  the  point  of  view  of  our  special 
inquiry  it  may  unqualifiedly  be  said  that  the  presence 
of  God  is  intuitively  made  known. 


CHAPTER  IX 

A  STUDY  OF  THE   EMOTIONS 

THE  investigation  which  we  now  begin  may  take  us 
somewhat  far  afield  for  the  moment,  inasmuch  as  it 
will  be  necessary  to  consider  the  nature  of  emotion 
in  general  before  undertaking  to  evaluate  it  for  our 
special  purposes.  Yet  for  various  reasons  such  a  study 
is  highly  important.  There  are  two  leading  questions 
which  we  might  ask  at  the  outset,  (i)  What  is  the 
reality  or  ultimate  value  of  the  emotions?  (2)  Granted 
that  some  of  the  emotions  are  desirable,  how  may  the 
higher  or  eligible  emotions  be  organised  in  conjunction 
with  other  factors  of  our  mental  life,  and  with  reference 
to  the  emotions,  which  should  be  eliminated?  Or,  we 
might  put  the  total  question  thus,  Are  the  emotions 
essential  to  human  life?  If  not,  how  may  they  be  over- 
come or  transmuted?  If  essential,  is  it  possible  to 
arrange  them  in  a  scale  of  values  with  a  view  to  moral 
and  spiritual  evolution,  so  that  their  relative  reality 
and  worth  may  be  ascertained?  It  would  be  possible, 
of  course,  to  dissociate  -the  practical  from  the  scientific 
question,  and  simply  describe  the  emotions,  without 
reference  to  the  authority  assignable  to  them,  inde- 
pendently of  the  problems  of  control  and  transmuta- 
tion. Yet  the  answer  to  the  scientific  question  is  likely 
to  depend  upon  one's  view  of  the  place  which  emotions 
hold  in  practical  life.  At  any  rate,  the  present  inquiry 
is  undertaken  for  other  than  merely  scientific  reasons. 

199 


I 

200          "The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

If  there  be  such  experiences  as  higher  or  spiritual  emo- 
tions, practical  life  will  be  most  likely  to  reveal  them. 

One  need  not  seek  far  for  popular  characterisations 
of  the  emotions.  Thoughtful  people  as  a  class  are  sus- 
picious of  them.  To  characterise  a  person  as  "  a  bundle 
of  emotions"  is  to  be  much  less  complimentary  than 
to  speak  of  the  person  in  question  as  "  a  creature  of 
habits."  An  emotional  person  is  said  to  be  unstable, 
"  flighty,"  not  to  be  depended  upon.  One  is  disinclined 
to  deal  with  such  a  person  on  matters  of  importance, 
lest  one  elicit  emotional  responses  of  an  unpleasant 
character.  Hence  it  becomes  part  of  one's  practical 
wisdom  to  avoid  arousing  either  the  tender  or  the  vio- 
lent emotions  in  cases  where  people  are  known  to  be 
so  far  victims  of  them  that  persuasion  will  be  of  no 
avail.  Professor  Royce  summarises  the  situation 
when,  speaking  of  the  romantic  poets,  he  asks: 

But  what  is  emotion?  Something  changeable  and  by 
nature  inconsistent.  Each  emotion  sets  up  a  claim  to 
fill  the  whole  of  life.  For  each  new  one,  the  earnest  poetic 
soul  feels  willing  to  die.  Yet  each  is  driven  away  by  its 
follower.  The  feet  of  them  that  shall  bear  it  out  are  be- 
fore the  door  even  while  the  triumphant  emotion  is  reign- 
ing over  the  heart  within.  Fulness  of  such  life  means 
fickleness.  Novalis,  upon  the  death  of  his  betrothed, 
made  a  sort  of  divinity  of  the  departed,  and  dated  a  new 
era  from  the  day  of  her  death.  His  diary  was  for  a  while 
full  of  spiritual  exercises,  suggested  by  his  affliction.  He 
resolved  to  follow  her  to  the  grave  in  one  year.  Within 
this  year  he  was  betrothed  anew.  #  such  is  Novalis,  what 
will  be  a  lesser  spirit  ?  * 

"All  enthusiasm  as  such,"  writes  Gomperz,2  "tends 

1  The  Religious  Aspect  of  Philosophy,  p.  114. 

2  Greek  Thinkers,  ii.,  45. 


A  Study  of  the  Emotions  201 

rather  to  obscurity  than  to  clearness  of  mental  vision. 
The  same,  indeed,  is  the  effect  of  emotion  in  general. 
Every  emotion  attracts  those  ideas  and  images  which 
nourish  it,  and  repels  those  which  do  not.  To  perceive 
and  judge  of  facts  with  an  open  unbiassed  mind  is  im- 
possible except  where  impartiality — that  is,  freedom 
from  emotion — has  first  paved  the  way."  It  is  now  a 
commonplace  of  science  that  a  man  must  set  aside  all 
emotional  bias  in  order  to  discover  the  truth.  In  the 
religious  world,  too,  emotionalism  is  to  a  considerable 
extent  out  of  date,  and  the  emotional  revival  is  re- 
garded with  suspicion.  That  emotion  belongs  rather 
in  the  childhood  of  the  race  than  in  its  maturity  is  so 
plain  that  it  hardly  seems  necessary  to  argue  the 
point. 

Yet,  is  the  account  closed  here?  Is  emotion  wholly 
primitive  and  without  use  in  civilised  life?  If  so,  what 
of  Emerson's  saying  that  "nothing  great  was  ever 
achieved  without  enthusiasm?"  What  is  so  high  in 
the  scale  of  human  happiness  as  an  emotion  of  the 
heart?  Why  is  it  that  we  habitually  disparage  certain 
religious  people  as  "cold,"  and  associate  our  spiritual 
ideals  with  those  who  are  emotionally  "warm"?  If 
the  brute  passions,  anger,  hatred,  jealousy,  and  the  like 
are  emotions,  so  is  sympathy,  aesthetic  enjoyment, 
religious  exaltation.  The  emotions  range  from  the 
lowest  impulses  or  instincts  within  us  to  the  noblest 
sentiments  of  which  we  are  morally  and  spiritually 
capable.  They  have  the  most  debased  objects  as  well 
as  the  purest  and  m<3st  elevated.  They  may  pertain 
to  an  essentially  small,  mean  interest,  or  be  related  in 
thought  to  the  total  universe,  as  in  the  case  of  what 
men  of  science  call  "cosmic  emotion." 

It  seems  impossible  to  generalise  or  to  classify  all  the 


202          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

emotions  under  one  head.  For  emotions  are  not  alone 
primitive  but  play  a  part  all  along  the  line.  Disparage 
them  if  you  will,  you  must  take  constant  account  of 
them  in  your  studies  of  human  nature.  It  is  a  question 
of  eligibility  and  organisation  rather  than  of  elimina- 
tion. Some  of  the  emotions  are  so  far  primitive  that 
they  can  be  recovered  only  through  the  scientific  imagi- 
nation. Some  are  obviously  so  unworthy  of  us  that 
we  quickly  banish  them,  while  others  annoy  us  for 
years  despite  all  efforts  to  quell  them.  We  despise  a 
mere  stoic  as  heartily  as  a  creature  of  the  emotions. 
The  truth  is  that  man's  emotions  change  as  his  life 
changes.  Only  in  evolutionary  terms  can  one  give 
a  complete  account  of  them. 

What  we  mean  to  say,  when  we  discard  emotion,  is 
that  emotion  alone  is  an  unsafe  guide,  for  it  is  essen- 
tially transitory.  But  emotions  may  be  exceedingly 
profitable  when  followed  by  philosophic  thought  or 
when  compared  in  the  light  of  their  results.  "  Where 
there  is  life  there  is  hope,"  and  it  is  emotion  that  gives 
life.  The  prime  difficulty  is  that  emotion  as  such 
knows  not  whither  it  is  moving.  It  is  relatively  form- 
less, insatiable,  ever  surging  forward.  But  it  is  also 
through  emotion  that  we  learn  what  is  rampant  in  us, 
how  much  of  the  animal  remains.  The  long  struggle 
with  the  duality  of  self  springs  out  of  the  contrasts 
which  our  emotions  reveal.  If  fear,  anger,  jealousy, 
hatred,  and  the  like  arise  within  us  only  to  be  unmerci- 
fully dealt  with,  we  are  never  able  completely  to  trans- 
mute the  life  that  is  active  within  them  until  we  can 
philosophically  relate  them  to  the  divine  love.  Fear 
plays  a  part  in  the  life  of  faith.  Anger  persists  far 
up  the  spiritual  highway  under  the  guise  of  right- 
eous indignation.  Jealousy  stimulates  selfishness  and 


A  Study  of  the  Emotions  203 

teaches  a  profoundly  important  lesson.  Hatred  takes 
on  successively  higher  objects  until  at  last  it  becomes 
condemnation  not  of  persons  but  of  wrong-doing. 
Sunder  all  emotion  from  man  and  the  spiritual  life 
would  be  sadly  maimed. 

Then,  too,  by  emotion  we  learn  that  there  is  a  way 
up  and  a  way  down.  If  the  man  who  is  in  earnest 
works  unceasingly  to  cut  off  the  emotions  which  draw 
the  mind  down  into  passion,  into  the  flesh,  and  into 
self,  it  is  by  cultivating  the  uplifting  emotions  that  he 
finally  conquers.  Hence  one  must  sharply  discrimi- 
nate between  the  upward  and  the  downward  types  of 
emotion.  We  condemn  some  emotions  only  to  exalt 
others.  Emotions  of  an  impulsive  character  play  less 
part  in  our  lives  as  intellectual  evolution  goes  on.  But 
as  impulse  subsides  higher  emotions  come  into  promi- 
nence. For  impulsive  emotions  we  can  usually  assign 
no  desirable  objects.  The  higher  emotions  we  classify 
as  aesthetic,  social,  moral,  religious,  or  cosmic,  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  of  their  objects. 

An  emotion,  then,  is  not  a  state  which  springs  as  it 
were  out  of  the  air,  full-fledged.  It  is  given  amidst 
an  environment,  is  called  out  in  the  presence  of  some- 
thing, or  accompanies  other  mental  states.  Whether 
it  be  aroused  by  a  bodily  change,  such  as  weeping,  or 
in  response  to  an  objective  event,  the  contemplation 
of  the  sublime,  the  presence  of  an  endeared  person,  it 
is  essentially  a  response,  a  resultant.  Hence,  we  should 
not  expect  to  understand  it  alone.  Nor  should  we 
take  it  as  the  central  clue  to  what  is  fundamental  in 
human  nature. 

Mental  life  is  not  always  emotional.  It  is  possible 
to  have  the  immediacy  of  an  experience  without  the 
supervening  emotion.  Usually  our  new  experiences 


204          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

begin  with  emotional  accompaniments.  But  as  our 
understanding  grows  we  know  better  what  to  expect 
of  nature,  of  our  fellow-men,  and  of  ourselves,  hence 
the  accompanying  emotion  subsides  and  the  intellectual 
object  remains.  Emotions  do  not  of  themselves  com- 
bine well.  They  tend  to  make  us  believe  that  they 
alone  are  real  and  true,  then  they  unceremoniously 
desert  us.  Hence  we  learn  to  assimilate  their  lessons 
and  in  time  to  do  without  them,  and  pass  directly  from 
immediate  experience  to  its  interpretation  or  to  the 
appropriate  conduct. 

Inasmuch  as  emotions  abound  in  illusions  and  as 
most  of  them  are  desirable  only  when  regulated,  every 
man  finds  it  necessary  to  pass  through  a  period  when 
he  distrusts  them,  even  love,  which  he  charges  with 
unlimited  waywardness.  But  no  man  can  long  main- 
tain this  extreme  attitude.  The  emotions  once  under- 
stood, one  is  able  to  give  free  play  to  some,  to  be  a  child 
again  in  spontaneous  response  to  their  promptings. 
This  means  that  the  intellect  also  has  been  assigned  its 
proper  sphere.  Hence  the  organisation  of  the  emo- 
tions is  likely  to  be  the  result  of  years  of  experience 
in  which  one  was  first  too  emotional,  then  excessively 
intellectual,  until  finally  the  balance  was  attained.  It 
is  also  the  result  of  certain  discriminations  by  which 
the  higher  side  of  our  nature  is  assigned  its  rightful 
place  under  the  head  of  values.  Who,  for  example, 
that  genuinely  appreciates  love  would  subject  it  to  the 
same  analysis  which  he  applies  to  hatred  and  jealousy  ? 
Love,  Swedenborg  tells  us,  is  the  very  "life  of  man," 
and  before  the  great  miracle  of  life  we  stand  somewhat 
in  awe. 

Probably  for  the  majority  even  of  thoughtful  people 
the  term  emotion  has  no  distinct  meaning  apart  from 


A  Study  of  the  Emotions  205 

sensation  and  the  life  of  feeling,  generally.  The  term 
"feeling"  is  often  used  in  the  vaguest  sense  to  cover 
any  sort  of  mental  experience  of  which  we  are  directly 
aware.  But,  obviously,  there  is  a  difference  between 
experiencing  a  sensation,  for  instance  of  heat  or  cold, 
and  being  disturbed  about  it.  The  sensation  may  be 
accompanied  by  a  feeling- tone  of  pleasure  or  pain,  and 
yet  produce  no  emotional  effect  within  us.  Sensations 
we  are  bound  to  have,  there  is  no  escape  from  them. 
But  the  way  of  taking  our  sense-experiences  may  de- 
pend upon  ourselves.  It  would  be  well,  then,  to  assign 
the  term  emotion  to  its  distinctive  place,  in  contrast 
with  sensation,  on  the  one  hand,  and  feelings  of  pleas- 
ure or  pain  on  the  other.  An  emotion  may  then  be  char- 
acterised in  terms  of  its  cause,  the  object  to  which  it 
is  directed,  or  by  reference  to  its  bodily  expression.  In 
the  case  of  anger,  the  sensational  element  in  connection 
with  which  it  arises,  and  its  physical  expression,  would 
doubtless  be  far  more  prominent  than  in  the  case  of 
emotions  of  finer  types.  If  the  emotion  be  called  out 
by  contemplation  of  the  idea  of  God,  the  physical  ex- 
pression would  very  likely  be  reduced  to  the  minimum. 
An  emotion  is  almost  sure  to  be  accompanied  by  feel- 
ings of  pleasure  or  pain.  Yet  that  is  no  excuse  for  con- 
fusing the  two.  In  some  instances  the  emotional  life 
has  no  meaning  apart  from  the  bodily  attitude,  the 
organic  reaction.  Yet  here,  again,  there  is  reason  for 
careful  discrimination. 

The  emotions  belong,  then,  with  the  primitive,  origi- 
nal side  of  our  nature,  under  the  head  of  immediate 
experience,  in  contrast  with  mediating  thought.  To 
describe  an  emotion  one  appeals  to  actual  experience, 
to  those  who  have  been  shaken  by  fear,  made  wretched 
by  anger,  touched  by  grief,  and  deepened  by  sorrow. 


206          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

Hence  one  must  guard  against  giving  a  highly  intellect- 
ualised  account  of  the  emotions.  It  is  significant  that 
it  is  not  the  psychologists  who  hold  the  intellectualistic 
view  of  human  nature  who  give  the  best  description 
of  the  emotions,  but  those  who  hold  the  physiological 
theory.  We  must  make  sure  that  we  understand  what 
an  emotion  is  before  we  undertake  to  evaluate  it.  It 
will  be  well,  therefore,  to  examine  some  of  the  theories 
of  the  emotions  with  a  view  to  understanding  the  place 
of  emotion  in  our  mental  life. 

The  most  natural  way  to  define  an  emotion  is  with 
respect  to  its  object  and  what  is  taken  to  be  its  accom- 
panying physical  effect,  for  example,  blushing,  trem- 
bling, or  weeping.  That  is,  emotion  is  ordinarily 
regarded  as  mentally  aroused,  and  followed  by  a  bodily 
response.  Here,  for  example,  is  a  typical  definition 
from  a  philosophical  vocabulary  once  in  vogue : 

An  emotion  differs  from  a  sensation  by  its  not  originating 
in  a  state  of  body.  .  .  .  Emotions,  like  other  states  of 
feeling,  imply  knowledge.  Something  beautiful  or  de- 
formed, sublime  or  ridiculous,  is  known  and  contemplated ; 
and  in  the  contemplation  springs  up  the  appropriate  feeling, 
followed  by  the  characteristic  expression  of  countenance, 
or  attitude,  or  manner.  .  .  .  Emotions,  then,  are  awak- 
ened through  the  medium  of  the  intellect,  and  are  varied 
and  modified  by  the  conceptions  we  form  of  the  objects 
to  which  they  refer.  .  .  .  Emotions,  in  themselves,  and 
by  themselves,  lead  to  quiescence  and  contemplation, 
rather  than  activity.1 

From  this  point  of  view,  the  chief  emotions  are  won- 
der, grief,  and  fear;  the  intellect  is  deemed  fundamental, 
and  the  emotions,  regarded  as  chiefly  quiescent,  con- 
stitute merely  one  type  of  expression  of  the  self.  But 

1  Krauth-Fleming,  Vocabulary  of  the  Philosophical  Sciences,  p.  156. 


A  Study  of  the  Emotions  207 

a  fundamental  objection  to  this  theory  is  the  fact  that 
it  is  not  the  quiescent  emotions,  not  those  that  spring 
from  ideas,  which  give  people  their  problems.  If  emo- 
tions were  simply  due  to  confused  intelligence,  the 
resource  would  be  plain,  namely,  strenuous  cultivation 
of  the  intellect.  In  sharp  contrast  with  this  intellect- 
ualistic  view,  stands  the  theory  that  the  response  which 
the  intellectualists  regard  as  the  physical  effect  or  ex- 
pression of  the  emotion  is  the  emotion  itself.  From 
this,  the  physiological,  point  of  view,  the  emotions  are 
by  no  means  secondary  to  intellectual  states,  but  are 
of  independent  origin.  This  theory  involves  some 
strange  propositions,  but  it  is  perhaps  the  first  gen- 
uinely scientific  theory  that  has  been  proposed. 

For  this  physiological,  or  James-Lange,  theory  we 
are  chiefly  indebted  to  Professor  James,  who  first  an- 
nounced it  in  an  article  in  1884,  and  afterwards  made 
it  an  integral  part  of  his  large  work  on  psychology. 
The  theory  as  expounded  by  Professor  James  is  entirely 
consistent  with  his  account  of  mental  life  as  a  whole  and 
immediately  follows  his  description  of  instinct,  defined 
in  customary  terms  as  "the  faculty  of  acting  in  such 
a  way  as  to  produce  certain  ends,  without  foresight 
of  the  ends,  and  without  previous  education  in  the 
performance."  1  That  is,  an  instinct,  apart  from  self- 
preservation  and  other  ends  which  it  is  supposed  to 
subserve,  conforms  to  the  general  reflex-action  type  and 
is  an  impulse.  That  is,  the  instincts  are  allied  to 
reflex  action  below,  and  to  acquired  habits  and  emo- 
tions above.  Sympathy,  fear,  jealousy,  and  love,  for 
example,  are  regarded  at  first  as  instincts.  Instinctive 
reactions  "shade  imperceptibly"  into  emotional  ex- 
pressions. The  mere  memory  of  an  experience  may 

1  Principles  of  Psychology,  ii  ,  p.  383. 


208          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

serve  to  "liberate  the  excitement,"  but  the  general 
causes  of  emotional  states  are  physiological.  That  is, 
the  emotions  of  grief,  fear,  hatred,  and  so  on,  are  de- 
scribed in  terms  of  the  rigidity  or  relaxation  of  the 
muscles,  the  constriction  of  the  arteries,  the  altered 
breathing,  the  quickened  pulse,  the  changed  secretions. 
Professor  James's  central  proposition  is  that  "the 
bodily  changes  follow  directly  upon  the  perception  of 
the  exciting  fact  .  .  .  our  feeling  of  the  same  changes 
is  the  emotion.  Common-sense  says,  we  lose  our  fort- 
une, are  sorry,  and  weep ;  we  meet  a  bear,  are  frightened, 
and  run;  we  are  insulted  by  a  rival,  are  angry,  and 
strike."  1  Professor  James  defends  the  thesis  that 

this  order  of  sequence  is  incorrect,  that  the  one  mental 
state  is  not  induced  immediately  by  the  other,  that  the 
bodily  manifestations  must  first  be  interposed  between, 
and  that  the  more  rational  statement  is  that  we  feel  sorry 
because  we  cry,  angry  because  we  strike,  afraid  because 
we  tremble,  and  not  that  we  cry,  strike,  or  tremble,  because 
we  are  sorry,  angry,  or  fearful.  .  .  .  Without  the  bodily 
states  following  upon  the  perception,  the  latter  would  be 
purely  cognitive  in  form,  pale,  colourless,  destitute  of  emo- 
tional warmth.  We  might  then  see  the  bear  and.  judge 
it  best  to  run,  receive  the  insult  and  deem  it  right  to  strike, 
but  we  should  not  actually  feel  afraid  or  angry. 

Many  objections  would  no  doubt  be  raised  to  this 
hypothesis.  But  Professor  James  has  already  given 
abundant  evidence  that  objects  "do  excite  bodily 
changes  by  a  preorganised  mechanism,"  hence  an  emo- 
tion is  only  a  special  instance  of  a  general  principle. 
He  insists  that  if  we  picture  some  strong  emotion,  then 
endeavour  to  abstract  all  the  feelings  of  the  physical 
symptoms  from  the  consciousness  of  the  emotion,  there 

1  Principles  of  Psychology,  ii,,  p.  449. 


A  Study  of  the  Emotions  209 

will  be  nothing  left.  For  there  is  " no  '  mind-stuff'  out 
of  which  the  emotion  can  be  constituted  ...  a  cold 
and  neutral  state  of  intellectual  perception  is  all  that 
remains."  "  What  kind  of  an  emotion  of  fear,"  Profes- 
sor James  asks,  ''would  be  left  if  the  feeling  neither  of 
quickened  heart-beats  nor  of  shallow  breathing,  neither 
of  trembling  lips  nor  of  weakened  limbs,  neither  of 
goose-flesh  nor  of  visceral  stirrings,  were  present,  it  is 
quite  impossible  for  me  to  think."  What  would  grief 
be  "without  its  tears,  its  sobs,  its  suffocation  of  the 
heart,  its  pang  in  the  breast-bone?  A  feelingless  cog- 
nition that  certain  circumstances  are  deplorable,  and 
nothing  more.  Every  passion  in  turn  tells  the  same 
story.  A  purely  disembodied  human  emotion  is  a 
non-entity."  1 

Emotions,  then,  in  terms  of  this  theory,  are  "sensa- 
tional processes,  processes  due  to  inward  currents  set 
up  by  physical  happenings  .  .  .  each  emotion  is  the 
resultant  of  a  sum  of  elements,  and  each  element 
is  caused  by  a  physiological  process  of  a  sort  already 
well  known.  The  elements  are  all  organic  changes, 
and  each  of  them  is  the  reflex  effect  of  the  exciting 
object. " 2 

In  reply  to  objections  to  this  theory,  Professor  James 
points  out  that  in 

listening  to  poetry,  drama,  or  heroic  narrative  we  are  often 
surprised  at  the  cutaneous  shiver  which  like  a  sudden  wave 
flows  over  us,  and  at  the  heart-swelling  and  the  lachrymal 
effusion  that  unexpectedly  catch  us  at  intervals.  ...  If 
our  friend  goes  near  to  the  edge  of  a  precipice,  we  get  the 
well-known  feeling  of  "all-overishness,"  and  we  shrink 
back,  although  we  positively  know  him  to  be  safe,  and 
have  no  distinct  imagination  of  his  fall.3 

1  Principles  of  Psychology ,  ii . ,  p .  4  5  2 .    2  Ibid. ,  p.  4  5  3 .    3  Ibid. ,  p.  4  5  7 . 
14 


210          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

Every  one  knows  how  panic  is  increased  by  flight,  and 
how  the  giving  way  to  the  symptoms  of  grief  or  anger 
increases  those  passions  themselves.  Each  fit  of  sobbing 
makes  the  sorrow  more  acute.  .  .  .  Refuse  to  express  a 
passion,  and  it  dies.  Count  ten  before  venting  your  anger, 
and  its  occasions  seem  ridiculous.  Whistling  to  keep  up 
courage  is  no  mere  figure  of  speech.  On  the  other  hand, 
sit  all  day  in  a  moping  posture,  sigh,  and  reply  to  every- 
thing with  a  dismal  voice,  and  your  melancholy  lingers.1 

All  this,  of  course,  means  that  our  mental  life  is 
far  more  closely  than  we  suspected  "knit  up  with  our 
corporeal  frame.  Rapture,  love,  ambition,  indigna- 
tion, and  pride,  considered  as  feelings,  are  fruits  of  the 
same  soil  with  the  grossest  bodily  sensations  of  pleasure 
and  of  pain. "  2  This  is  true  of  the  subtler  as  well  as 
of  the  coarser  emotions.  The  aesthetic  pleasure  given 
us  by  lines,  masses,  combinations  of  colours  and  sounds 
are  purely  sensational.  Even  in  cases  of  rapture  there 
is,  strictly  speaking,  no  emotion  without  the  bodily 
reverberation,  the  thrill  at  the  case  of  justice,  the  tingle 
at  the  act  of  magnanimity. 

In  support  of  this  physiological  theory,  Ribot  de- 
votes an  entire  volume  to  a  study  of  the  emotions  from 
the  point  of  view  of  their  evolution.3  The  emotions 
are  regarded  as  inseparable  from  the  organic  move- 
ments of  the  body,  the  needs,  appetites,  desires,  and 
other  physical  tendencies  which  have  to  do  with  the 
struggle  for  life.  The  underlying  element  is  the  need 
or  tendency,  the  bodily  motion,  while  the  emotion  is 
secondary  to  the  instinct  or  movement  from  which  it 
springs.  The  motion  is  the  cause,  the  emotion  is  the 
effect.  As  the  internal  sensations  (hunger,  thirst,  the 

1  Principles  of  Psychology,  ii.,  pp.  462-463.        2  Ibid.,  p.  467. 
3  The   Psychology   of    the  Emotions,   Eng.   trans.,   Contemporary 
Scientific  Series. 


A  Study  of  the  Emotions  211 

need  of  sleep,  etc.)  have  to  do  with  the  maintenance 
of  bodily  welfare,  so  the  primitive  emotions  directly 
relate  to  the  preservation  of  the  individual  or  the 
species.  Of  these  primitive  emotions,  fear  is  the  first 
in  point  of  time,  then  come  anger,  affection,  emotions 
connected  with  the  personality,  and  the  sexual  emotion. 
At  the  root  of  each  of  the  primitive  emotions  there  is 
a  tendency  or  instinct. 

From  this  point  of  view,  the  continuity  of  life  is  not 
in  our  emotions,  but  in  the  appetites  and  tendencies 
which  are  always  at  work  within  us.  Even  character 
is  reducible  to  the  preponderant  tendency  which  gives 
unity  and  stability  to  the  personal  life.  It  is  not  the 
intellect  which  essentially  expresses  character,  for 
the  intellect  tends  to  become  impersonal.  Scholars, 
for  example,  who  deal  with  abstractions  tend  to  reduce 
life  to  a  monotonous  routine  in  which  emotion  plays 
as  little  part  as  possible.  In  the  vast  majority  of 
people,  the  emotions,  pleasures,  and  pains  occupy  the 
first  place  in  the  mental  life.  The  physiological  evi- 
dence is  in  favour  of  the  priority  of  the  emotions  and 
feelings.  All  this  evidence  centres  about  one  point, 
the  fact  that  organic  life  appears  before  animal  life. 
The  organic  life  is  directly  expressed  by  the  needs  and 
appetites,  and  these,  as  we  have  seen,  are  the  founda- 
tions of  the  emotions. 

Ribot  describes  the  emotions  as  the  most  mobile  of 
the  mental  forms  of  life,  incessantly  oscillating  around 
one  point  of  equilibrium,  ever  ready  to  sink  too  low  or 
too  high.  ' '  An  emotion  which  does  not  vibrate  through 
the  whole  body  is  nothing  but  a  purely  intellectual 
state."  *  Every  emotion  loses  its  strength  in  propor- 
tion as  it  is  intellectualised.  Hence  the  subtle  and 

1  The  Psychology  of  the  Emotions,  p.  163. 


212          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

refined  forms  of  emotion  of  which  the  intellectualists 
speak  are  decidedly  impoverished  emotions.  The 
higher  emotions  are  explicable  by  the  same  principle 
as  the  primitive  emotions.  Esthetic  emotion  has  its 
origin  in  a  surplus  of  activity,  expending  itself  in  a  par- 
ticular direction  under  the  influence  of  the  creative 
imagination.  Religious  emotion  results  from  the 
fusion  of  fear  and  love  and  a  process  of  development 
which  depends  upon  intellectual  conditions.  The 
religious  emotion  in  its  origin,  and  taken  by  itself,  is 
fundamentally  selfish,  it  is  mere  anxiety  for  one's  own 
salvation. 

While  this  account  of  the  emotions  is  almost  purely 
biological,  with  constant  emphasis  on  evolutionary 
tendencies  and  organic  movements,  there  is  a  noticeable 
emphasis  put  upon  the  intellect  as  the  determining 
principle  of  the  higher  evolution.  For  example,  Ribot 
traces  moral  sentiment  to  an  emotional  origin.  There 
is  a  gregarious  instinct;  there  are  certain  modes  of 
action;  habits  founded  on  sympathy,  and  finally  suf- 
ficient stability  to  constitute  a  society.  Morality 
passes  through  an  instinctive  period  in  which  it  is 
unconscious,  unreflecting.  But  there  is  forthwith  a 
conscious  period,  reflective,  many-sided,  complex, 
expressed  in  institutions,  laws,  and  codes. 

There  is,  then,  a  certain  evolution  of  the  emotions 
from  fear  to  aesthetic  contemplation  and  religious  senti- 
ment. But  on  the  whole  the  emotions  are  so  intimately 
connected  with  the  bodily  instincts  and  processes  that 
they  do  not  of  themselves  ascend  very  far.  Essen- 
tially speaking,  the  emotion  is  only  the  consciousness 
of  the  organic  phenomena  which  accompany  it.  One 
emotion  differs  from  another  according  to  the  quantity 
and  quality  of  these  organic  states  and  their  various 


A  Study  of  the  Emotions  213 

combinations.     The  fundamental  and  irreducible  root 
of  all  emotion  is  attraction  or  repulsion,  motion  or 
arrest  of  motion.     An  emotion  may  be  a  pioneer  of 
knowledge,  an  anticipation  of  an  ideal.     An  impulse 
(for  example,  the  sexual  impulse)  may  be  in  turn  physi- 
ological,   psycho-physiological,    chiefly    psychological, 
and    finally  intellectual.     But  the   arrest   of  passions 
and  emotions  comes  through  the  development  of  the 
intellect.     It  is  no  doubt  a  very  obscure  question  how 
an  image  or  conception  can  produce  an  arrest  of  move- 
ment, but  the  fact  of  the  arrest  is  unquestionable.     The 
intervention  may  result  in  two  ways.     It  may  obstruct 
and  finally  suppress.     Thus  a  passion  kept  in  check, 
after  various  oscillations  backward  and  forward,  may 
finally  be  entirely  extinguished.     Or  there  may  be  a 
transformation  or  metamorphosis  by  arrest  of  devel- 
opment.    In  this  case  the  passion  is  not  extinguished 
but  its  nature  is  changed.     Reflection,  although  by 
nature  slow,  is  in  due  course  inhibitory.     Ribot  holds 
that  scarcely  one  person  in  a  hundred  thousand  or  a 
million  attains  the  higher  emotions.     To  attain  them 
the   following  conditions   are   needed:     (i)    a   person 
must  be  capable  of  conceiving  and  understanding  gen- 
eral ideas;  and  (2)  these  ideas  must  not  remain  simple 
intellectual  forms,  but  must  be  able  to  arouse  certain 
feelings,  certain  approximate  tendencies.     The  order 
of  development  of  the  emotions  depends  on  the  order 
of  development  of  the  general  ideas. 

The  great  merit  of  Ribot 's  account  is  its  fidelity  to 
human  nature  as  we  ordinarily  find  it.  It  is  no  doubt 
true  that  in  the  majority  of  people  an  emotion  is 
nothing  more  or  less  than  a  consciousness  of  instincts, 
bodily  passions,  sensuous  stirrings.  People  live  in  their 
instincts  and  passions.  By  these  they  are  prompted. 


214          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

By  the  desires  which  spring  from  them  they  are  actu- 
ated, not  by  reasoa^  or  by  lofty  sentiment.  It  is  well 
to  recognise  how  primitive  emotion  is  on  the  whole. 
It  is  well  to  verify  by  reference  to  history,  and  by 
present-day  life,  the  descriptions  which  James,  Ribot, 
and  others  have  given.  It  is  important  to  note  that 
the  moment  we  leave  the  level  of  bodily  stirrings  and 
begin  to  regard  emotion  as  other  than  a  consciousness 
of  organic  commotions  we  introduce  intellectual  consid- 
erations and  have  to  do,  not  with  emotion  as  such,  but 
with  mental  evolution.  It  is  no  less  important,  how- 
ever, to  notice  the  possibility  of  development  out  of  a 
low-down  emotional  state  through  the  acquisition  of 
intellectual  power.  If  an  intellectualised  emotion  be 
an  impoverished  emotion,  it  is  plain  that  in  almost 
every  instance  it  is  greatly  to  be  preferred. 

The  question  now  arises,  Does  this  physiological 
account  of  the  emotions  include  all  that  is  to  be  said? 
Is  it  an  adequate  description  of  the  higher  emotions, 
this  investigation  of  the  self-seeking  instincts  in  which 
many  of  the  emotions  are  said  to  have  arisen?  Or, 
have  we  thus  far  simply  the  evolutionary  and  physio- 
logical basis  of  the  emotions?  If  the  primitive  emo- 
tions are  accounted  for  on  this  basis,  the  higher  are  for 
the  most  part  explained  away.  It  would  seem  import- 
ant to  regard  these  emotions  in  the  light  not  merely 
of  their  origin  but  of  their  values. 

The  supplementary  point  of  view  is  well  stated  by 
David  Irons,  who  begins  with  the  assumption  of  pri- 
mary tendencies  to  action,  which  express  themselves 
not  alone  in  physical  events  but  in  mental  experiences.1 
From  this  point  of  view  man  is  primarily  an  active 
being,  and  is  to  be  understood  in  the  light  of  his  primary 

1  The  Psychology  of  Ethics,  Blackwood,  Edinburgh,  1903. 


A  Study  of  the  Emotions  215 

interests.  External  objects  become  significant  through 
their  relation  to  this  fundamental  activity  and  the  ends 
to  which  it  is  directed.  Man  does  not  merely  respond 
to  stimuli  but  reacts  in  accordance  with  his  inner  char- 
acter. Hence  introspection  must  be  called  into  play, 
"for  introspection  alone  can  give  a  verdict  in  regard 
to  the  ultimate  qualitative  distinctions  between  psy- 
chical phenomena,"  and  in  the  phenomena  of  impulse, 
desire,  effort,  an  apparently  irreducible  fact  of  con- 
sciousness is  involved. 

In  order,  then,  to  avoid  explaining  away  emotion 
before  a  serious  effort  to  discover  its  nature  has  been 
made,  our  author  begins  with  a  study  of  emotion  as  it 
actually  appears  in  consciousness.  Inasmuch  as  not 
all  emotions  are  of  a  violent  nature  the  process  of  direct 
observation  is  not  so  difficult  as  might  appear.  As 
opposed  to  experiences  of  pleasure  and  pain,  organic 
sensations  and  tendencies  to  act  in  a  certain  manner, 
emotion  reveals  itself  as  essentially  a  feeling-attitude, 
a  centrally  initiated  reaction.  It  expresses,  for  exam- 
ple, the  desire  to  inflict  injury,  or  affection  for  a  person. 
The  emotion  is  the  subjective  response  which  appears 
when  we  react  in  view  of  a  situation  instead  of  merely 
feeling  pleasure  or  pain.  Hence  it  has  an  outward 
direction,  is  an  attitude  towards  something;  whereas 
in  the  case  of  pain  or  pleasure  we  are  pained  or  pleased 
by  something.  We  might  be  pained  but  not  angry  at 
the  conduct  of  a  friend.  The  emotion  is  plainly  dis- 
tinguishable from  the  idea  of  the  object  and  from  the 
pleasure  or  pain.  A  passion  tends  to  subside  if  the 
person  in  question  concludes  that  he  is  making  himself 
ridiculous,  but  -no  such  reflection  suffices  to  banish  a 
pain.  We  are  more  aware  of  responsibility  in  the  case 
of  emotion  than  in  the  case  of  pleasure  or  pain.  "We 


216          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

justify,  excuse,  or  condemn  our  emotions,  while  we 
accept  our  pleasures  and  pains  as  mere  facts.  This 
is  inexplicable  save  on  the  assumption  that  emotion 
is  reaction,  for  we  can  identify  ourselves  only  with  our 
own  activity,  not  with  an  effect  imposed  on  us  from 
without. "  *  Pleasure  and  pain  indicate  the  way  events 
affect  us,  something  given;  while  emotion  is  something 
done. 

Again,  a  bodily  disorder  may  be  painful,  but  a  sense 
of  danger  must  be  aroused  before  emotion  appears. 
Hate  presupposes  that  the  object  of  it  is  already  re- 
garded as  a  hostile  personality.  The  emotional  situa- 
tion is  such  because  it  possesses  significance.  That  is, 
the  emotion  implies  an  intellectual  interpretation  of  the 
given  circumstances.  We  do  not  respond  to  the  facts 
as  mere  particulars.  Unless  we  interpret  we  do  not 
react  emotionally.  A  disagreeable  circumstance  may, 
for  example,  inevitably  cause  pain,  but  whether  or 
not  it  arouses  anger,  pity,  or  contempt  depends  upon 
one's  point  of  view  with  regard  to  it.  The  emotion 
can  be  directly  influenced  by  a  change  in  point  of 
view  in  regard  to  the  object  of  it.  Convince  a  terrified 
man  that  there  is  no  danger  and  his  emotion  will  van- 
ish. Abnormal  physical  and  mental  conditions  in- 
fluence the  emotional  life  by  perverting  the  judgment. 
If  the  situation  frequently  recurs  to  which  we  have 
become  accustomed  to  respond  emotionally,  anything 
which  is  associated  with  the  conditions  of  the  emotion 
may  arouse  the  emotion  directly. 

Fear  may  thus  appear  on  a  sign  or  signal,  simultaneously 
with  the  sense  of  danger.  .  .  .  Previous  interpretations 
and  responses  are  .  .  .  required  to  form  the  connections 
which  give  the  particular  presentation  borrowed  power. 

1  The  Psychology  of  Ethics,  Blackwood,  Edinburgh,  1903,    p.  13. 


A  Study  of  the  Emotions  217 

.  .  .  Emotion  is  dependent  on  a  cognitive  interpretation 
of  the  facts,  and  will  therefore  be  "irrational"  if  the  judg- 
ment is  wrong.  Moreover,  if  a  false  interpretation  has 
been  persistently  repeated,  the  resulting  emotional  re- 
action will  have  acquired,  through  repetition,  a  momentum 
of  its  own.  .  .  .  The  conflict  between  reason  and  emotion 
is  ultimately  a  conflict  between  inadequate  knowledge 
and  the  deeper  insight  which  has  subsequently  been 
attained. l 

Emotion,  then,  demands  as  a  necessary  condition 
an  interpretation  of  the  situation  in  question.  The 
judgment  may,  of  course,  be  made  and  all  the  normal 
conditions  of  the  emotion  be  present,  yet  the  emotion 
may  be  restrained  or  inhibited  by  considerations  which 
reach  beyond  the  case  in  hand.  "A  situation  may  be 
recognised  as  'irritating'  without  arousing  anger,  if 
a  vivid  perception  of  ultimate  consequences  inter- 
venes. "  2  "  When  the  agent  is  entirely  under  the  influ- 
ence of  emotion,  he  acts  as  he  feels  disposed  towards 
the  object,  just  because  he  is  so  disposed  and  for  no 
other  reason.  He  is  concerned  with  the  object  alone; 
the  subject  is  in  the  background,  the  object  all  in  all. 
The  malevolent  passions  are  as  'disinterested'  as  the 
others.  We  '  lose  ourselves'  in  hate  as  in  love."  3 

The  efficiency  of  an  emotion  is  not  dependent  on  its 
strength  alone,  but  is  more  frequently  conditioned  by 
the  absence  of  opposing  forces. 

A  slight  fear  with  regard  to  the  distant  future  may  be  a 
more  potent  factor  in  conduct  than  a  persuasive  dread 
suddenly  aroused  by  an  impending  danger.  Further,  even 
intense  emotions  are  not  necessarily  accompanied  by 
excitement.  An  individual  of  strong  character  may  have 

1  The  Psychology  of  Ethics,  Blackwood,  Edinburgh,  1903,  pp.  18. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  IQ.  3  Ibid.,  p.  22. 


2i8          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

strong  emotions  and  yet  retain  his  self-control.  .  .  .  The 
different  emotions  arise  regularly  in  connection  with 
definite  normal  conditions.  We  feel  kindly  disposed 
towards  those  who  have  benefited  us,  are  irritated  by  in- 
jury, admire  worth  and  scorn  its  opposite,  and  the  feeling 
in  each  case  tends  to  influence  conduct  by  fixing  certain 
ideas  in  mind.  Given  the  conditions,  the  result  always 
follows  unless  special  counteracting  forces  come  into  play. 1 

In  contrast  with  the  James-Lange  theory  of  the  emo- 
tions, the  present  doctrine  clearly  indicates  the  relation 
between  emotion  and  activity  or  desire,  and  shows 
that  as  emotion  is  essentially  a  reaction  it  cannot  be 
analysed  into  organic  sensations,  which  might  indeed 
be  present  without  arousing  an  emotion. 

An  athlete  who  engages  in  a  contest  without  sufficient 
preparation,  is  usually  in  a  position  to  cognise  a  complicated 
series  of  physical  changes  .  .  .  trembling,  respiratory 
disturbances,  heart-throbbing,  and  visceral  changes  gen- 
erally. Yet  these  seem  emotionally  non-significant,  for 
they  remain  the  same  whether  he  is  glad,  sad,  angry,  en- 
vious, or  simply  too  fatigued  to  care  for  anything.2 

Emotion  is  not  mere  excitement,  nor  is  it  the  sum 
of  the  organic  sensations  aroused  by  the  physical 
disturbance,  as  introspection  proves.  Excitement  very 
naturally  accompanies  great  fear,  sudden  anger, 
intense  joy,  and  the  like ;  but  excitement  is  not  an  essen- 
tial feature  or  concomitant.  Excitement  is  merely  a 
fortuitous  accompaniment  of  emotional  states.  The 
belief  that  it  is  essential  to  emotion  is  the  source  of 
many  misconceptions. 

That  emotion  must  be  regarded  as  an  ultimate  aspect 
of  mind  with  distinctive  influence  on  conduct,  our  au- 

1  The  Psychology  of  Ethics,  Blackwood,  Edinburgh,  1903,  pp.  25. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  51. 


A  Study  of  the  Emotions  219 

thor  further  shows  by  an  analysis  of  the  primary  emo- 
tions. A  man  may  be  irritated  by  an  occurrence  merely 
because  it  is  at  variance  with  his  ideals.  The  range  of 
objects  which  excite  emotion  depends  upon  our  sphere 
of  interests.  "  If  one  tendency  is  as  good  as  another, 
there  is  no  reason  for  subordinating  one  to  another. 
There  must  also  be  an  impulse  to  realise  this  supreme 
end,  else  all  subordination  would  remain  purely  theo- 
retical." 1  All  our  judgments  in  regard  to  human  con- 
duct imply  that  the  regulation  of  natural  impulses  is 
possible.  Some  of  our  tendencies  to  action  are  well- 
nigh  overpowering.  Others  tend  to  obscure  the 
judgment.  We  are  strongly  inclined  to  believe  what 
we  wish  to  believe.  The  conflicts  are  numerous  and 
severe.  But  within  and  above  all  are  the  judgments 
of  worth  which  imply  a  higher  type  of  self-conscious- 
ness and  a  central  tendency  towards  self-realisation. 
The  individual,  possessing  an  ideal  of  worth  is  able  to 
triumph  over  otherwise  utterly  discordant  tendencies. 
If  we  compare  this  ethical  view  of  the  emotions  with 
the  physiological  theory,  we  find  that  it  is  a  question 
of  rival  analyses  of  a  collection  of  tendencies  which 
are  regarded  as  fundamental  to  the  emotions  and  which 
the  emotions  may  express  or  influence.  Much  depends, 
then,  upon  the  interpretation  of  these  fundamental 
activities.  If  we  interpret  them  physiologically,  we 
are  likely  to  find  -little  value  in  the  emotions  save  as 
they  further  man's  physical  welfare.  If  we  distinguish 
between  emotion  and  organic  sensation  or  excitement, 
and  regard  emotion  in  the  light  of  the  objects  towards 
which  it  is  directed,  the  way  is  plain  for  the  assessment  of 
the  emotions  from  the  point  of  view  of  ideal  standards. 
A  fundamental  theory  of  human  activity,  then,  is  of 

1  The  Psychology  of  Ethics,  Blackwood,  Edinburgh,  1903,  p.  144. 


220         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

more  consequence  than  a  theory  of  the  emotions. 
Plainly,  the  physiological  theory  is  of  little  value  except 
for  purposes  of  description  of  the  coarse  emotions  and 
their  physical  expression.  But  it  is  an  inadequate 
account  of  the  emotions  to  describe  them  apart  from 
the  objects  towards  which  they  are  directed  and  the 
actions  in  which  they  eventuate.  Since  emotion  is 
a  feeling-attitude,  a  centrally  initiated  response  in  the 
presence  of  a  significant  situation,  the  intellectual 
element  cannot  be  omitted.  Moreover,  there  are  emo- 
tions that  are  by  no  means  describable  as  mere  commo- 
tions, or  as  the  consciousness  of  organic  processes. 
We  rightfully  judge  some  emotions  on  physiological 
grounds,  but  cannot  estimate  all  emotions  in  this  way. 
Most  emotions  may,  indeed,  be  low-down  and  physical. 
But  the  whole  story  is  not  told  until  it  is  no  longer  a 
question  of  physical  repletion  or  of  nervous  excitement, 
but  a  question  of  the  fruits,  values,  and  eligibility  of 
emotion. 

When,  therefore,  the  question  is  raised,  Is  emotion 
essential  to  human  life?  it  is  plain  that  no  general  an- 
swer can  be  given.  That  the  emotions  are  everywhere 
prominent  and  have  played  a  prominent  part  in  human 
experience  is  indubitable.  But  the  mere  fact  of  exist- 
ence is  no  argument  for  eligibility.  When  self-develop- 
ment begins  in  earnest  men  find  that  they  acquire 
moderation,  equanimity,  self-control,  and  this  means, 
more  than  anything  else,  control  of  the  emotions.  It  is 
safe  to  say  that  most  of  the  emotions  are  of  a  selfish  char- 
acter. The  emotion  of  fear,  for  example,  may  occa- 
sionally embody  an  element  of  genuine  solicitude  for 
others,  but  is  most  likely  to  be  mere  distress  lest  some 
anticipated  ill  befall  ourselves.  One  may  be  indignant 
because  another  has  suffered  wrong,  but  anger  usually 


A  Study  of  the  Emotions  221 

signifies  merely  personal  resentment  because  of  fancied 
injury  to  our  pride,  our  reputation,  or  the  like.     Emo- 
tions of  scorn,  envy,  contempt,  are  plainly  expressive 
of  undue  self-esteem.     Jealousy  is  always  selfish.     It 
has  been  said  that  all  grief  is  selfish.     Indeed,  a  selfish 
person  might  be  defined  as  one  who  lives  in  the  emotions. 
There  is  abundant  evidence  that  emotions  are  for 
the  most  part  detrimental.     The  evil  effects  of  passion 
are  too  obvious  to  need   mention.     Whether  one  is 
genuinely  angry  or  merely  stirred  up,  the  drain  upon 
the   organism   is    unmistakable.     Most   emotions    are 
''wearing"  in  the  extreme.     The  nervous  tension  and 
physical  heat  attendant  upon  an  emotion  of  compara- 
tively short  duration  are  sometimes  the  equivalent  of 
the   energy   used   in   several   days'    work.     Then,  too, 
emotions  are  often  pathological,  or  at  any  rate  readily 
run    into    disease.     Unprincipled    and    selfish    people 
carry  their  ends    by  "working    upon"    the    emotions 
of     others.     Those  who  are  too  easily  influenced   by 
other  people  are  invariably  too  emotional.     The  mag- 
netic person  sways  by  means  of  the  emotions.     We 
create  innumerable  imaginary  ills  through  the  emotions. 
Some  emotions  are  quickly  followed  by  depression,  or 
by   overwhelming   nervous   exhaustion.     The   history 
of  human  moods  is  thus  in  large  part  the  history  of  the 
emotions.     A  creature  of  the  emotions  is  seemingly 
a   multiple   personality.     To  possess   unity,   self-con- 
sistency, is,  on  the  other  hand,  to  be  no  longer  emotional 
to  a  noticeable  degree. 

Whether  or  not  a  man  be  actively  endeavouring  to 
control  and  transmute  his  emotions  of  course  depends 
upon  the  stage  of  development  he  has  attained.  Just 
as  some  psychologists  strenuously  insist  that  an  emo- 
tion is  nothing  if  not  physical  excitement,  so  one  finds 


222          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

people  in  practical  life  who  express  the  greatest  scorn 
for  those  who  try  to  intellectualise  the  emotional  life, 
who  speak  as  if  love,  for  example,  were  aught  else,  or 
ever  should  be  aught  else  than  passion.  But  for  the 
man  who  is  in  earnest  it  is  merely  a  question  of  eliminat- 
ing the  coarser  emotions,  of  transmuting  into  higher 
modes  of  expression  the  life  which  would  otherwise  go 
forth  in  emotions  of  anger,  hatred,  jealousy.  Merely 
from  the  point  of  view  of  practical  efficiency,  the  man 
of  common  sense  sees  that  he  must  keep  cool  and  col- 
lected. When  it  is  a  question  of  comparison  between 
mental  states  accompanied  by  excitement  and  those 
that  are  devoid  of  it,  probably  every  one  would  prefer 
the  quiescent  state.  The  business  man  who  finds  him- 
self excited  over  a  prospective  bargain  knows  that  his 
judgment  is  likely  to  err  when  he  is  thus  excited,  hence 
he  adopts  the  ideal  of  calm  dispassionate  judgment. 
The  lover  of  music  who  becomes  so  excited  over  the 
symphony  or  opera  that  she  must  either  master  this 
nervous  excitability  or  forego  such  pleasures,  is  likely 
to  decide  in  favour  of  a  more  intellectual  form  of  en- 
joyment. If  no  experience  is  so  wearing  as  emotional 
excitement,  there  is  every  reason  to  cultivate  the  mode 
of  life  that  is  characterised  by  poise,  equanimity,  the 
husbanding  of  energy.  Most  of  our  mistakes  in  life 
are  traceable  to  deeds  which  we  committed  under  the 
sway  of  emotional  impulse. 

Yet  if  in  some  cases  the  entire  elimination  of  emo- 
tion be  called  for,  in  others  it  is  a  question  of  progressive 
acceptance.  The  emotion  of  wonder  is  naturally  asso- 
ciated with  primitive  life,  yet  wonder  leads  the  way 
far  up  into  the  world  of  science.  The  objects  on  which 
we  bestow  admiration  change  as  our  interests  change, 
yet  we  continue  to  admire.  Likewise  gratitude  assumes 


A  Study  of  the  Emotions  223 

progressively  higher  forms.  We  overcome  impulsive 
sympathy  only  to  express  a  calmer,  more  genuinely 
altruistic  emotion.  Our  aesthetic  emotions  also  alter 
in  so  far  as  we  cease  to  "rave"  over  objects  of  beauty 
and  begin  to  display  good  taste.  In  many  depart- 
ments of  life  we  begin  emotionally,  then  discover  that 
emotion  impedes,  and  finally  eliminate  it.  Emo- 
tion may  have  taught  us  something.  But  we  assimi- 
late its  lesson  and  substitute  quiet  contemplation  where 
we  once  went  into  ecstasy. 

Some  emotions  cease  altogether,  after  a  time,  or 
appear  only  at  rare  intervals,  when  we  are  taken  un- 
awares, while  others  assume  higher  forms  and  take 
on  new  objects.  The  whole  history  of  human  passion  in 
all  its  baseness  and  all  its  holy  zeal  belongs  under 
the  latter  head.  All  passion  becomes  despised  in  the 
spiritual  world  save  the  passion  for  souls.  The  love 
of  truth  in  the  scientific  world  is  the  last  expression 
of  a  progressively  transmuted  emotion.  Love  at  the 
outset  is  no  doubt  a  "low-born  earthly  thing."  But 
it  is  still  essentially  an  emotion  when,  springing  from 
a  pure  source  it  is  expressed  in  the  unselfish  devotion 
of  the  mother.  Let  us  remember  that  it  is  selfishness 
and  bodily  passion  which  we  despise  when  we  disparage 
love,  not  that  we  condemn  emotion  altogether.  The 
love  which  seeks  not  to  enslave  for  selfish  purposes, 
but  to  ennoble  and  to  serve,  is  as  genuinely  an  emotion 
as  the  excitement  which  delights  the  physiological 
psychologist.  Love  may  be  fickle  and  blind,  but  may 
also  be  constant  and  clear-sighted.  Love  reveals 
reality  and  deserves  a  place  all  along  the  line  of  human 
thought.  In  other  words,  it  is  philosophy  which  shows, 
the  reality  and  value  of  love. 

To  answer  the  question  whether  emotion  be  essential 


224         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

to  human  life  is  thus  in  the  last  analysis  to  propound  a 
philosophy  of  the  Spirit.  Fo/  no  account  of  the  emo- 
tions is  adequate  which  fails  to  take  into  profound 
consideration  the  place  and  meaning  of  passion  and  love. 
The  whole  history  of  human  struggle,  the  entire  prob- 
lem of  evil  is  implied  here.  When  we  are  about  to 
disparage  and  discard  emotion  altogether,  we  are  forci- 
bly reminded  of  the  profound  function  of  what  is 
figuratively  called  "the  heart,"  as  opposed  to  the 
well-known  coldness  of  "the  head."  Whatever  we 
may  conclude  in  regard  to  the  results,  it  is  at  any  rate 
the  affections  which  set  men  in  motion  in  this  world; 
it  is  to  the  emotional  side  of  our  nature  that  we  trace 
the  spontaneity  and  the  sympathy  which  spur  men 
on  t6  nobility  of  service. 

The  same  conclusions  follow  when  we  examine  the 
essentially  spiritual  or  religious  emotions.  Such  emo- 
tions may  be  exciting,  and  hence  highly  objectionable, 
or  calm  and  eminently  desirable.  They  may  lead  to 
emotionalism  with  all  the  consequences  of  the  nervously 
exciting  revival,  or  be  direct  sources  of  the  highest  type 
of  spirituality.  The  crucial  question  arises  when  we 
ask  whether  religious  emotion  be  a  safe  guide  in  and 
of  itself.  This  leads  to  the  more  fundamental  question 
whether  any  emotion  be  intelligible  by  itself.  If  not, 
it  is  not  likely  to  be  acceptable  as  a  guide. 

If  one  were  to  tajce  the  clue  from  the  physiological 
description  of  the  eliiotions,  one  might  well  believe  that 
emotions  are  independently  intelligible.  These  physi- 
ologists have  feared  to  introduce  intellectual  elements 
lest  emotion  be  no  longer  itself.  Hence  they  have  held 
fast  to  sensation  and  practically  identified  emotion 
with  its  physical  expression.  But  we  have  found  reason 
to  conclude  that  men  never  have  emotions  without 


A  Study  of  the  Emotions  225 

knowledge  of  objects  and  the  interpretation  of  objects. 
The  intellectual  element  is  always  present.  What  a 
man  thinks  about  the  experience  or  person  in  question 
has  much  to  do  in  determining  whether  or  not  he  shall 
be  angry,  give  way  to  jealousy  or  fear.  In  the  case  of 
religious  emotion,  the  implied  interpretation  of  its  ob- 
jects— God,  heaven,  salvation,  the  soul — is  much  more 
apparent.  People  may  constantly  seem  to  be  governed 
by  emotion  when  their  whole  theory  of  the  religious 
life  is  involved.  The  emotional  element  is  usually  very 
apparent,  while  the  intellectual  is  subtle  and  concealed. 
We  find  a  clue  to  the  solution  of  this  question  in  re- 
gard to  the  alleged  independence  of  emotions  in  the 
fact  already  insisted  upon,  namely,  that  emotion  does 
not  spring  up  by  itself  but  is  added  to  an  activity. 
Whether  we  regard  this  activity  as  physiological  or 
spiritual,  it  is  the  environment  amidst  which  the  emo- 
tion appears  and  without  which  it  cannot  be  under- 
stood. No  emotion  either  exists  or  is  intelligible  by 
itself.  Since  the  emotion  is  added  to  an  activity,  and 
since  the  activity  is  constant  while  the  emotion  may 
or  may  not  be  present,  it  is  a  question  of  rightly  inter- 
preting the  activity.  The  devotees  of  the  physio- 
logical theory  interpret  the  activity  biologically.  But 
even  this  implies  the  introduction  of  an  intellectual 
element.  If  we  are  to  be  loyal  to  the  higher  emotions 
we  have  every  right  to  assess  them  in  the  light  of  their 
objects.  If  the  emotions  are  relatively  unstable,  more 
or  less  in  conflict,  there  is  every  reason  to  judge  them 
in  the  light  of  eligibility.  If  only  a  few  emotions  finally 
meet  the  test,  they  will  be  estimated  in  accordance  with 
our  philosophy  of  love,  art,  or  religion.  For  it  is  ulti- 
mately a  question  of  a  desirable  type  of  activity,  to- 
gether with  the  emotion  which  is  on  occasion  permitted 


226          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

to  accompany  it.  One  who  has  reduced  the  eligible 
emotions  to  two  or  three  is  likely  to  possess  the  power 
to  eliminate  them  altogether.  Hence,  everything  will 
depend  upon  one's  theory  of  the  self  and  its  social, 
aesthetic,  or  religious  objects. 

These  conclusions  are  enforced  when  we  ask  whether 
emotion  be  a  practical  guide.  Obviously,  it  is  such 
only  when  its  fruits  prove  worthy.  If  the  love-impulse 
leads  to  unselfish  results  we  commend  it,  hence  by 
implication  the  pure  source  from  which  it  springs. 
Much  depends  upon  the  life  in  which  the  emotion  ap- 
pears. It  is  character,  nobility,  and  purity  of  selfhood 
that  gives  it  worth.  Unless  judgments  of  worth  are 
introduced  emotion  is  not  eligible  as  a  practical  guide. 

It  is  plainly  impulsive  emotions  which  work  the 
greatest  mischief  in  our  lives.  Yet,  as  we  noted  when 
discussing  intuition,  the  noblest  leadings  in  the  world 
spring  from  impulse.  We  disparage  the  man  who 
coldly  reflects  whether  or  not  to  risk  his  precious  life 
while  others  are  in  grave  peril,  and  commend  the  one 
who  acts  instantly.  But  once  more  it  is  a  question  of 
mediation.  The  emotions  we  condemn  are  those  that 
spring  from  thoughtless  impulse.  Those  of  which  we 
approve  spring  from  a  life  of  reflection,  of  strength  of 
character,  one  that  is  trained  to  meet  emergencies. 
The  emotional  impulse  is  trustworthy  only  so  far  as  it 
arises  in  a  mental  environment  that  is  far  more  than 
emotional.  Moreover,  as  in  the  case  of  intuition, 
thought  is  incredibly  rapid  in  many  instances,  and 
what  appears  to  be  mere  impulse  expresses  a  decision 
which  was  arrived  at  by  a  most  astonishing  swiftness 
of  thought.  The  mere  impulse  might  have  been  fool- 
hardy in  the  extreme.  Likewise  with  love.  The  love- 
impulse  is  genuinely  trustworthy  only  when  tempered 


A  Study  of  the  Emotions  227 

by  wisdom.  If  youthful  love  be  "blind"  it  is  because 
it  is  an  emotion.  Love  is  clear-sighted  when  it  is  more 
than  mere  impulse. 

It  would  perhaps  be  generally  admitted  that  all 
ecstasy  is  detrimental  when  the  ecstasy  springs  from 
our  passions.  But  it  is  a  new  idea  to  some  that  ecstasy 
of  pleasurable  emotion  is  also  undesirable.  Yet,  what- 
ever its  object,  ecstasy  is  undeniably  allied  to  physical 
excitement  and  is  either  wearing  or  tends  to  interfere 
with  the  judgment.  Everybody  knows  how  great  is 
the  reaction,  the  exhaustion  which  follows  emotional 
pleasure  of  the  intense  sort.  In  contrast  with  such 
pleasure  one  pleads  for  happiness  as  the  more  durable, 
moderate  state  in  which  the  emotional  element  is 
reduced  to  the  minimum.  Ecstasy  disorganises,  while 
happiness  characterises  the  well-ordered  life.  Any 
emotion  which  brings  fatigue  may  be  classified  as  unde- 
sirable, as  well  as  any  emotion  which  confuses  the 
judgment. 

When  it  is  a  question  of  the  control  of  the  emotions 
it  is  plain  that  much  depends  upon  what  theory  of  their 
nature  is  adopted.  Yet  even  the  physiological  theory 
is  suggestive.  The  coarser  emotions,  scarcely  distin- 
guishable from  their  bodily  expression,  may  best  be 
controlled  by  regulating  the  physical  appetites  and 
passions,  the  bodily  attitudes  and  responses.  Inas- 
much as  the  evolution  of  emotion  proceeds  as  rapidly 
as  intellectual  evolution,  the  emotions  may  at  least 
be  indirectly  regulated  by  persistent  development  of 
the  intellect.  The  finer  emotions  are  inseparably 
associated  with  ideal  standards  and  judgments.  Hence 
we  must  look  to  our  judgments  of  worth,  more  carefully 
interpret  the  objects  towards  which  our  emotions  are 
directed.  If  undesirable  emotions  spring  from  a 


228          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

certain  mode  of  life,  the  resource  is  plain,  namely, 
to  lift  the  whole  life  to  a  higher  level  by  pursuit  of 
ideal  interests.  The  ideal  would  seem  to  be  the  steady 
development  of  an  attitude  so  well  balanced  that 
there  should  be  a  minimum  of  emotion,  with  a  quiet 
constancy  of  happiness,  and  a  maximum  degree  of 
philosophic  thought. 

The  question,  How  far  does  emotion  acquaint  us 
with  reality?  would  likewise  depend  upon  answers  to 
still  more  fundamental  questions.  It  is  plain  that 
when  emotion  is  associated  with  belief  it  has  a  pe- 
culiarly significant  character.  In  an  instructive  chap- 
ter on  "The  Perception  of  Reality"  J  Professor  James 
points  out  that  belief,  or  "the  sense  of  reality,"  is 
more  allied  to  the  emotions  than  to  aught  else.  Emo- 
tional interest  is  one  of  the  reasons  for  believing  ob- 
jects real — that  is,  objects  for  which  we  feel  desire, 
admiration,  dread,  love.  "Speaking  generally,  the 
more  a  conceived  object  excites  us,  the  more  reality  it 
has.  .  .  .  Every  exciting  thought  in  the  natural  man 
carries  credence  with  it."2  Deeply  moved  by  an  ex- 
perience, we  believe  that  its  supposed  objects  are  real. 
Religious  beliefs  are  of  this  type.  Immortality  must 
be  true,  God  must  exist,  because  we  so  greatly  long 
to  know  our  dear  ones  in  the  future  life,  because  we 
deeply  need  a  protecting  Providence.  "Our  require- 
ments in  the  way  of  reality  terminate  in  our  own  acts 
and  emotions,  our  own  pleasures  and  pains. " 3  Pro- 
fessor James  holds  that  this  emotional  interest  goes 
so  far  as  to  lead  to  the  choice  of  our  world-view.  He 
adduces  much  evidence  in  behalf  of  this  conclusion 
that  emotions  are  fundamentally  influential,  not 
merely  in  the  credulous  acceptance  of  what  we  wish 

1  Op.  cit.,  ii.,  283.     2  Ibid.,  pp.  307,308.     *Ibid.,  p.  311. 


A  Study  of  the  Emotions  229 

to  believe  true,  but  in  our  most  serious  attempts  to 
explain  the  world. 

Whether  or  not  emotions  are  rightfully  influential 
in  determining  our  views  of  reality  we  are  compelled, 
then,  to  chronicle  the  fact  that  they  are  influential. 
This  is  particularly  the  case  in  the  religious  world. 
From  the  crude  stage  of  emotion  experienced  by 
primitive  man  in  the  presence  of  nature,  or  in  a  highly 
emotional  conversion,  to  the  stage  of  refined  religious 
sentiment,  man  has  been  strongly  inclined  to  believe 
in  objects  which  were  real  for  his  emotions.  It  is  no 
doubt  the  emotional  element  added  to  the  otherwise 
colourless  mental  activity  wrhich  makes  men  believe 
in  various  forms  of  religious  ceremonial  as  expressions 
of  faith  in  genuine  realities.  The  extreme  case  is  that 
of  mysticism,  in  which  a  world- view  and  a  theory 
of  the  Godhead,  usually  culminating  in  pantheism,  is 
accepted  on  behalf  of  the  clues  which  ecstatic  emotion 
affords.  Yet  if  emotion  tends  to  lead  man  to  accept 
as  real  what  he  merely  wishes  to  believe  real,  it  is  a 
question  whether  an  important  place  can  be  assigned 
to  it.  At  any  rate  such  influence  is  not  very  creditable. 
Essentially  personal  in  character,  emotion  is  undoubt- 
edly too  eager;  it  particularises,  whereas  it  is  reason 
that  discovers  universals. 

Emotion  is  a  trustworthy  guide  only  when  put  with 
other  deliverances  of  our  mental  life  so  that  it  is  prop- 
erly qualified.  What  we  applaud  in  an  essentially 
emotional  action  are  the  fruits  which  have  withstood 
the  tests  of  moral  judgment.  An  emotion  is  a  guide 
to  reality  only  when  it  is  so  carefully  evaluated  that 
its  moral  and  religious  elements  can  be  singled  out 
from  the  personal  equation  and  the  illusions  which 
accompany  it. 


230          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

But  "God  is  love,"  some  one  insists,  in  behalf  of 
emotion.  Yes,  but  the  constancy  of  the  divine  love 
could  hardly  be  described  in  terms  of  emotion.  One 
can  hardly  employ  the  same  term  even  in  the  human 
sense  that  one  uses  for  emotions  of  fear,  anger,  jealousy, 
and  the  like.  Love  that  is  worth  while  is  spiritual, 
is  a  gift  of  the  Spirit,  does  not  come  and  go  but  abides ; 
all  else  is  passion.  Such  love  Mrs.  Browning  sings 
of  in  the  Sonnets  from  the  Portuguese.  Such  love  is  of 
the  soul  rather  than  of  the  body.  It  lacks  nearly 
all  the  characteristics  of  the  emotions.  Likewise  with 
the  divine  love,  which  is  not  intelligible  apart  from  the 
divine  purpose  and  wisdom. 

We  find  no  difficulty,  then,  in  reserving  an  appropri- 
ate place  for  love,  even  though  we  reject  nearly  all  the 
emotions  as  unstable  and  tending  to  excess.  It  is 
a  question  of  orderly  arrangement  -of  the  various 
impulses  and  emotions  in  a  scale  of  values.  Emotion 
belongs  under  the  head  of  immediate  experience,  and 
as  such  is  often  inferior  in  value  to  the  immediacy 
of  sensation,  and  is  less  constant  on  the  whole  than 
feeling.  Its  chief  value  is  found  in  the  results  whereby 
it  surpasses  itself.  That  is,  emotion  brings  experience, 
and  once  in  possession  of  experience  we  may  rationalise 
it  so  as  to  eliminate  the  emotion.  Love,  for  example, 
may  begin  with  the  lowest  passion,  the  most  ignoble 
impulse ;  but  in  the  end  may  be  so  far  purified  as  to  be 
purely  unselfish,  known  for  its  kindness  and  gentleness. 
If  emotion  gives  life,  arouses  people,  and  hence  is  essen- 
tial at  the  outset  of  human  experience,  it  is  illumined 
insight  that  is  preferable  in  the  end.  Such  insight  is 
synthetic,  reserves  a  place  under  the  head  of  values  for 
the  nobler  fruits  of  the  emotional  life.  Thus  the  warmth 
of  the  Spirit  may  be  preserved  without  undue  emotion. 


A  Study  of  the  Emotions  231 

Our  conclusions  therefore  leave  no  room  for  decisive 
scepticism.  One  may  indeed  pass  through  sceptical 
periods  during  which  the  only  resource  is  the  calmest 
reasoning  from  the  best  ascertained  facts,  devoid  of 
emotion.  Meanwhile,  the  supreme  objects  of  re- 
ligious faith  remain  at  heart  untouched.  When  one's 
heart  is  again  deeply  touched  by  emotion  it  is  with  a 
new  conviction  of  the  everlasting  realities  of  the  Spirit. 
Love  remains  triumphant  where  all  other  emotion 
fails.  Emotions  reveal  God  too.  The  only  stringent 
qualification  is,  that  one  must  abide  one's  time  till 
the  activities  have  settled  so  that  one  may  discern 
the  full  beauty  of  that  which  was  for  awhile  obscured. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  VALUE  OF  FEELING 

THE  two  preceding  discussions  were  necessarily 
critical.  We  found  intuition  beset  by  misconceptions 
which  had  to  be  cleared  away  to  make  room  for  the 
real  insight  which  withstands  the  tests  of  application 
to  experience  and  of  illumined  reason.  It  seemed 
for  the  moment  as  if  our  inquiry  were  lost  in  mere 
relativities.  But,  as  in  the  case  of  conscience,  we 
found  that  the  authority  rests,  not  with  the  mere 
"sense"  or  "faculty,"  but  with  the  rational  reflection 
which  discerns  the  reality  of  that  which  is  immediately 
given.  The  intuition  which,  as  a  supposed  absolute 
gift  provokes  scepticism,  reappears  in  the  full  power 
of  conviction  when  put  in  its  proper  environment. 
Likewise  with  the  emotions.  The  fault  lay  with  mere 
emotionalism,  not  with  the  emotions  which  undergo 
the  appropriate  tests.  The  trouble  with  ordinary 
enthusiasm,  for  example,  is  that  it  runs  to  excess 
and  then  peters  out,  taking  with  it  all  interest  in  its 
objects.  But  organise  your  enthusiasm  so  that  it  shall 
endure,  re-create  each  day  for  you,  and  it  will  prove 
a  noble  ally.  There  is  the  enthusiasm  of  temperate 
patriotism,  for  example,  of  reasonable  class-spirit,  the 
zeal  for  souls  and  for  truth. 

The  theory  that  emotion  is  real  or  authoritative 
by  itself  belongs  with  the  old-time  division  of  human 
nature  into  distinct  faculties.  Regard  emotion  as 
inseparably  connected  with  the  remaining  phases  of 

232 


The  Value  of  Feeling  233 

mental  life  and  it  takes  its  place  with  the  rest,  to 
survive  or  perish  according  to  the  estimate  put  upon 
our  evolving  mental  life  as  a  whole.  The  emotional 
life  contributes  a  power  or  principle,  love,  which  be- 
longs with  the  eternal  verities  of  the  Spirit.  The 
heart,  with  its  warmth  of  devotion,  is  a  part  of  per- 
fection itself.  In  this  sense  the  emotional  life  with- 
stands all  tests  unto  the  end.  But  inasmuch  as  this 
is  mainly  an  ideal  it  is  inseparably  connected  with  all 
else  that  constitutes  the  ideal  life. 

It  might  seem  that  in  thus  classifying  and  dismissing 
the  emotions  we  have  done  scant  justice  to  the  feelings. 
Despite  the  fact  that  the  term  feeling  is  vaguely  used 
there  would  appear  to  be  a  sense  in  which  the  feelings 
stand  over  against  the  life  of  thought  as  the  direct 
channels  of  the  religious  life.  By  insisting  that  man 
is  a  spirit  one  explicitly  means  that  he  feels  the  presence 
of  God,  not  now  through  a  special  faculty,  not  through 
sensational  experiences,  but  by  means  of  a  group  of 
higher  powers  collectively  known  as  "the  feelings." 
Moreover,  the  term  "feeling"  has  meaning  with 
reference  to  the  self  that  is  not  equally  attributable 
to  the  intellectual  side  of  our  nature.  One's  feelings 
seem  to  be  nearer  one's  inmost  selfhood;  they  consti- 
tute "the  heart."  One  must  personally  feel  in  order 
to  know,  and  what  is  "the  witness  of  the  Spirit"  if 
not  an  affair  of  feeling? 

It  must  be  admitted  that  there  is  truth  in  these  con- 
tentions. But  it  is  a  question  whether  any  reality 
or  truth  is  implied  that  has  not  already  found  place 
under  the  head  of  immediacy  and  the  emotions.  What 
we  "feel"  is  immediate.  It  is  the  immediacy  that  is 
private,  personal.  Everyone  must  have  experience 
in  order  to  know.  Without  doubt  the  witness  of  the 


234          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

Spirit  is  at  first  thus  intimately  personal.  Moreover, 
"the  heart"  apprehends  realities  to  which  thought 
never  does  entire  justice.  For  all  this  we  have  re- 
served a  large  place  under  the  head  of  values,  worths, 
appreciations.  But  when  it  is  a  question  of  a  distinct 
philosophy  of  feeling  one  must  take  exception  to  the 
popular  view.  To  assert  that  we  can  only  kno\v  God 
through  the  immediacy  of  feeling,  and  not  through 
reason,  is  to  be  dogmatic  in  the  extreme.  This  would 
mean  that  the  content  of  such  knowledge  could  not 
be  distinguished  from  the  merely  immediate  fact  that 
God  is.  We  should  then  never  know  what  God  is. 

Hegel  characterises  the  philosophy  of  feeling  as 
starting  with  the  statement  that  we  have  immediate 
knowledge  of  God,  and  that  we  should  not  seek  to 
comprehend  Him,  nor  to  argue  about  Him,  for  rational 
knowledge  has  proved  futile.1  The  question  would 
then  be,  What  does  the  term  "knowledge"  here  mean? 
Is  it  mere  acquaintance  or  philosophical  comprehen- 
sion? If  rational  knowledge  be  of  no  avail,  all  that 
one  can  know  is  that  God  is.  There  is  an  assumed 
certainty,  through  faith,  that  God  is,  and  this  certainty 
is  feeling.  What  is  in  our  faith  we  call  knowledge, 
hence  we  believe  in  God's  existence. 

Hegel  points  out  that  in  this  "feeling"  there  is  im- 
plied the  existence  both  of  the  self  and  of  something 
felt,  hence  that  feeling  is  not  merely  subjective  but 
involves  a  reference  to  an  object :  it  is  in  reference  to  an 
object  that  I  first  become  a  subject,  namely,  by  placing 
some  "other"  over  against  me.  If,  now,  we  accept 
"feeling"  as  the  guide  to  the  reality  of  which  we 
claim  knowledge  we  should  recollect  that  the  matter 
of  feeling  may  be  exceedingly  varied. 

1  Philosophy  of  Religion,!.,  119  ff- 


The  Value  of  Feeling  235 

We  have  the  feeling  of  justice,  of  injustice,  of  God,  of 
colour,  of  hatred,  of  enmity,  of  joy.  .  .  .  The  most  con- 
tradictory elements  are  to  be  found  in  feeling;  the  most 
debased,  as  well  as  the  highest  and  noblest,  have  a  place 
there.  Experience  proves  that  the  matter  of  feeling  has 
the  most  accidental  character  possible;  it  may  be  the 
truest,  or  it  may  be  the  worst.  God,  when  He  is  present  in 
feeling,  has  no  advantage  over  the  very  worst  possible 
thing.  On  the  contrary,  the  kingliest  flower  springs  from 
the  same  soil  and  side  by  side  with  the  rankest  weed.  Be- 
cause a  content  is  found  in  feeling,  it  does  not  mean  that 
this  content  is  anything  very  fine.  .  .  .  All  that  is  good 
and  all  that  is  evil,  all  that  is  real  and  all  that  is  not  real, 
is  found  in  our  feeling;  the  most  contradictory  things  are 
there.  All  imaginable  things  are  felt  by  me ;  I  can  become 
enthusiastic  about  what  is  most  unworthy.1 

Mere  feeling  is  therefore  in  itself  no  guide.  Feeling 
is  a  form  for  every  sort  of  content,  it  is  the  content 
which  shows  whether  or  not  the  feeling  be  eligible. 
So  far  as  the  mere  form  or  feeling  is  concerned,  it 
is  of  no  significance  that  the  content  in  question  is 
found  there.  Hence,  as  Hegel  puts  it, 

it  is  so  far  from  being  the  case  that  in  feeling  alone  we 
can  truly  find  God,  that  if  we  are  to  find  this  content  there, 
we  must  already  know  it  from  some  other  source.  And  if 
it  be  affirmed  that  we  do  not  truly  know  God,  that  we  can 
know  nothing  of  Him,  how  then  can  we  say  that  He  is 
in  feeling  ? 2 

This  is  the  decisive  consideration.  The  significance 
of  feeling  cannot  be  known  except  through  comparison 
with  other  phases  of  our  mental  life.  But  if  to  grasp 
its  significance  be  to  compare  its  content  with  other 
deliverances  of  the  inner  life,  we  know  feeling  not 

i  Op.  ci/.,p.  130.  2  Ibid.,   p.   134. 


236          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

through  mere  immediacy  but  through  mediate  thought, 
and  if  we  are  to  mediate  why  should  we  not  be  thorough  ? 

If,  now,  we  take  the  proposition  that  God  is  known 
through  feeling  to  imply  the  possession  of  immediate 
knowledge — it  is  not  now  a  question  of  feeling — it  is 
then  understood  that  God  is;  it  is  a  fact  of  our  con- 
sciousness, it  is  so.  This  is  supposed  to  imply,  as 
Hegel  shows,1  that  all  modes  of  knowing  which  involve 
relations  are  obliterated.  It  is  supposed  to  be  a  mere 
matter  of  immediate  experience,  one  is  not  to  go 
beyond  what  is  found  in  consciousness.  But  analysis 
shows  that  there  is  nothing  that  is  merely  immediate. 
If  I  declare  that  in  my  consciousness  I  find  the  idea 
of  God,  I  am  already  asserting  my  own  existence  and 
that  of  God;  hence  affirming  a  relation,  and  therefore 
passing  beyond  the  immediate. 

But  thus  to  criticise  the  philosophy  of  feeling  is  by 
no  means  to  reject  the  reality  of  religious  feeling. 
Note  that  Hegel,  who  is  supposed  to  be  the  most 
one-sided  of  all  intellectualists,  declares  that 

not  only  may  a  true  content  exist  in  our  feeling,  it  ought  to 
exist,  and  must  exist;  or,  as  it  is  put,  we  must  have  God  in 
our  heart.  Heart  is  indeed  more  than  feeling.  This  last 
is  only  momentary,  accidental,  transient;  but  when  I  say 
"I  have  God  in  my  heart,"  the  feeling  is  here  expressly 
represented  as  the  continuous,  permanent  manner  of  my 
existence.  The  heart  is  what  I  am;  not  merely  what  I 
am  at  this  moment  [this  would  be  mere  feeling],  but  what 
I  am  in  general;  it  is  my  character.2 

Hence  the  conclusion  is,  "  Spirit  bears  witness  to 
Spirit;  this  witness  is  the  peculiar  inner  nature  of 
Spirit.  In  this  the  weighty  idea  is  involved  that  re- 

»  Op  tit.,  p.  160.     For  a  further  elucidation  of  this  point  of  view, 
see  below,  Supplementary  Essay. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  132. 


The  Value  of  Feeling  237 

ligion  is  not  brought  into  man  from  the  outside,  but 
lies  hidden  in  himself,  in  his  reason,  in  his  freedom."  l 

Instead,  then,  of  declaring  that  God  is  known  through 
feeling,  with  all  the  vagueness  which  that  term 
implies,  it  would  be  better  to  state  explicitly  what 
we  mean.  That  is,  God  is  apprehended  through  the 
spirit  in  man,  and  this  spirit  is  complex,  holding 
various  contents.  The  spirit  in  us  is  intuitively 
related  to  the  supreme  Spirit,  and  this  is  what  we  mean 
to  say  when  we  vaguely  declare  that  He  is  known 
through  feeling;  every  man  may  enjoy  this  intuitive 
relationship,  indeed  he  must  apprehend  it  for  himself; 
and  this  is  the  truth  in  the  statement  that  every  man 
must  "feel"  the  presence  of  God  to  know  Him.  The 
spirit  in  us  also  includes  the  emotional  life  at  its  best, 
notably  love,  hence  "the  heart";  and  this,  again,  ex- 
presses a  meaning  implied  in  feeling.  Further,  there  is 
an  upliftment  and  freedom  in  the  divine  presence,  and 
here  we  have  feeling  in  a  more  specific  sense  of  the  term. 

Again,  feeling  is  closely  allied  to  what  is  sometimes 
denominated  "the  inner  light."  There  are  states  in 
which  the  mind  experiences  a  general  illumination,  not 
the  result,  so  far  as  one  can  discover,  of  conscious 
reasoning  or  of  any  particular  experience,  but  states 
in  which  one  is  able  to  ask  questions  and  obtain  an- 
swers by  coming  into  direct  contact,  as  it  were,  with 
the  reality  which  is  the  answer.  At  such  times  there 
is  apparently  very  little  that  stands  between  us  and 
the  environing  spiritual  world,  hence  we  "feel"  that 
world  near.  At  four  o'clock  in  the  morning  this 
immediate  vision  is  sometimes  clearest.  So  far  as  it 
can  be  psychologically  explained  it  appears  to  be 
due  to  the  relative  quiescence  of  sensational  and 

»  Op.  tit.,  p.  165. 


238          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

emotional  elements  and  intellectual  activities,  and  the 
predominance  of  a  contemplative  mood. 

This  or  a  similar  state  is  well  described  by  Granger, 
in  a  book  which  contains  the  finest  appreciations  of 
the  life  of  the  soul.1 

When  the  mind  reaches  the  attitude  of  self -forget  fulness, 
and  laying  aside  all  prepossessions  sets  itself  to  receive 
the  truth,  it  may  be  said  to  cease  from  the  acts  of  under- 
standing; and  in  so  doing  it  reaches  the  temper  for  which 
reflection  of  the  highest  kind  first  becomes  possible — the 
objective  temper  in  which  the  soul  sees  things  in  a  clear  light. 
This  is  the  purity  of  heart  upon  which  the  divine  vision  fol- 
lows, the  stillness  that  is  required  for  knowledge  of  God. 

The  life  of  feeling  is  a  starting-point  for  that  which 
is  noble,  provided  the  appropriate  ideal  is  there  to 
guide.  As  Granger  says,  "the  spiritual  life  is  not 
degraded  by  having  its  roots  in  the  life  of  sensible 
impression,  but  the  latter  is  exalted  by  being  taken 
up  into  the  life  of  the  spirit."2  Again,  Santayana 
points  out  that  ''the  dumbness  of  a  passion  may  .  .  . 
be  called  the  index  of  its  baseness;  for  if  it  cannot  ally 
itself  with  ideas  its  affinities  can  hardly  lie  in  the 
rational  mind  nor  its  advocates  among  the  poets.  "3 

The  life  of  feeling  easily  passes  over,  for  example, 
into  ecstasy  and  is  accordingly  to  be  tested  by  one's 
judgments  in  regard  to  mysticism.4  It  is  closely 
allied  with  the  imagination  and  hence  with  the  poetic 
and  mystical  symbols  in  which  feeling  finds  expression. 
But  it  would  take  us  too  far  afield  to  give  special 
attention  to  these  topics.  In  the  growing  psychology 

»  The  Soul  of  a  Christian,  p.  291  2  Op.  cit,  p.  43. 

3  The  Life  of  Reason,  ii.,  14. 

*  Granger's  work  above  cited  contains  a  sympathetic  account  of 
ecstasy,  chaps,  v,  vi. 


The  Value  of  Feeling  239 

of  religion  of  the  day  all  these  topics  are  receiving 
appropriate  attention."  l 

For  our  purposes  it  is  plainly  a  question  of  interpre- 
tation, after  psychology  has  made  its  descriptive 
account.  If  feeling  fails  to  give  rise  to  a  philosophy 
of  the  presence  of  God  which  can  be  defended  in  the 
naively  exclusive  form  in  which  it  arises,  it  behooves 
us  to  discover  another  point  of  view.  For  the  most 
part,  the  life  of  feeling  already  lies  behind  us. 

A  more  comprehensive  study  of  the  higher  nature  of 
man  than  the  one  here  undertaken  would  involve  a 
study  not  merely  of  its  immediacies  but  of  its  reactions 
and  its  constructive  powers.  That  is,  man's  nature  is 
(i)  responsive,  receptive,  yields  spontaneities,  leadings, 
promptings,  instincts,  emotions,  feelings  of  pleasure 
and  pain — immediacy  in  general;  (2)  reactive,  ex- 
presses itself  through  choice,  volition,  conduct;  and 
(3)  reconstructive,  indulges  in  reflection,  criticism, 
propounds  theories  of  its  own  responses  and  reactions. 
For  the  present  we  are  passing  by  the  volitional  re- 
actions, so  far  as  they  express  themselves  in  objective 
conduct.  Strictly  speaking  our  investigation  should 
include  a  thorough  examination  of  the  intellectual  life, 
as  opposed  to  that  of  feeling,  especially  the  intellec- 
tual claim  that  only  through  reason  is  God  knowable. 
But  inasmuch  as  the  present  volume  is  primarily 
devoted  to  the  immediacies  of  the  spiritual  life  it 
must  suffice  to  inquire  into  the  nature  and  scope  of 
immediacy  in  contrast  with  intellectual  mediation. 

i  On  mystical  symbolism,  see  Rece"jac,  Connaisance  Mys- 
tique; for  other  phases  of  the  psychology  of  religion,  see  James, 
The  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience;  Starbuck,  The  Psychology  of 
Religion;  Coe,  The  Spiritual  Life;  J.  B.  Pratt,  The  Psychology  of 
Religious  Belief. 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  IMPORT  OF  IMMEDIACY 

THE  purpose  of  the  present  discussion  is  to  indicate 
the  nature,  scope,  and  significance  of  the  immediate, 
hence  to  outline  the  concept  of  immediacy  in  contrast 
with  all  mediating  thought.  That  is  to  say,  What 
reality  and  authority  shall  be  assigned  to  the  immediate, 
and  what  are  its  limitations?  These  questions  are 
significant  for  various  reasons.  Philosophy  begins  with 
the  discovery  that  the  immediate  is  not  self-explana- 
tory, but  gives  rise  to  clues  which  are  susceptible  of 
various  interpretations,  and  is  a  quest  for  universally 
valid  principles  of  mediation;  philosophers  are  con- 
stantly called  upon  to  assess  new  claims  regarding 
the  immediate,  as  philosophy  divides  and  subdivides; 
while  certain  problems  of  immediacy  continue  to  be 
live  issues  as  long  as  there  are  those  who  insist  on  the 
given  reality  of  "pure  experience,"  or  try  to  return 
to  original  sources  of  experience  in  search  for  the  satis- 
faction which  mediation  is  apparently  unable  to  give. 
No  considerations  are  more  elementary  than  some  of 
the  relationships  of  the  immediate,  and  no  conclusions 
are  supposed  to  be  better  known  than  those  at  which 
the  student  of  the  immediate  is  likely  to  arrive.  Yet 
that  which  is  most  obvious  is  sometimes  longest 
overlooked,  and  as  long  as  rival  systems'  of  first  prin- 
ciples exist  it  will  be  necessary  to  call  fresh  attention 
to  these  elementary  considerations.  That  there  is 
still  wide  divergence  of  opinion  in  regard  to  certain 

240 


The  Import  of  Immediacy  241 

of  the  great  systems  which  have  profoundly  reckoned 
with  the  immediate  is  another  reason  for  investigating 
the  subject  afresh. 

By  the  term  "immediacy"  one  means  in  general  any 
experience,  sensational,  emotional,  affective,  in  the 
guise  in  which  it  first  comes  to  the  mind;  any  thing, 
element,  or  principle  in  its  original  form.  The  imme- 
diate is  first  in  contrast  with  analytic  thought,  which 
is  plainly  reflective,  reactive.  Immediate  experi- 
ence is  direct  as  opposed  to  derived  thought.  To 
open  one's  eyes  and  look  about  is  to  become  aware 
of  the  appearances  of  things.  These  first  semblances 
are  immediate  in  the  most  uncritical  sense  of  the  word. 
At  first  glance,  things  are  seemingly  what  they  imme- 
diately appear  to  be,  as  if  in  so  appearing  there  were 
no  observer.  For  naive  realism  the  problem  of  how 
we  know  things  does  not  arise  at  all;  if  things  are  not 
strictly  what  they  at  first  appear  to  be,  at  any  rate 
they  are  immediately  apprehended.  But,  for  more 
mature  thought,  immediacy  is  experience  on  its  sub- 
jective side,  it  is  the  present  moment  of  psychical 
apprehension,  the  present  sentiment  or  volition.  This 
psychical  experience,  that  is,  sentient  experience  as 
given,  is  a  typical  case  of  immediacy. 

In  Baldwin's  Dictionary  of  Philosophy  immediacy 
is  carefully  discriminated  as  (i)  psychological,  (2) 
psychical,  and  (3)  logical,  (i)  Immediacy  is  said 
to  be  psychological  in  so  far  as  a  new  conscious  process 
is  free  from  connection  with  all  previous  mental 
processes ;  whereas  a  process  is  mediate  if  it  is  a  develop- 
ment of  previous  processes.  For  example,  I  am  sitting 
by  the  window  reading,  when  suddenly  I  chance  to 
look  up  and  out  of  the  window  just  as  a  crow  alights 
in  the  garden  yonder.  There  was  nothing  in  the  fore- 

16 


242          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

going  mental  process  which  foretold  the  appearance 
of  that  bird  in  my  field  of  vision.  Its  appearance  is 
for  me  an  immediate  fact,  an  event  in  my  consciousness 
originating  from  without.  The  psychological  moment 
of  immediacy  is  not,  however,  entirely  outside  of  all 
series.  Since  it  belongs  to  a  series  without  whose 
foregoing  events  it  could  not  have  happened,  it  is  not 
purely  immediate,  but  is  both  mediate  and  immediate. 
Hence  one  agrees  with  Baldwin  that  psychological 
immediacy  is  never  pure.  It  must  have  some  con- 
nection at  least  with  the  present  moment  of  the  de- 
veloping mental  process,  although  it  is  an  aspect  that 
cannot,  as  immediate,  be  wholly  explained  away. 
The  bird  arrives  in  my  field  with  no  apparent  con- 
nection with  previous  experience.  Yet  it  is  only  by 
reference  to  .previous  experience  that  I  am  able  to 
describe  the  object  which  thus  unpredictably  appears. 
Only  by  considerable  mediate  thinking  am  I  able 
to  differentiate  the  type  of  immediacy  known  as 
1 '  psychological. ' ' 

If  some  one  argues  that  it  is  an  illusion  that  I  see 
anything  outside  of  my  own  inner  states,  then  I  reply 
that  I  am  at  least  aware  of  the  moment  of  inner  appre- 
hension. An  idea  may  suddenly  occur  to  me  that  I 
never  consciously  thought  of  before,  which  seems  to 
have  not  the  slightest  connection  with  my  present 
train  of  thought.  In  comparison  with  the  train  of 
thought,  that  idea  is  immediate.  Doubt  as  I  may 
the  objective  aspect  of  any  given  moment  of  percep- 
tual connection  with  the  outside  world,  I  am  at  least 
sure  of  the  inner  apprehension;  I  find  the  mediate 
and  the  immediate  contrasted  in  my  own  consciousness. 

(2)  Psychical  immediacy  is  defined  as  the  element 
of  experience  which  is  directly  apprehended  by  the 


The  Import  of  Immediacy  243 

subject  "  as  it  exists  for  the  subject  of  that  experience, 
at  the  time  when  it  occurs."1  In  the  foregoing 
illustration,  the  mind  was  supposed  to  be  under- 
going a  process  of  mediate  thinking,  suddenly 
broken  into  by  the  act  of  looking  up  and  perceiving 
the  bird.  In  the  present  case,  there  is  no  object 
brought  before  the  mind  from  without.  We  are 
now  considering  more  specifically  a  moment  of  con- 
scious experience  as  felt.  There  is  no  conscious  in- 
ference. There  is  no  recognition  of  the  dependence 
of  the  given  moment  upon  other  cognitions.  Were 
there  conscious  inference,  the  moment  would  be 
mediate.  The  moment  is  felt  for  and  as  itself.  Or 
again,  it  may  be  defined  as  having  no  reference  to  the 
psychological  conditions  wherein  it  appears.  For 
example,  an  idea  is  accepted  precisely  -as  it  occurs, 
without  inquiry  either  into  its  theoretical  connection 
with  other  ideas,  or  its  psychological  association  with 
them.  The  purest  form  of  this  kind  of  immediacy 
is  perception,  feeling,  emotion. 

(3)  Immediacy  is  logical  or  epistemological  when  no 
proof  is  required,  whereas  mediate  cognition  requires 
proof.  One  naturally  thinks  of  immediacy  as  per- 
taining to  the  perception  of  external  objects,  or  to  the 
inner  aspect  of  perceptual  experience.  But  in  refer- 
ence to  that  which  requires  no  proof  immediacy  is 
considered  independently  of  particular  experience  as 
the  element  wherewith  thought  begins.  We  have 
immediate  certainty,  for  example,  that  something 
exists.  What  that  something  is,  is  another  question; 
but  we  must  start  with  the  proposition  that  something 
is,  has  being.  Hence  the  immediate  is,  in  general, 
that  with  which  we  must  begin.  In  contrast  with  the 

»  Op.  cit.,  i.,  522. 


244          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

immediacy  of  this  beginning  all  thought  is  mediate. 
To  philosophise  about  the  world  is  to  mediate  just 
the  world  which  experience  gives  us.  Thought  does 
not  create  its  world. 

The  more  purely  immediate,  however,  the  more 
empty,  seems  to  be  a  general  law.  To  say  that  some- 
thing exists,  or  must  be  started  with,  is  to  state  very 
little.  A  logical  immediate  is  held  to  be  axiomatic, 
self-evident ;  yet  until  a  man  has  done  much  mediating 
he  is  unable  to  distinguish  any  truth  or  fact  as  self- 
evident.  Even  then  such  truths  appeal  to  those  only 
as  self-evident  who  have  made  a  similar  analysis.  A 
truth  or  axiom  may  seem  self-evident  until  a  critic 
appears  who  is  acute  enough  to  point  out  its  derived 
character  or  the  implied  fallacy. 

The  alleged  creation  of  something  out  of  nothing 
is  a  good  illustration  in  a  theoretic  sense  of  that  which 
begins  as  immediate.  The  difficulty  is  to  conceive 
of  an  immediate  event,  a  first  thing  without  a  previous 
thing  to  spring  from.  If  there  is  to  be  a  first  in  any 
ultimate  sense,  plainly  it  must  be  absolute,  its  own 
eternal  ground.  But  there  could  be  but  one  such 
immediate  and  this  is  what  we  mean  by  the  Absolute, 
the  ground  of  all  existence  and  of  all  thought.  For 
purposes  of  logical  convenience,  the  immediate  may  be 
regarded  as  the  first  of  a  series,  the  first  of  its  kind  in  a 
given  universe  of  discourse.  But  it  is  one  thing  to 
find  a  first  in  the  realm  of  pure  thought  and  another 
to  find  an  immediate  in  the  realm  of  experience.  Atoms 
would  be  true  firsts  in  a  physical  sense  of  the  word, 
and  empty  space  would  be  their  playground  for  im- 
mediate impact.  But  atoms  and  empty  space  are 
merely  speculative  items  in  the  world  of  cosmological 
thought.  The  more  one  considers  the  old-time  notions 


The  Import  of  Immediacy  245 

of  atoms  and  empty  space,  creation  out  of  nothing, 
the  origin  of  force  where  there  was  no  force  before,  the 
beginning  of  motion  in  a  motionless  void,  and  the 
like,  the  more  one  is  driven  into  the  realm  of  modern 
scientific  theory  with  its  conception  of  the  conservation 
of  energy. 

In  the  world  of  human  life,  innocence  has  sometimes 
been  brought  forward  as  a  candidate  for  authoritative 
immediacy.  Again  and  again  in  the  history  of  thought 
there  has  been  an  attempt  to  return  to  nature,  but 
somehow  it  is  always  to  a  different  nature,  oftentimes 
far  removed  from  nature  in  any  verifiable  sense,  as 
in  the  case  of  Hobbes's  account  of  the  primitive  state 
of  man,  regarded  as  in  constant  warfare  and  artificially 
combining  to  break  from  the  primitive  condition  of 
hatred.  Devotees  of  Rousseau's  * '  uncorrupted  natural 
feeling"  reappear,  and  it  is  sometimes  said  that  art 
and  the  other  higher  things  of  life  cannot  be  taught. 
But  the  more  forcibly  these  pleas  are  brought  forward 
the  more  theoretical  they  prove  to  be.  The  alleged 
''pure  gift"  of  nature  is  discovered  by  very  careful 
interpretation  and  is  preserved  only  by  being  developed. 

For  devotees  of  the  garden  of  Eden  story,  the  "fall" 
seems  to  have  been  the  first  bit  of  mediation  which 
broke  the  purity  of  innocence  as  immediate.  But  mere 
innocence  is  eulogised  less  and  less  as  human  thought 
matures.  The  belief  still  lingers  among  the  naively 
orthodox  that  all  mediation  is  of  the  evil  one,  hence 
the  priests  should  keep  the  people  in  a  state  of  igno- 
rance. Yet,  once  more,  one  cannot  maintain  this 
position  without  setting  up  a  rival  mediational  theory. 
If  to  endeavour  to  understand  spiritual  things  be  to 
league  oneself  with  the  devil,  spiritual  things  are 
already  so  far  understood  and  one  may  as  well  com- 


246          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

plete  the  undertaking  even  at  the  risk  of  losing  heaven. 
Salvation  gained  at  the  cost  of  intellectual  self-sup- 
pression were  indeed  a  poor  thing. 

The  intuition  which,  as  opposed  to  all  reasoning 
processes,  appears  to  be  direct  cognition,  proves  to  be 
partly  an  eventuation  and  intrepretation.  The  alleged 
thought  without  words  of  which  some  people  speak 
would  be  intelligible  only  so  far  as  it  should  be  made 
intellectually  explicit.  The  supposed  highest  type  of 
immediacy  in  which  all  thinking  ceases,  and  subject 
and  object  become  one,  is  the  sort  that  underlies  not 
only  mysticism  in  all  its  radical  forms  but  all  doctrines 
of  verbal  inspiration.  The  tacit  assumption  is  that 
the  recipient  of  the  ecstasy,  the  vision  or  the  scripture, 
is  mentally  passive.  That  is  to  say,  there  are  no 
intermediate  factors  that  in  the  slightest  degree  modify 
the  product.  This  assumption  we  totally  reject,  in- 
asmuch as  the  hypothesis  of  passivity  is  inconceivable. 
The  human  mind  is  not  like  a  window-pane,  but  is 
responsive,  reactive,  carrying  with  it  a  highly  complex 
personal  equation  and  always  some  sort  of  interpre- 
tative belief,  together  with  various  social  and  other 
conditions. 

For  our  purposes  the  term  immediacy  practically 
resolves  itself  into  a  matter  of  sentiency.  The  im- 
mediate is  the  psychical  element  as  it  exists  for  the 
subject  of  an  experience  when  the  experience  occurs. 
The  immediate  is  apprehended  as  one  might  rub  one's 
hands  over  a  smooth  surface  and  create  frictional  heat ; 
immediacy  is  a  joint  product,  due  to  relatedness.  The 
immediacy  for  which  uncritical  devotees  plead  is 
unrelated,  and  experience  reveals  nothing  that  is  not 
related.  Merely  to  describe  is  further  to  relate  that 
which  was  already  widely  related.  To  describe  is  one 


The  Import  of  Immediacy  247 

thing,  to  explain  is  another,  and  to  interpret  is  a  third ; 
popular  thought  confuses  the  three.  To  describe 
our  mental  states  is  psychologically  to  tell  what  took 
place,  for  example,  a  feeling  of  pleasure  or  of  pain ; 
to  explain  is  to  show  why,  psychophysically,  the  feeling 
occurred;  to  interpret  is  to  account  for  it  philosophi- 
cally. Plainly  the  question  of  authority  depends  upon 
the  previously  assigned  degree  of  reality.  If  sentient 
experience  be  assigned  a  relatively  low  place  in  the 
scale  it  is  not  likely  to  be  accepted  as  authoritative. 
Whether  mystical  or  other  spiritual  experience  be 
judged  immediately  real  depends  upon  the  con- 
clusions reached  in  regard  to  the  description  of  im- 
mediacy in  general. 

The  first  problem  is  to  find  a  way  to  describe  im- 
mediacy in  its  simpler  forms  so  as  to  do  justice  to  its 
reality  in  contrast  with  descriptive  and  interpretative 
thought.  That  immediacy'  is  real  in  some  sense  goes 
without  saying.  Everything  that  originally  stirs  men 
proceeds  out  of  the  immediate,  for  the  immediate 
includes  the  wide  realm  popularly  known  as  " feeling." 
The  peculiarity  of  the  situation  is  that,  while  there  is 
nothing  of  which  we  are  more  sure  than  of  the  im- 
mediate existence  of  something,  there  is  nothing  more 
difficult  in  the  descriptive  world  than  to  seize  upon 
anything  that  really  is  immediate.  "  If  to  have  feelings 
or  thoughts  in  their  immediacy  were  enough,"  says 
Professor  James,1  "  babies  in  the  cradle  would  be 
psychologists,  and  infallible  ones."  James  repeatedly 
insists  that  the  description  of  a  mental  state  is  other 
than  the  state  itself;  to  confuse  the  two  would  be  to 
commit  "the  psychologist's  fallacy." 

It  is  easy  to  insist  that  the  real  is  simply  what  it  ap- 

i  Psychology,  i.,  189. 


248          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

pears  to  be  as  given.  But  to  ask  what  the  given  means 
is  to  find  it  incompetent  to  account  for  itself.  If  you 
question  a  believer  in  the  existence  of  an  immediate 
moral  sense,  you  will  be  given,  instead  of  immediacy, 
a  highly  mediate  series  of  beliefs  that  are  meant  to 
establish  the  supposed  immediate  authority.  In  his 
Types  of  Ethical  Theory,1  Martineau  points  out  that 
one  psychical  state  is  immediately  felt  to  be  unlike 
another.  For  example,  the  sense  of  shame  is  at  once 
felt  to  be  different  from  the  sound  of  thunder.  We 
regard  the  immediacy  of  sense-perception  as  sufficient 
evidence  that  physical  objects  actually  exist;  why, 
Martineau  argues,  should  we  not  accept  the  authority 
of  our  ethical  sentiments?  He  regards  the  immediate 
gifts  of  conscience  as  at  least  as  authoritative  as  any 
other  pronouncements  of  consciousness.  Moreover, 
there  is  what  he  calls  a  "felt 'inner  binding"  which  we 
are  morally  bound  to  obey.  But,  having  advanced 
thus  far,  Martineau  proceeds  to  mediate  this  ethical 
immediacy  at  great  length.  He  points  out,  for  ex- 
ample, that  mere  spontaneity  is  not  moral.  We  do 
not  morally  judge  our  spontaneities,  but  our  volitions. 
Now  in  volitions  there  are  two  impulses  present,  not 
one,  as  in  the  case  of  spontaneity.  How,  then,  is  one 
to  know  the  authority  of  conscience?  Why,  by  Mar- 
tineau's  well-known  serial  arrangement  of  ".the  inner 
springs  of  action."  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  con- 
science, so  far  from  being  immediate,  is  made  known 
through  such  an  elaborate  series  of  mediations  that  no 
tendency  to  action,  or  moral  sentiment,  is  to  be  taken 
as  authoritative  by  itself. 

Again,   the  'spiritual  devotee   lays  great  'stress   on 
first-hand     experiences,   which     are   said   to   be    un- 

1  ".,  7- 


The  Import  of  Immediacy  249 

qualifiedly  real  and  true  in  their  first  form.  Yet 
to  examine  these  assumptions  is  to  find  them  depen- 
dent on  many  preconceptions.  In  order  for  a  revela- 
tion, for  example,  to  be  absolutely  pure,  we  must  not 
only  presuppose  the  entire  passivity  mentioned  above, 
but  perfect  affinity  between  inspirer  and  inspired,  no 
modifying  circumstances  in  temperament,  cerebral 
or  other  states,  and  perfect  correspondence  of  word  to 
word.  This  would  mean  that  the  scribe  was  practically 
an  automaton.  But  experience  as  we  know  it  is 
never  absolute  possession  of  one  member  of  it  by  an- 
other; immediacy  is  given  in  a  context  and  is  not  in- 
telligible apart  from  its  context.  It  is  plain,  therefore, 
that  to  establish  a  belief  in  such  inerrant  revelation 
would  be  to  rest  it,  not  on  immediate  grounds,  but  on 
the  basis  of  theologic  mediation.  Even  on  the  hy- 
pothesis that  revelation  is  essentially  spiritual  and 
any  degree  of  allowance  may  be  made  for  the  personal 
equation,  it  would  still  be  a  question  of  assigning 
certain  interpretative  values  which  would  have  to  be 
defended  on  rational  grounds. 

The  final  resort  of  uncritical  thinking  is  to  fall  back 
upon  mystical  ecstasy.  But  as  this  appeal  involves 
not  only  the  acceptance  of  a  long  series  of  practical 
mediations  for  the  attainment  of  the  beatific  vision, 
but  certain  ill-established  conclusions  in  regard  to 
the  illusions  of  mundane  existence,  it  is  plain  that  to 
agree  with  the  mystic  would  be  to  prejudge  the  whole 
question.  Immediacy  is  due  to  a  relationship  of 
elements  which  may  not  be  alike.  In  the  most  meagre 
experience  a  part  of  the  immediacy  is  communicated 
by  the  subject,  and  part  is  given  to  the  subject  by  the 
object  experienced.  This  twofoldness  precludes  the 
alleged  absoluteness  of  the  mystic  experience. 


250          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

Even  the  self,  regarded  as  immediate,  proves  to  be 
an  interchanging  relationship  of  subject  and  object. 
There  is  no  ground  for  believing  that  it  is  a  bare  unity, 
intuitively  known  as  such;  it  is  rather  a  ground  of 
multiform  differences.  The  same  is  true  of  God,  re- 
garded as  the  ground  of  all  differences  in  the  universe. 
To  imagine  all  those  differences  overcome  were  to  deem 
God  non-existent.  God  is  known  by  means  of  inter- 
relationship, not  by  the  annihilation  of  all  relations. 
If  there  be  no  experience  and  no  thought  that  is  not 
relational,  why  should  we  seek  to  transcend  all  rela- 
tions? The  characterless  Absolute  of  mystical  panthe- 
ism has  been  relentlessly  exposed  as  mere  zero.  As 
matter  of  fact,  however,  the  mystic  does  not  lay  so 
much  stress  upon  the  alleged  transcendence  of  all 
relations  as  upon  the  inferences  he  draws  when  he 
has  descended  from  the  heights  and  begun  to  mediate 
his  vision.  It  is  not,  then,  a  question  of  a  unique 
immediacy,  but  of  accurate  description  and  rational 
interpretation  of  well-known  psychical  elements. 

Since  it  is  first  a  question  of  scientific  description, 
we  turn  from  those  who  merely  point  to  experience  to 
those  who  expound  the  universal  characteristics  of 
immediacy.  If  immediacy  have  a  universal  character 
every  man  can  verify  it,  whether  or  not  he  be  a  mystic. 
Life  as  we  all  know  it  begins  and  persists  amidst  the 
immediate.  If  the  quest  for  immediacy  in  a  universal 
sense  lead  us  to  a  point  where  we  despair  of  finding 
a  solution  to  our  problem,  it  will  not  be  because  sen- 
tiently  perceived  reality  deserts  us.  We  may  well 
challenge  mere  intellectualism  to  do  its  worst,  give 
criticism  the  freest  opportunity.  Only  by  going  as 
far  as  critical  philosophy  can  carry  us  may  we  arrive 
at  sound  conclusions. 


The  Import  of  Immediacy  251 

Our  entire  investigation  has,  in  a  sense,  been  a  study 
of  the  immediate;  for  we  have  tried  to  let  experience 
speak  for  itself,  we  have  zealously  guarded  the  witness 
of  the  Spirit  as  an  empirical  possession.  But  we  must 
now  undertake  to  penetrate  farther  back.  For  primi- 
tive man,  the  sense  of  the  immediate  was  undoubtedly 
so  strong  that  he  projected  his  own  emotions  outward, 
and  regarded  the  world  of  hard-and-fast  things  as 
animated  with  great  compelling  emotions  such  as  those 
that  stirred  within  him.  Before  man  began  to  specu- 
late about  the  nature  of  things,  the  immediacy  of  emo- 
tion doubtless  played  a  part  which  it  would  be  difficult 
for  us  to  conceive  of.  Here  was  the  pathetic  fallacy  in 
all  seriousness,  and  mysticism  is  only  an  extreme  case 
of  this  projection  of  emotions  into  the  entire  universe 
of  discourse. 

When  reason  appears  a  new  epoch  begins  in  human 
life.  Santayana  has  in  admirable  fashion  portrayed 
the  transition  from  the  immediate  to  the  mediate,  a 
portrayal  which  might  well  serve  our  present  purposes. 
Speaking  of  the  immediate  in  general,  he  says : 

The  immediate  is  what  nobody  sees,  because  convention 
and  reflection  turn  existence,  as  soon  as  they  can,  into 
ideas ;  a  man  who  discloses  the  immediate  seems  profound, 
yet  his  depth  is  nothing  but  innocence  recovered  and  a  sort 
of  intellectual  abstention.  Mysticism,  scepticism,  and 
transcendentalism  have  all  in  their  various  ways  tried 
to  fall  back  on  the  immediate;  but  none  of  them  has 
been  ingenuous  enough.  Each  has  added  some  myth,  or 
sophistry,  or  delusive  artifice  to  its  direct  observation. 
Heraclitus  remains  the  honest  prophet  of  immediacy.1 

Santayana  holds  that  to 

revert  to  primordial  feeling  is  an  exercise  in  mental  dis- 
i  The  Life  of  Reason,  i.,  15. 


252          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

integration,  not  a  feat  of  science.  ...  In  order  to  begin 
at  the  beginning  we  must  try  to  fall  back  on  uninterpreted 
'  feeling,  as  the  mystics  aspire  to  do.  We  need  not  expect, 
however,  to  find  peace  there,  for  the  immediate  is  in  flux. 
.  .  .  Nor  has  the  mystic  who  sinks  into  the  immediate 
much  better  appreciated  the  situation.  This  immediate  is 
not  God,  but  chaos.  .  .  .  Peace,  which  is  after  all  what  the 
mystic  seeks,  lies  not  in  indistinction,  but  in  perfection.1 

To  revert  to  primitive  immediacy  is  also  to  discover 
that  man  has  travelled  very  far  from  simple  sensation. 
It  would  be  futile  to  contend,  at  this  late  day,  that 
there  is  simple  sensation,  that  any  of  us  can  experience 
a  sensation  as  such.  What  we  mean  by  the  term  is 
some  sort  of  unexperienced  union  or  pre-experienced 
immediacy.  Professor  James  conclusively  argues  that 
"no  one  ever  had  a  simple  sensation  by  itself.  Con- 
sciousness, from  our  natal  day,  is  of  a  teeming  multi- 
plicity of  objects  and  relations,  and  what  we  call  simple 
sensations  are  results  of  discriminate  attention."2 
What  is  immediately  given  is  not  sensation,  but  a 
complex  stream  of  consciousness  in  which  manifold 
characteristics  are  distinguishable.  Hence  for  a  de- 
scription of  what  is  immediate  one  turns,  for  ex- 
ample, to  James's  classic  chapter  on  "The  Stream  of 
Thought";  whereas  his  account  of  sensation  (as  an 
abstraction)  does  not  occur  until  his  second  volume. 
That  is  to  say,  the  thought-stream  is  empirically 
verifiable  by  everybody,  while  "sensation"  is  a 
psychological  construction. 

We  appear  to  be  immediately  conscious  of  the 
causally  efficient  influence  of  the  mind  on  the  body, 
but  every  student  of  Hume  knows  that  no  one  is  di- 
rectly aware  of  causal  power.  What  we  are  aware  of 

*  The  Life  of  Reason,  i.,  pp.  40-42.  a  Op.  cit.,  i.,  224. 


The  Import  of  Immediacy  253 

is  the  last  mental  event,  say  the  volitional  act  or  the 
motor  image,  and  of  the  subsequent  movement,  for 
example,  of  the  arm;  we  are  not  empirically  conscious 
of  what  lies  between.  Between  the  image  or  volitional 
event  there  are,  as  Strong  shows  at  length, i  events 
which  are  entirely  concealed  from  introspection. 

As  Santayana  has  pointed  out,  the  immediate  is 
in  flux;  hence  it  is  that  Heraclitus  is  its  prophet: 
' 'transition  is  unintelligible,  and  yet  is  the  deepest 
characteristic  of  existence."2  What  is  immediately 
apprehended,  when  we  seem  volitionally  to  cause  a 
bodily  change,  is  mental  activity,  not  a  causal  con- 
nection. All  that  one  discovers  by  immediate  intro- 
spection is  the  moment  that  is  just  now  passing.  The 
meaning  of  that  moment  is  another  question.  That 
consciousness  is  active  is  indeed  immediately  known.3 
Consciousness  may  perhaps  immediately  apprehend 
its  own  efficiency  in  a  very  slight  degree,  but,  as  Pro- 
fessor Royce  points  out,  the  activity  of  consciousness 
is  never  quite  immediate.  Immediate  consciousness 
can  only  tell  that  B  follows  A.  A  and  B  are  immediate 
facts  for  the  moment.  As  facts  only  their  connection 
is  felt.  No  psychical  experience  of  apparent  efficacy 
can  be  seized  upon.  The  causal  connection  of  event 
with  event  is  far  too  complex  to  be  immediately  known. 

Immediacy  in  its  simplest  form  cannot  be  mere 
identity  of  subject  and  object,  although  as  apprehended 
it  may  seem  so.  The  unit  of  primitive  immediate 
experience  is  a  twofold,  complex  fact;  and  it  is  im- 
possible to  conceive  of  any  empirical  immediacy  that 
is  less  simple.  One  need  not  even  assume,  with  nai've 

»  Why  the  Mind  Has  a  Body.    See  especially  pp.  106,  170,  and  foil. 
*Op.  cit.,  p.  67. 

3  See  Royce's  criticism  of  Stout's  theory  of  activity,  Mind,  xxii., 
387. 


254          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

thinkers,  that  like  apprehends  like.  In  the  act  of 
apprehension  there  is  a  union  of  something  external 
with  an  organism  capable  of  apprehending  the  im- 
mediately given.  The  apprehending  portion  of  the 
organism  need  not  literally  become  the  something  felt, 
nor  need  the  something  felt  absorb  the  organism  which 
apprehends  it.  The  thing  felt  is  such  that  it  can  be 
simply  apprehended.  The  apprehending  organism  is 
such  that  it  can  apprehend.  In  spatial  terms,  we  may 
say  that  something  is  next- to  the  organism,  as  when, 
for  example,  an  object  is  placed  on  the  hand.  This 
spatial  contiguity  may  be  said  to  be  typical  of  the 
relation  which  exists  all  along  the  line,  when  the  physi- 
cal contact  is  reported  to  the  nerves,  and  thence  gives 
rise  to  the  psychological  element  known  as  "sensation," 
finally  to  the  psychical  moment  of  perception.  But 
what  we  mean  by  immediacy,  when  this  long  series 
of  contiguities  finally  leads  to  a  perceived  moment  of 
experience,  is  rather  a  sense  of  blurred  oneness  than 
an  awareness  of  union.  The  investigation  of  the  nature 
of  psychical  immediacy  properly  begins  with  a  fact 
on  the  mental  side  of  the  psychophysical  series,  that 
is,  when  the  relation  of  contiguity  is  reported  in  an 
experienced  moment  which  we  hypothetically  recon- 
struct and  term  "sensation/'  but  which  as  sensation 
is  not  experienced.  The  sensation  could  be  known 
only  in  case  the  self  could  be  aware  of  the  act  in  suffi- 
ciently simple  form  to  be  as  it  were  present  and  yet 
not  present,  as  if  subject  and  object  were  one  (as  the 
mystic  believes  they  are).  By  hypothesis  our  unit  of 
immediacy  is  a  mere  moment  in  a  psychological  series, 
an  object  of  possible  experience.  This  hypothetical 
unit  is  too  abstract  to  be  experienced,  inasmuch  as  the 
barest  moment  actually  known  is  not  a  sensation,  but 


The  Import  of  Immediacy  255 

a  perception  in  which  the  sensation  is  already  an 
element;  the  felt  union  is  not  simply  apprehended,  but 
is  perceived.  Even  perception  therefore  involves  an 
immediacy  which  can  be  described  only  in  mediate 
terms.  This  is  an  important  conclusion. 

Thus  the  character  of  immediacy  begins  to  be  plain. 
It  is  a  kind  of  psychical  nextness  such  that  object, 
sensation,  perception,  and  perceiver  seem  to  be  one 
continuous  experience.  Our  problem  is  to  try  to 
maintain  this  apparent  oneness  while  rendering  pro- 
gressively explicit  the  wealth  which  it  involves.  For 
there  is  a  reality  in  this  first  immediacy  which  is  never 
wholly  absorbed,  but  is  partly  mediated  and  partly 
suggested  in  appreciative  terms.  The  more  faithfully 
we  try  to  single  out  this  psychical  instant  as  appre- 
hended, the  more  are  we  compelled  to  confess  that  it 
is  not  the  merely  sentient  contiguity  which  it  appears 
to  be.  Distinctions  are  made  within  the  seemingly 
blurred  oneness,  then  judgments  are  passed:  Something 
exists;  there  is  a  world  outside  of  me;  I,  the  perceiver, 
exist,  and  so  on.  Hence  interest  centres  upon  the 
logical  implications  of  that  which  at  first  appeared  to 
be  independent.  Plainly,  the  simplest  moment  of  the 
immediate  is  not  absolute,  but  is  already  a  multiform, 
belongs  to  a  system  of  relations  which  involve  the 
universe.  Not  until  a  described  moment  of  immediacy 
stands  out  in  contrast  with  a  moment  of  mediation  do 
we  really  begin  to  know  immediacy;  and  simply  to 
describe  is  after  all  to  mediate,  to  admit  that  im- 
mediacy is  not  what  it  seems  to  be. 

The  first  statement  that  can  be  made,  then,  con- 
cerning the  immediate  is  that  it  exists,  it  possesses  be- 
ing, is  a  brute  fact,  is  something  given,  a  mere  "that" 
without  a  ' '  what. "  What  the  something  is  one  cannot 


256          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

discover  by  mere  reference  to  just  that  moment  of 
psychic  experience,  for  that  moment  as  such  has  al- 
ready ceased  to  exist.  Seek  as  we  may  to  recover 
the  experience  precisely  as  apprehended,  the  result 
is  at  best  its  mediate  reconstruction.  For,  contrary 
to  popular  thought,  we  cannot  have  identically  the 
same  experience  twice.1  At  best  we  have  that  which 
we  take  to  be  a  similar  experience.  Only  by  experience 
can  one  appreciate  what  psychic  immediacy  is,  but 
only  through  reflection  can  one  know  what  even  this 
uniqueness  is,  for  we  know  by  comparison,  hence 
mediately.  Yet  mediacy  must  not  assume  too  much, 
for  it  is  immediacy  which  supplies  thought  with  its 
original  content.  If  immediacy  is  known  only  through 
reflection,  it  exists  as  real  when  psychically  perceived. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  thought,  immediacy  is  mere 
unorganised  stuff  which  must  be  taken  up  into  the 
categories  of  form. 

Psychically  regarded,  then,  immediacy  is  most 
unruly,  since  it  cannot  be  seized  and  held  fast  to  dis- 
cover what  it  is.  What  we  really  begin  with  is  an 
experienced  moment  as  it  exists  for  memory,  as  re- 
constructively  dwelt  upon,  and  with  the  general 
series  in  which  that  moment  appears,  not  as  isolated, 
but  as  giving  place  to  another  moment  in  a  stream 
which  exhibits  no  rest.  There  is,  to  be  sure,  a  break 
on  the  selfward  side  during  sleep;  but  this  gap  is  not 
experienced.  Immediacy  as  perceived  is  due  to  the 
coming  together  of  two  streams — one  flowing  from 
the  environing  field  of  our  mental  life,  and  the  other 
meeting  it  from  the  depths  of  the  self.  Neither  stream 
can  be  seized  and  held  fast.  Immediacy  is  their  point 
of  contact,  a  moment  in  their  co-operative  activity. 

i  See  James,  op.  cit.,  i.,  230. 


The  Import  of  Immediacy  257 

It  may  be  that  the  self  is  in  a  profound  sense  inde- 
pendent of  time.  But  in  its  empirical  aspect  it  is 
appreciable  amidst  time.  Time  is  not  a  fact  of  direct 
experience,  but  immediacy  when  analysed  proves  to 
possess  a  transitivity  in  contrast  with  what  James 
calls  the  ''substantive"  states  of  consciousness;  time 
and  the  wealth  it  brings  are  differentiated  out  of  "the 
stream  of  thought."  The  significant  characteristic 
for  our  purposes  is  the  fact  that  psychic  immediacy 
is  given  amidst  change  in  a  relentless  time-stream. 
Into  the  same  moment  of  that  stream  no  man  can 
step  twice.  Thus  we  are  compelled  to  distinguish 
between  immediacy  as  (i)  just  now  presented  and 
involving  change,  and  (2)  as  it  exists  for  reflection, 
as  a  concept.  Since  immediacy  as  psychically  ap- 
prehended can  be  known  only  through  the  mediating 
thought  which  reconstructs  it,  what  we  really  mean 
in  most  of  our  references  to  the  immediate  is  this 
construct,  not  the  bare  psychic  moment,  no  longer 
recoverable.  In  other  words,  it  is  not  the  mere  fact 
of  being  that  interests  us,  not  the  mere  that,  but  what 
it  is  that  exists  and  what  its  meaning  is.  Our  recon- 
structed immediacy  may  indeed  be  intended  as  a  mere 
description  of  what  was  felt  in  its  simplicity,  but  the 
probability  is  that  we  are  concerned  with  its  theoretical 
implications.  Thus  our  analysis  points  more  and 
more  to  mediation  as  the  prime  consideration.  This 
is  an  important  result,  as  we  shall  soon  see.  It  may 
well  be  that  we  constantly  refer  anew  to  immediacy 
as  now  apprehended,  and  hence  exclaim,  "That  is  the 
experienced  quality  I  meant."  But  note  that  it  is 
ever  with  increased  wealth  of  mediate  thought  that  we 
refer  to  and  interpret  the  experience. 

The  chief  difficulty  thus  far  is  this:  Here,  in  my 

17 


258          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

description,  I  have  immediate  experience  conceptually 
represented.  I  endeavour  to  reconstruct  every  de- 
tail with  utmost  faithfulness.  At  last  my  concept  is 
marked  off  with  such  clearness  that  I  am  able  to  point 
out  universal  characteristics,  for  example,  that  a  given 
moment  is  knowable  only  in  relation  to  another  mo- 
ment, when  the  first  has  gone ;  that  the  psychic  element 
is  particular,  unique,  evanescent,  while  the  implied 
universal  is  the  product  of  mediation,  hence  is  the 
property  of  all.  But  do  I  at  last  possess  the  imme- 
diacy of  real  experience,  so  that  another,  reading  my 
account,  may  possess  the  reality  itself?  Obviously, 
only  in  case  he  turns  from  the  conceptual  characteri- 
sation in  renewed  reference  to  his  own  stream  of 
consciousness,  as  even  now  passing.  The  empirical 
element  each  man  must  appreciatively  apprehend  by 
means  of  that  unique  quality  so  hard  even  to  suggest, 
namely,  the  living  moment  itself.  The  description 
fails  just  so  far  as  life  is  appreciable  by  experiencing 
it  as  simple  life.  Life  in  a  sense  is  the  same  for  all; 
all  are  compelled  to  make  precisely  these  admissions; 
life  is  always  in  a  way  psychically  unique.  You  can- 
not know  it  completely  from  my  description,  for  you 
must  apprehend  it  as  presented  fact.  Hence  we  find 
psychologists  constantly  appealing  to  immediacy;  for 
example,  when  Miss  Calkins  says  of  pitch,  "like  every 
element  of  consciousness  it  is  indescribable/'1  Pro- 
fessor James  repeatedly  makes  this  empirical  appeal: 
"The  reader's  own  consciousness  tells  him  of  course 
just  what  these  words  of  mine  denote.  And  I  freely 
confess  that  I  am  impotent  to  carry  the  analysis  of  the 
matter  any  farther.  .  .  .  "2  But  all  this  is  univer- 
sally characteristic  of  immediacy,  and  the  commonest 

*  Introduction  to  Psychology,  p.  46.  2  Op.  cit.,  ii.,  568. 


The  Import  of  Immediacy  259 

phase  of  it  presents  the  same  elements  as  the  most 
mystical. 

What,  then,  do  you  mean  when  you  refer  to  a  given 
case  of  immediate  experience  as  profoundly  real  for 
you?  Suppose  it  is  an  experience  which  has  stirred 
you  deeply,  a  great  joy  or  a  supreme  sorrow.  You 
attempt  to  describe  the  experience  to  me  and  I  try  to 
show  that  I  know  what  you  mean.  "No,"  you  insist 
each  time;  "  it  is  not  that,  but  something  you  will  know 
when  you  have  felt  it.  There  is  a  certain  deep  sense 
of  life  in  it  for  you,  a  warmth,  a  reality  which  defies 
analysis.  In  fact,  it  is  sacrilegious  to  attempt  to 
analyse  its  higher  phases"— so  you  declare.  The  ex- 
perience entered  into  your  life,  became  part  of  you, 
made  your  life  larger,  hence  it  possesses  for  you  a 
certain  character  which  wills,  as  it  were,  to  be  just 
itself.  All  the  experiences  we  revere  as  most  in- 
timately parts  of  us  possess  a  quality  such  that  others 
apprehend  in  a  measure  what  we  mean  when  we  refer 
to  them — provided  they  have  enjoyed  similar  ex- 
periences. The  unique,  immediate  quality  is  the 
essence  without  which  all  mere  description  is  cold  and 
dead. 

Note  that  the  more  persistently  one  endeavours  to 
be  true  to  immediate  experience,  in  however  sacred  a 
guise,  the  more  one  is  compelled  to  mediate  by  differ- 
entiating its  values  as  constituting  a  universe  of  ap- 
preciation in  contrast  with  the  world  of  bare  fact. 
The  mere  uniqueness  becomes  less  significant  as  we 
proceed,  while  the  mediated  world  grows  in  value. 
Here,  as  elsewhere,  the  immediacy  that  is  so  real  for 
us  is  no  "mere  immediacy,"  but  belongs  to  a  class  of 
experiences  which  have  survived  all  criticism.  The 
most  empirical  aspect  of  immediacy  is  itself  dis- 


260         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

covered  to  be  such  through  critical  scrutiny.  To  mis- 
take the  psychic  or  particular  element  for  the  universal 
which  mediation  alone  discovers,  is  to  be  guilty  of 
confusing  psychology  with  logic.  What  is  important 
in  descriptive  theories,  such  as  sensationalism,  and 
the  doctrines  of  so-called  "pure  experience,"  is  not 
after  all  the  experience  so  emphatically  appealed  to, 
but  the  subtle  universal  which  has  been  introduced 
unawares.  Critics  of  constructive  idealism  resort  to 
such  conceptions  as  "pure  experience,"  in  order  to 
escape  from  what  they  call  "absolutism,"  but  thereby 
merely  propose  a  rival  system  of  first  principles  which 
must  be  tested  by  the  canons  of  thorough-going  me- 
diation. The  complaint  seems  to  be  that  thought  is 
artificial,  "abstract";  while  immediate  experience  is 
somehow  directly  real  or  rational.  But  it  is  precisely 
the  inherent  rationality  of  the  immediate  which  thought 
endeavours  to  make  explicit.  Mediate  thought,  when 
complete,  enters  into  full  possession  of  the  truth  which 
immediacy  implicitly  meant.  In  a  sense  one  need 
not  even  refer  back  to  new  immediacy,  for  mediation 
in  its  higher  moment  passes  over  into  a  third  moment 
in  which  it  holds  the  realities  of  sentiency  and  of 
thought  in  unification:  it  sees  that  just  this  its  pro- 
foundest  meaning  is  the  truth  which  immediacy  in  all 
its  wealth  involved. 

It  is  clear  that  we  must  distinguish  between  that 
which  is  through  mediation  found  to  have  been  present 
and  the  interpretations  which  attribute  to  the  given 
that  which  was  not  empirically  found  there.  That 
things  differ  or  resemble  one  another  is  a  discovery 
made  through  mediating  comparison,  and  the  differ- 
ences or  resemblances  are  empirically  verifiable.  All 
such  discoveries  merely  tell  us  what  was  present  all 


The  Import  of  Immediacy  261 

along.  By  this  sort  of  discrimination  we  learn  what 
was  immediately  given  as  a  confused  whole.  People 
constantly  resort  to  various  devices  in  order  to  make 
explicit  that  which  they  possess  as  immediate  wealth. 
Hence  our  analysis  by  no  means  takes  from  the  im- 
mediate the  value  which  it  possesses  as  an  empirical 
clue,  to  be  first  discovered,  then  interpreted. 

Suppose,  for  instance,  a  man  wishes  to  discover  his 
own  deeper  meanings,  shall  he  find  them  by  sheer 
self -analysis,  or  partly  through  the  side-lights  which 
direct  contact  with  his  fellows  reveals?  What  if  he 
wish  to  determine  his  position  with  regard  to  the 
teachings  of  the  church,  will  mere  intellectual  in- 
trospection suffice?  Experience  shows  rather  that 
it  is  the  unexpected  side-lights  which  reveal  a  man's 
true  estate,  particularly  if  he  be  at  all  aware  of  the 
witness  of  the  Spirit.  Take  the  case  of  one  who  has 
analysed  his  religious  faith  down  to  the  point  of  thin 
symbols  and  soulless  values.  From  the  point  of  view 
of  mere  theory  there  are  no  realities  corresponding 
to  these  cold  mediate  symbols.  Such  a  man  may  sup- 
pose that  he  knows  precisely  what  he  believes.  He 
may  maintain  this  attitude  for  ten,  fifteen  years.  Yet, 
upon  occasion  he  may  be  so  deeply  touched  by  a  new 
experience  that  he  will  find  himself  believing  in  or 
praying  to  God  with  the  old  fervour.  Or  he  may  be 
like  the  man  whom  Professor  James  tells  about  who 
thought  he  believed  only  in  Spencer's  "Unknowable" 
but  who  one  day  discovered,  after  the  lapse  of  many 
years,  that  he  had  really  believed  down  in  his  heart 
in  the  God  of  his  early  faith,  the  God  of  prayer.  In 
such  a  case  the  symbolism  or  agnosticism  is  a  mediate 
husk  which  conceals  the  real  pith  of  a  man's  belief. 
This  theoretical  mediacy  must  be  mediated  by  refer- 


262          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

ence  to  the  concealed  immediacy  of  still  unquestioned 
belief.  I  do  not  say  that  thereby  the  unexpected 
side-light  proves  the  concealed  belief  to  be  true,  or 
authoritative ;  but  only  by  taking  this  into  account  may 
the  man  in  question  discover  what  he  really  does 
believe.  The  sudden  side-light  on  one's  character 
which  a  quick  insight  throws  may  have  far  more  value 
than  the  severest  self -analysis.  Our  deeper  imme- 
diacies may  be  much  nearer  the  heart  of  things.  But 
they  are  at  best  so  many  considerations  to  be  taken 
account  of  when  immediacy  and  mediation  combine. 
If  immediacy  must  in  all  cases  be  mediated  before 
one  can  judge  what  is  real,  what  is  true,  it  may  also 
be  true  that  all  mediacy  must  be  compared  with  these 
spontaneous  immediacies.  It  may  then  be  said  that 
immediacy  has  a  truth  of  its  own.  The  hidden  and 
half-hidden  immediacies  of  human  life  are  of  great 
interest  and  of  great  consequence.  But  it  is  important 
to  point  out  the  equally  subtle  effect  of  mediation. 
On  the  whole,  one  is  inclined  to  think  that  the  part 
played  by  mediation  is  far  more  subtle.  It  is  the 
inferences  that  are  unwittingly  read  into  immediacy 
which  give  it  its  great  value  in  all  cases  bordering 
on  mysticism,  poetry,  love,  faith,  and  the  like.  Or, 
again,  it  is  the  rediscovered  conviction  wrought  out 
by  a  long  process  of  mediate  thinking  which  seems 
to  be  a  pure,  entirely  new  revelation. 

The  immediate  is  in  a  profound  sense  more  directly 
connected  with  the  subject  than  with  that  which  is 
outer.  In  this  sense  will  and  feeling  are  more  sub- 
jective than  thought;  feeling  and  will  are  particular, 
personal;  while  thought  is  universal,  seeks  to  com- 
prehend all  things  in  concepts  freed  from  personal 
equations.  Perception  refers  to  the  objective,  while 


The  Import  of  Immediacy  263 

feeling  is  the  inner  "tone"  accompanying  it.  As  re- 
lated to  the  self,  the  term  feeling  may  be  said  to  possess 
a  broader  meaning  than  that  of  mere  pleasure  and 
pain  and  hence  to  represent  immediacy  in  its  most 
personal  guise.  H.  N.  Gardiner,  for  example,  defines 
feeling  as  the  "immediate  consciousenss  of  the  modifi- 
cation of  individual  experience,  as  such."1  That  is, 
the  immediate  modification  of  the  individual's  con- 
sciousness is  distinguished  from  "the  functions  of 
knowledge  and  action  it  subserves."  In  the  process 
of  thought,  however,  there  is  again  a  respect  in  which 
the  immediate  certainty  spoken  of  by  logicians  is 
directly  connected  with  feeling,  hence  with  the  self.2 

From  the  point  of  view  of  feeling,  in  order  for  im- 
mediacy to  exist  there  must  be:  (i)  something  felt, 
given,  perceived;  hence  some  thing  or  some  being  that 
gives;  (2)  a  state  of  union  between  perceived  and  per- 
ceiver;  and  (3)  a  perceiver,  who  apprehends  the  im- 
mediacy and  apperceives  it.  Immediacy  exists,  then, 
for  a  self,  and  the  self  possesses  some  sort  of  cognitive 
constitution ;  the  self  on  its  part  brings  those  principles 
to  the  experience  which  enable  it  to  enter  into  the 
union.  Hence,  to  state  our  problem  differently,  we 
have  been  endeavouring  to  differentiate  the  factors  of 
psychical  union  so  as  to  make  the  element  of  im- 
mediacy stand  out  by  itself,  now  on  the  objective 
side  and  now  on  the  subjective;  and  we  have  found 
this  extremely  difficult.  Despite  the  fact,  however, 
that  there  is  a  give  and  take  between  subject  and  ob- 
ject such  that  we  seem  to  lose  immediacy  altogether, 
we  constantly  find  that  even  with  all  its  shifting  there 

1  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology,  and  Scientific  Methods,  iii., 
No.  3,  p.  61. 

2  See,  for  example,  Sigwarc,  Logic,  Eng.  trans.,  i.,  14. 


264          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

is  a  sense  in  which  the  immediate  is  real  in  which 
mediacy  is  not.  These  points  are  so  important  that 
we  must  insist  upon  them. 

To  love,  for  example,  to  enjoy  music — what  is  that 
but  to  apprehend  a  somewhat  which  thought  never 
fully  exhausts?  To  show  that  nothing  is  immediately 
complete  just  as  perceived  is  by  no  means  to  prove 
that  there  is  not  a  quality  which  one  may  critically 
return  to  and  truly  apprehend.  If  thought  corrects 
feeling,  feeling  also  corrects  thought.  Despite  the 
fact  that  given  experience  is  largely  chaotic,  as  given, 
there  is  still  a  possibility  that  one  may  compare  pre- 
sented experiences  and  long  afterward  learn  their  law, 
the  profound  order,  system,  which  they  reveal.  That 
is  to  say,  thought  may  have  intruded  its  own  recon- 
structions, and  must  now  become  passive,  contem- 
plative, obedient,  in  search  for  the  spontaneous. 

According  to  this  view  of  immediacy  we  may  then 
say  that  immediacy  has  a  law  of  its  own,  namely, 
the  order  of  existence  which  given  experience  reveals, 
when  that  experience  has  been  scrutinised,  freed  from 
accidents,  taken  up  into  the  understanding,  yet 
separated  from  the  artificialities  of  understanding 
and  again  discovered  by  reference  back  to  immediacy. 
Thus  understood,  immediacy  implies  the  total  system 
of  human  experience,  the  real  order  and  constitution 
of  the  universe,  the  nature  of  the  self,  and  of  the 
Supreme  Self.  This  law  of  immediacy  is  the  one 
implied  in  the  mystic's  attachment  to  the  immediate: 
that  is,  sentiency  is  in  a  sense  the  real  thing,  and  to 
know  you  must  feel.  No  account  of  immediacy  can 
take  the  place  of  personal  experience.  Another  man's 
account  of  a  given  immediate  experience  must  be 
tested  by  further  reference  to  experience. 


The  Import  of  Immediacy  265 

But  the  laws  implied  in  the  critical  view  of  immediacy 
are  no  less  true.  That  is,  (i)  immediacy  has  a  law  of 
its  own,  but  (2)  it  is  a  law  that  nothing  immediate  is 
really  known  as  first  given;  thought  must  follow  upon 
and  discover  by  contrast  and  comparison,  by  criticism, 
what  the  directly  presented  implied;  (3)  the  third 
law  is  that,  since  the  immediate  is  directly  felt,  it  must 
be  felt  by  a  self  which  brings  to  the  experience  its 
own  cognitive  constitution.  These  laws  hold  within 
all  ranges  of  human  experience.  That  is  to  say:  we 
recognise  that  a  thing  is  through  some  reality  which 
our  will  did  not  create ;  that  the  meaning  of  that  thing 
is  not  clear  on  the  face  of  it;  and  that  in  all  attempts 
to  discover  its  meaning  there  is  involved  the  sentient 
constitution  whereby  the  thing  is  apprehended.  In  all 
this  we  must  emphasise  the  fact  that  thinking  is 
itself  almost  as  susceptible  to  illusion  as  feeling;  hence 
that  when  our  theory  of  immediacy  has  said  its  last 
word  we  must  once  more  turn  to  immediacy  to  see  if 
thought  correspond  to  reality. 

There  are  of  course  many  assumptions  involved  in 
this  exposition  of  the  laws,  system,  and  ranges  of  im- 
mediacy. But  one  must  start  with  some  sort  of 
hypothesis  in  order  to  mark  off  the  concept  in  any 
clearly  defined  way.  The  general  presupposition  is 
this:  The  self  is  able,  through  mediate  thought,  to 
grasp  the  meaning  of  immediacy;  reason  is  competent 
to  complete  its  task;  immediacy  and  the  mediate 
belong  to  one  system;  thought  and  corrected  feeling 
apprehend  the  same  Reality. 

Yet  it  may  well  be  that  the  character  of  human  ex- 
perience is  such  that  no  unqualified  law  of  the  ultimate 
gifts  of  immediacy  can  be  stated.  For  if  you  must 
verify  your  theory  of  the  immediate  by  reference  to 


266          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

further  immediacy,  if  that  immediacy  is  somehow 
just  your  immediacy,  yet  is  also  the  gift  of  a  larger 
Being  to  whom  you  belong,  you  must  leave  room  for 
the  unexpected  deliverances  of  further  immediacy 
whose  character  no  one  can  foretell.  In  short,  there 
seems  to  be  involved  in  the  immediate  a  peculiar  com- 
bination of  the  individual  and  the  general,  the  one  and 
the  many,  law  and  chance. 

In  the  light  of  the  appreciations  of  the  preceding 
chapters,  it  is  plain  that  we  must  assign  an  important 
place  to  the  spontaneous  upwellings  which  throw  a 
light  on  the  immediate  that  is  hardly  to  be  equalled 
by  the  insights  of  self-conscious  thought.  The  spon- 
taneous action  which,  as  Emerson  assures  us,  "is 
always  best,"  belongs  under  this  head,  and  we  have 
made  allowances  for  this  factor  from  the  first.  A 
system  of  practical  thought  is  sometimes  reared  on 
the  basis  of  acceptance  of  such  immediacies.  It  is 
argued,  for  example,  that  immediate  giving  to  the 
poor,  immediate  succour  of  the  afflicted,  precisely  as 
the  heart  prompts,  is  greatly  superior  to  the  pains- 
taking donations  gingerly  measured  out  by  that  de- 
lectable sentiment  known  as  "charity."  Again,  it  is 
said  that  what  a  man  writes  intuitively  is  superior 
to  aught  that  he  can  think.  In  one  form  or  another, 
this  belief  in  immediacy  underlies  many  kinds  of 
esthetic,  literary,  social,  and  religious  endeavour.  Al- 
though it  may  be  carried  to  great  excess,  and  easily 
passes  either  into  sensualism  or  mysticism,  it  is  not 
to  be  lightly  set  aside.  There  are  many  practical 
problems  involved  in  it  which  are  still  far  from  solution. 
But  if  it  be  a  question  of  the  substitution  of  this  kind 
of  immediacy  as  authoritative,  one  must  point  out 
that  no  one  accepts  such  immediacy  as  authoritative 


The  Import  of  Immediacy  267 

except  by  careful  comparison  of  experience  with  ex- 
perience. One  may  very  well  give  such  insights  and 
experiences  their  place  and  let  them  reveal  all  that 
they  are  capable  of  revealing — untampered  with.  But 
it  is  barren  immediacy  indeed  that  is  not  made  logically 
richer  by  mediation.  The  point  is  that  immediacy 
is  never  found  by  itself,  nor  is  it  judged  by  itself.  As 
a  concept  it  is  as  thoroughly  inwrought  with  other 
concepts  as  any  that  could  be  named.  Only  by  putting 
mediation  out  of  the  way  as  much  as  possible,  by 
setting  self  aside,  may  one  hope  to  apprehend  it  in 
deepest  reality.  But  only  by  mediating  this  negation 
may  one  know  how  deeply  the  self  really  was  put 
aside.  If  only  by  losing  oneself  may  one  find  it,  the 
discovery  of  the  self  is  the  great  point,  not  the  mere 
losing.  He  who  has  never  doubted  the  existence  of 
God,  the  self,  freedom,  immortality,  love,  and  all  the 
rest  that  the  heart  holds  dear,  has  never  fully  pos- 
sessed these  verities.  To  analyse  intuition,  to  inquire 
into  the  possibility  of  revelation,  is  not  to  lose,  but  in 
the  profoundest  sense  to  gain. 

The  moral  of  such  examination  is  not  that  one  should 
cease  to  believe  in  life's  first  gifts,  crush  out  all  spon- 
taneity, and  depend  solely  upon  painful  induction; 
but  that  we  should  give  immediacy  a  place  side  by 
side  with  thought  and  encourage  it  to  reveal  its  ut- 
most. We  may  well  trust  our  instincts  to  the  end. 
But  granted  the  rich  possessions  of  experience  in  its 
first  guise,  we  may  well  learn  all  that  can  be  learned 
from  appreciative  comparison.  To  fall  back  upon 
the  merely  immediate  would  be  to  close  the  door  to  the 
profoundest  truths  of  human  life.  The  coolest,  calm- 
est reasoner  in  the  world  is  dependent  to  the  last  upon 
the  clues  which  fresh  experiences  and  flash-like  in- 


268          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

sights  afford.  The  realities  which  he  would  interpret 
are  of  the  order  of  sentiency,  while  thought  is  as  persist- 
ently indirect,  derived.  The  great  lesson  of  our  com- 
parison is  the  utter  mutual  dependence  of  experience 
and  reason. 

Thus  we  arrive  at  the  same  conclusions  whether  it 
be  a  question  of  immediacy  or  of  mediating  thought. 
Neither  is  knowable  as  real  without  the  other,  and  both 
must  be  tested  by  comparisons,  side-lights,  criticism, 
and  by  fresh  return.  Negation,  not  immediacy,  is  the 
fundamental  law.  Try  to  seize  immediate  experience 
while  it  passes  and  you  fail  utterly.  Only  through 
retrospection  can  you  make  any  headway.  But  do  not 
trust  your  mediating  retrospect  absolutely,  for  only  by 
constant  reference  to  the  subtle  stream  which  you 
observe  but  cannot  check  shall  your  description  possess 
value.  Begin  to  take  interest  in  your  description 
as  such  and  it  shall  forthwith  become  dead.  Only 
in  change  is  life  abundant.  Entirely  universal  in 
form,  so  roomy  that  it  can  hold  anything  conceivable, 
hence  in  itself  entirely  non-committal,  immediacy  is 
nevertheless  the  bearer  of  an  ever-astonishing  wealth.1 
What,  then,  is  thought  if  not  that  power  in  us  which 
makes  the  empirically  implicit  intelligibly  explicit? 
Thought  is  no  enemy,  as  the  devotees  of  religion  some- 
times fear,  it  is  utterly  powerless  in  itself.  If  it  negate 
it  must  itself  be  negated  to  the  utmost.  The  truth, 
as  Hegel  shows,  is  found  neither  in  the  immediate 
nor  in  mere  mediacy,  but  in  a  higher  moment. 

The  process  would  be  endless  if  it  were  merely  a 
question  of  the  elusive  contrasts  which  we  have  been 
considering.  This  will  become  the  clearer  if  we  once 
more  briefly  summarise.  We  find  that  psychic  im- 

i  See  Supplementary  Essay,  Sec.  19. 


The  Import  of  Immediacy  269 

mediacy  is  appreciable  rather  than  describable;  as 
psychic  fact  it  exists  for  one  subject  only,  is  statable  as 
a  felt  moment  only  in  retrospective,  hence  in  mediate, 
terms.  Therefore  immediacy  is  rather  psychological 
than  psychical,  is  a  theoretical  construct,  proposed 
after  careful  discrimination.  But,  further,  it  is  more 
strictly  logical;  for  only  when  assigned  its  conceptual 
place  may  it  play  a  part  in  our  critical  thought.  No 
immediacy  as  given  informs  us  (i)  what  is;  (2)  what 
is  real;  (3)  that  a  world  exists;  or  (4)  that  a  self  exists; 
(5)  hence  no  immediacy  as  given  is  authoritative,  not 
even  the  immediacy  of  sensuous  experience,  not  that 
of  consciousness  in  general,  not  mystical  immediacy, 
therefore  not  revelation;  (6)  no  immediacy  as  given 
is  a  test  of  truth;  and  (7)  none  issues  into  defensible 
sensationalism,  or  any  other  form  of  immediatism. 
The  truth  or  reality  exists,  rather,  for  judgment:  im- 
mediacy is  first  judged  to  be,  then  judged  to  contain 
this  or  that;  if  there  is  reference  back,  or  forwards  to 
new  immediacy,  its  verifying  quality  still  exists  for 
mediating  thought.  Hence,  again,  immediacy  proves 
intelligible  only  as  a  logical  moment.  But  its  logical 
character  cannot  be  reduced  to  mediacy;  it  qualifies 
while  it  baffles,  opens  the  way  to  new  experiences  and 
unexpected  side-lights  until,  finally,  it  escapes  from 
an  infinite  process  by  uniting  with  mediation  to  con- 
stitute a  third,  or  higher,  logical  moment.  Both 
immediacy  and  mediacy  are  one-sided  when  taken 
alone,  but  their  baffling  life  which  sends  us  hither  and 
yon,  when  confined  to  the  level  of  the  understanding, 
proves  to  be  the  rich  life  of  constructive  dialectic 
when  developed  by  enlightened  reason.1 

Thus  the  deeper  lesson  is  transitivity,  "becoming," 

»  See  Supplementary  Essay,  Sec.  20  ff. 


270         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

as  Hegel  calls  it.  The  inner  stream  whose  moments 
never  return,  the  perpetual  flux  which  so  long  ago 
fascinated  Heraclitus — this  is  the  constructive  clue 
which  emerges  from  our  study.  Our  investigation 
reveals  three  stages.  In  the  first,  we  have  immediacy 
regarded  as  unique,  particular,  psychical;  in  the  second, 
we  have  immediacy  as  it  retrospectively  appears  in 
detail,  with  its  baffling  character  of  reality  amidst 
irrecoverable  flux,  facing  its  rival,  thought,  and  almost 
succumbing  before  it;  in  the  third,  experience  is  con- 
ceptually given  back  enriched,  immediacy  has  lost 
its  innocence  and  its  independence,  yet  it  retains  a 
value  which  thought  can  never  take  away.  Imme- 
diacy as  first  discovered  belonged  to  the  lowest  cate- 
gory of  being,1  and  it  was  necessary  to  resolve  it  into 
this  poorest  of  categories  in  order  to  strip  it  of  all 
misconceptions.  But  there  is  a  higher  immediacy 
of  tested  insight,  transfigured  love,  transmuted  feeling, 
perfected  guidance,  proved  faith,  which  is  the  ally 
of  illumined  reason.  There  is  in  fact  a  gradation  of 
immediacies  from  sensuality  to  divine  love,  and  he 
who  is  unable  to  classify  is  unable  even  to  appreciate. 
The  reality  which  clings  to  the  immediate  is  the  reality 
of  that  wonderful  gift  called  "life"  which  is  a  sharing 
in  that  larger  Life  that  is  more  than  ourselves.  Thus 
it  is  primarily  immediacy  that  convinces  us  that  there 
is  an  Other  than  ourselves.  The  transitivity  to  which 
we  must  be  obedient  in  order  to  know  that  which  is 
real  is  precisely  this  immanent  Life.  Our  whole 
process  of  mediation  is  in  a  way  a  recovery  of  what  we 
at  first  unwittingly  possessed,  the  highest  universal, 
"the  Absolute  Spirit,"  as  Hegel  calls  it.  The  higher 

1  The  Seyn  of    Hegel's  Logic.   See   Supplementary   Essay,    Sec. 
52  ff. 


The  Import  of  Immediacy  271 

immediacy  is   a  co-operative   product.     Its  meaning 
is  the  Idea.1 

i  Since  the  above  was  in  type  an  article  has  appeared  which 
strikingly  confirms  some  of  the  above  conclusions:  "  Immediacy, 
Mediation  and  Coherence,"  by  G.  F.  Stout,  Mind,  Jan.,  1908.  See 
especially  pp.  26-30. 


CHAPTER  XII 

AN  ESTIMATE  OF  MYSTICISM 

IT  should  be  plain  from  the  foregoing  that  there  is 
no  road  back  from  the  point  reached  in  the  preceding 
chapter  to  empiricism,  whether  mild  or  radical.  All 
immediatism  is  in  some  sense  a  reversion  to  lower 
experience,  neglect  of  the  fact  that  immediacy  is  only 
intelligible  when  combined  with  mediating  thought 
in  a  higher  moment.  For  him  who  has  once  put  his 
hand  to  the  plow  there  is  no  looking  back  that  is  of 
more  than  tentative  value.  The  prime  question  is, 
Whither  does  life  lead?  If  we  are  unable  at  present 
fully  to  say,  we  may  at  least  state  what  we  can  now 
discern,  then  move  forward  with  the  life  that  is  ad- 
vancing within  and  around  us.  To  appeal  to  the 
witness  of  the  Spirit  does  not  mean  to  revert  to  what 
the  Spirit  was,  but  to  be  faithful  to  what  it  is  now 
doing.  To  know  what  the  Spirit  is  at  present  accom- 
plishing is  in  the  first  instance  to  refer  to  experience, 
but  we  must  also  consult  that  parallel  line  of  mental 
life  which,  added  to  the  other,  comments  upon  and 
expounds  it.  The  "life  of  reason"  is  far  more  sig- 
nificant than  the  "life  of  feeling."  Only  through 
sentiency  are  we  concretely  brought  into  relation  with 
reality  in  an  empirical  sense,  only  through  "the 
feelings"  do  we  personally  enter  into  experience;  but 
only  through  thought  do  we  apprehend  the  significance 
of  the  persistent  transitivity  of  experience.  Imme- 
diacy refers  not  only  to  itself  as  experience,  but  to  the 

273, 


An  Estimate  of  Mysticism  273 

self  that  apprehends,  as  well  as  in  the  direction  pointed 
out  by  its  incessant  life.  Far  deeper,  therefore  than 
the  nature  of  the  immediate,  is  the  question  of  the 
reality  of  the  self. 

That  our  conclusions  coincide  in  a  measure  with 
common  sense  becomes  evident  when,  for  instance,  we 
consider  the  nature  of  love.  Love  is  revered  above 
all  else  in  its  immediacy,  its  first  estate;  and  yet  what 
do  we  mean  by  love  in  its  deeper  sense  if  not  that 
quality  which  is  perfected  through  the  years?  If  love 
be  "blind"  at  the  beginning,  it  is  clear-sighted  when 
matured  through  relationship  with  wisdom.  What 
people  adore  in  love  is  not  a  state,  a  fixed  condition, 
but  a  life  that  is  ever  renewed  and  for  ever  renews. 
The  literature  of  love  which  has  fascinated  the  ages 
is  the  mediation  of  this  wonderful  life  which  has  stirred 
men  all  along. 

But  our  conclusions,  although  at  this  point  coin- 
cident with  common  sense,  lead  in  two  directions. 
The  practical  man  will  return  to  the  clues  of  the  inter- 
preted immediate  with  renewed  conviction,  inasmuch 
as  he  can  now  rationally  single  out  the  clues  that  are 
worth  while.  The  religious  man,  for  example,  can 
believe  in  the  critically  discerned  immediate  presences 
of  the  spiritual  life,  while  rejecting  all  doctrines  which, 
like  mysticism,  are  reversions.  For  those  who  are 
interested  in  the  further  logical  development  of  the  im- 
mediate the  most  direct  clue  is  found  in  the  dialectic 
of  the  Hegelian  Idea.  For  if  Heraclitus  was  the 
prophet  of  the  immediate,  Plato  was  its  first  great  critic, 
and  in  the  idealistic  movement  from  Plato  to  Hegel 
one  finds  the  all-inclusive  philosophical  clue.  This 
does  not  mean  that  one  stops  with  Hegel,  but  that  he 
above  all  others  has  exhaustively  analysed  the  im- 

18 


274         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

mediate  and  developed  the  logical  forms  in  terms  of 
which  it  may  be  reflected;  it  is  he  who  furnishes  the 
proof  that  idealism,  not  sensationalism,  materialism 
or  mere  empiricism,  is  the  final  philosophy. 

In  Hegel's  philosophy  one  finds  a  constructive 
idealism  of  the  Spirit  which,  beginning  with  the  most 
meagre  moment  of  consciousness,  moves  forward  to 
the  Idea.  The  movement  is  through  Spirit  and  nature 
in  antithesis  to  their  union  in  the  Idea.  Nature  is  the 
process  and  the  transition  to  Spirit  reveals  the  ultimate 
truth;  in  nature  the  Idea  is  merely  potential,  not  con- 
sciously known;  in  the  Spirit  the  truth  of  that  which 
is  external  is  made  clear.  According  to  Hegel,  we 
possess  the  idea  of  God  already,  what  we  seek  is  its 
full  significance;  to  develop  this  meaning  is  to  propose 
the  Idea  and  develop  it  through  its  various  stages.  It 
is  the  nature  of  God  not  to  remain  merely  implicit, 
within  Himself,  but  to  manifest  Himself.  The  com- 
pleteness of  this  manifestation  is  the  absolute  Spirit. 
Nature,  the  world  of  consciousness,  the  finite  selfhood, 
are  forms  of  manifestation  of  God,  "embodiments  of 
the  divine  Idea." 

The  fundamental  issue  to  which  one  is  thus  led  is 
this:  Is  the  immediate  a  product  of  absolute  Thought, 
so  that  it  is  through  and  through  rational,  can  one 
deduce  nature  and  history  from  the  Idea;  or,  is  the 
immediate  a  given  somewhat,  a  datum,  an  irrational 
element,  which  our  thought,  starting  with  the  facts 
of  history,  must  mediate  as  well  as  it  can?  This  is  a 
subject  which  can  hardly  be  treated  without  a  technical 
study  of  the  profoundest  works  in  the  history  of 
thought,  and  hence  has  been  reserved  for  separate 
treatment  in  the  Supplementary  Essay. 

»  Cp.  Supplementary  Essay,  Sec.   19. 


An  Estimate  of  Mysticism  275 

Like  Santayana,  we  have  started  with  "the  im- 
mediate flux,  in  which  all  objects  and  impulses  are 
given,"  1  although  we  have  forthwith  denominated 
this  flux  "life"  and  interpreted  it  as  manifesting  the 
Spirit.  With  Santayana,  we  acknowledge  that  "the 
immediate  exists,  even  if  dialetic  cannot  explain  it."2 
But  inasmuch  as  a  doctrine  exists  which  makes  an 
attempt  absolutely  to  revert  to  the  immediate  as  ir- 
rational, it  would  seem  necessary  to  examine  that 
doctrine.  Moreover,  in  assigning3  to  emotion  an  or- 
ganic place  amidst  a  whole  we  apparently  passed  by 
the  most  striking  case  of  emotionalism  in  the  entire 
history  of  human  thought.  For  it  is  the  mystic  above 
all  others  who  claims  to  have  had  experience  of  the 
direct  presence  of  God,  and  mysticism  is  nothing  apart 
from  a  certain  interpretation  of  religious  emotion. 
Indeed  it  is  the  mystic  who  gives  rise  to  the  theory 
that  God  is  in  a  special  sense  directly  present  to  the 
human  soul.  It  is  surely  incumbent  upon  us  to 
examine  the  mystic's  assumptions.  The  foregoing  dis- 
cussions have  fully  prepared  the  way.  In  fact  we 
have  delayed  the  analysis  of  this  most  striking  case 
until  we  had  gathered  the  elements  of  a  criticism 
which  should  be  decisive.  This  delay  was  all  the 
more  necessary  inasmuch  as  our  conclusions  will  differ 
from  those  of  nearly  all  other  critics. 

In  general,  mysticism  implies  belief  in  a  religious 
experience  which  transcends  all  ordinary  under- 
standing. The  experience  is  supposed  to  bring  the 
soul  into  the  most  direct  relation  with  the  spiritual 
world  and  to  involve  the  most  intimate  communion 

i  Op.  cit.,  i.,  32. 

*Ibid,  p.  41.      On  chaos  as  a  starting  point,  see  ibid.,  pp.  35-43 

3  Chap.  IX. 


276          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

with  God.  Essentially  incommunicable,  the  experi- 
ence is  appreciable  only  by  those  who  have  enjoyed  it 
and  who  indicate  by  various  hints  that  they,  too,  have 
stood  on  holy  ground.  The  term  mysticism  is  of 
widespread  significance  and  is  not  necessarily  a  term 
of  reproach.  It  need  not,  for  example,  involve  a 
belief  in  the  identification  of  the  soul  with  God,  and 
does  not  always  eventuate  in  pantheism.  It  usually 
implies  a  radical  departure  from  worldly  ways,  but 
does  not  necessarily  involve  the  notion  that  the  world  is 
an  illusion.  The  mystic  may  be  a  Hindoo  ascetic  or 
a  mild-mannered  religious  devotee  of  a  well-known  type 
here  in  the  Western  world.  Usually,  however,  the 
mystic  in  whom  the  experience  is  strongly  enough 
marked  to  be  deemed  decisive  is  one  who  disparages 
both  the  human  intellect  and  the  human  self.  In- 
asmuch as  the  experience  seemingly  involves  the 
transcendence  or  suppression  of  discursive  reasoning, 
all  attempts  to  describe  it  in  rational  terms  are  given 
up  as  hopeless.  If  the  mystic  continue  to  believe  in 
his  own  selfhood  it  is  with  the  conviction  that  he  is 
nothing  and  God  is  all,  hence  God  alone  may  be  men- 
tioned. Alone  with  God,  he  is  so  far  absorbed  in 
beatific  contemplation  as  to  be  unable  to  give  any 
account  of  his  ecstasy  save  to  refer  to  it  as  essentially 
incommunicable.  In  other  words,  mystic  experience 
is  the  extreme  case  of  immediacy  and  mysticism  is 
immediatism  in  the  extreme;  to  know  its  reality  is 
not  to  analyse  and  define,  but  to  feel  and  enjoy. 

We  may  well  begin  our  study,  therefore,  by  refer- 
ence to  actual  experience.  The  following  is  from  a 
correspondent  whose  appeal  for  help  reads  like  a  voice 
from  the  middle  ages. 

I  write  you  in  almost  fearful  hope  that  I  have  found  a 


An  Estimate  of  Mysticism  277 

living  man  who  can  and  will  guide  me  in  my  efforts  to 
arrive  at  a  true  interpretation  of  a  religious  experience, 
which  no  one  seems  to  understand,  nor  I  myself,  and 
which  has  sent  me  a-wandering  o  'er  the  world  .  .  . 
bringing  me  in  conflict  with  all  established  systems  and 
institutions,  whether  practical  or  speculative.  ...  I 
have  been  brought  to  realise  that  I  am  a  mystic.  .  .  .  For 
some  years  I  have  been  struggling,  in  feeling  and  in  thought, 
with  profound  questions  of  religion  and  philosophy.  .  .  . 
Starting  with  the  fundamental  assumption  of  experience 
as  a  basis  of  all  knowledge  and  thought,  I  find  difficulty 
in  making  any  beginning  in  building  up  a  system  of  belief 
.  .  .  from  the  fact  that  my  own  experience  is  radically 
different  from  that  of  any  person  with  whom  I  ever  came 
in  contact.  I  may  say  that  the  following  lines  in  your 
book  [Man  and  the  Divine  Order]  were  the  inspiration 
of  this  letter: 

"The  intuitive  person  who  has  beheld  the  beatific 
vision  receives  no  sympathy  except  from  those  who  have 
also  stood  on  holy  ground.  It  is  right  to  cling  to  the  reality 
of  such  experiences  despite  all  scepticism  [p.  294].  .  .  . 
Why  does  a  single  insight  outweigh  the  authority  of  all 
arguments  which  apparently  make  against  it?  [p.  157]. 
...  It  may  seem  to  the  percipient  that  he  is,  in  very 
truth,  the  living  God  [p.  162].  .  .  .  The  experience  is 
incommunicable.  Although  it  is  not  to  be  known  in  terms 
of  thought,  it  may  be  known  from  itself,  by  having  it " 

[p.  158]- 

I  am  confronted  with  a  serious  practical  problem  of 
nullifying  my  own  experience — which  I  have  endeavoured 
to  do  in  vain, — or  of  finding  an  environment  on  earth  (in 
order  to  remain  thereon  in  any  peace  of  mind,  or  hope  of 
usefulness)  in  which  I  can  objectify  the  subjective,  and 
make  real  that  which  I  feel  is  true,  that  for  which  I  have 
suffered  worse  than  death. 

As  it  was  with  St.  Teresa,  I  need  a  "confessor,"  a  "di- 
rector" of  my  thought.  Thus  far  I  have  sought  in  vain 


278         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

until,  in  despair  and  desperation,  I  am  about  to  turn  my 
back  upon  the  world  in  which  I  have  tried  to  live  so  long; 
and  seek  the  peace  and  quietness  of  some  form  of  monastic 
seclusion — in  which  I  may  live  in  communion  with  departed 
spirits  who  felt  as  I  do — and  cherish  my  wild  dreams  and 
dear  delusions  until  released  from  the  bondage  of  the  flesh 
by  the  kindly  hand  of  Death.  You  may  or  may  not  sym- 
pathise with  and  respond  to  this  effort  to  find  a  kindred 
soul — one  to  whom  I  may  speak  in  the  fulness  of  my  love 
and  faith,  without  being  cruelly  tortured  and  misunder- 
stood; but  it  is  a  necessity  of  my  being.  .  .  . 

Among  others  whom  this  mystic  had  consulted,  he 
thus  speaks  of  those  who  have  engaged  in  psychic 
research : 

I  have  ever  felt  a  kind  of  repulsion  toward  those  "psy- 
chical societies, "  whose  endeavours  have  seemed  to  me 
to  be  uncanny  attempts  to  penetrate  divine  mysteries  with 
the  eye  of  the  intellect  alone — which  are  doomed  to  barren 
results;  for  it  is  not  through  the  senses,  but  through  the 
eternal  Spirit,  in  which  we  must  "live  and  move  and  have 
our  being,"  that  we  may  find  out  God.  The  keenest 
intellects  are  baffled  by  the  mysteries  that  are  laid  open 
to  the  eye  of  faith  and  heart  of  love;  for  indeed  are  "these 
things  hidden  from  the  wise  and  great,  and  are  revealed 
to  babes. "  I  hope  I  do  no  wrong  to  those  excellent 
gentlemen  who  are  engaged  in  such  pursuits. 

In  response  to  this  outpouring  I  wrote  that  it  was 
not  necessary  to  retire  into  monastic  seclusion,  nor 
to  "nullify"  the  experience  of  immediate  communion, 
but  rather  to  mediate  it  in  sympathetically  rational 
terms;  and  a  second  outpouring  came  as  follows: 

I  read  your  letter  with  deep  emotion ;  and  I  glance  with 
sacred  awe  into  a  future  that  is  fraught  with  tremendous 
consequences,  if  my  strange  experience  is  true — if  the 
vision  that  swept  over  me  in  the  long  ago  proves  to  be  a 


An  Estimate  of  Mysticism  279 

reality  and  not  a  mere  hallucination.  For  the  burden  that 
I  bear  seems  more  than  can  be  borne  by  one  man  alone — 
and  yet  all  attempts  to  share  it  have  proven  worse  than 
vain,  bringing  naught  but  strife  and  pain  to  self  and  others. 
If  it  be  not  delusion  (against  the  snares  of  which,  from 
within,  and  the  charges  of  which,  from  without,  I  have 
ever  struggled  in  bitterness  and  doubt) ,  if  the  insight  that 
guides  my  thought  is  not  the  fallacious  reasoning  it  is  pro- 
nounced to  be  by  the  world,  the  problems  of  my  life  are 
the  problems  of  the  age ,  and  their  solution  will  mean  some- 
thing to  mankind.  Oh!  I  hope  you  don't  misunderstand 
me;  and  if  I  go  beyond  you,  I  implore  you  to  have  patience 
and  faith ;  and  you  will  enable  me  thereby  to  sift  the  true 
from  the  false,  and  cling  to  it — as  no  other  will,  or  can. 
Believe  me,  it  is  only  the  blessed  Truth  I  seek;  and  to  die 
for  it  would  sweeten  the  torture  of  living  for  it!  I  feel 
the  terrible  responsibility  that  rests  upon  me — '-or  seems 
to — which  I  long  to  share  with  another,  or  be  freed  from, 
whether  it  be  real  or  imaginary.  But  I  am  driven  by  a 
power  I  cannot  all  control;  and  the  Spirit  of  the  Eternal 
demands  that  we  be  faithful  to  our  trust,  and  obedient 
to  what  we  believe  to  be  truth — or  perish  everlastingly. 

And  if  I  have  found  the  friend  I  have  looked  for  so  long 
—wandering  in  the  darkness  of  the  world,  swept  almost 
out  of  being  by  the  storms  that  have  broken  over  me — my 
joy  will  break  forth  in  an  ecstasy  of  delight,  which  I  shall 
endeavour  to  subdue  by  deeds  of  love  and  gratitude.  If 
you  could  know  my  sufferings  at  the  hands  of  faithless 
men,  in  my  life-long  search  for  a  friend — one  whom  I  could 
trust,  one  "with  whom  I  can  think  aloud" — you  would 
understand  what  otherwise  might  shock  and  repel  you. 
.  .  .  Through  "excess  of  self,"  I  have  lost  every  real 
friend  that  ever  came  close  to  that  which  I  actually  am — 
I  who  would  lay  down  my  life  for  my  friend,  if  I  had  one ! 
You  would  be  amazed  at  some  of  the  experiences  I  have 
been  through  in  relation  to  the  human  spirit,  in  a  life  that 
has  been  filled  at  times  with  intense  social  activity. 


280          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

Even  now,  I  stop  a  moment  to  question  if  you  will 
sympathise  with  this  outpouring.  But  I  know  that  if  you 
understand  at  all,  you  are  aware  that  the  self  must  be 
lost  in,  interpreted  by,  or  related  to  something  without  it, 
before  its  higher  energies  can  be  aroused,  its  real  strength 
and  interest  expressed  in  objective  form.  .  .  . 

As  you  may  perceive,  the  idea  of  reformation  is  a  vital 
part  of  my  nature  and  religion.  So  strong  is  this  desire  in 
me,  that  it  throws  me  out  of  all  harmonious  relation  with 
the  world  in  which  I  live — individually  and  otherwise.  I 
believe  in  "leaving  all  to  follow" — which  the  Church 
preaches;  but,  as  she  will  not  leave  all,  she  cannot  follow. 
The  practical  application  of  this  simple  doctrine  of  the 
Martyr  of  humanity  means  more  than  reformation:  it 
means  Revolution.  It  means  the  overturning  of  all  existing 
systems  and  institutions,  and  their  foundation  on  a  more 
lasting  basis.  And  this  must  be  done — to  satisfy  the 
demands  of  the  expanding  soul  of  man,  and  to  furnish 
the  Spirit  of  the  Eternal  a  habitation  and  a  home  on 
earth.  As  I  have  found  by  actual  experience  in  the  world, 
the  complete  reformation  of  a  single  human  life,  and  its 
establishment  on  the  higher  law  of  love  proclaimed  by 
Jesus  Christ,  would  bring  about  such  unfitness  between 
organism  and  environment  as  could  only  result  in  the 
extermination  of  the  former  or  the  transformation  of  the 
latter.  Which  shall  it  be?  The  progress,  nay,  the  sal- 
vation, the  continuance  of  the  human  race  depends  upon 
the  answer.  For  my  part,  individually,  I  have  left  all; 
but  have  not  been  able  to  follow  all  alone.  The  world, 
which  I  endeavoured  to  reform,  was  too  much  for  me ;  and 
I  have  not  yet  been  able  to  get  a  hold  on  any  existing  insti- 
tution, nor  individual,  with  whom  I  may  join  hands,  and 
"make  a  beginning  of  right  living"  in  the  light  of  the 
eternal  Truth  of  the  divine  Ideal,  that  shines  down  through 
the  darkness  of  the  ages  from  the  glorious  life  that  went 
out  on  the  Cross  of  Calvary. 

.  .  .  My  main  problem  seems  now  to  be  to  keep  body 


An  Estimate  of  Mysticism  281 

and  soul  together  in  a  world  that  seems  almost  bent  on  rend- 
ing them  asunder;  for  my  very  presence,  through  the  ideas 
that  possess  me,  seems  to  be  disturbing  to  the  peace  of  those 
with  whom  I  come  in  contact;  and  unintentionally,  un- 
consciously, instinctively,  they  turn  on  me,  like  animals. 
It  is  this  that  is  forcing  me  into  seclusion.  Among  the 
educated,  with  whom  I  have  spent  most  of  my  days,  I  am 
peculiarly  out  of  place.  To  one  who  loves  his  kind,  this 
is  very  painful;  but  I  suppose  it  is  better  for  the  develop- 
ment of  my  doctrines — which  must  be,  henceforth,  through 
study  and  reflection. 

To  meet  this  man  face  to  face  was  to  find  him  even 
more  on  fire  than  the  above  quotations  indicate.  He 
had  indeed  enjoyed  the  mystic's  vision,  with  all  its 
ecstasy.  But  not  being  of  a  merely  emotional  type, 
he  had  sought  to  relate  his  vision  with  prevalent  the- 
ories of  human  nature.  Everywhere  misunderstood, 
he  had  turned  so  violently  against  the  world  that  for 
him  the  existence  of  evil  was  the  central  problem, 
hence  his  bitterness  and  his  longing  for  monastic 
seclusion.  His  statements  exemplified  all  the  ex- 
cesses of  mysticism,  notably  that  of  attributing  to 
others  the  conditions  which  were  due  to  "  excess  of 
self."  Not  by  any  possible  persuasion  could  one  con- 
vince him  that  the  trouble  lay  within  himself,  not  with 
the  world. 

Yet  the  fault  was  not  wholly  his  own.  Strange  to 
relate,  it  was  within  the  walls  of  a  divinity  school  that 
he  had  been  most  deeply  misunderstood.  Of  all 
places  in  the  world,  such  a  school  is  the  one  where  the 
mystic  should  meet  sympathy.  There  he  should  be 
gently  dealt  with,  there  the  right  word  ought  to  be 
spoken  which  should  enable  him  to  organise  his  powers. 
To  condemn  a  man  as  "insane"  merely  because  he  is  a 


282          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

mystic,  and  because  mysticism  is  heresy,  might  indeed 
be  called  the  unpardonable  sin  of  a  theological  institu- 
tion. To  fail  to  understand  and  to  organise  mysticism 
is  to  fail  radically. 

Why  is  it  that  the  mystic  is  thus  ungently  treated? 
Why  is  mysticism  heresy?  In  the  first  place,  because 
the  mystic  claims  to  hold  direct  communion  with  God. 
This  assumption  appears  to  the  orthodox  theologian 
to  strike  at  the  root  of  all  beliefs  in  Christ  as  the  sole 
mediator,  as  well  as  to  undermine  the  conviction  that 
the  Bible  contains  the  only  authoritative  revelation. 
If  mysticism  be  universally  true,  any  one  could  hold 
communion  with  God.  Where,  then,  is  the  authority 
of  the  Church?  To  admit  the  validity  of  the  mystic's 
experience  were  to  put  the  first  emphasis  upon  ex- 
perience, but  dogmas  and  creeds  stand  first ;  not  a  word 
of  qualification  can  be  admitted.  In  the  second 
place,  mysticism  readily  runs  into  the  doctrine  that 
"all  is  God,"  and  pantheism  is  heresy,  while  Chris- 
tianity is  explicitly  theistic.  It  is  well  known  that  the 
pantheistic  tendencies  of  the  Christian  Church  were 
of  foreign,  mainly  Eastern,  origin.  To  admit  one 
premise  might  be  to  run  the  full  length  to  which  the 
mystic's  conclusion  carries.  It  matters  not  that 
mysticism  reappears  in  various  forms  and  hence  may 
be  said  to  express  human  nature  on  one  of  its  sides. 
Wherever  it  appears  it  is  replete  with  danger  to  estab- 
lished institutions  and  creeds. 

This  unsparing  theological  condemnation  is  seem- 
ingly strengthened  by  the  disparagement  which  mys- 
ticism receives  at  the  hands  of  moral  and  metaphysical 
philosophers.  It  is  well  known  that  mystic  doctrines, 
such  as  "All  is-  God,"  usually  involve  the  denial  of  all 
moral  distinctions,  the  reduction  of  all  ethical 


An  Estimate  of  Mysticism  283 

trasts  to  the  dead-level  proposition,  "all  is  good,  there 
is  no  evil,"  "whatever  is,  is  right";  and  belief  in  evil 
is  the  very  life  of  the  Church.  Even  when  mysticism 
does  not  involve  pantheism  it  is  ethically  objectionable, 
because  the  mystic  isolates  himself  from  his  fellows 
and  emphasises  the  via  negativa,  mere  self -purification, 
and  absolute  absorption  in  the  mystic  state.  Conse- 
quently mysticism  is  conveniently  classified  as  exempli- 
fying "the  abstract  universal"  and  as  conveniently 
dismissed. 

Metaphysically,  it  is  sharply  dealt  with  because  its 
Absolute  is  conceived  in  merely  negative  terms.  The 
mystic  claims  that  reality  is  knowable  only  through 
pure  immediacy,  mere  oneness  with  God,  in  which  all 
contrasts  between  subject  and  object  have  been  over- 
come. But  psychological  analysis  fails,  as  we  have 
conclusively  seen,  to  reveal  any  such  experience  as 
mere  immediacy.  The  mystic  experience  is  said  to 
be  mysterious,  beyond  all  rational  description.  But 
metaphysics  is  essentially  rational  and  finds  no  place 
for  mystery.  Once  more,  therefore,  mysticism  is  said 
to  represent  the  abstract  universal. 

Condemned,  disparaged,  the  mystic  can  find  no 
comfortable  place  on  earth.  Yet  he  cannot  be  wholly 
wrong.  The  main  fault  is  no  doubt  his.  Tempera- 
mentally one-sided,  emotional  in  the  extreme,  in- 
tellectually undeveloped  or  defective,  he  gives  so  poor 
an  account  of  his  experience  that  those  who  judge 
by  the  letter  find  no  positive  content  therein.  Hence 
he  is  supposed  to  be  a  sensuous  degenerate.  It  is 
not  strange  that  he  has  fared  ill. 

The  mystic's  experience  is  not,  however,  merely 
negative,  and  it  is  unfair  to  dismiss  it  without  ap- 
preciative examination.  Were  the  experience  nega- 


284          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

tive,  the  mystic  would  not  mind  the  ill-treatment  he 
receives.  It  is  so  far  overwhelming  that  the  mystic 
would  stake  everything  in  its  behalf.  The  difficulty 
is  that  the  experience  is  so  greatly  excessive  that  its 
percipient  is  unable  to  describe  it  in  sufficiently  mod- 
erate terms  to  win  attention.  But  let  a  man  who  is 
not  essentially  a  mystic  enjoy  the  same  type  of  ex- 
perience in  milder  degree  and  it  is  possible  not  only 
to  appreciate  but  to  interpret  the  vision,  to  succeed 
where  the  mystic  fails.  In  this  sense  it  may  be  said 
that  many  have  the  mystic's  experience.  Indeed, 
if  real,  this  experience  must  conform  to  a  type  of 
mental  life  which  every  intelligent  person  is  capable 
of  identifying. 

Regarded  without  prejudice  yet  appreciatively, 
there  appear  to  be  three  leading  misconceptions  in 
the  radical  mystic's  own  account  of  the  experience. 
The  mystic  declares  that  (i)  he  apprehends  God 
either  by  "becoming"  God  or  by  being  so  far  "one 
with"  Him  that  nothing  further  is  to  be  said;  (2)  the 
communion  is  an  experience  in  which  all  thought  is 
transcended;  and  (3)  this  ineffable  communion  or 
ecstasy  is  indescribable,  incommunicable. 

(i)  We  may  very  well  go  part  way  with  the  mystic 
and  declare,  not  that  the  finite  self  "becomes"  God, 
but  that  the  pure  in  heart  "see"  God,  apprehend  the 
realities  of  the  divine  love.  This  is  both  rational  and 
Christian.  In  various  books  of  the  Old  Testament 
and  throughout  the  New  Testament  the  verities  of 
mysticism  are  discoverable  without  the  excesses.  As 
a  child  of  God  one  may  hold  communion  with  Him, 
yet  still  possess  one's  finitude.  To  behold  the  glory 
of  the  Lord  need  not  be  to  turn  away  from  the  beauty 
of  the  world.  If  in  some  sense  of  the  word  the  incar- 


An  Estimate  of  Mysticism  285 

nation  of  the  Father  in  Jesus  have  special  significance, 
it  is  at  any  rate  through  personal  communion  that 
the  meaning  of  the  incarnation  is  appreciated.  Belief 
in  direct  communion  of  man  with  God  is  not  incom- 
patible with  belief  in  the  special  mission  of  Jesus. 
It  is  questionable  if  even  in  the  mystical  Fourth 
Gospel  any  of  the  excesses  of  mysticism  are  right- 
fully discoverable. 

(2)  Our  entire  inquiry  has  shown  that  there  is  no 
experience  in  which  thought  is  wholly  transcended — 
that  is,  there  is  no  mere  immediacy,  either  emotional 
or  of  any  other  sort.  The  mystic's  communion  is 
nothing  if  not  emotional,  and  we  have  found  that  it 
is  the  nature  of  emotion  to  fill  the  entire  horizon  as 
if  it  alone  were  real.  But  the  fact  that  an  experience 
completely  fills  the  mind  neither  proves  that  it  is  not 
the  fulfilment  of  the  experiences  which  went  before 
nor  that  its  reality  possesses  unique  significance. 
The  mystic  would  have  it  that  his  ecstasy  springs, 
as  it  were,  out  of  the  air,  an  absolute  gift,  absolutely 
real.  But  his  life  has  long  been  a  preparation  for 
just  that  experience.  He  has  his  methods  of  purifi- 
cation and  contemplation.  He  brings  to  the  ex- 
perience a  full  measure  of  expectancy.  Thus  it  is  in 
part  a  creation  of  his  own  thought,  it  is  mediated,  made 
possible  by  what  he  is  and  by  all  that  he  brings  to  the 
experience.  The  fact  that  in  the  supreme  moment 
of  ecstasy  the  conscious  expectancy  gives  place  to 
pure  realisation  by  no  means  implies  the  negation 
of  the  foregoing  preparatory,  interpretative  thought. 
His  experience  is  in  part  a  gift  and  in  part  the 
product  of  conscious  mental  life.  Even  in  case  it 
occur  without  conscious  expectation  on  the  mys- 
tic's part  it  is  a  fruition  of  his  temperament,  so 


286          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

that  to  know  what  he  is,  is  thus  far  to  mediate  the 
experience. 

(3)  But  since  the  mystic's  experience  is  analysable 
into  emotional  and  other  elements,  it  is  in  part  at  least 
describable.  To  accept  the  experience  as  wholly 
incommunicable  would  be  to  ignore  the  fact,  that  it  is 
given  amidst  a  mental  environment  which  can  be 
psychologically  described.  The  more  pronounced  the 
ecstasy  the  less  able  is  the  mystic  to  describe  it,  and 
an  experience  which  is  so  far  absorbing  that  there  is 
no  opportunity  to  give  attention  to  details  is  naturally 
difficult  to  recall.  But  the  greater  the  absorption 
the  more  reason  for  comparing  it  with  moderate  ex- 
periences, such  as  the  enjoyment  of  nature  or  of  art, 
in  which  there  is  opportunity  for  intelligent  recall. 

In  the  first  place,  the  experience  is  probably  like 
any  emotion  in  which  an  underlying  activity  gives  the 
decisive  direction.  In  this  case  the  activity  expresses 
eagerness  to  possess  God.  It  is  a  moment  of  attention 
which  for  the  time  knows  no  wavering.  Supervening 
upon  this  comes  the  emotion  which  gives  zest  to  the 
activity.  Then  there  is  the  feeling  of  happiness  that 
the  divine  presence  has  been  found. 

That  is  to  say,  there  is  first  an  experience  of  ineffable 
union,  then  a  sense  of  blessedness  and  an  uplifting 
emotion.  These,  occurring  simultaneously,  and  ful- 
filling an  intellectual  expectancy  in  terms  of  which 
the  experience  is  symbolically  mediated,  undoubtedly 
constitute  the  mystical  experience.  The  emotion 
would  conceivably  increase  in  intensity  according  to 
the  temperament  of  the  individual,  the  stress  put  upon 
mystical  blessedness  as  a  clue  to  reality,  and  the  inter- 
pretation put  upon  the  ineffable  union  when  regarded 
as  a  direct  revelation  of  God.  If  the.  mystic  possessed 


An  Estimate  of  Mysticism  287 

acuter  knowledge  of  himself  and  greater  power  over 
his  mental  states,  he  would  probably  be  able  to  in- 
hibit the  emotional  ecstasy,  retain  the  happiness  and 
sense  of  upliftment,  and  be  able  to  interpret  the  ex- 
perience in  moderate  terms.  If  the  implied  principle 
of  interpretation  happened  to  be  theistic,  the  emotion 
would  no  doubt  be  tempered,  would  be  such  as  a  con- 
ception of  the  divine  Father  would  call  forth.  A  more 
sensuous  experience  would  probably  give  rise  to  an 
overwhelming  emotion.  Hence  the  subject  might 
exclaim  in  his  intemperance,  ''all  is  God,"  pointing 
to  his  emotion  in  proof.  That  is,  the  emotion  which 
accompanies  the  immediacy  judged  to  bespeak  the 
divine  presence  is  no  doubt  the  chief  source  of  the 
excesses  of  mysticism.  In  some  cases  the  sensuous 
ecstasy  is  probably  temperamental,  hereditary,  na- 
tional; while  in  other  cases  the  preceding  thought  has 
tended  to  evoke  it.  In  the  more  intelligible  sense, 
the  ecstasy  is  apparently  due  to  the  eagerness  on  the 
recipient's  part  to  seize  every  atom  of  blessedness 
while  the  vision  lasts.  Hence  the  mystic  defeats  his 
own  object.  To  make  allowances  for  the  ecstasy,  to 
interpret  the  feeling  of  blessedness  philosophically, 
would  be  to  prepare  the  way  for  an  impartial  account 
of  the  experience.  Quiet,  passionless  contemplation 
would  seem  to  be  greatly  preferable.  To  control  the 
emotion  might  be  to  spread  the  sentiment  of  happiness 
so  far  as  not  only  to  avoid  reading  a  mystical  interpre- 
tation into  it  but  be  able  to  assimilate  it  into  one's 
daily  life.  It  would  still  be  the  peace  which  "passeth 
all  understanding,"  but  its  surpassing  beauty  would 
be  intelligible. 

When  due  allowances  have  thus  been  made  for  the 
excesses  both  of  the  experience  and  of  the  interpre- 


288          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

tat  ion,  what  remains  is  the  intelligible  proposition 
that  in  the  ineffable  union  there  were  no  obstacles 
that  separated  God  and  man,  that  man  holds  com- 
munion with  God  in  accordance  with  his  temperament 
and  his  belief.  That  the  actual  psychic  union  is 
incommunicable  might  reasonably  be  expected.  But 
so  is  any  experience  whatsoever,  to  the  extent  that 
the  experience  is  immediate — that  is,  psychically 
perceived.  The  calmest  emotion  is  as  non-trans- 
ferable as  the  most  exciting.  To  know  any  sensation, 
emotion,  feeling,  volition,  or  other  mental  state  as 
felt,  one  must  feel;  there  is  and  could  be  no  other  way. 
What  is  communicable  is  the  description  of  the  expe- 
rience, and  the  chief  difficulty  the  mystic  labours  under 
is  the  fact  that  his  experience  is  so  much  more  intense 
that  it  appears  to  be  of  another  kind,  hence  all  words 
fail  him.  The  mystic  is  skilled  neither  in  psychology 
nor  in  logic,  and  he  gives  as  faulty  an  account  of  the 
experience  as  could  well  be  made. 

There  are  various  approaches  to  the  divine  nature, 
different  communions.  Mysticism  selects  but  one. 

If  we  live  in  union  or  affinity  with  God  at  all  [says  Mar- 
tineau]1  it  must  be  in  several  relations,  not  in  one  alone; 
for  our  being  is  complex,  and  must  touch  His  at  every 
point.  We  suffer,  we  think,  we  will;  what  we  feel  is  the 
pressure  of  His  laws;  what  we  know  is  the  order  of  His 
reality;  what  we  choose  is  from  His  possibilities;  and  how 
can  there  fail  to  be  a  path  to  Him  from  the  sensitive,  the 
intellectual,  and  the  moral  passages  of  our  history? 

We  cannot  agree,  then,  with  those  who  so  severely 
characterise  mysticism  that  they  have  nothing  positive 
to  say.  For,  as  we  have  seen,  the  difficulty  is  not  that 

i  A  Study  of  Religion,  i.,   16. 


An  Estimate  of  Mysticism  289 

mysticism  is  empty,  but  that  mystic  immediacy  is  so 
compacted  with  content  that  the  mystic  is  unable  to 
do  aught  save  to  point  to  it.  The  most  one-sided  of 
men,  the  mystic  above  all  others  requires  the  sym- 
pathetic aid  of  the  appreciative  psychologist,  the  con- 
siderate logician,  the  moderate  theologian — one  who 
is  not  hunting  for  heretics, — and  above  all,  the  meta- 
physical thinker  who  shall  explain  what  the  mystic 
really  meant  to  say  when  he  declared  that  reality  is 
immediate. 

There  is  nothing  in  mysticism,  then,  that  leads  us 
to  modify  the  conclusions  of  the  foregoing  chapters. 
In  the  mystic  experience  the  presence  of  God  is  im- 
plied, but  so  it  is  in  the  great  world  of  nature:  the 
Spirit  is  not  limited  to  the  inner  life.  There  is  no 
reason  to  suppose  that  any  "faculty"  or  "power" 
is  active  that  is  not  present  in  other  experiences,  hence 
the  mystic  experience  is  neither  miraculous  nor  unique. 
That  God  is  immediately  present  is  no  doubt  known 
through  intuition,  but  this  intuition  is  of  the  well- 
known  intellectual  type — that  is,  it  is  an  insight,  a 
culmination  of  many  experiences  and  reflections,  a 
rich  product  susceptible  of  logical  analysis,  like  any 
other  intuition.  That  emotions  which  demand  the 
most  careful  scrutiny  are  present  is  too  obvious  to 
require  further  mention.  That  the  mystic  obeys 
what  to  him  is  a  sure  principle  of  guidance  which  even- 
tually leads  up  the  mountain  of  beatific  vision  is  no 
less  plain.  That  he  possesses  a  certain  faith  which 
has  its  perfect  fruition  in  this  same  vision  is  also  clear. 
What  is  least  obvious  is  that  the  mystic  has  awk- 
wardly employed  his  intellectual  powers,  and  has 
mediated  his  experience  so  that  his  theory  plays 
straight  into  the  hands  of  the  constructive  idealist. 


The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

What  the  mystic  should  say  is,  not  that  the  world 
is  illusion — this  is  the  conclusion  of  Hindoo  mystics — 
but  that  it  is  a  manifestation  of  Spirit,  hence  of  such 
stuff  as  intellectual  insights  are  made  of.  Instead  of 
turning  from  the  world,  he  ought  to  carry  to  unen- 
lightened man  the  glorious  news  of  the  realities  of  the 
Spirit.  Instead  of  condemnation  he  should  display 
love.  Instead  of  enlarging  his  own  selfhood  so  that 
the  whole  world  seems  to  have  gone  wrong,  he  should 
learn  the  open  secret  of  mysticism  all  through  the 
ages,  namely,  the  fundamental  malady  of  the  mystic 
is  that  he  takes  himself  too  seriously.  For  if  ever  the 
pathetic  fallacy  was  exemplified  here  it  is. 

It  should  be  plain  from  the  foregoing  that  we  are 
not  using  the  term  mysticism  with  respect  to  so-called 
mysteries,  such  as  the  trinity  and  the  incarnation. 
For  these  phases  of  religious  belief  we  reserve  the  term 
"values."  If  "the  blessed  trinity"  be  an  acceptable 
mystery  which  it  is  not  man's  province  to  inquire 
into,  it  is  for  those  who  accept  it  a  value  to  be  con- 
served. If  the  incarnation  be  beyond  all  comprehen- 
sion it,  too,  belongs  to  the  world  of  values.  We  have 
agreed  from  the  first  to  reserve  a  place  for  the  ac- 
complishment of  divine  ends  whose  conditions  man  may 
not  comprehend.  The  "Lord's  supper"  and  other 
forms  of  religious  observance  have  special  significance 
for  those  who  employ  them.  But  from  a  philosophical 
point  of  view  these  are  merely  particular  instances  of 
general  principles.  No  doubt  there  is  a  connection 
between  mystery  and  mysticism.  The  devotee  of 
mystery,  like  the  mystic,  prefers  to  retain  the  mystery 
in  its  unmediated  form.  The  rationalist  would  say, 
mediate  your  mystery,  resolve  it  into  its  elements, 
and  while  you  may  still  reserve  some  of  these  elements 


An  Estimate  of  Mysticism  291 

as  unanalysable  values  you  will  gain  in  understanding, 
mayhap  discard  some  of  the  mysteries. 

The  thorough-going  mystic  is  not  often  found  in 
these  days  outside  of  the  far  East,  and  the  problems 
of  mysticism  do  not  exist  for  the  average  religious 
devotee.  But  the  mystic  element  appears  in  the 
religious  hymns  and  poetry  of  the  ages.  Even  the 
most  moderately  stated  reminders  of  the  direct  pres- 
ence of  God  contain  the  same  element.  Every  genuine 
prayer  is  so  far  mystical  as  to  imply  sane  communion 
with  God.  The  act  of  worship  is  a  stage  in  the  mystic 
ascent.  The  hymn  of  praise  springs  from  the  thought 
of  God's  presence.  The  beatific  vision  of  the  poets 
is  a  more  refined  form  of  the  mystic's  ecstasy,  without 
the  pantheistic  implications. 

More  direct  still,  the  practical  mysticism  of  the 
ages  is  a  clue  to  what  is  sane  in  mysticism  at  its  height. 
The  " practice  of  the  presence  of  God"  implies  a  certain 
preparation  which  may  lead,  not  to  the  ecstatic  sum- 
mits, but  to  acts  of  divine  service.  The  trouble  with 
the  ecstatic  mystic  is  that  he  is  seized,  carried  away 
by  his  mood.  Were  he  sensible,  instead  of  sinking 
more  deeply  into  self-contemplation  he  would  turn  his 
consciousness  of  the  presence  of  God  to  practical 
account.  Fortunate  is  he  of  a  mystic  type  whose 
experience  is  spread  along  the  years  in  milder  form, 
so  that  he  can  at  will  realise  the  divine  presence,  so 
that  he  not  only  knows  the  way  up  but  the  way  down. 
To  ascend  to  the  mount  at  will  is  to  be  able  to  temper 
one's  zeal,  to  linger  there  and  enjoy  the  landscape, 
noting  its  details  so  that  one  may  recall  them  at 
leisure. 

A  poor  psychologist,  a  worse  logician,  the  mystic 
may  well  become  a  noble  servant  of  the  people.  For 


292          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

what  could  be  better  than  to  bear  within  the  soul  the 
consciousness  of  the  presence  of  God  in  such  wise  as 
to  manifest  that  consciousness  in  daily  life?  Surely, 
the  pragmatic  test  should  be  applied  to  mysticism. 
What  do  you  propose  to  do?  What  practical  con- 
sequences has  mysticism  for  your  life?  If  many 
mystics  have  failed  to  show  good  results,  the  time  is 
ripe  for  conduct  which  shall  show  that  the  mystic 
really  believes  what  he  professes.  Judged  by  its 
fruits,  the  mysticism  which  has  run  into  disparagement 
of  the  world,  mortification  of  the  body,  condemnation 
of  men,  belittlement  of  the  intellect — the  unpardon- 
able sin  of  mysticism — is  faulty  indeed:  that  it  im- 
plies "the  abstract  universal"  is  too  mild  a  form  of 
reproach.  But  the  mystic  needs  to  be  harnessed. 
If  by  some  good  fortune  you  are  able  to  persuade  him 
to  become  "as  a  little  child, "  you  may  lead  him  where 
the  needy  and  the  sinful  are  and  give  him  work  to  do. 
Without  the  mystic  in  the  general  sense  of  the  word 
how  would  we  ever  have  had  religion,  save  as  a  remote 
supernaturalism?  For,  plainly,  it  is  the  men  who  are 
fired  with  the  presence  of  God  who  stir  their  fellows 
out  of  worldliness.  It  is  well  that  the  mystics  have 
been  specialists.  Forgive  them  their  excesses  and 
recognise  the  work  they  have  wrought.  The  passion 
for  God  becomes  a  lost  emotion  every  now  and  then. 
Forthwith  there  arise  men  so  filled  by  this  passion  that 
they  are  fairly  beside  themselves  with  zeal.  They 
are  the  original  seers  who  behold  the  kingdom  at  first 
hand.  Few  in  any  age,  they  enjoy  the  greatest  of 
privileges.  From  them  power  goes  forth  into  the 
world,  so  that  uncounted  thousands  feel  it  and  respond. 
In  Jesus  we  behold  what  the  mystic  might  have  been 
had  he  risen  to  the  fulness  of  his  privilege. 


An  Estimate  of  Mysticism  293 

The  saying  that  " things  go  by  contraries"  is  well 
illustrated  in  the  case  of  mysticism.  The  mystic 
above  all  others  insists  that  God  is  first  and  last,  while 
the  self  is  naught.  Hindoo  mystics  especially  under- 
valuate  the  individual,  and  place  great  stress  on  hu- 
mility and  resignation.  Yet  by  a  subtle  irony  of  fate 
it  is  the  mystic  who  puts  himself  most  in  the  way,  so 
much  in  the  way  that  it  is  not  strange  that  the  reality 
of  mysticism  has  frequently  been  overlooked.  If  he 
who  would  "annihilate  the  self"  permits  it  to  be  most 
prominent,  then  in  truth  is  the  self  unescapable. 

The  lesson  of  mysticism  in  this  regard  plainly  is, 
since  the  self  is  a  hindrance,  understand  it  through 
and  through,  so  that  due  allowances  may  be  made 
for  the  deflecting  power  of  emotion,  the  subtle  play 
of  desire,  and  the  resistance  of  will.  If  the  self  be 
unescapable,  cultivate  it  to  the  full,  in  accordance 
with  the  Greek  ideal,  round  it  out  to  the  full  and  then 
offer  it  as  an  instrument  for  the  Spirit — well  knowing 
what  you  are  offering.  To  annihilate  the  self  were 
to  destroy  God  too.  He  who  loses  the  self  shall  find  it, 
that  is,  he  who  interprets,  not  he  who  tries  to  ignore; 
he  who  mediates,  not  he  who  endeavours  to  revert 
to  mere  immediacy.  If  there  be  pride,  talent,  desire 
for  personal  leadership,  originality,  belief  in  self— 
these  are  not  to  be  despised  but  to  be  consecrated. 
Their  "nothingness"  is  not  that  of  their  inherent 
qualities,  but  of  their  mere  immediacy,  the  first  form, 
which  must  be  transmuted.  When  the  self  tries  to  be 
somewhat  of  and  by  itself  it  fails,  it  is  literally  nothing. 
This  is  the  first  great  discovery  of  the  spiritual  life. 
The  second  is  the  one  for  which  mysticism  stands, 
namely,  that  God  is  all,  that  all  credit  belongs  with 
the  Holy  Spirit.  But  this  is  only  the  second  movement 


2 94         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

in  the  great  dialectic  of  the  Spirit.  The  third  is  the 
one  in  which  the  truths  of  the  other  two  are  unified, 
where  the  power  of  the  individual  is  seen  in  the  light 
of  the  glory  of  God. 

There  need  be  no  ultimate  conflict  between  the 
teachings  of  Greece  and  of  India.  Self-realisation  and 
self-disparagement  both  teach  their  lessons.  The 
harmonising  clue  is  found  in  the  fact  that  the  deep 
spiritual  experience  which  has  come  to  the  soul,  the 
test  of  faith,  the  leadership  of  guidance,  is  precisely 
that  which  prepares  the  way  for  the  best  expression 
of  the  individual.  The  purpose  of  God  is  expressed 
both  in  the  spiritual  trial  and  in  the  promptings  of 
intellectual  ambition.  We  help  to  make  ourselves 
individuals  by  the  act  of  faith  through  which  we  accept 
the  higher  guidance.  The  particular  experience  gives 
us  something  to  say,  something  to  do;  it  is  the  Spirit 
that  gives  the  carrying  power. 

The  abiding  truth  of  mysticism  is  the  great  fact  of 
the  presence  of  God,  the  environing  relationship  of  the 
eternal  spiritual  world.  The  mystic  may  be  chiefly 
mistaken  in  all  other  respects,  but  on  this  fact  he 
rightfully  insists.  One  would  not  go  to  him  to  be  told 
what  reality  is,  for  he  over-emphasises  the  importance 
of  immediacy.  He  is  not  a  moral  philosopher.  It  is 
difficult  either  to  use  or  to  teach  him.  He  is  surely 
wrong  in  insisting  that  his  experience  is  unique.  But 
it  is  very  profitable  to  analyse  his  doctrine  so  far  as  to 
learn  its  universal  elements.  We  return  not  only  to 
the  larger  truth  that  God  is  present  to  man's  entire 
nature,  but  with  increased  conviction  that  there  is 
nothing  that  excludes  you  or  me  from  that  presence. 
It  is  not  for  us  who  do  not  so  vividly  realise  the  divine 
presence  to  bemoan  our  fate,  as  if  we  were  cut  off  from 


An  Estimate  of  Mysticism  295 

the  Spirit.  It  is  no  doubt  unusual  to  be  so  profoundly 
aware  of  the  divine  presence  as  some  appear  to  be  who 
tell  how  deeply  they  were  stirred,  what  a  sense  of  up- 
liftment  the  experience  brought,  and  it  is  still  more 
unusual  to  have  the  beatific  vision.  But  we  who  can 
interpret  what  baffles  the  mystic  may  be  in  a  position 
the  better  to  serve  than  he.  There  is  some  truth  in  the 
statement  that  mysticism  is  a  reversion  to  sensualism. 
At  any  rate,  there  is  no  reason  to  envy  the  mystic. 

.If  none  of  us  is  deprived  of  the  presence  of  God,  it 
behooves  us  to  discover  what  form  that  presence  takes 
in  our  individual  experience.  If  one  is  of  the  intellec- 
tual type  rather  than  the  emotional,  the  chances  are  that 
the  idea  of  God  will  be  brought  near  to  the  soul  by 
philosophically  taking  thought  in  regard  to  the  under- 
lying reality,  the  fundamental  purpose  of  life.  There 
are  advantages  in  this  mode  of  approach  inasmuch  as 
the  way  lies  through  a  clearly  defined  country,  and  the 
possessions  of  thought  are  permanent  while  the  uplifts 
of  emotion  are  ephemeral.  If  you  can  so  far  read  the 
meaning  of  your  soul's  travail  as  to  conclude  that  the 
power  of  God  has  had  a  hand  in  it,  you  have  won  a 
possession  which  is  at  once  stable  as  compared  with 
the  stirrings  of  emotion  and  secure  from  the  point 
of  view  of  systematic  thought.  These  conclusions 
will  become  more  certain  when  we  examine  the  evi- 
dences for  divine  guidance,  and  the  nature  and  the 
sources  of  faith. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

GUIDANCE 

WE  may  now  regard  our  investigation  as  completed 
so  far  as  special  claims  in  behalf  of  unique  faculties 
and  experiences  are  concerned.  In  each  case  we  have 
found  that  the  special  claims  involve  a  measure  of 
truth,  but  we  were  unable  to  discern  that  truth  until 
we  eliminated  various  misconceptions.  The  gain  was 
great  inasmuch  as  we  vindicated  the  conviction  that 
the  Spirit  is  present  to  all  sides  of  man's  nature.  The 
authority  of  the  Spirit  proved  to  be  no  less  when  dele- 
gated to  man's  nature  at  large,  when  transferred  from 
a  special  "sense"  to  the  universalising  power  of  re- 
flection. The  reality  of  the  Spirit  was  equally  great, 
although  we  reduced  the  vague  "feeling"  through 
which  the  Spirit  was  said  to  be  revealed  to  numerous 
principles  and  elements.  The  authority  is  discoverable 
through  reason  and  vindicated  by  its  fruits;  while  the 
reality  is  discovered  through  analysis  and  comparison 
of  experiences.  There  is  a  part  of  our  nature  which 
is  supreme  over  the  rest,  but  it  is  supreme  because  there 
is  a  hierarchy  of  inseparable  powers.  That  is  to  say, 
it  is  not  a  question  of  independent  senses  or  faculties, 
but  of  a  series  of  intimately  related  powers.  God 
may  well  be  directly  present  to  the  sentient  side  of  our 
nature.  But,  if  so,  this  does  not  mean  the  singling 
out  of  a  distinctive  spiritual  sense ;  it  means  that  there 
is  an  element  of  sentiency  in  all  experience,  not  absent 
even  when  we  will  or  reason.  Moreover,  our  study  of 

296 


Guidance  297 

immediacy  showed  that  there  is  no  mere  sensation,  as 
supposably  experienced;  even  perception  is  in  part  a 
theoretical  construct. 

God  may  indeed  speak  through  a  "voice,"  but  no 
such  possession  is  found  on  inspection;  the  "voice" 
is  an  experience,  given  in  a  context,  and  interpreted  to 
be  the  voice  of  God.  The  power  of  God  is  surely 
immanent  in  conscience,  but  it  requires  analytical 
discernment  to  discover  it  amidst  the  inconsistent 
wealth  of  utterances  made  in  the  name  of  conscience. 
Again,  God  is  revealed  through  intuition,  but  pure 
intuition  is  an  ideal;  actual  intuitions  are  like  the 
"voices"  whose  complexities  require  analytical  me- 
diation. Emotion  withstands  the  test  of  the  most 
severely  critical  study,  inasmuch  as  love  itself  is  an 
emotion,  and  it  is  emotion  that  drives  us  forth  to 
experience.  But,  like  intuition,  the  mere  immediacy 
of  emotion  is  incompetent  to  reveal  its  worth  and 
reality.  Emotion  is  felt  towards  something,  love  is 
love  for  some  end;  to  state  the  end  in  sympathetically 
rational  terms  is  greatly  to  enrich  its  value.  Mere 
emotion  is  unaware  of  its  own  meaning.  Mysticism 
is  an  attempt  to  state  that  meaning;  but  mysticism, 
we  have  seen,  is  an  immediatism,  and  immediatism 
thinks  it  has  preserved  the  immediate  unaltered. 
God  is  no  doubt  as  surely  present  as  the  mystic  believes, 
but  He  is  present  in  an  ineffable  immediacy  which 
may  be  compared  to  pure  white  light;  whereas  what 
human  beings  feel  and  know  is  an  interpreted  im- 
mediacy as  rich  as  the  prismatic  colours. 

Each  of  these  deliverances  of  the  receptive  side  of 
our  nature  is,  therefore,  real,  contains  truths,  values; 
the  spirit  of  man  is  in  direct  relation  with  God.  But 
these  immediates  do  not  possess  the  independence 


298         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

which  is  popularly  attributed  to  them.  There  is  no 
mere  immediacy,  no  " thing  in  itself,"  no  intuition  or 
pronouncement  by  itself;  every  thing,  every  ex- 
perience, or  product  is  given  amidst  relations  and  is 
intelligible  only  so  far  as  rationally  interpreted  with 
reference  to  these  relations.  What  we  mean  when 
we  revert  to  the  immediate,  eulogise  " feeling,"  or  ad- 
vise a  return  to  spontaneity,  is  interpreted  experience; 
and  all  such  experience  is  susceptible  of  varied  interpre- 
tations. Hence  it  becomes  a  question  of  the  right 
interpretation,  and  to  discover  this  we  must  have  a 
philosophy.  Inasmuch  as  it  is  reason,  and  reason 
only,  that  interprets,  no  study  of  the  higher  nature  of 
man  is  complete  without  taking  into  account  the 
nature  and  value  of  reason.  Intuition,  emotion, 
feeling,  need  not  be  any  less  productive,  but  their 
independence  has  been  taken  from  them.  One  may 
still  accept  a  teaching  because  it  "appeals"  to  the 
mind,  but  once  having  raised  the  question  one  is  little 
likely  to  give  allegiance  without  distinguishing  be- 
tween the  personal  equation  and  the  given  doctrine, 
without  separating  the  mere  impression  from  the 
ignorance  which  it  may  imply.  In  short,  there  will 
be  a  gradual  progress  from  "feeling"  to  reason,  from 
mere  immediacy  to  discriminative  thought. 

In  turning  to  the  subject  of  guidance  we  know  very 
well,  therefore,  what  to  expect.  We  have  no  reason, 
for  example,  to  look  for  guidance  which,  like  a  "blind 
instinct,"  is  complete  in  itself.  But  there  surely  is 
guidance  that  is  produced  through  our  total  nature. 
The  evidence  for  it  is  found  by  consulting  human 
experience  in  a  sympathetic  attitude.  We  may  well 
regard  such  experience  at  first  very  much  as  it  is 
known  by  those  who  uncritically  accept  it.  There  can 


Guidance  299 

be  no  doubt  that  many  experiences  and  insights  have 
the  value  of  guidance  for  those  who  pursue  the  spiritual 
life.  Fortunate  shall  we  be  if  we  can  lift  our  philosophy 
to  the  level  of  conduct  of  those  who  already  live  by 
"divine  guidance." 

It  is  plain  that  the  results  thus  far  attained  bear 
directly  on  the  question  of  the  nature  and  authority 
of  guidance.  If  we  had  taken  intuition  to  be  merely 
what  it  is  ordinarily  supposed  to  be,  as  directly  au- 
thoritative, our  theory  would  be  relatively  simple. 
We  should  then  deem  guidance  a  mere  gift  or  mystery. 
But  inasmuch  as  the  authority  attributed  to  intuition 
has  proved  to  be  that  of  illumined  reason,  not  of  mere 
''feeling,"  or  uninterpreted  experience,  it  is  clear  that 
what  we  have  to  say  about  guidance  will  also  come 
under  the  head  of  interpretation.  This  does  not  imply 
the  rejection  of  guidance  either  as  a  fact  of  experience 
or  as  a  practical  incentive  to  action. 

We  have  thus  far  been  concerned  with  beliefs  in 
the  general  existence  of  a  higher  order  of  being.  With 
the  acceptance  of  guidance  as  a  fact  in  the  religious 
life  we  advance  to  the  position  that  a  higher  order  is 
not  only  around  us  but  that  out  of  its  recesses  there 
proceed  leadings  which  pertain  to  successive  purposive 
experiences.  That  is,  we  approach  the  question  of 
divine  providence,  of  teleology.  Here  as  elsewhere 
we  must  depend  on  the  witness  of  the  Spirit,  in  the  face 
of  criticism  which  would  laugh  to  scorn  those  who 
believe,  themselves  divinely  led.  Too  many  all  down 
the  ages  have  claimed  to  be  guided  "from  above" 
to  permit  us  to  doubt  the  practical  reality  of  the  ex- 
perience known  as  guidance,  although  we  may  take 
exception  to  some  of  the  theories  brought  forward  in 
its  interpretation.  From  one  point  of  view,  it  is  the 


300          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

fact  of  guidance  which  underlies  the  entire  empirical 
approach  to  a  philosophy  of  the  Spirit.  Hence  we 
must  make  full  allowance  for  its  value. 

The  term  "guidance"  might  be  taken  in  a  variety 
of  senses,  varying  from  the  promptings  of  instinct, 
the  indications  which  Nature  gives  of  her  prudence,  to 
the  highest  moments  of  illumined  insight.  Experience 
in  general  is  a  guide,  the  wise  lead  the  less  wise,  and 
the  guidance  of  common  sense  is  always  available. 
There  are  also  abundant  sources  to  draw  upon  in  the 
literature  of  the  ages.  But  it  is  desirable  to  employ 
the  term  as  indicative  of  experience  whose  source  is 
in  part  other  than  that  of  the  ordinary  channels  of 
instinct,  investigation,  and  reasoning.  As  thus  used 
the  term  relates  to  any  item  of  wisdom,  any  "leading" 
which  pertains  to  the  conduct  of  life,  its  immediate 
needs,  and  ideal  interests.  The  line  between  ordinary 
thought  and  guidance  is  difficult  to  draw,  and  in  the 
light  of  the  foregoing  discussions  one  would  not  expect 
to  discover  a  sharp  line  of  distinction.  The  term 
ordinarily  implies  belief  in  the  existence  of  higher 
powers  or  presences  and  the  capacity  of  man  to  obtain 
wisdom  for  special  occasions,  either  through  the  exer- 
cise of  unwonted  receptivity  or  through  the  spontaneous 
leadings  of  the  inner  life.  The  results  of  our  investi- 
gation will  perhaps  justify  this  use  of  the  term. 

Guidance  is  obtainable  through  the  whole  mind, 
and  when  one  seeks  it  one  brings  to  the  experience 
whatever  life  holds  up  to  the  moment  in  question. 
Guidance  is  a  clue  or  leading  for  its  recipient  to  follow, 
for  experience  to  confirm,  or  for  later  clues  to  modify. 
It  is  most  apt  to  be  a  distinct  experience  for  those 
who  have  preserved  a  well-nigh  unquestioned  belief  in 
the  divine  fatherhood.  Intuition  is  a  phase  of  it — 


Guidance  301 

that  is,  all  higher  guidance  is  intuitive.  The  term 
"inner  light"  is  closely  identified  with  it.  But  the 
term  itself  refers  not  so  much  to  the  general  intuitive 
ability  of  the  mind,  the  light  shining  from  within, 
as  to  the  leading  which  is  intuitively  given,  the  defi- 
nite message  or  authoritative  utterance.  Guidance 
is  essentially  an  experience,  or  comes  amidst  an  ex- 
perience, apart  from  which  it  would  be  unintelligible. 

We  may  distinguish  several  types  of  guidance, 
according  to  the  sources  to  which  it  is  attributed  and 
the  method  by  which  it  is  sought. 

In  the  first  place,  there  is  the  guidance  which  is 
attained  through  conscious  receptivity,  silence,  prayer- 
ful listening,  consecrated  openness  of  mind  and  heart, 
deep  longing  to  know  and  to  do  what  is  right.  The 
characteristic  of  this  type  of  guidance  is  that  it  is 
obtainable  through  voluntary  activity.  As  a  pre- 
liminary to  such  receptive  listening  as  may  be  deemed 
essential  one  may  have  sought  the  counsel  of  friends, 
or  argued  the  case  pro  and  con.  But  when  the  time 
comes  for  the  final  decision  the  believer  in  the  inward 
light  withdraws  into  the  solitude  of  nature,  or  to  a 
quiet  room  away  from  people  and  their  atmospheres, 
influences,  and  persuasions.  The  mind  may  still  be 
engaged  in  a  process  of  testing  or  weighing,  but  the 
process  is  not  now  explicitly  argumentative;  it  is 
rather  a  process  of  seeking  the  harmonies  and  fitnesses 
of  the  matter  in  question,  a  casting  about  in  quest  for 
the  line  of  action  which  unmistakably  accords  with 
the  highest  ideal.  A  person  may,  for  example,  look 
ahead  in  imagination  to  discover  what  one  of  several 
proposed  plans  arouses  favourable  impressions.  Or, 
less  actively,  one  may  bear  several  possibilities  in  mind 
in  a  quiet  way,  while  roaming  over  the  hills  or  idly 


302          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

looking  at  books.  The  aim  is  to  discern  the  finer 
leadings  which  make  themselves  known  when  the 
mind  is  less  active,  when  the  whole  personality  is 
spontaneously  at  play. 

The  contemplation  of  various  possible  courses  of 
action  serves  to  keep  the  mind  sufficiently  alert,  in 
the  preliminary  stage.  The  mind  once  rightly  di- 
rected, the  next  step  is  the  kind  of  responsiveness 
amidst  which  one  may  discern  the  appropriate  leading. 
The  ultimate  ideal  is  the  discovery  of  the  divine  will. 
Hence  one  is  ready  to  forego  all  plans  of  one's  own. 
One  believes  that  at  each  hour  of  the  day  there  is  a 
line  of  activity  which  most  directly  accords  with 
the  divine  purpose.  What  the  wisest  action  is  in 
the  given  case  one  hopes  to  learn  by  dwelling  upon  the 
divine  ideal  as  nearly  as  one  can  conceive  it,  and  by 
quietly  brooding  over  the  situation.  These  quiescent 
mental  states  are  sure  to  be  instructive,  for  one  at 
least  discovers  by  a  process  of  elimination  what  courses 
of  action  do  not  accord  with  what  has  been  accepted 
as  the  divine  ideal.  Then,  too,  one  learns  by  contrast 
with  previous  experiences  of  the  same  type  what 
progress  has  been  made  meanwhile.  Sometimes  one 
arrives  at  a  clearly  defined  conviction.  But  again  the 
mind  may  glide  almost  insensibly  into  what  proves 
to  be  the  right  course,  and  one  hardly  realises  that 
a  decision  has  been  reached  until  one  begins  to  act. 
The  acceptable  guidance  may  be  either  a  confessedly 
rational  conclusion  or  an  immediate  leading  whose 
value  is  seen  by  its  fruits.  But  in  any  event  the  guid- 
ance is  accepted,  and  acceptance  means  judgment, 
hence  involves  responsibility  on  our  part. 

The  guidance  is  frequently  negative  rather  than 
positive.  That  is,  one  is  not  shown  decisively  what 


Guidance  303 

to  do.  The  absence  of  positive  guidance  may  some- 
times be  taken  as  an  indication  that  one  already  knows 
what  is  right,  hence  that  it  is  high  time  to  make  use 
of  the  wisdom  already  at  hand.  Or  the  guidance  may 
come,  like  "the  certain  divine  sign"  of  Socrates,  by 
way  of  restraint.  Possibly  it  is  a  mere  impression 
for  which  one  can  see  no  reason,  but  which  when 
followed  proves  to  be  entirely  worthy  of  acceptance. 
The  absence  of  a  reason  may  be  as  significant  as  its 
presence. 

In  the  second  place,  there  are  guidances  which 
come  into  the  mind  unsought  but  possibly  in  response 
to  previous  quests — that  is,  as  a  result  of  subconscious 
activity  or  during  the  greater  receptivity  of  the  hours 
of  sleep.  Such  guidances  are  most  likely  to  come 
as  it  were  "out  of  a  clear  sky,"  with  no  apparent 
connection  with  any  conscious  train  of  thought.  It 
simply  appears  plain  that  a  certain  course  of  action 
is  right.  The  moment's  flash  of  insight  illumines 
the  pathway,  and  for  the  time  the  mind  is  in  possession 
of  the  wisdom  that  is  especially  applicable  to  the  given 
situation.  There  is  nothing  more  to  say,  nothing  to 
argue.  The  way  is  clear,  unmistakable.  The  guid- 
ance may  come,  for  example,  in  the  form  of  a  distinct 
sentence  embodying  the  needed  wisdom  and  bearing 
the  clearest  sort  of  conviction  that  it  is  decisive. 
The  sentence  does  not  seem  to  be  uttered  by  any  one. 
Nor  does  it  appear  to  be  the  utterance  of  one's  sub- 
liminal self.  Unassociated  with  any  personality,  it 
flashes  into  the  mind,  a  message  of  convincing  wisdom. 
An  intuitive  utterance,  it  is  the  succeeding  months  or 
years  which  prove  its  wisdom. 

In  the  third  place,  we  may  distinguish  the  guidance 
which  comes  from  some  person,  usually  a  friend  or 


304         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

teacher.  The  friend  may  or  may  not  know  that  he  is 
uttering  words  of  wisdom  that  strike  at  the  heart  of  the 
matter.  Givers  of  such  guidance  sometimes  insist 
that  they  do  not  know  why  they  insist  upon  what  they 
are  prompted  to  say,  but  the  leading  came  and  they 
obeyed,  they  were  so  "moved."  Again,  those  who 
come  with  such  guidances  almost  force  themselves 
upon  one's  notice,  until  their  message  be  delivered. 
Sometimes  they  come  with  a  distinct  warning.  The 
one  who  is  warned  may  be  under  a  spell,  at  the  mercy 
of  another's  mind,  too  active,  or  mayhap  too  fatigued 
to  see  clearly.  The  message  may  strike  home  at  once 
and  awaken  the  soul  from  its  spell.  Or,  perhaps  the 
wise  word  seems  far  from  right  when  first  heard,  perhaps 
it  is  rejected  or  combated,  but  presently  forces  its 
way  so  into  consciousness  that  the  mind  must  give 
it  credence.  The  friend  who  utters  the  word  may  or 
may  not  be  able  to  give  a  reason  for  it.  It  is  the  proof 
of  its  wisdom  in  actual  results  which  shows  its  character. 
Then,  in  the  fourth  place,  however  objectionable  to 
those  who  profess  no  interest  in  the  implied  beliefs, 
one  must  reserve  a  place  for  guidances  which  are 
definitely  associated  with  friends  who  have  passed  out 
of  the  flesh,  and  for  so-called  angel  guidances.  The 
recipient  of  such  guidance  is  not  always  able  to  assign 
the  prompting  to  the  appropriate  personality.  Yet 
the  wise  word  is  unmistakably  uttered  from  outside, 
accompanied  by  a  spiritual  presence,  a  supernal  in- 
timation which  is  unmistakable,  which  withstands  the 
test  of  sceptically  critical  mediation.  Oftentimes  the 
message  comes  in  the  form  of  a  distinct  sentence  spoken 
as  if  into  the  ear.  It  plainly  does  not  come  by  thought 
transference  from  some  one  in  the  flesh.  It  is  not  a 
mere  uprush  from  the  subliminal  region,  an  impersonal 


Guidance  305 

product  of  subconsciousness,  but  is  unmistakably 
personal.  Some  people  are  so  well  aware  of  such 
guidances  that  they  attribute  nearly  all  to  some  one 
person,  or  to  the  same  "angel  guide,"  who  seems  to 
have  one's  complete  welfare  lovingly  and  wisely  at 
heart.  To  doubt  these  messages,  or  to  endeavour 
to  reduce  them  to  the  mere  machinations  of  one's 
own  mind,  would  be  to  deny  a  series  of  experiences 
which  for  their  possessor  are  as  real  as  life  itself,  per- 
haps the  most  significantly  real  of  all  the  experiences 
of  life. 

Such  leadings  or  warnings  sometimes  come  at  about 
four  o'clock  in  the  morning,  the  hour  already  mentioned 
as  the  time  when  the  physical  organism  offers  less 
resistance  and  the  mind  is  more  receptive.  For  ex- 
ample, take  the  case  of  one  wrho  was  awakened  three 
times  at  this  hour  during  one  month  by  the  same 
message,  associated  with  the  same  angelic  personality. 
The  recipient  of  these  insistent  messages  finally  obeyed 
the  summons,  which  came  in  the  form  of  an  imperative 
warning,  and  when  he  followed  it  found  that  the  guid- 
ance was  indeed  the  utterance  of  superior  wisdom. 
He  explained  his  unusual  obstinacy  on  the  ground 
that  his  mind  was  greatly  absorbed  in  an  important 
intellectual  task,  in  an  environment  which  did  not 
greatly  favour  receptivity. 

Again,  the  guidance  may  come  in  decisive  restraint 
at  one  of  those  crucial  moments  of  life  when  character 
is  made  or  unmade.  Here  is  a  young  woman,  for 
example,  whose  whole  life  is  altered  by  such  a  re- 
straining presence.  Here  is  a  young  man  of  promise 
who  is  sorely  tempted  by  influences  which  are  ap- 
parently about  to  overwhelm  him.  Suddenly,  without 
the  least  warning,  without  conscious  receptivity,  and 


306         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

without  prayer,  on  the  recipient's  part  the  angelic 
personality  conies  between,  turns  the  youth  from  the 
enticement,  and  gives  him  a  higher  impetus.  Such 
experiences  may  not  come  oftener  than  two  or  three 
times  in  a  lifetime,  but  they  are  sufficiently  real  and 
authoritative  to  form  the  basis  of  an  entire  spiritual 
creed.  These  experiences  are  to  be  ranked  above  the 
intuitions  which  we  have  subjected  to  criticism.  They 
are  overwhelmingly  convincing  experiences  in  which 
a  wiser  person's  power,  not  one's  own  mere  judgment 
and  will,  decides.  It  is  a  source  of  great  satisfaction 
that  there  are  at  least  these  few  guidances  which  so 
stand  out  as  to  be  utterly  unassailable.  All  the  scep- 
ticism which  years  of  study  enables  the  mind  to  en- 
gender is  unable  to  shake  one's  conviction  in  the 
authoritative  reality  of  these  superior  presences — so 
one  hears  people  say  who  have  been  fortunate  enough 
to  enjoy  such  experiences.  "There  are  really  angels," 
they  insist,  "they  are  no  figments  of  the  imagination, 
not  hypothetical  entities  postulated  by  way  of  medi- 
ation of  one's  insights.  They  are  real  beings.  Their 
guidances  are  real  facts,  facts  to  be  reckoned  with  in 
rearing  the  structure  of  one's  philosophy." 

Does  the  coming  of  such  guidance  imply  that  the 
recipient  of  it  is  specially  favoured?  It  is  difficult  at 
times  to  avoid  thinking  so.  Yet  these  guidances  are 
not  miraculous,  they  correspond  with  the  higher, 
partially  dormant  nature  of  the  soul  not  yet  fully  aware 
of  the  divine  ideal.  The  guidances  become  more 
distinct  when  the  one  who  receives  them  has  reached 
the  level  of  consciousness  where  he  is  distinctly  able 
to  recognise  them.  But  they  undoubtedly  exist  for 
all.  Possibly  we  are  many  times  led,  if  not  almost 
coerced,  when  we  believe  we  are  acting  solely  of  our- 


Guidance  307 

selves.  If  the  angels  ever  utter  a  lament  it  is  prob- 
ably because  they  find  it  supremely  difficult  to  win  our 
attention,  engaged  as  we  are  in  all  sorts  of  activities. 

Finally,  we  note  the  guidances  which  are  directly 
associated  with  the  presence  of  the  divine  Father.  To 
be  sure,  the  religious  devotee  believes  that  all  guidance 
bespeaks  the  presence  of  the  Father.  But  we  have 
pointed  out  in  the  foregoing  chapters  that  the  Father 
manifests  His  wisdom  through  some  instrumentality, 
and  the  channel  becomes  purer,  as  one  ascends  the 
scale  of  guiding  experiences,  until  a  point  is  reached 
where  one  can  no  longer  assign  even  secondary  causes 
or  describe  the  conditions.  Sometimes  our  own  con- 
sciousness is  the  channel.  Again,  it  is  not  our  active 
thought  but  our  childlike  subconscious  receptivity. 
Anon,  it  is  the  word  of  a  friend,  and  again  the  irresisti- 
ble guidance  of  a  discarnate  soul  or  angel.  The  com- 
mon characteristic  of  all  these  forms  of  guidance  is  the 
conviction  that  the  guidance  is  right,  contains  a  higher 
wisdom,  that  the  mind  which  utters  it  speaks  better 
than  we  consciously  know.  The  consciousness  that 
the  wisdom  is  higher  than  ours  is  at  first  implicit,  but 
the  implicitness  is  an  earnest  of  what  is  presently 
to  become  plain.  The  channel  of  communication  is 
secondary,  the  ultimate  source  is  divine. 

There  are  doubtless  some  misconceptions  to  be 
guarded  against  in  the  guidance  which  is  more  directly 
referred  to  the  divine  Personality.  For  example,  here 
is  a  teacher  who  claims  that  God  bids  him  cease  teach- 
ing school  and  take  up  the  study  of  theology.  He 
further  insists  that  God  distinctly  told  him  to  go  to  a 
certain  divinity  school.  Now,  the  school  in  question 
may  prove  to  be  the  wrong  one.  The  mistake  lay 
not  with  God,  not  with  the  guidance,  but  with  the  man 


308          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

who  read  too  much  into  the  immediacy  of  his  guidance. 
That  the  man  was  divinely  led  to  take  up  a  line  of 
work  more  nearly  in  accord  with  his  soul's  purpose 
one  can  well  believe.  But  granted  the  central  guid- 
ance, it  would  probably  rest  with  the  man  who  re- 
ceived it  to  determine  where  to  carry  it  into  execution, 
in  accordance  with  the  methods  which  we  have  made 
mention  of  above.  The  fact  that  one  decided  to  enter 
one  divinity  school  in  preference  to  another  might 
well  express  one's  own  judgment,  after  various  plans 
of  study  had  been  submitted  to  quiet  moments  of 
brooding  reflection. 

By  this  highest  type  of  guidance  one  does  not  mean 
the  form  but  rather  the  spirit  of  the  prompting  that 
distinguishes  it  from  the  others.  It  is  not,  for  ex- 
ample, like  the  leading  which  seemingly  guides  a 
person  to  open  the  Bible  at  an  appropriate  place,  but 
is  rather  the  upwelling  of  the  highest  spontaneity,  a 
supreme  moment  of  illumination,  a  prompting  of  the 
Holy  Spirit.  Like  the  noblest  messages  that  come  from 
the  "angels,"  such  guidances  come  by  a  law  of  the 
unexpected.  So  far  as  one  may  reasonably  look 
forward  to  them,  it  is  with  the  probability  that  they 
will  come  when  we  least  anticipate  yet  when  we  most 
need  them.  Such  guidance  is  plainly  a  gift,  somewhat 
that  comes  not  because  we  seek  it  but  because  it  seeks 
us.  It  is  due  to  the  "divine  grace" — not  the  super- 
natural grace  of  old,  but  the  grace  of  the  divine  love 
and  wisdom,  ever  ready  to  meet  all  human  needs,  as 
plentiful  and  universal  as  the  sunlight. 

The  various  types  of  guidance  mentioned  above 
might  possibly  be  reduced  to  two,  that  is  (i)  those 
that  come  in  response  to  desire  or  search  on  our  part; 
and,  (2)  those  that  come  unsought,  whether  from 


Guidance  309 

friends  in  the  flesh  or  from  a  higher  source.  It  might 
even  be  said  that  all  guidance  is  due  to  desire  or  need 
on  our  part,  hence  is  of  one  type.  But  if  we  undertook 
to  explain  all  guidance  on  psychological  grounds  the 
difficulty  would  be  to  account  for  the  religious  values 
and  striking  characteristics  which  mark  off  the  guid- 
ances from  ordinary  processes  of  reflection.  Guidances, 
for  example,  are  infrequent,  they  come  as  gifts, 
freighted  with  conviction,  oftentimes  in  striking  con- 
trast with  individual  desire  or  with  the  processes  of 
thought  into  which  they  break  with  triumphant 
persuasiveness.  Again,  guidance  is  characterised  by 
disinterestedness.  In  contrast  with  selfish  interests 
guidance  pertains  to  the  best  welfare  of  others,  to  the 
best  work  one  is  able  to  do  in  the  world.  Then  there 
is  always  the  result  to  judge  by,  and  by  comparing 
results  one  is  able  to  connect  guidance  with  guidance 
and  ascertain  the  implied  laws.  Some  discrimination 
is  required  in  order  to  detect  the  quality  of  disinterest- 
edness, as  compared  with  mere  preference  or  inclina- 
tion. One  may  not  at  the  moment  see  the  force  of 
what  is  later  judged  to  be  a  divine  prompting.  But 
retrospect,  at  least,  enables  one  to  single  out  the 
guidance  from  its  attendant  desires  or  temptations. 
Thus  the  divine  quality  in  time  stands  out  in  striking 
contrast. 

It  is  momentarily  profitable  to  undertake  to  explain 
away  all  guidances,  since  doubt  prepares  the  way  for 
deeper  conviction.  It  is  also  profitable  to  mistake 
individual  preference  for  guidance,  since  by  so  doing 
one  the  more  clearly  learns  to  apprehend  the  quality 
of  disinterestedness.  It  is  experience  tested  by  reason 
that  reveals  these  distinguishing  qualities.  The  re- 
lationship of  desire  and  guidance,  for  example,  de- 


310         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

pends  upon  the  case  and  upon  the  individual.  What 
a  man  individually  wants  to  do  may  or  may  not  be 
in  accord  with  the  divine  guidance.  If  out  of  accord, 
it  is  superficial,  ephemeral,  readily  deviates  into  side- 
issues;  if  in  accord,  it  bespeaks  a  man's  central  purpose 
in  life.  The  man  who  is  still  wrestling  with  self-love 
is  likely  to  mistake  the  human  for  the  divine  very  many 
times,  whereas  the  one  whose  will  is  already  in  line 
with  the  divine  will  may  frequently  find  his  own 
preference  coinciding  with  the  divine  prompting. 
There  need  be  no  conflict  between  the  ethical  ideals  of 
self-realisation  and  of  service.  Every  acceptance  of 
guidance  means  the  giving  up  of  something,  and  the 
more  clearly  defined  the  life-purpose  the  more  clearly 
one  sees  this.  On  the  other  hand,  disinterested 
promptings  more  and  more  fulfil  the  heart's  ideal. 
The  fact  that  guidance  must  be  carefully  discrimi- 
nated, empirically  tested,  and  rationally  verified,  implies 
no  disparagement  of  its  worth ;  but  merely  proves  that 
guidance  is  an  affair  of  our  whole  nature.  Promptings 
which  are  not  attributable  to  a  higher  origin  are  more 
apt  to  have  a  deceptive  emotional  accompaniment, 
or  to  be  belittling;  whereas  divine  guidance  is  uplifting. 
Again,  guidance  is  knowable  by  the  feeling  of  happiness 
which  frequently  arises  immediately  after  a  decision 
has  been  made.  One  may  not  at  the  time  be  able  to 
tell  why  a  move  that  was  made  on  faith  was  the  right 
one,  but  the  ensuing  happiness  is  an  earnest  of  genuine- 
ness. But,  again,  a  period  of  doubt  may  ensue,  and 
this  in  turn  may  be  a  sign  that  one  has  made  the  right 
decision.  One  frequently  hears  believers  in  divine 
guidance  say  that  at  the  moment  of  guidance  and 
decision  only  one  course  seemed  right — the  one  they 
thereupon  embarked  on — and  that  they  were  very 


Guidance  311 

happy  when  the  decision  was  made.  These  same 
people  later  confess,  however,  that  doubts  crowded 
in,  that  they  not  only  doubted  the  decision,  or  that 
the  guidance  was  divine,  but  persistently  raised  ob- 
jections to  it,  and  argued  for  many  alternative  courses 
of  action.  Such  is  the  pathway  of  the  Spirit.  The 
more  important  the  decision  the  greater  and  more 
persistent  the  temptation.  All  this  is  a  part  of  the 
mediation  of  the  guidance.  Never  without  contro- 
versy is  truth  established.  To  find  one's  convictions 
assailed  is  to  have  evidence  that  there  is  truth  in  them. 
A  conviction  can  hardly  be  truly  called  such  until  it 
has  borne  the  test  of  criticism.  One  may  learn  to 
distinguish  between  guidance  and  its  counterfeit  so 
as  to  be  sure  of  the  guidance  even  in  advance  of  ex- 
perience, precisely  because  through  contrast  one  has 
discerned  the  promptings  which  withstand  the  test 
of  criticism.  Thus  the  guidances  may  increase  in 
number  and  value  even  amidst  criticism,  that  is,  in 
so  far  as  one  possesses  a  rational  faith  in  terms  of 
which  the  guidances  are  interpreted. 

Again,  guidances  are  distinguishable  through  their 
connectedness,  they  are  not  only  disinterested,  social, 
moral,  ideal;  they  belong  together  and  imply  a  more 
comprehensive  purpose  than  any  of  which  the  human 
mind  is  independently  capable.  It  is  this  implication 
of  purposiveness  which  above  all  else  shows  the  divine 
character  of  the  various  guidances.  It  does  not  of 
course  necessarily  follow  that  predestination  is  true, 
that  every  detail  of  life  has  been  arranged  in  accord- 
ance with  a  fixed  plan.  A  devotee  of  such  guidances 
may  well  believe  in  the  universe  of  law  and  evolution 
of  which  modern  science  tells  us,  may  hold  that  no- 
where is  there  infringement  of  law.  Guidance  does 


The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

not  then  imply  divine  intervention.  It  need  not  even 
imply  design  or  providence  except  so  far  as  the  most 
important  issues  are  concerned.  Guidance  might 
rationally  be  said  to  pertain  to  each  individual's 
welfare  when  viewed  in  the  light  of  what  I  have  called 
the  eternal  type  of  life.  That  is,  guidance  may  di- 
rectly relate  to  that  which  is  permanently  essential 
to  the  soul's  welfare  in  the  long  run ;  and  only  indirectly 
to  the  little  events  once  supposed  to  be  arranged  by 
special  design.  If  this  be  the  true  principle,  guidance 
is  most  likely  to  be  gained  in  the  decisive  epochs  of 
human  life,  when  men  seek  their  life-work,  the  en- 
vironment in  which  to  labour,  their  partners  in  service ; 
and  when  they  are  passing  through  the  great  tran- 
sitional stages  of  moral  and  religious  experience. 

Again,  if  this  be  the  true  principle  of  explanation, 
if  guidance  relate  more  intimately  to  the  opportunities 
which  make  for  the  growth  of  character,  this  shows  why 
people  are  sometimes  unable  to  obtain  divine  guidance 
for  secondary  things,  why  a  part  of  our  life  may  be 
foreseen  while  the  rest  is  indeterminate.  The  central 
leading  would  appear  to  be  a  basis  on  which  we  should 
be  able  to  settle  secondary  matters  for  ourselves.  For 
there  are  apparently  minor  decisions  without  number 
that  are  left  wholly  to  the  individual.  If  the  Spirit 
be  responsible  for  the  central  purpose,  the  individual 
is  responsible  for  the  rest. 

It  is  plain  that  there  is  no  open  book  on  whose  pages 
we  may  read  the  decrees  of  fate,  nor  do  the  facts  in- 
dicate that  no  room  is  left  for  human  freedom.  Some 
devotees  of  the  spiritual  life  do  indeed  speak  as  if  there 
were  but  one  course  a  man  could  pursue,  and  as  if 
that  course  were  always  right.  But  this  would  im- 
ply fatalism,  hence  would  rob  man  of  his  reason  for 


Guidance  313 

being.  Divine  guidance  is  not  forced  upon  the  soul, 
it  comes  as  an  alternative  or  check.  One  may  or  may 
not  choose  it  as  a  clue  to  action.  Oftentimes  one  is 
scarcely  aware  that  the  guidance  came  until,  retro- 
spectively, one  discovers  that  side  by  side  with  the 
prompting  which  one  obeyed  there  was  an  imperative 
guidance  not  to  follow  it,  or  a  guidance  whose  superior 
origin  was  overlooked  in  the  excitement  of  obedience 
to  an  impulse.  At  any  rate,  analysis  shows  that  either 
the  alternative  was  vividly  present  or,  if  ignored  or 
put  aside,  was  as  surely  there.  The  presence  of  al- 
ternatives is  unmistakable.  Without  them,  whether 
they  be  judged  good  or  bad,  guidance  would  have  no 
meaning.  For  if  every  "feeling,"  emotion,  impulse  or 
thought  that  chanced  to  enter  the  mind  were  a  guid- 
ance, the  term  would  be  wholly  without  value.  It  is 
the  occasional  moments,  those  that  stand  out  when 
measured  by  a  criterion,  that  are  worthy  of  the  name 
"guidance. "  Regard  every  moment  as  a  guidance,  do 
merely  the  thing  at  hand,  and  all  your  life  will  be  spent 
in  that  which  is  trivial;  there  will  be  no  time  for  or- 
ganised action  with  a  high  end  in  view.  This  would 
be  a  reversion  to  the  life  of  instinct. 

It  may  be  that  at  every  moment  there  is  some  deed 
that  is  wiser  than  any  other,  and  every  one  is  in  a 
sense  bound  to  believe  this  who  holds  that  the  Spirit 
is  present  as  a  guiding  life.  But  such  a  belief  is 
interpretable  in  accordance  with  human  freedom. 
The  ideal  of  fidelity  to  the  Spirit  would  be  the  central 
principle.  Contributory  to  this  would  be  the  fine 
art  of  conduct,  with  its  wisely  adjusted  details,  and  its 
minor  matters  all  alike  expressive  of  a  consistent  life. 
That  is  to  say,  the  central  purpose  would  be  a  mat- 
ter of  divine  guidance,  while  the  details  of  its  fulfil- 


314          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

ment  would  depend  upon  the  good  sense  of  the 
individual;  and  there  might  be  many  roads  to  the 
same  goal,  within  the  same  field. 

The  significant  consideration  is  the  presence  of  a 
unitary  tendency  in  a  person's  life  as  a  whole,  a  work- 
ing of  all  things  together  towards  one  high  end.  To 
possess  a  series  of  guidances  which  thus  belong  to- 
gether is  to  conclude  that  in  the  eternal  order  of  life 
there  is  a  place  for  the  purpose  which  these  guidances 
imply.  One  may  not  as  yet  be  able  adequately  to 
justify  this  conclusion,  or  to  show  how  a  given  purpose 
relates  to  the  purposes  for  which  other  people  exist. 
But  the  conviction  grows  gradually  out  of  the  experi- 
ences which  reveal  the  guidance.  Were  the  guidances 
merely  products  of  one's  own  reflection  one  might 
explain  how  they  cohere.  One  dimly  apprehends 
at  first  what  later  proves  to  be  an  underlying  tendency, 
one  accepts  the  tendency  on  faith  until,  in  due  course, 
it  becomes  matter  of  conscious  purpose.  It  is  not, 
then,  that  there  is  a  straight  and  narrow  way  that  is 
clearly  discerned  from  the  first,  but  one  that  is  found 
through  much  experience,  questioning  and  search;  and 
the  way  may  be  very  far  from  straight  and  narrow, 
may  lead  into  thorny  regions  and  involve  much  suffer- 
ing and  hardship. 

Again,  it  is  characteristic  of  guidance  that  it  arrives 
only  when  most  needed,  oftentimes  at  the  eleventh 
hour,  or  after  the  last  hope  that  guidance  will  come 
has  vanished.  All  may  be  darkness  up  to  the  last 
moment,  when  the  skies  suddenly  clear  and  all  the 
way  is  bright.  Then  it  is  that  one  exclaims,  as  if  in 
self -rebuke,  "O  ye  of  little  faith!"  The  seeming 
tardiness  of  the  guidance  is  one  more  evidence  of  its 
superior  origin.  In  one's  finitude  one  would  like  to 


Guidance  315 

be  assured  in  advance  that  all  will  be  well,  one  would 
like  to  know  the  nature  of  events  ere  they  happen. 
But  such  assurance  and  such  knowledge,  if  vouch- 
safed as  frequently  as  we  wish  it,  would  no  doubt 
deprive  us  of  the  opportunity  of  learning  from  ex- 
perience, would  leave  no  room  for  trust.  It  may 
indeed  be  true  that  the  essentials  of  our  life  are 
divinely  foreknown.  But  their  fruition  is  plainly  de- 
pendent in  part  on  our  co-operation.  Hence  a  divine 
guidance  at  best,  however  authoritative,  is  a  possi- 
bility or  probability.  In  accepting  it  as  divine  or 
authoritative  we  are  willing  to  make  a  venture,  we 
assume  that  it  is  congruous  with  previous  guidances 
and  in  accord  with  the  central  purpose  of  life.  Other 
guidances  have  brought  good  results  and  we  antici- 
pate good  from  this.  We  have  not  been  misled  and 
do  not  expect  to  be  now.  But  there  is  no  absolute 
assurance  of  success. 

Guidances,  then,  are  not  so  numerous  or  so  sure  as 
to  deprive  us  of  the  lessons  of  experience.  Yet  the 
leadings  come  in  sufficient  frequency  to  make  possible 
the  conviction  that  all  essential  moments  of  life  work 
together  towards  one  high  end.  There  are  many 
indications  of  this  co-operation  of  events  in  the  spiritual 
life.  Here  is  an  opportunity  to  serve  another,  for 
example,  which  accords  capitally  with  the  aid  which 
one  is  able  to  give.  Here  is  some  one  whose  acquaint- 
ance we  make  at  a  time  which  proves  most  fortunate 
for  the  soul's  best  good.  There  is  surprising  fitness 
in  the  meeting  and  we  wonder  what  brought  it  about. 
Again,  it  is  a  book  which  is  put  into  one's  hands  when 
most  needed.  Or,  perhaps  one  is  greatly  in  need  of  a 
certain  sum  of  money  and  the  money  arrives  from  an 
entirely  unexpected  source  on  the  appointed  day. 


316         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

Such  incidents  are  explained,  so  far  as  they  are 
explicable  at  all,  by  the  deeper  connection  between 
souls  in  the  eternal  order  of  life.  Here,  for  instance,  is 
a  believer  in  the  inner  light  who  has  abundant  financial 
resources  which  he  stands  in  readiness  to  bestow 
wherever  they  will  do  the  greatest  good.  Here  is  a 
person  greatly  in  need  who  also  believes  in  being  led, 
and  whose  need  becomes  the  other's  opportunity.  He 
unexpectedly  needs  a  hundred  dollars  and  does  not 
know  how  to  procure  the  money  on  short  notice.  But 
he  awaits  the  appropriate  guidance,  and  a  few  days 
before  the  money  is  due  opens  a  letter  containing  a 
gift  of  one  hundred  dollars.  His  friend  is  in  Europe 
and  has  no  means  of  knowing  of  this  sudden  need, 
but  sends  the  money  with  no  other  explanation  than 
this,  "I  was  prompted  to  send  thee  this  little  gift." 
Supply  and  demand  are  brought  together  by  the  subtle 
attraction  which  is  all  the  time  operating  in  the  spirit- 
ual life.  The  attraction  is  part  of  the  eternal  fitness 
of  things.  It  bespeaks  a  general  tendency  which  in- 
cludes all  souls  in  their  upward  march.  It  environs 
all,  exists  for  all.  Now  and  then  there  is  a  soul  suffi- 
ciently alert  to  detect  both  the  tendency  and  the 
guidance  which  corresponds  with  it. 

One  is  disinclined  to  believe  that  there  is  any  fa- 
vouritism in  the  eternal  world.  The  stream  or  tendency 
includes  the  welfare  of  all  souls,  the  guidance  is  for 
each  one  who  lowly  listens.  But  there  is  the  sin  of 
non-receptivity,  there  is  the  darkness  of  ignorance. 
At  best  we  are  merely  progressing  souls  emerging  into 
the  light,  we  still  see  "  as  in  a  glass  darkly. "  If  some  are 
more  frequently  guided  than  others  it  would  appear  to 
be  because  more  is  expected  of  them,  or  because  they 
are  more  faithful  to  opportunities  that  are  open  to  all. 


Guidance  317 

We  return  once  more,  then,  to  the  conclusion  that 
guidance  is  disinterested.  It  is  those  who  obey  the 
law  who  know  it.  Guidance  is  not  bestowed  at  random, 
but  upon  those  only  who  will  use  it.  Yonder  man  who 
complains  that  it  never  comes  to  him  is  doing  nothing 
to  aid  his  fellows.  This  very  moment,  while  he  stands 
there  bewailing  his  lot,  there  are  opportunities  which 
he  neglects.  He  is  like  the  man  who,  in  this  genuinely 
ideal  world  of  ours,  dreams  of  what  might  be  accom- 
plished if  only  we  lived  in  an  ideal  state  of  his  own 
creation.  The  condition  of  affairs  which  enables 
men  and  women  to  take  the  next  step  in  evolution  or 
in  service  is  the  ideal  state.  That  is,  it  may  be  laid 
down  without  qualification  that,  whenever  we  ask 
what  we  ought  to  do  and  receive  no  answer,  the  deed 
that  should  be  done  is  already  awaiting  accomplish- 
ment before  our  eyes.  A  thousand  times  a  year  when 
the  mind  reaches  into  the  future  to  know  wrhat  will 
be  wise  for  the  morrow,  for  next  week  or  next  year, 
one  must  recollect  that  the  present  opportunity  is 
sufficient.  If  you  are  unwilling  to  do  the  work  which 
lies  nearest  your  hands,  you  have  no  right  to  complain 
either  to  God  or  to  your  fellow-men.  It  is  an  important 
part  of  the  law  of  guidance  to  understand  why  there 
is  no  new  prompting. 

One  finds  it  impossible,  however,  to  agree  with  the 
optimistic  fatalists  who  declare  that  because  an  event 
occurs,  therefore  it  is  right.  We  have  seen  that 
guidance  is  distinguishable  from  individual  desire, 
emotion,  and  inclination,  that  it  possesses  convincing 
qualities  and  is  disinterested.  It  may  lead  away  from 
or  more  deeply  into  present  circumstance.  The  present 
circumstance  may  be  the  contrivance  of  some  one  who 
is  trying  to  shape  events  in  his  own  way.  The  mere 


318          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

fact  that  an  imperious  person  has  forced  his  plans  into 
your  view  is  no  sign  that  those  plans  are  right.  The 
case  is  for  you  to  test  by  reference  to  the  highest 
standards  you  know.  You  may  indeed  conclude  that 
the  disturbing  presence  of  this  officious  person  has 
meaning  for  you,  but  the  meaning  may  be  that  you 
should  be  strong  on  a  side  of  your  nature  where  you 
are  disposed  to  yield  too  much.  Every  incident  of 
the  experience  may  be  turned  to  account.  Yet  the 
occurrence  of  precisely  this  set  of  circumstances  may 
signify  very  little. 

The  true  basis  of  optimism  is  not  mere  acceptance 
of  whatever  comes,  but  the  fact  that  the  profound, 
occasional  leadings  reveal  a  deep  connectedness  that 
implies  a  divine  purpose.  On  the  basis  of  these  con- 
nected guidances  one  concludes  that  the  eternal  life 
is  for  the  best,  that  its  ultimate  source  is  the  Spirit. 
Whether  or  not  the  details  of  daily  life  may  also 
rightfully  be  judged  to  be  for  the  best  depends  upon 
the  degree  to  which  such  conduct  has  been  co-ordinated 
in  terms  of  the  central  tendency  or  purpose.  The 
optimistic  conclusion  is  an  act  of  faith  relating  to  that 
which  is  essential,  fundamental,  significant. 

No  doubt  the  majority  of  believers  in  divine  guidance 
hold  a  less  critical  view  than  this.  But  the  view  that 
withstands  the  test  of  reason  is  expressible  in  terms 
of  purpose,  that  is,  with  reference  to  the  end  to  be 
achieved  rather  than  in  terms  of  the  mere  immediacy 
of  the  several  guidances.  A  purpose  is  plainly  not 
a  hard-and-fast  plan  or  design  that  is  forced  upon  us, 
as  if  naught  else  were  possible ;  it  is  not  a  mere  instinct 
or  "feeling  of  tendency."  It  may  be  prompted  in 
the  first  place  by  desire,  love  or  longing  of  some  sort ;  but 
it  is  far  more  truly  a  product  of  patient  reasoning, 


Guidance  319 

the  fruition  of  many  years  of  conscientious  thought. 
A  purpose  expresses  individuality,  and  that  is  of  slow 
growth.  It  manifests  will,  and  experience  is  required 
to  learn  how  to  will.  It  unifies  head  and  heart,  and 
such  unification  is  not  quickly  made.  The  intellect 
gives  centrality  to  it,  and  the  intellect  must  weigh  and 
ponder.  If  in  the  last  analysis  it  is  a  common  ex- 
pression of  the  human  will  and  the  divine,  then  once 
more  it  is  gradually  discovered  and  slowly  wrought. 

To  achieve  a  purpose  which  shall  at  once  express 
the  Father's  will  and  the  human  individuality — and 
there  need  be  no  ultimate  conflict  between  the  human 
will  and  the  divine — one  must  return  to  the  sources 
many  times  a  year,  asking  ' '  What  wilt  thou  have  me 
to  do  ? "  much  as  if  one  had  never  had  a  purpose.  Thus 
successive  guidances  lead  the  way  to  the  strengthening 
of  a  man's  purpose.  To  do  the  Father's  will,  whatever 
it  be,  is  precisely  one's  purpose.  Inasmuch  as  one 
does  not  always  clearly  discern  that  will,  one  must 
commit  oneself  afresh  to  the  Father's  good  wishes, 
ready  to  follow  whatever  is  given.  A  relative  degree 
of  freedom  from  all  plans,  or  at  least  a  willingness  to 
change  all  plans,  is  imperative.  One  may  be  led  to 
continue  in  the  same  work.  But  one  needs  the  new 
leading,  so  that  one  may  abide  with  the  Spirit.  Thus 
adjustment  to  the  divine  will  is  attained  progressively, 
by  repeated  endeavours. 

One  frequently  hears  devotees  of  spiritual  guidance 
say  that  they  have  no  plans,  they  do  not  know  where 
they  may  be  next  year,  or  what  they  may  be  doing. 
To  the  critical  observer  this  seems  to  imply  a  random 
sort  of  life.  Yet  from  the  point  of  view  of  divine 
guidance  nothing  seems  more  sure  or  more  reasonable. 
The  man  who  plans  his  career  from  beginning  to  end, 


320         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

and  is  entirely  dependent  on  worldly  methods,  be- 
lieves that  he  knows  precisely  where  he  is  coming  out. 
He  has  money  and  can  use  it  as  he  wishes.  He 
has  friends  and  can  use  them,  too.  He  is  enter- 
prising and  immensely  confident.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  man  who  lives  by  faith,  appears  to  have  no  basis 
of  assurance,  is  the  one  who  really  has  a  principle  to 
depend  upon.  Inasmuch  as  he  seeks  to  do  that  which 
is  permanently  worth  while,  to  live  for  eternal  ends, 
he  knows  perfectly  well  that  no  event  can  befall  him 
which  will  upset  his  calculations.  However  the  ex- 
ternal life  may  fluctuate,  the  inner  life  will  be  marked 
by  steady  development.  If  changes  come  they  will 
grow  out  of  that  which  already  exists.  He  who 
dedicates  everything  to  the  Spirit  is  not  asked  to  give 
up  anything  essential. 

As  we  concluded  when  studying  the  conditions  of 
realisation  of  an  ideal  type  of  life,  one  of  the  prime 
essentials  throughout  is  willingness  to  receive  the 
gifts  of  the  Spirit  as  gifts,  to  let  them  develop  in  their 
own  way,  not  to  impose  one's  own  way  upon  them. 
For  example,  here  is  a  new  friend  who  has  come  in  an 
hour  of  need.  To  ask  why  that  friend  came  and  how, 
why  he  loves  you,  what  place  you  occupy  in  his  love, 
what  that  love  is  leading  to,  is  thus  far  to  close  the 
door  upon  the  divine  gift.  The  fact  that  the  gift  has 
been  bestowed  suffices.  Do  not  ask  why  it  is  right. 
Follow  the  friendship  and  learn  from  its  development 
whither  it  leads.  For  a  gift  comes  by  its  own  laws, 
in  fulfilment  of  an  inner  attraction  or  affinity.  The 
fact  that  it  comes  shows  that  it  accords  with  the  other 
factors  of  your  soul's  life.  Therefore  let  it  develop 
in  accordance  with  the  ideal  of  the  eternal  type  of 
life. 


Guidance  321 

Guidance,  then,  in  its  various  forms  is  an  experience 
which  springs  from  the  immediate  side  of  our  nature 
and  assumes  different  phases  as  life  progresses  from  a 
stage  of  childlike  faith  to  the  stage  of  rational  purposes. 
Beginning  in  the  life  of  feeling,  at  a  point  where  dis- 
crimination is  difficult,  it  emerges  from  mere  impres- 
sions into  the  moral  realm  of  disinterestedness.  It 
is  social  as  well  as  individual,  and  implies  a  working 
of  all  significant  events  together  towards  a  worthy 
end.  It  is  originally  empirical,  must  be  tested,  put 
in  contrast  with  selfish  desires  and  inclinations;  yet 
is  knowable  by  its  quality,  the  convictions  which  are 
attendant  upon  it.  It  is  occasional  in  its  coming, 
provident,  orderly,  revealing  a  fitness  in  things,  never 
arriving  so  frequently  as  to  be  commonplace  but  always 
to  be  had  for  the  asking  or  through  remembrance 
of  the  gifts  already  at  hand.  It  is  not  insistent,  never 
exacting,  and  does  not  so  greatly  abound  as  to  imply 
fatalism.  Yet  if  it  gently  retires  when  rejected  it  as 
surely  returns  to  teach  the  lessons  which  non-receptiv- 
ity inculcates.  You  may  have  it  if  you  will  abide  by 
its  conditions,  but  will  lose  it  for  a  while  if  unwilling 
to  make  certain  moves  on  trust.  The  evidence  for 
it  seems  decidedly  intangible  to  those  who  insist  on 
absolute  proof,  yet  there  are  those  who  would  hazard 
its  reality  and  its  leadings  over  against  all  other  de- 
liverances of  human  experience.  In  short,  guidance 
is  a  gift  of  the  Spirit  "which  bloweth  where  it  listeth,'' 
and  relates  to  the  eternal  welfare  of  the  soul. 

It  is  plain  that  decidedly  different  views — spiritistic, 
optimistic,  fatalistic — are  compatible  with  belief  in 
divine  guidance.  The  foregoing  account  is  based  on 
ethical  considerations.  We  submit  that  a  guidance, 
whatever  its  source  is  said  to  be,  is  an  experience 


322          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

awaiting  response  on  man's  part,  subject  to  his  will 
and,  if  acted  upon,  involving  him  in  responsibility. 
If  side  by  side  with  a  leading  judged  to  be  divine  there 
are  inclinations  and  temptations,  it  is  absurd  to  de- 
clare that  "whatever  is,  is  right. "  So  long  as  alterna- 
tives exist  fatalism  cannot  be  true,  and  one  challenges 
any  man  to  find  a  guidance  that  is  not  accompanied 
by  alternatives.  To  conclude  that  the  message  is 
from  a  departed  spirit  is  not  to  be  absolved  from 
responsibility.  Guidance  is  never  so  frequent  or  so 
conclusive  as  to  save  men  from  making  mistakes. 
Granted  a  prompting  that  is  judged  infallible,  ex- 
perience tested  by  reason  can  alone  prove  it  to  be  so. 
In  all  acceptance  of  guidance  there  is  an  element  of 
risk,  that  is,  of  faith ;  guidance  is  an  element  in  the 
life  of  faith. 

It  would  not  be  difficult,  therefore,  to  prove  that 
the  seeming  fatalism,  the  inert  optimism,  the  pleasing 
conceits  of  those  who  insist  that  "all  is  good,  there  is 
no  evil, "  "whatever  is,  is  right, "  are  due  to  insufficient 
analysis.  Such  doctrines  are  no  mere  gifts  of  ex- 
perience, but  are  due  to  imperfect  induction.  To 
examine  them  critically  is  to  be  prepared  to  make 
far  more  careful  inductions;  that  is,  it  is  a  question  of 
reason,  not  of  the  mere  "feeling"  which  seems  to  be 
decisive.  It  is  impossible  sharply  to  distinguish 
between  guidance  regarded  as  a  sheer  gift  and  guidance 
regarded  as  a  product  of  reason,  because  the  mind  is  not 
guided  into  compartments.  Guidances  and  theories 
alike  are  co-operative  products.  Sound  interpretations 
grow  out  of  recognition  of  the  intimate  relationship 
of  all  parts  of  our  nature. 

If  part  of  one's  experiences  are  emphasised  as  more 
directly  related  to  the  Spirit,  it  is  because  by  careful 


Guidance  323 

comparison  we  have  learned  to  know  the  worth  of 
these  higher  moments.  The  initial  guidances  were 
not  self-explanatory.  There  is  no  wholly  complete 
or  absolute  guidance  if  by  "guidance"  one  means  the 
prompting  as  first  given.  But  there  is  a  persistently 
true  inner  light  that  shines  upon  our  pathway,  and  in 
terms  of  this  we  are  able  to  make  successively  truer 
interpretations.  The  childlikeness  of  spirit  which  we 
eulogise  is  by  no  means  the  merely  unthinking  inno- 
cence of  childhood,  but  rather  a  spontaneity  recovered 
after  we  have  found  the  illuminating  clue.  Reason 
contributes,  it  does  not  merely  criticise,  and  our  later 
guidances  are  partly  due  to  reason's  persistent  en- 
deavour to  free  the  mind  from  all  misconception ;  when 
we  rightly  interpret  we  know  what  to  look  for. 

These  conclusions  are  reinforced  when  we  consider 
the  relationship  of  guidance  to  prayer.  While  prayer  is 
in  addition  an  act  of  worship  it  is  essentially  a  request 
for  the  guidance  of  the  Spirit,  and  the  interpretation 
put  upon  prayer  is  likely  to  be  the  same  as  that  put 
upon  guidance.  If  one  still  believe  that  God  answers 
prayer  by  altering  the  course  of  events,  one  will  seek 
guidances  which  imply  interruptions  of  law.  But  it 
one  adore  the  God  of  law,  one's  prayer  will  be  for  the 
guidance  which  is  already  provided  in  the  plenitude 
of  the  divine  love.  Some  maintain  that  prayer  is 
meaningless  unless  it  imply  belief  that  God  will  bring 
about  some  change  in  the  course  of  things.  But  others 
would  ask,  Why  restrict  the  meaning  of  prayer  thus 
narrowly  ?  Despite  the  fact  that  prayer  has  a  crude 
beginning  in  which  it  is  allied  with  incantation  and  with 
selfish  interest,  it  has  a  place  and  meaning  even  in  the 
most  intelligent  spiritual  life.  Prayer  springs  from 
a  need  and  the  belief  that  there  is  a  provision  for  that 


324          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirk 

need.  Our  needs  change  all  along  the  line,  the  the- 
ory of  the  Godhead  changes ;  yet  prayer  endures.  The 
type  of  prayer  indicates  the  stage  of  development. 
To  condemn  its  form  as  "vain  repetition''  is  not  to 
disparage  the  principle;  its  persistence  in  human  life 
may  be  taken  as  evidence  of  man's  belief  in  guidance. 
The  complete  theory  of  guidance  begins  with  an 
evaluation  of  prayer  and  ends  with  the  conclusion 
that  adjustment  to  the  perennial  gifts  of  the  Spirit  is 
its  permanent  value.  Prayer  lifts  consciousness  from 
ordinary  levels  to  the  plane  of  sweet  communion  with 
the  Father.  It  assumes  definite  form  as  the  need  of  the 
moment  prompts.  But  however  earnest  the  prayer, 
however  great  the  need,  the  true  request  for  guidance 
ends  with  the  qualification,  in  which  belief  in  prayer 
and  the  theory  of  guidance  are  alike  summarised, 
"Nevertheless,  if  it  be  thy  will." 

Thus  prayer  is  at  best  renewed  consecration,  dedi- 
cation of  all  that  one  is  to  the  uses  of  the  Spirit.  With- 
out the  specific  need  the  prayer  would  hardly  be 
effectual.  Without  endeavour  to  gainv  the  guidance 
for  which  the  soul  longs  there  would  not  be  sufficient 
receptivity.  Yet  need,  prayer,  and  the  request  for 
guidance  are  alike  transcended  in  the  moment  when 
the  human  will  is  adjusted  to  the  divine.  To  pray 
without  ceasing  is  to  believe,  as  matter  of  consecrated 
habit,  that  the  Spirit  is  ever  near,  with  perennial 
provision,  according  to  the  need.  What  the  need  is 
one  believes  one  knows.  We  seem  to  know  very  well 
what  another's  needs  are  for  whom  we  pray.  Yet  we 
may  not  know.  Hence  the  element  of  consecration 
is  needed,  the  life  of  faith  is  triumphant.  The  Spirit, 
one  sees,  is  doing  its  work  all  along.  But  we  fail  to 
do  ours.  Hence  the  need  of  readjustment.  Without 


Guidance  325 

the  uttered  willingness  to  yield  our  own  way  to  the 
better  way  which  we  may  not  know,  we  could  hardly 
seek  the  divine  guidance  in  earnest. 

It  is  also  plain  that  belief  in  and  adaptation  to 
spiritual  guidance  bespeak  a  certain  type  of  life. 
Not  only  is  less  effort  given  to  the  making  of  plans, 
but  in  general  there  is  less  concern  for  what  is  ordi- 
narily deemed  success.  The  so-called  successful  man 
pushes  and  drives,  looks  out  for  his  own  interests,  and 
strives  to  outwit  others.  The  devotee  of  guidance 
holds  that  if  a  contemplated  course  of  action  be  right, 
events  will  develop  in  line  with  it;  that  if  a  possible 
opportunity  to  help  another  accords  with  one's  powers 
the  necessary  means  will  be  found,  and  it  would  be 
contrary  to  the  spiritual  ideal  to  take  coercive  steps 
to  bring  the  opportunity.  There  is  no  scheming  and 
pulling,  no  driving  or  managing ,  but  much  expectancy 
and  readiness.  This  readiness  does  not  imply  in- 
activity, but  the  absence  of  the  anxiety  which  is  so 
often  an  obstacle  to  all  that  is  highest. 

The  simplicity  of  this  kind  of  life  carries  with  it 
the  repose  which  readily  invites  and  leaves  room  for 
guidance  and  spontaneity.  One's  days  may  be  as  full 
as  the  days  of  those  who  depend  solely  upon  their  own 
wit.  Indeed,  they  may  be  more  active  days;  time 
may  pass  so  quickly  that  no  room  is  left  for  secondary 
interests.  But,  again,  they  may  be  days  of  com- 
parative leisure.  For  it  is  well  that  some  days  be 
wholly  given  over  to  the  quiet  solitudes  of  the  Spirit 
—the  spontaneity  of  a  day  entirely  free  from  plans. 
If  the  external  life  of  those  who  adapt  their  conduct 
to  such  an  ideal  is  as  busy  as  the  lives  of  those  who 
have  no  such  ideal,  at  any  rate  there  is  more  repose 
at  the  centre — where  a  portion  of  the  consciousness 


326          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

is  for  ever  consecrated  to  the  whisperings  of  the 
Spirit. 

It  is  difficult  to  characterise  the  lives  of  those  who 
are  thus  led  by  the  Spirit  without  seeming  to  set  them 
apart  from  other  people,  as  if  they  were  of  a  distinct 
type.  As  matter  of  fact,  there  is  no  sharp  line  between 
the  guided  life  and  the  life  in  which  there  is  no  con- 
sciousness of  guidance.  The  one  who  is  led  by  the 
Spirit  has  his  times  when  he  cannot  see  so  clearly 
and  must  depend  upon  more  widely  known  resources, 
while  the  man  who  is  unaware  of  guidances  is  some- 
times led  more  wisely  than  he  knows.  We  may  seem 
to  be  wholly  deciding  our  careers  when  there  is  a  higher 
Wisdom  working  in  and  through  them.  The  difference 
between  people  is  that  some  are  far  more  aware  of 
such  leadings  than  others ;  hence  they  are  able  to  shape 
life  accordingly,  while  to  others  a  guidance  would  be  a 
miracle  or  coincidence  from  which  they  could  learn 
nothing. 

For  the  purposes  of  our  inquiry,  guidance  is  a  part, 
and  a  part  only,  of  the  witness  of  the  Spirit.  When 
the  time  comes  to  put  together  the  evidences  of  the 
Spirit's  presence  the  facts  and  values  of  guidance  are 
sure  to  occupy  a  prominent  place.  Yet  there  are 
lives  equally  near  the  Spirit  which  would  be  describable 
in  rather  different  terms.  Such  lives  might  as  truly 
be  called  guided  lives,  yet  they  might  not  abound  in 
incidents  which  indicate  susceptibility  to  impressions, 
leadings,  and  illuminations.  For  we  have  seen  that 
guidance,  beginning  in  the  immediacies  of  impulse, 
feeling,  and  intuition,  gradually  evolves  into  conscious 
purposes  and  clearly  defined  ideals  to  which  reason 
has  made  rich  contributions.  The  guidances  which 
some  would  experience  in  detail  as  so  many  separate 


Guidance  327 

impressions  might  in  the  case  of  a  genius  be  compacted 
into  a  single  ideal.  For  others  the  leadings  would  be 
indistinguishably  blended  with  conscious  reasoning 
processes.  Hence  it  is  important  to  avoid  a  narrow  view 
of  guidance;  far  more  important  to  avoid  exclusive 
conclusions,  as  if  some  were  led  by  the  Spirit  while 
others  are  not.  If  we  do  not  find  the  inclusive  prin- 
ciple by  investigating  the  facts  and  types  of  guidance, 
we  may  find  it  by  inquiring  into  the  nature  and  content 
of.  faith.  At  any  rate  our  inquiry  would  be  incom- 
plete without  a  study  of  the  character  and  place  of 
faith  in  the  spiritual  life. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  PLACE  OF  FAITH 

THROUGHOUT  these  discussions  we  have  insisted  on 
the  presence  of  an  ideal  element  in  human  experience. 
The  distinctions  made,  the  principles  emphasised,  and 
the  goals  which  have  come  into  view  have  not  been 
dependent  on  mere  fact,  but  have  involved  appre- 
ciative evidences  of  the  guiding  presence  of  the  Spirit. 
Hence  the  witness  of  the  Spirit,  the  truth  of  hope,  has 
been  our  chief  subject  of  reference.  With  this  su- 
perior principle  in  view,  we  have  ventured  to  claim 
real  existence  for  a  spiritual  order  of  being,  an  eternal 
order  which  fulfils  the  values  assigned  to  experiences 
that  cannot  adequately  be  described.  In  accordance 
with  this  principle,  we  have  also  ventured  to  accept 
spiritual  guidance  as  a  reality.  From  the  first  we  have 
pointed  out  that  the  immediacies  of  spiritual  experi- 
ence are  subject  to  varied  interpretations.  Neverthe- 
less we  have  steadily  accumulated  evidence  that  there 
is  an  ideal  principle  at  work  in  the  inner  life,  and 
our  studies  have  pointed  forward  to  a  certain  type  of 
interpretation. 

The  important  consideration  thus  far  is  that  the 
Spirit  is  apprehended  through  all  sides  of  our  nature. 
As  opposed  to  those  who  limit  guidance  to  an  exclusive 
principle  of  which  they  apparently  possess  the  secret, 
we  have  shown  that  there  are  many  leadings  and  clues 
which  the  heart  knows  and  various  types  of  guidance. 
Moreover,  these  leadings  are  not  the  exclusive  sources 

328 


The  Place  of  Faith  329 

of  higher  wisdom.  The  guided  life  is  one  of  a  certain 
type.  In  behalf  of  those  who  live  according  to  that 
type,  it  might  be  said  that  those  who  are  willing  to 
lead  the  life  may  have  the  guidance:  for  all  who  are 
ready  to  meet  the  tests  there  is  abundant  evidence 
that  guidance  springs  from  a  higher  source.  The 
tests  are  those  of  experience  and  patient  fidelity  to  the 
leadings  which  are  judged  to  be  divine.  It  is  reasonable 
to  appeal  to  experience,  since  it  is  only  through  ex- 
perience that  we  know  what  promptings  are  disin- 
terested. If  we  are  unable  to  discover  all  the  tests 
and  principles  in  our  own  life,  we  have  as  resources  the 
teachings  of  the  pioneers  of  spiritual  idealism  whose 
work  stands  out  in  bold  relief  against  the  half-hearted 
doctrines  of  their  age.  They  are  the  men  who  most 
consciously  dwell  near  the  sources  and  most  con- 
vincingly bear  the  essence  of  the  Spirit  within  them. 
Such  seers  seldom  have  opportunity  to  propound  a 
constructive  theory  of  the  spiritual  life,  or  explain  in 
detail  the  laws  and  types  of  guidance;  for  they  are 
absorbed  in  good  works  and  in  the  enunciation  of 
practical  principles.  But  inquire  into  their  lives  and 
you  find  that  events  occur  almost  daily  which  would 
be  pronounced  ' '  miraculous "  by  uncritical  people, 
those  who  have  no  theory  in  regard  to  the  universality 
of  guidance — events  which  are  passed  by  almost  un- 
noticed by  the  profound  believer  in  guidance.  It  is 
in  the  life  of  habitual  adaptation  to  higher  leadings  that 
one  finds  the  clue  to  a  philosophy  of  guidance. 

To  know  what  guidance  is  at  its  best  is  to  be  aware 
of  a  superior  element  which  transfigures  life  and  makes 
it  holy,  guidance  being  but  one  expression  of  the  gen- 
eral immediacy  of  the  Spirit.  The  divine  element  is 
given  amidst  circumstances  which  may  be  very  well 


330          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

described,  whereas  that  element  itself  belongs  essen- 
tially to  the  world  of  values.  The  certainty  which 
makes  guidance  knowable  as  divine  is  given  with  the 
guidance.  The  Spirit  seems  to  possess  the  soul  in 
that  moment.  By  that  moment's  decision,  that 
venture  in  the  world  of  faith,  one's  life  is  allied  with 
the  Spirit,  come  what  may  when  doubts  and  struggles 
ensue.  The  most  that  one  can  say  with  respect  to 
the  human  part  of  the  experience  is  that  there  is  an 
element  of  humility,  of  receptive  readiness  to  make 
the  venture,  without  which  the  guidance  would  hardly 
come.  Guidance,  then,  is  apparently  relative;  the 
greater  receptivity  yields  the  greater  guidance,  up 
to  that  point  of  which  Jesus  speaks  where  man  has 
no  desire  save  to  do  the  Father's  complete  will. 

The  moment  of  the  coming  of  guidance  is  not  a 
time  for  analysis,  but  for  readiness.  Not  until  certain 
guidances  stand  out  as  authoritative  is  one  able  to 
understand  the  finite  factors  and  make  clear  the  law. 
Even  then  it  may  be  impossible  to  discover  how  the 
guidances  are  mediated  to  us,  that  is,  to  assign 
them  to  their  proper  secondary  origin.  There  may  be 
virtue  in  the  belief  that  ministering  angels  attend  us. 
But  if  in  the  last  analysis  it  be  a  question  of  the  Father's 
love  and  purpose  it  would  be  well  to  place  emphasis 
there,  that  one  may  not  attribute  a  too  prominent 
part  to  human  instrumentalities.  Hence  in  the  present 
discussion  we  leave  the  account  open,  with  the  re- 
minder that  in  divine  guidance  there  is  an  element 
that  surpasses  merely  factual  analysis.  The  essential 
on  our  part  is  the  humility  that  invites  the  guidance, 
the  faith  which  enables  us  to  make  the  venture. 

For  the  moment  our  conclusions  appear  to  be  in 
conflict  with  results  at  which  we  arrived  when  we  were 


The  Place  of  Faith  331 

studying  intuition  and  the  emotions.  We  were  scepti- 
cal regarding  intuitions,  feelings,  and  the  like  in  the 
guise  in  which  they  first  come;  and  now  we  are  ac- 
cepting guidances  as  authoritative  intuitional  products. 
But  the  conflict  is  only  apparent.  We  studied  intuition 
from  the  side  of  human  faculty  and  as  a  product;  and 
we  discarded  the  emotions  which  bear  unsound  fruits, 
or  claim  the  right  to  occupy  the  whole  field.  Intuition 
as  a  " faculty"  is  merely  one  of  many,  and  as  a  product 
it  points  to  the  fruits  by  which  it  should  be  tested. 
We  distrusted  emotion  because  of  its  low  origin,  the 
excitement  by  which  it  is  accompanied,  and  the  mis- 
conceptions to  which  it  gives  rise.  We  were  no  less 
distrustful  of  guidance  in  its  crude  forms.  To  dissociate 
genuine  guidance  from  its  imitations  we  were  obliged 
to  distinguish  between  disinterested  promptings  and 
personal  desires,  philosophical  and  spiritistic  inter- 
pretations, rational  purposes  and  naive  beliefs  in 
providence.  Acceptable  guidance  is  able  to  withstand 
the  tests  which  we  have  applied  to  mere  immediacy, 
and  hence  is  interpreted  in  the  light  of  a  philosophy 
of  the  Spirit.  Emotion,  for  example,  is  divine  guidance 
when  it  is  transfigured  love,  when  it  is  mediated  by  a 
noble  life.  Illumined  feeling  is  divine,  so  is  illumined 
thought.  The  test  in  every  case  is  the  divine  quality 
wrhich  withstands  the  test  of  reasoned  experience. 
Guidance  springs  from  our  total  nature,  is  essentially 
a  product.  As  such  it  points  forward  to  its  fruition 
in  the  life  of  faith. 

If  intuition,  emotion,  feeling,  or  guidance,  or  even 
all  these  together,  were  immediately  authoritative, 
there  would  be  no  room  for  faith.  But  experience 
shows  that  the  life  that  is  inspired  by  belief  in  divine 
guidance  is  essentially  a  life  of  faith.  It  is  not  through 


332          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

sensuous  experience,  emotion,  feeling,  or  intuition,  or 
even  through  mystical  union,  that  we  know  the  Spirit 
face  to  face,  but  through  faith.  For,  as  we  have 
repeatedly  noted,  the  immediacy  of  our  experience 
is  purely  general,  and  hence  may  be  variously  inter- 
preted, by  reference  now  to  human  factors  and  now 
to  those  that  are  adjudged  divine.  If  despite  the 
misconceptions  which  are  associated  with  intuition 
we  still  believe  in  it,  we  believe  because  on  various 
grounds  our  faith  supports  this  claim.  If  despite 
the  excitement  which  mars  most  emotions  we  persist- 
ently cling  to  a  few  as  divine,  our  faith  is  the  secret 
of  such  persistence.  However  greatly  we  may  be 
misled,  if  we  continue  to  trust  that  certain  guidances 
are  true,  it  is  faith  that  offsets  our  scepticism  and 
carries  us  to  the  point  where  experience  shows  what 
promptings  are  trustworthy.  Thus  faith  is  a  link 
between  the  immediacy  of  an  experience  and  the 
fruits  which  reveal  its  true  character.  It  is  allied 
to  the  instinctive,  intuitive  side  of  our  nature  in  its 
original  forms,  but  is  also  a  product  of  inductive 
reasoning.  The  immediacies  of  our  experience  yield  the 
content  of  faith,  but  its  maturer  form  is  intellectual. 
It  is  not,  therefore,  a  special  power  or  faculty,  but  a 
characteristic  of  our  total  human  nature. 

The  appeal  to  faith  thus  has  universal  significance, 
whereas  the  appeal  to  guidance  is  often  special.  Every 
one  knows  that  faith  has  a  place  in  human  life,  every 
one  in  a  measure  lives  by  faith.  Hence  from  one  point 
of  view  it  would  seem  absurd  to  counsel  a  man  to 
be  of  firm  faith.  Yet,  although  faith  at  its  best  is 
created  in  us  by  experience,  or  is  a  matter  of  tempera- 
ment, it  grows  by  study  of  the  facts  and  values  of  the 
spiritual  life  and  may  almost  be  reared  from  the 


The  Place  of  Faith  333 

foundation  by  reflective  reconstruction  of  familiar 
facts.  For  all  people  have  at  least  detached  evidences 
of  the  Spirit's  presence  within  them;  the  difficulty  is 
that  they  have  had  no  unifying  intuition.  It  is  worth 
our  while,  then,  to  regard  the  subject  in  a  very  general 
sense  in  order  that  we  may  discover  the  special  function 
of  faith  in  the  life  according  to  the  Spirit. 

I  pass  by  some  of  the  better  known  aspects  of  faith 
with  merely  a  reference.  That  confidence  in  those  with 
whom  we  have  constant  dealings  is  requisite,  every 
one  knows.  We  tentatively  put  faith  in  people,  or  for 
increasing  periods  of  time,  as  the  case  may  be.  We 
have  faith  in  tested  servants,  in  teachers,  the  family 
physician,  the  clergyman,  in  friends.  Sometimes  we 
are  able  to  state  the  basis  of  faith;  for  example,  the 
sincerity  which  necessarily  underlies  all  friendship. 
Again,  our  faith  is  a  pure  venture  based  on  intuition. 
We  entrust  our  lives  to  many  relatively  dangerous 
modes  of  conveyance,  and  every  journey  through  a 
city  is  an  act  of  faith.  We  put  faith  in  various  under- 
takings and  always  there  must  be  faith  in  oneself. 

It  is  less  obvious  that  faith  in  the  uniformity  of 
nature  supplements  our  scientific  knowledge,  for  or- 
dinarily science  dwells  on  what  is  known,  not  what 
is  taken  on  faith.  Our  most  exact  knowledge  receives 
a  rude  shock  now  and  then,  however,  and  we  are  con- 
strained to  have  faith  anew  until  our  science  shall 
enlarge  to  the  proportions  of  newly  discovered  phenom- 
ena which  no  one  is  at  first  able  to  explain.  Oftentimes 
a  phenomenon  of  which  science  renders  a  clear  account 
is  equally  explicable  on  another  basis,  and  one  must 
make  choice  according  to  one's  faith. 

The  man  [says  Fullerton]  who  would  cast  out  of  his 
mind  all  beliefs  for  which  he  is  not  in  a  position  to  offer 


334          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

definite  and  detailed  evidence  should  first  reflect  upon  the 
extraordinary  denudation  of  his  mind  which  must  result 
from  such  a  procedure.  We  walk  by  faith  much  of  the 
time,  and  sometimes  we  have  no  choice  save  to  walk 
where  the  clear  light  of  assured  knowledge  does  not  reach. l 

Without  faith  no  philosophy  is  possible.  At  the 
very  beginning  of  any  serious  attempt  to  propound  a 
philosophy  there  is  confidence  in  the  power  of  reason 
to  organise  its  data  and  develop  a  consistent  view 
of  things.  We  believe,  for  example,  that  reason  in  us 
corresponds  with  ultimate  reality  in  such  wise  that 
we  need  make  allowances  only  for  the  deflections  of 
temperament.  We  must  make  this  assumption  on 
faith,  for  we  are  unable  to  lift  the  mind  above  its 
processes  so  that  it  may  look  down  upon  these  and 
compare  them  with  reality.  That  an  objective  reality 
is  out  yonder,  and  that  we  can  accurately  describe  it, 
we  believe,  and  without  this  belief  we  could  make  no 
headway.  Hence  faith  is  a  fundamental  element  of 
belief,  underlying  philosophy  in  all  its  branches. 
Ordinarily  we  make  the  act  of  faith  and  think  little 
of  it.  But  so  far  as  mere  facts  go  we  might  often  de- 
cide the  other  way.  The  agnostic  or  the  sceptic  may 
know  the  facts  in  a  given  case  as  well  as  the  man  who 
believes.  Something  other  than  facts  usually  com- 
pels belief. 

A  philosophy  is  in  reality  a  reasoned  faith,  based  on 
an  accepted  immediate  or  first  principle  which  can- 
not be  proved  by  ulterior  reference.  Or,  again,  it  is 
founded  on  moral  conviction,  and  this  implies  a  prior 
faith  that  the  world  will  sometime  witness  the  triumph 
of  the  good. 

1  A  System  of  Metaphysics,  p.  603. 


The  Place  of  Faith  335 

We  can  ia  part  give  reasons  for  such  faith,  the  rest 
remains  as  mere  assumption.  Further,  there  is  religious 
conviction  that  the  power  of  love  is  supreme.  Belief 
in  God's  existence  is  an  act  of  faith.  We  cannot  prove, 
but  must  start  with,  the  postulates  of  religious  faith. 
Granted  the  postulates,  reason  may  make  the  best  of 
them  it  can,  and  hence  in  a  measure  offer  justification 
for  them. 

In  practical  life  every  man  recognises  the  need  of  a 
working  faith.  Our  creed  may  be  partly  founded  on 
knowledge  verified  by  experience,  partly  on  beliefs 
borrowed  by  acts  of  faith  from  others;  but  is  more 
likely  to  be  faith  outright — faith  in  the  world  and 
in  God.  Such  a  faith  involves  a  collection  of  hy- 
potheses which  have  been  accepted  simply  because 
they  met  our  needs.  If  a  faith  "works"  it  is  deemed 
true.  But  it  works  only  so  far  as  familiar  experiences 
are  concerned,  and  is  easily  shaken  when  an  event 
occurs  which  apparently  controverts  the  implied 
hypothesis.  However  secure  the  practical  assurance, 
there  is  a  region  of  uncertainty  covered  by  downright 
trust.  Even  when  intelligence  is  put  before  faith, 
when  we  plainly  see  what  we  are  placing  reliance  in, 
our  working  faith  is  supplemented  by  a  less  secure 
trust  where  hope  plays  a  larger  part  than  reason, 
where  we  make  a  venture  almost  in  the  dark. 

That  faith  is  essential  to  the  religious  life  is  more 
cbvious  than  in  the  cases  cited  above,  for  the  more 
we  relate  our  life  to  the  unseen  the  more  our  thought 
departs  from  fact.  If  faith  be  "the  substance  of 
things  hoped  for,"  it  is  still  a  venture.  Who  would  be 
accounted  worthy  of  the  reality  unless  he  willingly 
trusted  where  he  could  not  see  ?  We  would  fain  know 
precisely  how  the  future  is  to  develop  and  when.  But 


336         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

give  us  such  knowledge  and  life  would  lose  its  zest. 
Faith  is  at  once  an  assurance  and  a  substitute  for  it,  in- 
asmuch as  it  both  gives  the  essence  of  that  for  which 
we  hope  and  yet  still  leaves  room  for  courage.  The 
essence  pertains  to  the  immediate,  hence  to  the  initial 
promptings  of  human  life,  rather  than  to  the  pronounce- 
ments of  reason,  but  the  venture  which  faith  inspires 
takes  the  subject  out  of  the  immediate  into  the  world 
of  the  will.  To  "fall  back  upon  faith"  would  be  to 
revert  to  an  immediacy  of  an  emotional  type  akin  to 
what  is  called  * '  blind  faith."  A  merely  emotional  faith 
may  be  as  misleading  as  the  belief  of  the  man  who 
so  firmly  relies  on  what  he  "feels"  to  be  true  that 
he  thinks  he  cannot  be  misled.  Knowledge  that  one 
possesses  the  "essence"  should  give  one  a  better  clue 
than  to  "fall  back,"  or  to  cultivate  emotionalism; 
for  the  essence  points  forward  to  the  experiences  and 
the  thoughts  which  are  to  put  it  to  the  test.  Hence 
religious  faith  becomes  intellectual,  the  more  faith- 
fully we  depend  upon  the  promises  of  that  which  it 
essentially  holds  for  us.  It  is  the  essence  of  "things 
hoped  for"  precisely  through  the  potentialities  which 
reason  makes  explicit.  Theories  of  interpretation  are 
read  into  our  faith  as  readily  as  into  the  intuitions 
which  we  believe  we  have  preserved  in  their  purity. 
We  may  suppose  that  we  are  relying  upon  pure  im- 
mediacy when,  as  matter  of  fact,  our  faith  is  supported 
by  a  gradually  produced  conviction  that  had  but  a 
slight  foundation  at  the  outset. 

Faith,  then,  is  not  a  pure  gift  bestowed  upon  us  in 
completed  form,  but  grows  out  of  our  total  life  and  is 
far  more  a  product  of  inference  than  we  suspect.  The 
important  point  is  that,  while  faith  is  partly  a  result  of 
the  hidden  processes  of  reason,  it  possesses  a  spiritual 


The  Place  of  Faith  337 

quality  which  surpasses  the  reason  that  mediates  it. 
If  without  reason  faith  would  hardly  be  more  than 
blind  instinct,  without  faith  reason  would  be  unable 
to  proceed  at  all.  Faith  makes  or  receives  the  gifts 
which  reason  forthwith  renders  explicit.  Reason 
often  halts  by  the  way,  and  becomes  so  involved  in 
the  multiplicity  and  the  wealth  of  faith's  gifts  that 
it  cannot  arrive  at  a  comprehensive  synthesis.  It  is 
then  that  faith  once  more  enters  with  its  appreciative 
element,  its  essence  of  things  rationally  hoped  for.  If 
intuitively  inclined  people  are  more  dependent  on 
reason  than  they  suspect,  the  intellectualists  depend 
more  upon  faith  than  they  know. 

Faith  is  by  nature  unitary,  comprehensive,  synthetic ; 
it  pertains  to  the  eternal,  the  divine  order.  In  a  sense 
it  is  the  best  representative  of  the  Spirit,  inasmuch 
as  the  Spirit  is  essentially  a  whole.  Hence  the  impli- 
cations of  faith  are  sufficient  to  engage  the  mind  for 
a  life- time.  Fortunate  are  we  if  we  put  faith  and 
reason  in  the  right  order.  To  understand  their  relation- 
ship is  to  go  very  far  towards  a  solution  of  the  age-long 
conflict  between  feeling  and  thought,  dogma  and 
criticism.  Formerly  faith  was  more  dogmatic  and 
reason  was  either  regarded  as  an  enemy  or  as  a  mere 
tool  wherewith  to  defend  the  established  faith.  In 
reality  faith  and  reason  should  be  allies,  since  faith 
contributes  the  unitary  vision  while  reason  develops  its 
content  in  systematic  form ;  faith  makes  the  gifts  while 
reason  contributes  an  element  which  faith  was  not 
aware  that  it  possessed.  Hence  a  faith  analytically 
established,  a  faith-illumined  reason,  is  the  ideal. 

We  have  more  confidence  in  faith  than  in  reason, 
as  reason  is  ordinarily  understood.  For  our  reasoning 
is  usually  very  human.  We  may  argue  that  a  certain 


338          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

event  is  utterly  impossible  and  the  next  day  experience 
it.  Reason  is  often  limited  in  scope,  while  faith  gives 
horizon.  Even  when  we  cannot  discern  the  reasons 
we  have  more  confidence  in  faith's  pronouncements, 
inasmuch  as  we  possess  the  essence  concerning  which 
faith  prophesies.  We  distrust  reason  because  a  man 
can  so  readily  reason  as  he  will,  "prove"  what  he 
wishes  to  prove.  All  this,  however,  with  reference 
to  popular  usage  of  the  term  "reason."  Strictly 
speaking,  the  faults  attributed  to  reason  are  those 
of  the  mere  understanding,  whereas  reason  is  higher 
and  commands  an  infinite  horizon. 

Nevertheless,  it  is  faith  that  gives  us  ideals.  We 
do  not  say,  "  Go  to,  let  us  be  philosophical."  We  find 
ourselves  in  possession  of  a  faith  which  inspires  in  us 
the  ideals  of  truth,  beauty,  and  goodness.  We  do 
not  always  inductively  reason  out  what  we  shall  do  in 
life,  that  is,  not  when  it  is  a  question  of  the  best; 
we  find  ourselves  in  possession  of  a  gift.  To  hold  to 
an  ideal  means  to  live  by  faith  more  than  by  explicit 
reason.  Yet,  once  more,  to  see  the  reason,  to  make 
our  faith  explicit,  is  to  depend  more  and  more  upon 
the  philosophical  element. 

Faith  implies  possession  of  a  power  which  we  be- 
lieve will  accomplish  through  us  what  we  could  never 
achieve  alone.  We  do  not  so  much  have  this  con- 
sciousness when  we  reason,  for  reason  is  more  critical 
and  analytical,  more  dependent  on  fact  and  logical 
clues.  The  ideal  of  human  reason  is  to  render  the 
best  account  it  can  of  the  great  whole  which  faith  re- 
veals. If  reason  to  be  strictly  accurate  must  acknow- 
ledge faith's  gifts  or  immediacies,  it  is  reason  which, 
with  fine  discrimination,  acknowledges  the  world  of 
appreciation,  in  contrast  with  the  more  familiar  world 


The  Place  of  Faith  339 

of  fact.  Every  item  is  acceptable  to  reason,  and  in 
the  end  the  account  which  reason  gives  of  the  world 
is  no  less  broad  than  the  ineffable  whole  which  faith 
reveals. 

But  faith  is  not  alone  the  ally  of  reason:  for  the 
majority  it  is  a  guide  to  practical  life,  and  the  aim 
is  not  to  lift  reason  to  its  level  but  rather  to  enlarge 
conduct  to  its  ideal  proportions.  It  is  easy  to  have 
a  general  faith  in  the  universe,  in  God,  a  faith  that 
for  the  most  part  has  never  been  seriously  questioned ; 
the  real  tests  of  faith  hardly  begin  until  we  not  only 
carefully  question  but  endeavour  to  apply  our  faith 
in  detail.  Indeed  it  may  be  doubted  if  we  truly 
possess  faith  until  we  have  applied  it  to  the  little  things. 
If  we  are  comfortably  placed  in  life,  with  an  abundance 
of  resources,  people  to  serve  us,  friends  to  assist  us, — 
the  probability  is  that  we  scarcely  know  what  faith 
is.  The  real  tests  begin  with  financial  hardship,  ill- 
health  from  which  the  chances  of  recovery  are  slight, 
or  the  contests  with  adverse  circumstance  which  come 
to  those  who  are  thrown  on  their  own  resources: 
necessity  is  the  spur  which  incites  men  to  the  real  tests. 
Such  tests  often  begin  with  a  certain  readiness  on 
our  part  to  meet  whatever  may  come  that  will  bring 
spiritual  development,  with  a  certain  eagerness  to 
take  life  very  much  in  earnest.  The  tests  may  be 
slight  at  first,  but  they  increase  almost  without  limit 
if  we  meet  them  with  entire  earnestness. 

Faith,  then,  is  really  faith  when  it  is  concrete. 
Jesus  thus  characterises  it  when  he  assures  his  hearers 
that  not  even  a  "sparrow  falleth  without  the  Father," 
when  he  bids  them  give  heed  to  the  lilies  of  the  field, 
and  counsels  them  to  take  no  anxious  thought  for 
the  morrow.  Merely  general  faith  is  only  a  belief. 


340         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

Our  entire  conception  of  the  Spirit  points  forward  to 
this  conclusion;  for  we  regard  the  Spirit  as  a  concrete 
principle  working  through  events  moment  by  moment, 
in  minuteness  of  emphasis.  Men  hardly  recognise 
the  Spirit  in  a  practical  sense  until  they  look  behind 
or  within  the  present  moment  of  joy,  sorrow,  or  conflict. 
To  be  thankful  for  whatever  comes  in  the  pathway 
of  the  Spirit,  and  to  banish  the  little  cares,  moments 
of  anxiety  and  distrust — this  it  is  to  manifest  faith. 
This  means  the  giving  of  thanks  for  that  which  might 
once  have  been  deemed  a  burden  or  affliction.  It 
means  unqualified  acceptance  of  whatever  may  come 
in  response  to  the  dedication  of  the  soul  to  the  pur- 
poses of  the  Spirit.  It  means  the  cessation  of  hatred, 
bitterness,  impatience,  and  condemnation;  it  means 
that  one  now  judges  righteously.  This  entirely  philo- 
sophic view  of  the  situation  is  not  easily  attained,  but 
it  surely  accords  with  the  ideal  of  trust  in  the  Spirit. 

If  you  avow  faith  in  God  and  then  lay  plans  to 
shape  circumstances  in  your  own  way,  that  is  ev- 
idence that  you  do  not  really  trust.  To  believe 
that  the  Father  really  provides  all  things  is  to  act  in 
accordance  with  this  conviction  the  first  time  you 
are  concerned  for  something  which  you  fear  may  not 
come.  If  the  work  in  which  one  is  engaged  be  given, 
if  it  be  spiritual,  the  needed  resources  will  come  in 
accordance  with  its  own  developments.  The  immedi- 
ate question  is,  Do  you  see  what  move  to  make  just 
now?  If  so,  that  is  all  that  is  at  present  required.  If 
not,  there  is  good  reason.  To  await  faith's  occasions 
is  to  do  faith's  work. 

Many  times  when  we  seem  to  have  faith  there  is  an 
offsetting  doubt,  a  secret  fear,  which  later  comes  to 
light.  It  is  fairly  easy  to  see  the  power  of  God  in 


The  Place  of  Faith  341 

some  events,  but  hard  to  find  God  in  everything.  We 
are  apt  to  identify  the  terms  "God"  and  "good,"  and 
forget  that  naught  exists  without  the  Father.  Hence 
faith  in  the  little  things  of  life  is  slowly  attained. 
Then,  too,  there  is  the  resistance  offered  by  habit 
and  by  outgrown  creeds.  We  would  gladly  make 
faith  a  habit,  but  the  tendency  to  distrust  is  strong. 
The  life  of  faith  should  be  centred  in  the  immediate 
present,  but  it  is  easy  to  borrow  trouble. 

.Yet  practical  faith  can  surely  be  acquired,  for  it  is 
faith  in  a  power  and  a  law ;  and  one  may  gather  evi- 
dences. Retrospective  intuition  increases  faith,  when 
we  realise  how  wisely  we  have  been  led,  how  tenderly 
cared  for.  Then  a  greater  test  ensues,  new  evidences 
arrive,  and  the  power  to  meet  the  new  situation  is 
greater.  Each  new  test  may  require  as  much  faith 
as  the  old,  but  in  due  time  the  multiplicity  of  evidences 
is  impressive.  One  has  so  many  times  been  provided 
for  when  one  was  apparently  about  to  be  deserted  that 
it  would  be  ungracious  to  disbelieve.  It  becomes 
plainer  and  plainer  that  when  the  central  guidance 
comes  one  may  take  the  rest  on  faith.  The  central 
leading  is  the  gift  of  the  Spirit,  the  essence  of  that 
which  is  to  come;  our  part  is  to  make  that  guidance  a 
working  basis  and  to  refer  to  it  each  time  a  dubious 
point  develops. 

Faith,  then,  is  a  power  as  well  as  a  working  basis 
and  a  spiritual  essence.  To  yield  to  its  leadings,  to 
make  the  move  in  the  dark  that  is  sometimes  demanded 
of  us,  is  to  find  that  an  additional  impetus  has  entered 
into  life.  Faith  lifts  the  soul,  imbues  it  with  a  divine 
energy,  a  sweet  love  and  peace.  It  makes  "whole," 
gives  centrality — the  power  by  which  the  soul's 
various  activities  are  welded  into  consistency.  A 


342          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

man  will  do  for  his  faith  what  he  would  hardly  do  for 
aught  else  save  for  the  one  he  loves.  Faith  is  love 
in  another  guise,  love  for  truth,  for  a  cause,  an  in- 
stitution, a.  creed,  love  for  God.  Blessed  are  we  if 
we  are  able  to  break  free  from  circumstances  and 
yield  to  faith's  uplifting  tide. 

As  we  have  before  noted,  faith  brings  a  security 
that  we  little  realise  until  we  consider  the  insecurity 
which  besets  many  of  life's  enterprises.  No  one  knows 
what  sudden  turn  will  take  away  the  resources  of  the 
man  who  depends  upon  getting  all  he  can  out  of  people 
instead  of  giving  whatever  he  may.  To  found  one's 
judgments  of  people  upon  character  is  to  lay  a  basis  for 
security.  Nothing  ill  can  befall  the  man  of  faith,  he 
is  in  no  sense  a  child  of  fortune:  what  comes  is  part 
and  parcel  of  the  supreme  purpose  of  the  universe,  a 
purpose  that  is  of  one  piece.  There  is  no  obstacle  in 
the  way,  and  whatever  comes  grows  logically  out  of 
whatever  exists. 

One  who  possesses  faith's  central  insight  is  able  to 
quicken  faith  in  others.  Grounded  in  consciousness 
of  the  one  Power,  he  carries  in  his  presence  a  life  that 
inspires  confidence,  arouses  conviction.  Intellectually 
he  is  constructive,  in  contrast  with  those  who,  lacking 
the  central  insight,  do  the  iconoclastic  work  of  the 
world.  Even  if  he  does  not  consciously  seek  to  be 
logical  he  is  so  by  virtue  of  this  unitary  possession. 
Dwelling  at  the  centre  himself,  he  is  able  to  stir  those 
who  have  found  no  poise.  The  critic  may  discern 
flaws  in  his  utterances,  for  he  may  give  himself  far 
more  to  the  spirit  than  to  the  form  of  his  insight.  But 
the  critic  no  doubt  judges  solely  by  the  letter;  whereas 
those  who  possess  the  constructive  insight  are  faithful 
above  all  to  the  essence  of  their  vision.  To  possess  the 


The  Place  of  Faith  343 

Spirit,  to  discern  the  unity,  is  to  be  unable  to  bean 
iconoclast.  A  marvellous  consistency  springs  from 
the  central  insight. 

To  seek  the  sources  of  this  all-compelling  faith  is  to 
find  that  at  some  time  in  life  the  possessor  of  it  passed 
through  an  experience  that  stirred  the  soul  to  its  depths. 
For  example,  here  is  a  young  man  whose  hopes  are 
bound  up  with  his  father's  life  and  work.  Suddenly 
the  father  passes  from  this  life  and  leaves  the  son 
practically  helpless.  Apparently  every  door  is  closed, 
all  resources  are  gone,  and  the  work  which  the  two 
were  doing  together  hardly  seems  worth  carrying 
on  alone.  Moreover,  the  shock  of  separation  brings 
upon  the  bereaved  one  an  illness  which  strikes  him 
down  to  the  depths.  But  in  the  most  forlorn  moment, 
when  the  soul  seems  utterly  weak,  a  soothing  presence 
comes,  a  manifestation  of  the  divine  love  that  brings 
supreme  evidence  of  the  life  of  the  Spirit.  Out  of  this 
deepest  of  experiences  a  new  faith  is  born,  the  realities 
of  the  spiritual  life  are  brought  home. 

No  one  would  voluntarily  undergo  so  severe  a  test 
of  the  law  that  "  he  that  loseth  his  life  shall  find  it," 
yet  no  one  who  has  passed  through  the  experience 
would  for  any  price  part  with  it.  For  it  is  the  last 
moment  of  weakness,  the  uttermost  evidence  of  the 
finitude  of  the  human  soul,  that  brings  the  supreme 
proof  of  the  sustaining  strength  of  the  Spirit.  One 
such  descent  into  the  depths,  one  such  moment  of  utter 
despair,  followed  by  the  ascent  to  the  heights  of  the 
Spirit,  is  sufficient  to  transform  mere  theory  into  faith, 
mere  appearance  into  reality.  Before  that  time  one 
may  indeed  have  seemed  to  believe,  but  by  contrast 
one  now  proves  to  have  been  a  doubter.  One  appar- 
ently understood  the  laws  of  life,  but  now  one  not 


344          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

only  knows  but  possesses,  lives,  commands.  Every- 
thing one  possessed  before  is  turned  to  account,  but 
the  power  has  now  come  which  productively  employs 
it.  This  is  the  sort  of  faith  that  is  created  in  us.  The 
Spirit  comes  as  a  sustaining  presence,  an  encompassing 
love,  and  the  everlasting  arms  so  enfold  the  troubled 
soul  that  it  would  be  an  utter  sin  not  to  respond.  It 
is  such  experiences  which  above  all  others  make  the 
word  " Father"  the  fitting  name  to  apply  to  God. 
God  is  literally  a  Father  in  that  supreme  moment. 

This  is  one  of  the  occasions  when  religious  experience 
stands  forth  in  all  the  wealth  of  its  reality.  Yet, 
again,  it  is  the  mediation  of  the  years  of  experience 
and  thought  that  follow  which  transforms  the  ex- 
perience into  an  intelligible  faith.  Food  for  thought 
sufficient  for  a  lifetime  may  well  be  involved  in  such 
an  experience.  It  is  the  quickening  of  the  Spirit 
which  creates  the  faith,  but  it  is  the  life  of  thought 
that  makes  it  rational.  As  the  years  pass  and  one 
learns  the  deep  meaning  of  this  quickening,  one  is  able 
to  put  it  in  its  true  light  as  central  to  a  faith  which 
applies  to  every  experience  in  human  life.  It  is  be- 
cause the  soul  was  once  touched  as  deeply  as  could 
be  that  the  way  is  clear  to  meet  manifold  experiences 
even  when  all  seems  dark  ahead. 

As  Hoffding  puts  it, 

religious  faith  is  the  conviction  of  a  steadfastness,  a  cer- 
tainty, an  uninterrupted  interconnection  in  the  fundamental 
relation  between  value  and  reality,  however  great  may 
be  the  changes  to  which  the  conditions  of  reality  .  .  . 
are  subjected.  .  .  .  Faith  is  a  subjective  continuity  of 
disposition  and  will,  which  seeks  to  hold  firmly  to  an  objec- 
tive continuity  in  existence.  The  object  of  faith  is  the  con- 
servation of  values,  but  the  existence  of  faith  is  in  itself 


The  Place  of  Faith  345 

a  witness  to  the  conservation  of  values  in  the  particular 
personality.  1 

The  postulates  of  faith  would  of  course  be  stated 
differently  according  to  the  theological  point  of  view. 
One  person  may,  as  we  have  noted,  experience  an 
upliftment  of  heart  and  will  which  he  attributes  to  the 
direct  inspiration  of  the  Father,  while  another  will 
declare  that  "Christ  came,"  that  he  actually  saw  the 
face  of  the  Master;  and  yet  both  may  have  enjoyed 
essentially  the  same  experience.  You  could  hardly 
convince  a  man  who  believes  that  he  literally  saw 
the  face  of  Christ  that  his  theological  interpretation 
had  aught  to  do  with  what  he  claims  to  have  beheld. 
Yet  compare  the  inner  history  of  one  illumined  man 
with  that  of  another  and  you  will  find  that  in  very 
subtle  fashion  the  theological  preconceptions  largely 
create  the  imagery.  To  some  people  it  has  long  been 
matter  of  habit  to  attribute  everything  spiritual  to 
the  acceptance  of  the  presence  of  Christ.  To  another 
it  is  no  less  natural  to  turn  in  thought  directly  to 
the  Father.  The  one  cannot  think  of  God  without 
the  idea  of  a  mediator,  the  other  cannot  conceive  of 
Him  except  as  immediately  revealed. 

There  are  those  who  maintain  that  it  is  a  positive 
hindrance  to  put  Christ  in  the  place  of  the  Father. 
From  their  point  of  view  this  implies  the  deification 
of  Jesus.  Hence  the  Father  is  seemingly  lost  to  view. 
For  if  God  be  alone  known  through  Jesus,  it  is  heresy 
to  believe  in  the  direct  presence  of  the  Father.  Con- 
sequently a  philosophy  of  the  Spirit  is  impossible  save 
so  far  as  the  third  Person  of  the  trinity  is  concerned. 
This  doctrine  has  no  doubt  had  much  to  do  with  the 

i  The  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Eng.  trans.,  p.  117. 


346          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

relegation  of  God  to  a  heaven  outside  of  the  universe. 
It  has  held  men  back  who  might  have  enjoyed  a 
universal  faith.  It  has  subordinated  both  God  and  man 
by  elevating  Jesus  into  a  place  which  he  never  sought. 

It  is  not  our  province,  however  to  take  sides  in 
theological  disputes.  No  doubt  it  was  Jesus  who 
showed  mankind  the  supreme  pathway  to  the  Spirit, 
so  that  he  alone  at  that  time  could  say,  "I  and  my 
Father  are  one."  It  may  be  that  Jesus  has  appeared 
to  many  an  illumined  soul  besides  St.  Paul.  That 
some  should  at  any  rate  symbolise  their  vision  in  terms 
of  Jesus 's  face,  even  declare  that  they  beheld  the 
fleshly  "Son  of  man"  as  a  living  personality,  is  per- 
fectly natural.  To  many  it  is  far  easier  to  think  first 
of  the  Son,  then  of  the  Father.  But  this  is  no  reason 
for  excluding  the  Father.  It  does  not  disprove  the 
belief  that  the  Father  is  directly  related  to  every 
human  soul.  The  ideal  is  to  be  "one  with  the  Father  " 
as  Jesus  was  one  with  Him. 

Insist,  if  you  will,  that  the  living  Christ  came  to  you. 
Enter  into  the  vision  in  all  its  fulness,  and  by  all 
means  live  by  the  truth  which  your  vision  revealed. 
But  recollect  that  what  you  experienced  may  be  the 
subject  of  numerous  interpretations,  that  your  Chris- 
tology  is  an  interpretation,  and  that  you  make  it  on  the 
autnority  of  your  own  judgment.  Remember  that 
for  others  it  has  been  easy  from  their  spiritual  youth 
up  to  turn  in  thought  directly  to  the  Father.  Those 
whose  interpretations  differ  from  yours  may  hold 
Christ  in  equally  great  esteem.  One  might  accept  a 
strictly  orthodox  view  of  Jesus  as  the  redeemer,  yet 
believe  in  the  immediate  presence  of  the  Father.  Our 
philosophy  of  the  Spirit  must  be  broad  enough  to  in- 
clude strikingly  diverse  interpretations. 


The  Place  of  Faith  347 

Inasmuch  as  philosophy  aims  to  be  universal,  a 
strictly  universal  faith  would  seem  most  to  accord 
with  a  philosophy  of  the  Spirit.  That  is,  it  is  not  for 
the  devotee  of  philosophy  to  impose  dogmatic  dis- 
tinctions. If  no  man  ever  lived  without  the  Spirit, 
the  Spirit  may  be  said  in  very  truth  never  to  have 
left  man  without  a  witness.  Man,  made  in  the  image 
and  likeness  of  God,  is  by  nature  fitted  to  apprehend 
the  divine  presence  without  personal  intermediary. 
Teachers,  organisations,  revelations,  and  the  Master 
are  indeed  necessary.  But  to  what  end  ?  Not  because 
they  are  final,  but  because  man  in  the  darkness 
of  his  ignorance  needs  help.  The  ideal  is  not  one  of 
dependence  on  scripture  or  upon  Jesus,  but  upon  the 
Father,  namely,  the  ability  each  may  acquire  to  go 
directly  to  the  Father.  Make  any  of  the  instruments  or 
intermediaries  ends  in  themselves  and  to  that  extent  you 
exclude  the  Father,  for '  *  No  man  can  serve  two  masters." 

"To  preserve  the  faith,"  as  the  phrase  goes,  may 
be  to  preserve  the  letter.  Really  to  preserve  the 
faith  is  to  recollect  that  faith  is  a  gift  of  experience. 
That  is,  it  is  first  a  gift  of  experience,  then  is  marred, 
modified  or  appreciatively  set  forth,  as  the  case  may 
be,  in  forms  which  are  likely  to  be  outgrown.  A  living 
faith  springs  from  a  living  experience,  one  in  which 
spontaneity  is  perennial.  If  the  experience  expresses 
itself  in  new  ways,  its  modes  of  expression  must  alter, 
too.  The  test  is  fresh  experience  studied  afresh.  It 
may  be  hard  to  part  with  endeared  forms  of  expression. 
But,  once  more,  no  man  can  serve  two  masters,  and 
unqualified  allegiance  must  be  given  to  the  Spirit. 
The  Spirit  is  here  now,  its  revelations  are  true  now. 
Nothing  except  man's  own  perversity  can  keep  him 
from  apprehending  the  Spirit. 


348          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

It  is  the  office  of  faith  to  supplement,  bridge  over, 
act  as  intermediary,  while  we  are  in  partial  possession 
of  facts,  while  we  are  making  a  move  in  behalf  of 
intuition,  the  inner  light,  guidance.  It  is  not  a  faculty 
or  an  organ.  It  does  not  represent  an  entire  phase  or 
side  of  our  nature  but  plays  its  part  on  all  sides.  Hence 
it  is  not  to  be  assigned  a  special  place  as  revealer  of 
reality  or  truth,  but  must  be  taken  into  account  all 
along  the  line,  as  essential  not  merely  to  the  spiritual 
life  particularly  so-called,  but  as  essential  to  human 
life  itself,  as  a  prime  essential  of  our  very  being. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE  WITNESS  OF  THE  SPIRIT 

THAT  the  presence  of  God  may  be  regarded  in  a 
number  of  ways  has  become  more  and  more  apparent 
in  the  preceding  discussions.  From  the  point  of  view 
of  a  philosophy  of  Spirit  at  large,  God  is  the  immanent 
source  of  all  things  and  all  experiences  which  may 
rightfully  be  called  real.  In  this  sense,  God  is  not 
an  object  of  experience  but  the  absolute  ground  of  all 
experience.  The  trees,  fields,  and  hills  are  not  God ; 
our  sensations,  emotions,  and  feelings  do  not  give  us 
sense-impressions  of  God's  being.  God  is  rather  the 
underlying  life  whose  Spirit  imbues  all  these.  Nature 
and  men  are  manifestations  of  God,  not  identical  with 
Him;  for  God  is  an  object  of  thought.  The  same  is 
true  if  we  speak  of  the  divine  being  from  the  point 
of  view  of  logic:  God  is  the  ultimate  universal,  the 
immediate  of  immediates,  the  basis  of  all  premises, 
the  giver  of  all  objects  of  thought,  hence  the  ground 
of  all  truth.  From  an  ethical  point  of  view,  God  is  the 
final  ground  of  the  right,  hence  the  ultimate  object  of 
reference  in  all  moral  judgments.  From  a  theological 
point  of  view  God  is  still  an  object  of  thought,  as  the 
basis  of  all  attributes,  providences  and  religious  powers ; 
and  as  the  creator  of  the  physical  universe  and  the 
human  soul.  One  might  argue  without  limit  in  be- 
half of  the  existence  of  God  as  the  Underlying  reality 
without  believing  that  God  is  present  as  an  experience. 

Not  until  it  is  specifically  a  matter  of  religious  expe- 

349 


35°          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

rience  is  God  referred  to  as  vividly  present  in  the  same 
way  that  a  sensation  or  feeling  is  present.  In  the 
above-mentioned  respects  God  is  only  inferentially 
present.  But  for  religion  God  is  empirically  immanent 
in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word.  He  is  present  when 
we  worship,  when  we  pray,  imbuing  us  with  His  pur- 
poses when  we  aspire,  loving  through  us  when  we 
serve,  and  bestowing  His  sweet  peace  upon  us  when 
we  commune  with  Him.  For  religion  at  its  best  there 
is  in  fact  no  barrier  of  any  sort  between :  in  the  revela- 
tional  experience  it  is  God  who  speaks,  in  the  prophet 
the  Holy  Spirit  is  incarnated.  For  religion,  too,  the 
relationship  is  so  intimate  that  it  would  ordinarily 
seem  audacious  to  undertake  a  differentiation  of  its 
factors. 

In  the  foregoing  chapters  we  have  sought  to  give 
meaning  to  the  experience  of  the  divine  presence  by 
regarding  it  as  not  merely  special  and  religious,  but 
as  implied  in  the  entire  inner  life  of  man.  Regarding 
the  miracle  of  the  renewing  life  of  nature  and  of 
the  human  heart  as  an  earnest  of  the  reality  of  God's 
life  in  action,  we  took  the  clue  from  the  presence  of  an 
advancing  life  within  us,  adopting  the  theory  that  this 
life  is  from  the  Holy  Spirit  because  it  more  abundantly 
explained  the  facts  of  human  experience.  This  led 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  life  of  the  Spirit  has  a  nat- 
ural basis  within  us,  that  the  natural  and  the  spirit- 
ual are  in  closest  relationship.  Hence  we  found  the 
Spirit  not  only  in  man's  so-called  higher  nature,  but 
working  up  from  below  through  the  stirrings  of  instinct, 
the  activities  of  desire,  through  our  struggles  and  our 
aspirations  towards  the  perfect.  Yet,  although  we 
concluded  that  God  is  present  to  all  sides  of  our  nature, 
we  also  concluded  that  there  is  a  hierarchy  of  powers 


The  Witness  of  the  Spirit  351 

within  us;  hence  we  must  acknowledge  the  supremacy 
of  the  higher  over  the  lower,  the  authority  of  conscience 
and  the  decisive  power  of  enlightened  reason. 

Approaching  the  subject  from  the  point  of  view 
of  human  faculty,  the  chief  difficulty  we  encountered 
was  due  to  our  inability  to  limit  the  divine  presence,  or 
even  the  authoritative  divine  pronouncement,  to  any 
single  power.  To  assign  the  experience  of  the  presence 
of  God  to  a  special  faculty  would  be  to  do  injustice 
to  our  other  po\vers,  hence  to  exclude  the  Spirit  from 
them.  There  is  no  exclusive  faculty  or  ''God-sense," 
no  miraculously  operative  revelational  power  implying 
quiescence  of  human  initiative,  no  moral  "sense"  which 
invariably  or  infallibly  tells  man  what  is  right  or  wrong. 
Nor  could  we  even  say  that  God  is  made  specifically 
knowrn  through  those  vague  possessions  known  as 
"the  feelings"  in  contrast  with  the  intellect.  God  is 
no  doubt  present  to  our  sensibilities,  but  it  requires 
philosophic  thought  and  a  criterion  to  discern  Him 
there,  and  the  life  of  sensation  is  not  sundered  from 
that  of  thought.  God  is  authoritatively  present  in 
conscience,  but  that  does  not  absolve  man  from  the 
law  of  responsibility.  Neither  through  conscience 
regarded  as  a  "sense"  nor  through  intuition  regarded 
as  "infallible"  are  we  always  able  to  discern  the  right 
or  the  true,  but  experiences  of  various  sorts  are  in- 
wrought with  all  our  judgments  and  our  judgments 
are  very  human.  God  is  without  doubt  directly 
apprehended  through  the  emotional  life,  yet  the  emo- 
tions by  themselves  so  readily  run  to  excess  that  only 
in  connection  with  other  phases  of  mental  life  are  we 
able  to  distinguish  the  emotions  which  are  permanently 
eligible.  We  cannot  go  even  half  way  with  the  mystic, 
for  he  places  too  much  emphasis  on  ecstatic  emotion, 


352          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

although  we  recognise  a  value  in  the  experience  which 
is  so  filled  with  the  thought  of  God  that  God  alone  seems 
to  exist.  God  is  surely  apprehended  through  ' '  feeling," 
that  is,  each  man  has  experiences  peculiar  to  himself, 
the  presence  of  God  is  made  real  to  the  individual 
through  actual  immediacy,  as  opposed  to  intellectual 
generality;  but  it  is  more  intelligible  to  say  that  God 
is  known  through  "the  heart,"  meaning  by  this  conven- 
ient expression  not  any  organ,  not  a  faculty,  not  the 
emotions  of  love  alone,  but  the  entire  immediacy  of 
man's  spiritual  nature.  To  say  that  God  is  revealed 
through  providential  guidance  is  also  to  acknowledge 
that  it  is  not  a  matter  of  faculties  but  of  interpreted 
experiences.  Faith,  too,  is  a  co-operative  product. 
The  imagination  plays  its  part,  also,  and  oftentimes 
what  we  really  mean  when  we  speak  of  spiritual  ex- 
perience is  that  the  imaginative  description  is  a  mere 
symbol  of  the  Spirit's  presence:  we  did  not  actually 
experience  what  we  describe,  but  this  is  our  way 
of  poetically  suggesting  what  we  experienced. 

Moreover,  our  more  technical  analysis  of  immediacy 
showed  that  there  is  no  precisely  describable  or  re- 
coverable immediacy.  What  men  mean  by  "sensa- 
tion," "feeling,"  or  "intuition"  is  not  something  merely 
empirical,  not  something  which  they  actually  felt  as 
described,  but  an  experience  conjoined  with  a  descrip- 
tion and  an  interpretation.  Indeed  our  analysis 
almost  led  us  to  believe  that  reality  is  merely  a  recon- 
struction of  human  thought,  that  our  sole  resource 
is  to  develop  mediational  thought.  We  were  con- 
stantly reminded,  however,  that  in  immediacy,  how- 
ever elusive,  lies  the  pearl  of  great  price  which  we  went 
out  to  seek.  If  only  through  analysis,  comparison, 
criticism,  and  interpretation  can  what  is  real  or  true 


The  Witness  of  the  Spirit  353 

be  known,  only  through  spontaneity,  obedience,  fresh 
return  and  fidelity  to  unexpected  leadings  can  we 
keep  sufficiently  close  to  reality  to  interpret  it  in 
terms  of  life.  Thus  the  presence  of  life,  with  its 
wealth  and  its  surging  progress  through  us,  once  more 
proved  to  be  the  central  clue.  The  result  of  our  in- 
vestigation was  not  that  we  were  condemned  to  the 
formulas  of  thought,  but  that  through  transitivity, 
becoming,  movement,  change,  it  is  possible  to  pass 
beyond  immediacy  and  mediation  to  a  higher  moment 
of  thought  in  which  both  are  included  in  the  Idea. 

Our  general  conclusion  therefore  was  that  the 
spirit  in  man  is  directly  related  to  the  Spirit  of  God,  and 
that  out  of  this  ineffable  union  proceeds  a  rich  life 
which  may  be  appreciatively  apprehended  and  philo- 
sophically interpreted.  The  mystic  is  surely  wrong  in 
claiming  to  know  this  direct  union  so  familiarly,  nor 
does  that  union  imply  either  identity  of  selfhood  or 
absorption  in  God  such  that  naught  else  exists.  The 
union  is  too  high,  too  pure,  to  be  thus  characterised. 
By  the  time  the  mystic  has  brought  the  description 
down  to  his  level  the  experience  has  already  become 
complex  and  is  lost  in  irrelevant  sentiency.  It  would 
be  more  reasonable  to  say  that  the  power  of  God  is 
mediated  to  us,  and  that  only  the  human  factors 
are  recoverable.  Inasmuch  as  no  realistic  description 
can  do  justice  to  the  experience  of  the  presence  of  God, 
it  would  be  better  to  give  up  the  attempt  to  be  literal 
and  make  the  best  interpretation  possible  in  terms,  not 
of  mysticism,  but  of  constructive  idealism.  Since  God 
is  present  to  all  sides  of  our  manifold  nature,  we  are 
compelled  to  give  a  constructive  account. 

The  same  results  follow  if  we  regard  the  divine 
presence,  not  from  the  point  of  human  faculty,  but  in 


354          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

the  light  of  various  modes  of  conduct.  If  some  men 
find  God  by  withdrawing  from  their  fellows,  rejecting 
society,  and  living  a  life  of  contemplation  or  of  asceti- 
cism, others  discover  Him  amidst  the  most  social  life. 
Some  know  Him  through  what  they  take  to  be  direct 
guidance,  while  others  depend  solely  upon  inductive 
thought.  Again,  there  are  those  who  so  shape  their 
conduct  as  to  obtain  and  enjoy  what  they  call  the  di- 
vine peace.  For  them,  as  for  many  others,  the  divine 
presence  is  always  associated  with  a  life  of  harmony 
and  tranquillity,  inspiring  reposeful  freedom  and 
ineffable  beauty.  But  what  of  those  who  find  God  in 
moral  victory  and  spiritual  struggle?  If  He  be  a  God 
of  peace  and  harmony,  what  of  our  passions?  It  may 
be  that  to  find  Him  in  the  discarded  things  of  life  is 
really  to  find  Him.  To  limit  God  to  one  channel  is 
to  exclude  Him  from  others,  but  a  philosophy  of  the 
Spirit  must  be  widely  inclusive.  No  doubt  the  special 
experiences  in  meditative  solitude  have  their  value, 
but  that  value  can  hardly  be  seen  in  its  true  light 
until  the  relationship  of  God  to  our  entire  experience 
is  seen.  It  cannot  be  fundamentally  a  question  of 
a  certain  mode  of  life,  if  by  such  conduct  we  mean  that 
external  conditions  are  ultimate  factors. 

Though  ideally  a  unitary  self,  man  as  matter  of  fact 
is  a  collection  of  manifold  tendencies,  and  his  life  is  so 
rich  in  inconsistencies  and  conflicting  forces  that  it  is 
difficult  to  make  our  descriptions  sufficiently  inclusive. 
Then,  too,  temperaments  differ,  and  what  one  man 
would  characterise  as  spiritual  in  a  given  situation 
another  would  account  for  in  wholly  different  terms. 
Some  would  neglect  facts  and  indulge  in  symbolic 
imagery  without  limit,  while  others  would  care  solely 
for  facts  and  precise  general  principles.  The  mystic 


The  Witness  of  the  Spirit  355 

and  the  rationalist  are  so  far  apart  in  point  of  view 
that  they  can  scarcely  understand  each  other.  The 
intermediate  man  runs  the  risk  of  being  true  to  neither 
while  trying  impartially  to  serve  both.  Some  readers 
of  the  foregoing  chapters  would  find  little  to  interest 
them  in  bur  account  of  intuition,  guidance,  and  the  life 
of  faith;  while  others  would  complain  that  we  have 
not  given  sufficient  credence  to  these  factors  of  the 
spiritual  life. 

The  resource  is  to  return  to  our  guiding  principle 
throughout,  namely,  the  witness  of  the  Spirit,  a 
witness  which,  while  taking  individual  form  in  each 
case,  exhibits  universal  characteristics,  and  includes 
values  which  relate  to  the  ineffable  immediacy  of  the 
Spirit.  Were  we  able  to  say  all  that  their  devotees 
would  have  us  say  in  behalf  of  faculties  and  special 
modes  of  life,  regarded  as  authoritative  in  themselves, 
there  would  be  no  word  left  for  the  Spirit.  We  should 
expect  all  accounts  of  spiritual  experience  to  fail  in  so 
far  as  it  is  a  question  of  human  faculty.  The  larger 
truth  is  that  there  is  one  Spirit  but  a  diversity  of  gifts. 
The  witness  of  the  Spirit  in  the  race  is  the  human 
evidence  in  general  of  the  creative  gifts  of  the  Spirit. 
The  spiritual  life  of  faith  is  created  in  us.  We  would 
doubt  if  we  could,  or  explain  these  spiritual  gifts  as 
merely  psychological;  but  we  cannot.  The  Spirit  sur- 
passes all  limitations ;  it  is  perfectly  made  known  not 
through  one  mode  alone,  but  through  the  organised 
totality  of  human  experience.  The  Spirit  is  first,  last, 
and  always  its  own  witness,  identical  in  essence,  yet 
varying  so  greatly  in  forms  of  expression  as  to  challenge 
all  powers  of  description. 

Thus  conceived,  the  Spirit  may  be  compared  to 
the  sunlight,  poured  in  and  around  all,  abundant 


356          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

beyond  all  computation.  Universal  in  essence,  its 
forms  are  individual,  its  utterances  particular.  It 
enters  into  this  channel,  now  into  that,  taking  on  and 
revealing  itself  through  the  characteristics  of  the 
channel  through  which  it  is  manifested.  It  is  not 
itself  any  one  of  these  its  instruments.  It  is  not  it- 
self any  of  the  pronouncements  that  are  made  by  its 
agents.  Yet  each  represents  a  phase  of  its  total 
selfhood  and  reality.  Speaking  through  guidance,  it 
is  real  and  true  for  the  recipient  of  guidance,  although 
another  soul  would  express  the  message  differently. 
Voicing  itself  through  intuition,  it  is  infallible  for 
the  believer  in  intuition.  Stirring  within  the  heart, 
it  is  unspeakably  real  for  the  heart  that  apprehends 
its  tender  presence — and  all  men  speak  the  language 
of  the  heart.  Welling  up  as  experience,  it  is  experience 
and  naught  else  for  the  mystic.  But  rare,  in  any  age 
and  in  all  time,  is  the  man  who  knows  God  as  reason, 
who  has  the  universal  insight. 

We  might  then  compare  the  presence  of  God  to 
natural  beauty.  The  same  landscape  exists  for  all, 
but  beauty  in  its  various  forms  for  those  who  have 
eyes  to  see  it.  The  beauty  is  not  in  any  one  object, 
grass-plot  or  group  of  trees,  seen  at  close  range,  but  in 
that  subtle  blending  which  appropriate  distance  reveals. 
The  objects  in  which  the  beauty  appears  to  reside  might 
indeed  be  enumerated,  but  the  beauty  is  real  for  those 
only  whose  attention  has  been  called  to  it.  So  in  the 
case  of  human  faculty,  one  may  point  now  to  intu- 
ition, now  to  emotion  and  to  guidance ;  but  these  when 
psychologically  analysed  prove  to  be  very  human. 
The  presence  of  God  is  not  thus  to  be  confined.  To  find 
that  presence  it  is  necessary  rather  to  gather  evidence 
here  and  there  until  something  comparable  to  a  total 


The  Witness  of  the  Spirit  357 

scene  in  nature  is  developed.  Such  evidences  are 
found,  for  example,  in  studies  like  the  foregoing  in 
which  we  symbolically  referred  to  the  presence  of  God 
as  the  awakening  life,  the  over-power  which  unites  that 
which  is  natural  to  that  which  is  more  frequently 
denominated  spiritual ;  the  spontaneous  element  which 
wells  up  in  man  through  worship,  prayer,  creative 
work ;  the  life  that  is  active  in  our  struggles  from 
lower  to  higher;  and  through  the  creation  within  us 
of  a  convincing  intuition  of  the  fact  of  guidance  in- 
spiring a  life  of  faith. 

The  difficulty  is  to  make  the  account  large  enough 
to  include  all  approaches  to  this  universal  element. 
If  some  would  gather  evidence  solely  through  inter- 
pretation of  nature,  others  would  depend  rather  upon 
a  study  of  human  faculty,  while  still  others  would 
insist  that  it  is  a  certain  mode  of  life  or  an  authoritative 
revelation  that  reveals  God.  Again,  it  would  be  said 
that  God  is  known  through  distinctively  religious 
experience,  through  "the  soul's  awakening,"  the 
prompting  to  prayer,  worship,  service,  holy  love; 
through  expressions  of  praise,  sacred  music,  and  in- 
spired hymns.  But,  again,  •  it  would  be  said  that 
God  is  known  through  a  specifically  moral  life,  through 
regeneration,  the  awakenings  of  conscience,  through 
reverence  for  the  moral  law.  Still  others  would  insist 
that  the  divine  Being  is  appreciable  through  the  love 
and  quest  for  truth.  But  all  these  statements  are 
true.  It  would  be  unwarrantable  to  declare  that  any 
one  of  these  approaches  is  exclusively  a  channel  to 
the  divine  nature.  The  universal  failing  of  men  is 
exclusiveness.  The  mystic,  for  example,  holds  that 
God  is  solely  what  the  mystical  ecstasy  shows  Him 
to  be.  The  moral  philosopher  assures  us  that  God 


358          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

is  good,  meanwhile  there  is  the  fact  of  evil.  The 
churchman  has  a  copyright  on  his  creed.  The  devotee 
of  social  reform  thinks  that  yonder  scholar  in  his 
library  knows  not  God.  Meanwhile  the  Spirit  waits 
for  unqualified  recognition. 

If  instead  of  making  special  claims  we  wait  on  nature 
and  consider  how  our  convictions  come  to  be  con- 
victions, we  discover  that  it  is  not  alone  through  any 
one  of  the  channels  ordinarily  enumerated,  but  that 
the  witness  of  the  Spirit  is  gradually  developed  within 
us,  through  co-operation  of  all  sides  of  our  nature.  Men 
assume  that  their  intuitions  spring  into  being  full- 
fledged,  but  it  is  not  so.  The  man  whose  life  is  governed 
by  guidance  began,  not  with  a  distinct  and  unmistak- 
able leading  which  answered  all  questions,  but  with 
a  clue  which  when  followed  eventually  led  to  desirable 
results.  Then  came  another  clue  and  another,  amidst 
conflicting  impulses  and  moments  of  doubt,  until  in 
due  course  a  habit  was  acquired — the  habit  of  listening, 
discerning,  testing,  accompanied  by  a  habit  of  practical 
application.  Thus  through  years  a  standard  was 
developed,  by  comparison  of  immediacies  and  their 
fruits  when  variously  interpreted. 

The  love  that  at  last  stands  revealed  as  spiritual, 
in  contrast  with  passion,  hence  with  selfishness, 
gradually  emerges  into  such  prominence  through  no 
particular  act  on  our  part,  but  through  many  experi- 
ences and  periods  of  reflection.  We  doubt  and  contend 
to  a  certain  point,  then  arrive  at  convincing  insight. 
So  with  intuition:  it  proves  itself  by  its  works  and 
by  its  triumphant  contests  with  impressions,  emotions, 
and  feelings;  intuition  is  a  culmination.  By  insensible 
degrees  we  gather  our  evidence,  now  brooding  over  our 
data  and  now  drawing  inferences.  By  the  time  the 


The  Witness  of  the  Spirit  359 

conviction  emerges  we  have  forgotten  the  steps  that 
led  to  it,  hence  it  appears  to  be  a  pure  gift.  But  were 
it  not  a  complex  product,  partly  empirical  and  partly 
intellectual,  partly  of  slow  growth  and  finally  of 
sudden  fruition,  it  would  by  no  means  possess  the 
authority  over  us  which  it  proves  to  hold. 

Faith,  too,  is  a  gift  that  is  gradually  bestowed.  We 
may  believe  that  it  is  either  a  pure  gift  or  that  it  is 
solely  the  result  of  inductive  reason,  but  neither  view  is 
correct.  We  can  no  doubt  point  to  certain  experiences 
which  strengthened  our  faith,  we  can  argue  in  their 
behalf,  point  lessons  for  others,  hence  inculcate  faith. 
But  that  is  not  the  whole  story.  The  Presence  which 
surpasses  all  description  has  meanwhile  dwelt  with 
us,  silently  carrying  forward  the  stream  of  our  life. 
We  cannot  tell  how,  we  cannot  tell  when,  but  some- 
how and  at  a  time  of  which  we  took  no  account  there 
was  added  an  element  which  now  reveals  itself  as  a 
living  witness.  Where  we  once  contended  or  were 
disturbed,  we  now  sit  serenely  watching  the  play  of 
forces  which  would  then  have  shaken  us  to  the  foun- 
dation. We  cannot  tell  where  we  won  this  trium- 
phant power.  Through  no  poise  that  was  consciously 
acquired  could  we  withstand  such  contentions. 
Something  has  been  born  within  us  in  the  night  of 
unconsciousness.  Its  power  is  unmistakable.  Its 
works  prove  its  high  origin. 

Again,  it  is  a  matter  of  general  experience  which  we 
cannot  assign  to  any  particular  side  of  our  nature. 
As  the  days  and  weeks  pass,  hours  intervene  that  add 
an  ineffable  value  to  the  occasion.  Had  we  planned 
for.  them  these  hours  would  have  failed  us.  Had  we 
psychologically  analysed  them  they  would  have  thinned 
into  pale  descriptions.  We  did  not  even  "let"  them 


360         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

come,  they  came.  They  are  like  the  sunset  glow, 
added  to  the  prose  of  cloudland.  They  come  as  those 
wondrous  moments  come  when,  listening  to  a  Beetho- 
ven symphony,  one  transcends  the  mere  moment  and 
thought  plays  at  random  in  the  world  of  eternal  values. 
In  due  time  these  ineffable  hours  combine  by  a  law 
no  less  sacred  than  the  law  of  their  coming.  Out  of 
their  variety  springs  a  new  unitary  conviction.  That 
the  Spirit  is  one,  universal,  and  varied  in  its  forms  of 
expression — this  is  the  great  truth  that  emerges. 

Thus  the  deeper  truth  that  the  Spirit  is  progressively 
bestowed  upon  us  displaces  the  petty  doubts  which 
annoy  us  when  we  try  to  develop  a  static  conception 
of  the  divine  presence.  Whatever  else  the  Spirit  is, 
it  is  surely  life,  it  is  life-bringing,  and  only  in  terms 
of  life  can  we  even  approximately  describe  its  reality. 
It  would  seem  delightful  to  enter  such  a  state  of  bliss 
as  the  Hindoo  mystics  tell  about  and  to  abide  in 
such  consciousness.  But  such  is  not  the  way  of  life. 
He  who  knows  God  merely  as  the  quiescent  good  does 
not  yet  know  Him.  Our  God  is  a  God  of  struggle 
as  well.  He  who  has  wrestled,  who  knows  what  sorrow 
and  suffering  are,  has  a  right  to  speak.  When  God 
is  excluded  from  nothing  then  is  He  truly  God.  My 
own  life  must  know  no  exception  if  I  am  actually  to 
realise  the  divine  presence.  I  must  discern  to  the 
foundation,  philosophise  to  the  utmost  and  fearlessly. 
Then  shall  the  great  conviction  be  born. 

The  ideal  element  for  which  we  have  made  allowances 
throughout,  the  element  of  values  appertaining  to  the 
world  of  appreciation,  is  just  this  additive  gift  of  the 
Spirit.  When  we  have  made  our  most  precise  statement, 
and  apparently  included  all  the  facts,  it  is  this  over- 
element  that  gives  worth  to  all  the  rest.  Yet  the 


The  Witness  of  the  Spirit  36z 

witness  of  the  Spirit  is  no  less  precise  than  the  limita- 
tions which  it  overcomes.  It  is  not  a  vague  or  random 
element,  but  is  added  according  to  law.  Hence  to 
make  allowances  for  it  is  to  proceed  with  as  much  con- 
fidence as  to  appeal  to  anything  else  that  man  knows 
only  through  experience.  The  only  qualification  is 
that  one  does  not  attempt  to  complete  even  the  ap- 
preciative account.  On  the  God-ward  side  it  is  pure 
Spirit  that  is  given.  To  know  what  is  given  were 
to  be  the  Father  of  all  gifts.  What  we  apprehend 
is  the  Spirit  as  mediated  to  us  by  such  experiences  as 
we  are  capable  of  entering  into. 

That  the  Spirit  is  life  and  stirs  us  to  newness  of  life 
we  frequently  realise  when,  bored  by  the  artificialities 
of  conventional  society,  we  drop  them  all  and  associate 
with  people  who  are  doing  things.  It  may  be  the 
missionary  who  gives  us  the  divine  touch,  or  the  social 
worker  who  opens  our  eyes  to  real  life  in  the  slums. 
Or,  again,  it  is  the  reactionary  who  has  forsworn  society 
altogether  and  is  working  his  way  back  to  the  heart  of 
life.  Peasant  people  lead  us  back,  nature  restores  us, 
so  do  little  children.  To  give  up  all  plans  and  let  life 
manifest  itself  through  us  as  it  will  is  another  way. 
A  new  insight  brings  freshness  of  life.  Love  quickens 
us  anew,  and  when  all  other  resources  fail  we  can  find 
the  Spirit  by  ministering  in  love.  Where  "two  or 
three  are  gathered  together"  there  indeed  shall  the 
Spirit  be  found  as  it  never  could  be  if  we  dwelt  alone. 

The  great  lesson  is  obedience.  He  who  w^ould  know 
the  Spirit  in  its  more  immediate  guises  must  be  willing 
to  follow,  ready  to  give  up  all  attempts  to  manage 
or  control.  Obedience  is  indeed  a  fundamental  need 
of  the  spiritual  life.  It  includes  the  preservation  of 
spontaneity  and  the  losing  of  one's  life  in  order  to 


362          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

find  it.  First  there  is  need  of  receptivity,  patient  listen- 
ing, quiet  readiness,  closeness  to  life.  Then  comes  the 
discovery  of  leadings  or  clues,  accompanied  by  will- 
ingness to  follow  wherever  they  may  lead,  in  full  trust, 
in  entire  fidelity  to  the  new  life  that  stirs  within  the 
breast.  To  follow  without  knowing  at  first  that  we 
are  obeying  is  best  of  all.  For  we  then  do  what  we 
are  led  to  accomplish,  write  what  comes,  express  what 
stirs,  without  ulterior  motive  and  with  self-abandon- 
ment; when  self -consciousness  comes,  as  come  it  must, 
fortunate  are  we  if  we  do  not  try  to  imitate  the  letter 
of  some  previous  act  instead  of  seeking  the  new  meaning 
of  the  Spirit  in  the  living  present.  If  we  try  to  repeat 
what  people  have  applauded  our  performance  is  sure 
to  be  inferior.  To  centre  our  interest  upon  the  letter 
is  to  take  it  away  from  the  life.  Without  the  fresh 
revelation  of  life  the  letter  soon  dies  and  becomes 
a  crystalline  record  of  what  the  Spirit  was.  Thus 
constant  obedience  is  the  price  of  life. 

The  devotee  of  the  Spirit  no  doubt  wishes  to  be 
established  in  faith,  in  attitude  and  in  life,  but  he  must 
choose  between  a  static  and  a  dynamic  conception. 
In  this  volume  we  have  argued  from  the  first  for  the 
dynamic  view.  Hence  we  have  emphasised  the  pri- 
macies of  experience  as  opposed  to  all  formulas,  creeds, 
books,  and  institutions.  The  forms  find  their  value 
as  instruments  of  the  achieving  Spirit  and  must  keep 
pace  with  man's  growing  consciousness  of  the  Spirit. 
To  become  settled  in  a  static  sense  is  eventually  to 
lose  the  Spirit  for  which  we  sought  to  become  es- 
tablished. In  motion  or  change  alone  is  life  constantly 
present.  It  is  what  the  Spirit  is  doing  to-day  that 
avails.  Consequently  the  first  and  last  need  is  ad- 
justment to  the  present  leadings  of  the  Spirit. 


The  Witness  of  the  Spirit  363 

Hence  the  one  in  whom  the  witness  of  the  Spirit  is 
strong  is  frequently  heard  to  remark:  "This  is  what 
I  see  to-day.  I  cannot  tell  how  the  situation  may 
appear  to-morrow.  I  know  not  what  I  shall  do."  He 
who  is  thus  poised,  who  is  ready  to  go  wherever  he  is 
led,  has  in  truth  begun  to  be  settled.  For  the  only  real 
basis  of  rest  is  in  the  trust  which  the  Spirit  inspires. 
And  we  now  know  that  such  rest  is  very  far  from  being 
merely  emotional.  For  unless  a  man  understand  the 
law  his  pathway  is  by  no  means  sure.  Indeed  one 
may  say  that  a  man  is  sure  in  so  far  as  philosophic 
conviction  has  taken  the  place  of  mere  experience. 
Stability  is  a  gift  of  divine  reason. 

To  be  faithful  to  the  present  leadings  of  the  Spirit 
does  not,  as  here  conceived,  mean  the  rejection  of  all 
system  or  order.  On  the  contrary,  to  be  established 
in  adjustment  with  the  Spirit's  leadings  is  to  possess 
the  only  real  system.  The  disorder  of  human  life 
springs  from  man's  effort  to  be  something  by  himself 
in  the  world  of  surfaces.  Really  to  be  grounded  is  to 
move  with  the  Spirit  whose  perpetual  creation  is  the 
divine  order.  The  Spirit  is  one,  the  only  ultimate 
basis  of  unity.  Each  soul  may  find  a  home  there. 
That  home  shall  be  eternal  for  those  who  abide  in  the 
consciousness  of  the  divine  presence.  Centred  in  that 
presence  within  the  sacred  precincts  of  the  soul,  one  may 
adjust  oneself  without  limit  to  the  needs  of  external  and 
social  life,  hence  make  the  fullest  use  of  all  systems. 
The  basis  of  choice  is  this  central  guidance.  The 
criterion  is  fidelity  to  the  Spirit.  To  begin  each 
activity  in  the  light  of  the  Spirit  is  to  follow  the  central 
clue.  And  every  line  of  conduct,  every  system,  needs 
to  be  repeatedly  tested  to  see  if  it  meet,  the  require- 
ments of  the  Spirit. 


364          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

Despite  the  fact,  however,  that  the  witness  of  the 
Spirit  is  first  a  matter  of  experience,  and  that  out  of 
experience  a  conviction  almost '  unwittingly  grows, 
we  are  unable  to  conclude  that  the  Spirit's  witness  is 
merely  empirical.  Experience  never  gives  universals, 
but  only  particulars,  not  even  when  it  is  a  question 
of  the  presence  of  God.  It  is  our  sentiency  which 
gives  us  the  experience,  our  thought  that  tells  us  it  is 
God.  Experience  may  indeed  combine  with  experience 
to  produce  conviction,  but  the  conviction  is  no  less 
a  matter  of  thought.  Without  reality  immanent 
in  our  premise  we  should  not  discover  it  in  our  con- 
clusion, and  critical  comparison  is  needed  to  prove 
that  it  is  reality.  To  know  the  witness  of  the  Spirit 
is  not  alone  to  live  close  to  the  immediacies  which 
bestow  upon  us  a  newness  of  life,  but  to  ascend  the 
heights  of  reason  and  learn  the  universal  meaning  of  our 
experiences.  If  experience  supplies  the  renewing 
clues  it  is  reason  that  makes  explicit  their  divine  order. 
Hence  the  necessity  for  a  philosophy  of  Spirit  as  op- 
posed to  mere  life. 

This  relationship  of  experience  to  mediating  thought 
has  appeared  throughout  the  preceding  chapters. 
The  discussion  in  regard  to  the  presence  of  God  each 
time  showed  that  it  is  first  a  matter  of  immediacy,  then 
of  comparison  and  interpretation.  The  basis  of  the 
mystic's  experience,  for  example,  proved  to  be  an  im- 
mediacy which  we  resolved  into  its  elements.  .  Guid- 
ance, too,  proved  to  be  a  gift  of  the  immediate  side  of 
our  nature,  distinguishable  into  numerous  types.  So 
far  as  the  immediacy  of  guidance  is  concerned,  it  might 
be  given  us  by  a  community  of  spirits ;  only  through  the 
acceptance  of  an  underlying  philosophy  of  the  spiritual 
life  is  one  able  to  decide  that  all  guidance  is  ultimately 


The  Witness  of  the  Spirit  365 

from  a  single  Providence.  Faith  in  the  first  instance  is 
a  product  of  the  immediate,  growing  up  within  us  out 
of  a  complexity  of  emotions,  feelings,  and  beliefs, 
meeting  successively  severer  tests  and  finally  as- 
suming philosophic  form.  If  there  be  any  reason 
for  differentiating  a  part  of  our  nature  as  spiritual,  then 
that  part  is  surely  immediate;  for  it  is  characteristic 
of  the  spiritual  to  be  in  the  first  instance  receptive, 
docile,  responsive,  obedient.  Hence  the  simplicity  of 
all  these  powers  and  experiences  is  best  seen  in  child- 
hood, in  the  naive  or  uncritical  stage  of  experience.  In 
contrast  with  these  essentially  obedient  immediacies, 
the  intellect  is  more  active,  aggressive.  Manhood's 
thought  recovers  the  immediate,  yet  in  a  reconstructed 
form,  one  that  has  survived  the  tests  of  doubt,  struggle, 
and  seeming  defeat. 

To  the  immediate  side  of  our  being  belong  the  ex- 
periences which  first  send  us  forth  into  activity.  It  is 
not  originally  ideas  that  stir  men's  souls,  compel  them 
to  believe,  and  make  them  willing  to  undergo  hardships ; 
it  is  some  prompting  that  rises  from  the  realm  of  sen- 
tiency,  some  emotion  or  feeling.  The  immediate  may 
be  of  slight  value  in  itself,  for  instance,  an  emotional 
conversion  in  one's  youth;  but  it  may  be  unspeakably 
rich  in  consequences.  Under  the  head  of  immediacy 
belong  all  instinctive  stirrings,  the  original  quicken- 
ings  of  desire,  the  swaying  powers  of  impulse,  and  the 
overwhelming  life  of  passion,  all  emotions  of  an  un- 
critical or  untransformed  type,  all  spontaneous  prompt- 
ings and  all  activities  of  love  in  primitive  guise.  It  is 
impulse,  desire,  love,  not  reason,  that  first  sends  men 
forth  to  action.  Imagination  may  follow  and  enlarge 
upon  our  original  experiences,  emotion  may  cause 
their  increase,  will  may  choose  and  hence  develop  some 


366          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

experiences  to  the  neglect  of  others,  while  reason  makes 
plain  what  it  is  that  we  love;  but  it  is  love  that  stirs. 
Indeed  it  might  be  said  to  be  the  function  of  the  im- 
mediate to  stir,  to  make  gifts,  while  reason's  province 
is  to  state  the  implied  ends,  worths,  and  values.  Our 
immediacies  are  often  like  vague  gropings  in  the  fog, 
while  the  calm  intellect  sits  aloft  and  beholds  the  var- 
ious ends  we  would  attain,  like  so  many  masts  rising 
above  the  mist.  Yet  the  intellect  is  helpless  without 
the  gifts  which  life  brings  it.  The  intellect  is  delibera- 
tive in  the  extreme,  while  impulse  surges  to  the  rescue 
and  saves  the  endangered.  On  theoretical  grounds  we 
disbelieve  what  immediate  experience  forthwith  pro- 
ceeds to  reveal.  Intellectually  our  minds  become  dry 
and  lifeless,  but  the  new  awakenings  of  the  heart  create 
everything  anew.  While  there  is  spontaneity  there  is 
hope. 

A  thousand  experiences  would  be  impossible  and 
life  would  be  dull  in  the  extreme  were  it  not  for  the 
ever-powerful  gifts  of  the  immediate  side  of  our  nature. 
Without  the  inspired  zeal  of  our  evangelical  friends  we 
would  hardly  depart  as  missionaries  to  foreign  lands, 
or  seek  out  the  sinner  in  the  slums.  Without  the  emo- 
tional persuasiveness  of  the  magnetic  leader  we  would 
not  break  from  the  usual  routine  of  life  and  thought. 
One's  evangelical  friends  may  preach  strange  theology 
when,  for  example,  they  insist  that  probation  ceases 
with  death  and  hence  one  must  be  energetic  to  save 
souls  while  there  is  yet  time — and  before  the  devil  is  up. 
But  were  it  not  for  their  almost  fanatical  earnestness  we 
might  have  settled  back  with  the  quiet  conviction  that, 
as  all  men  are  sons  of  God,  they  are  saved  already.  We 
do  not  go  to  the  evangelical  leader  primarily  for  ideas, 
but  rather  to  the  philosopher,  who  tells  us  how  the 


The  Witness  of  the  Spirit  367 

mind  works  and  almost  wearies  us  with  his  criticism. 
But  who  in  all  the  world  so  stands  for  the  power  of 
God  as  these  naive  theological  people  who  are  in  touch 
with  the  compelling  immediacies  of  the  religious  life? 

What  we  love,  what  we  will  or  are  stirred  to  be, 
this  it  is  which  makes  the  most  of  us  what  we  are ;  not 
what  we  conclude  after  careful  reasoning.  The  mystic 
simply  shows  in  the  extreme  this  compelling  power 
of  the  immediate.  His  is  the  soul  on  fire,  his  the  all- 
mastering  emotion.  But  he  is  merely  an  exaggeration 
of  all  men  in  the  childhood  of  the  race.  Were  he  a  good 
critic  of  his  own  states  he  would  be  a  poor  mystic.  He 
teaches  us  that  there  is  something  sacred  in  human  life. 
To  preserve  the  power  of  spontaneous  return  to  the 
original  sources  is  of  as  much  consequence  as  to  in- 
tellectualise  the  mystic's  experience. 

It  is  a  deeply  suggestive  fact  that  the  man  who 
brings  us  nearest  God  is  most  apt  to  be  the  evangelical 
person  who  stands  for  an  uncritically  naive  view,  who 
pleads  for  "the  point  of  view  of  God."  Ignorant  of 
the  profounder  results  of  modern  criticism  and  unable 
to  interpret  his  own  experiences,  he  will  insist  with 
utmost  earnestness  that  God  alone  can  accomplish,  that 
man  does  nothing  by  his  own  efforts.  Man  is  in  fact 
belittled  in  the  extreme,  and  the  intellect  is  disparaged 
without  limit.  Yet  amidst  all  this  crudity  of  thought 
there  stands  out  the  sublime  truth  that  "God  is  all  in 
all."  There  is  an  enormous  carrying  power  in  such 
utterance.  It  has  the  persuasiveness  of  an  absorb- 
ing idea,  the  power  of  an  overwhelming  emotion; 
whereas  the  well-informed  man  has  so  many  ideas  that 
he  is  unable  to  yield  his  mind  wholly  to  any  one  of 
them.  Surely  here  is  the  witness  of  the  Spirit. 

Yet,  having  conceded  all  this  persuasiveness  to  the 


368          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

immediate,  we  must  accord  to  criticism  its  due.  Woe 
unto  him  to  whom  doubts  come,  for  it  is  a  long,  long 
road  from  this  naive  evangelism  to  the  mature  con- 
viction which  puts  criticism  in  its  right  light.  The 
uncritical  devotee  of  the  religious  immediate  appears 
to  possess  the  full  reality  and  truth  concerning  God. 
But  reality  is  not  so  apparent  and  truth  is  not  so 
easily  won.  To  depart  from  the  uncritical  stage  of 
life  is  like  beholding  the  disappearance  of  youth,  with 
all  its  delights  and  its  unconsciousness.  Yet  every 
man  is  sooner  or  later  compelled  to  sail  out  on  the  sea 
of  life  in  quest  for  his  own  fortune.  The  unspoiled 
heart- is  a  priceless  treasure,  innocence  is  a  perpetual 
delight,  and  every  one  must  indeed  ' '  become  as  a  little 
child"  in  order  to  enter  the  kingdom.  But  no  one  is 
counselled  to  be  or  to  remain  merely  a  child.  Nothing 
is  surely  known  as  real  until  it  has  been  put  though 
the  tests  of  experience,  comparison,  and  restatement. 
The  truth  is  discoverable  through  dialectic,  through 
negation,  contrast,  and  reconstruction.  Immediacy  is 
so  dear  to  us  that  we  cling  to  it  as  to  life  itself.  But 
the  life  of  the  Spirit  in  us  is  progressive,  and  its  su- 
preme witness  is  the  testimony  of  reason. 

It  would  be  possible  to  attribute  an  exaggerated 
importance  to  knowledge  as  opposed  to  experience, 
and  no  doubt  modern  philosophy  has  over-emphasised 
the  problems  of  epistemology.  But  it  is  plain  that  no 
man  is  really  established  in  faith  until  he  has  not  only 
enjoyed  the  vision  but  grasped  its  meaning.  If,  as 
Emerson  assures  us,  "our  faith  comes  in  moments, 
our  vice  is  habitual,"  it  is  because  we  still  live  much  in 
the  realm  of  emotion  and  other  immediacies.  To 
possess  a  faith  that  is  stable,  to  move  steadily  towards 
the  moral  and  spiritual  goal,  we  must  understand 


The  Witness  of  the  Spirit  369 

the  law  of  life.  It  is  easy  to  have  faith  while  we  are 
prosperous  or  when  the  mood  is  on,  easy  to  rejoice  with 
those  who  rejoice;  but  the  test  comes  when  we  must 
prove  for  ourselves  that  which  seemed  so  persuasive 
when  we  dwelt  with  the  multitude,  or  when  we  had 
not  yet  encountered  adversity.  Really  to  know  is  to 
prove  in  detail  for  ourselves.  Wisdom  cannot  be  com- 
municated as  the  immediacies  can.  Emotions  are 
cheap;  for  knowledge  we  must  pay  an  increasing  price. 
It  seems  to  the  uncritical  observer  that  the  mere 
immediacy  of  emotion  or  feeling  reveals  the  universal- 
ity of  the  Spirit.  This  misconception  is  repeatedly 
exemplified  in  popular  speech  when,  for  example, 
we  hear  people  say,  "I  feel  this  to  be  true,"  meaning 
thereby  a  law  which  they  hold  to  be  universal.  What 
they  "feel"  is  of  course  merely  a  particular  instance 
which  they  judge  to  be  representative  of  a  law  already 
accepted  on  other  grounds.  Newton,  gazing  at  the 
apple,  does  not  "experience"  the  law  of  gravitation, 
does  not  "feel"  its  truth;  he  reflects  upon  the  apple's 
fall,  and  on  the  basis  of  his  knowledge  of  nature  and  of 
science  arrives  at  a  generalisation.  He  does  not  and 
cannot  observe  every  possible  falling  body  and  hence 
arrive  at  his  law  by  mere  enumeration  of  instances. 
No  one  can  empirically  verify  a  law  by  actually  perceiv- 
ing every  instance  of  it.  No  one  can  touch,  see,  or  feel 
a  law.  A  law,  just  because  it  holds  in  every  case  in  the 
given  universe  of  discourse,  is  universal  and  necessary. 
The  truth  of  its  universality  and  necessity  is  arrived 
at  by  means  of  a  generalisation.  The  nearest  one  can 
come  to  experiencing  it  is  in  a  given  instance  of  it 
when  experience  and  generalisation  blend  in  a  verifying 
intuition.  It  is  such  a  blending  that  leads  to  the  con- 
fusions of  popular  speech. 
24 


370         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

The  element  of  surety  in  spiritual  faith  belongs, 
therefore,  to  the  intellectual  generalisation,  not  to  the 
feeling  which  seems  to  establish  its  truth.  Far  more 
important  than  to  receive  a  particular  guidance,  or 
any  number  of  such  guidances,  if  uninterpreted,  is  to 
arrive  at  a  conclusion  in  regard  to  their  common 
origin  and  meaning.  Hence  to  receive  a  guidance 
and  to  prove  its  value  by  its  empirical  fruits,  and  to 
discern  its  philosophic  significance,  are  two  different 
things.  The  mere  guidances  do  not  by  any  means  leap 
together  and  form  themselves  into  a  law.  The  law 
is  discovered  through  comparison  and  inference.  It 
is  no  doubt  an  act  of  faith  to  pass  from  the  particular 
to  the  universal,  but  we  have  already  noted  that  faith 
is  an  inseparable  part  of  our  rational  processes.  To 
see  the  consistency,  the  connection  of  all  guidances 
— that  is  the  significant  discovery.  The  grand  result, 
therefore,  of  spiritual  experience  at  large,  whether 
mystical  or  not,  is  the  conclusion  that  there  is  a  law, 
a  power — call  it  what  you  will  so  long  as  you  express 
its  universality — that  presides  over  events,  over  our 
lives,  a  Life  in  which  we  can  absolutely  trust. 

It  is  no  small  part  of  the  witness  of  the  Spirit,  there- 
fore, to  gather  the  evidences  which  indicate  the  Spirit's 
presence  and  on  the  basis  of  the  facts  to  arrive  at  sound 
generalisations.  Particular  experiences  are  often  so 
ambiguous  that  one  questions  whether  all  ambiguities 
can  be  resolved.  But,  however  perplexing  the  various 
pronouncements  of  experience,  one  fact  is  plain,  that 
there  is  a  Life  in  events  not  of  our  own  creation,  with 
the  arrangements  of  which  we  had  nothing  to  do.  It  is 
plain  that  this  Life  takes  a  certain  course  through  us, 
that  it  is  revealed  under  varied  conditions,  some  phys- 
ical, some  moral,  some  distinctively  religious.  We  are 


The  Witness  of  the  Spirit  371 

compelled,  for  example,  to  observe  certain  natural 
conditions  in  order  to  live;  and  no  man,  by  taking 
thought,  can  change  these  natural  conditions.  Again, 
there  is  a  law  over  us  in  the  mental  world,  conditions 
to  which  thought  must  adapt  itself  if  it  would  under- 
stand that  world  with  its  unceasing  flux  of  experiences 
which  never  recur.  In  the  moral  realm  we  are  brought 
back  to  learn  what  we  sought  to  escape  from.  There 
is  a  necessary  correspondence  between  inner  and 
outer  conditions  such  that  we  are  compelled  to  suffer 
the  consequences  of  our  own  acts.  We  are  com- 
pelled to  observe  precise,  orderly  conditions,  if  we 
would  attain  certain  ends.  Indeed  the  law  is  so  far 
over  us  that  men  miscall  it  "fate."  But  it  is  this  same 
law  which,  enforced  upon  us  at  every  turn,  proves  to  be 
the  law  of  love,  and  convinces  us  beyond  all  doubt  that 
the  Spirit  exists. 

It  is  a  part  of  this  great  law,  for  example,  that  the 
noblest  gifts  of  the  spiritual  life  come  in  their  own 
way,  added  to  the  rich  blessings  of  that  which  is  more 
distinctively  natural.  Hence  in  one's  reflection  on  the 
facts  of  life  there  gradually  grows  up  a  belief  in  the 
environing  existence  of  a  higher  order  of  being  in- 
visibly surrounding  the  natural  world.  Then  there 
takes  place  a  memorable  transition  as  the  point  of 
view  shifts  from  the  natural  or  temporal  to  the  eternal. 
From  the  higher  point  of  view,  the  great  truth  is  that 
God  is  eternally  present,  not  "in"  space,  but  mani- 
fested in  and  through  a  universe  of  which  nature  is  a 
part  only.  From  this  point  of  view  God  is  not  speci- 
fically "here,"  but  is  immanently  related  to  all  beings 
and  things  every  "where."  From  this  point  of  view, 
the  initial  fact  is  life,  the  divine  power  manifested  in 
and  through,  active  in  every  living  creature.  From 


372          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

above,  not  from  below,  becomes  the  great  word,  "the 
above"  whence  cometh  the  direct  influx  of  life  and 
love;  the  above  whence  descendeth  the  divine  grace, 
the  quickening  power  of  the  new  birth,  the  everlasting 
wonder  of  the  incarnation.  From  that  source  is  born 
the  conviction  which  transcends  all  doubt  and  reveals 
the  Reality  of  realities.  And,  here,  once  more,  it  is 
experience  that  is  the  primary  clue. 

It  has  been  said  that  no  one  is  prepared  to  teach 
philosophy  who  has  not  had  "the  spiritual  experience," 
and  we  have  found  abundant  evidence  that  it  is  expe- 
rience that  gives  the  incentive  in  a  spiritual  direction. 
The  mystical  ecstasy  will  serve  as  well  as  any  other 
provided  that  out  of  the  experience  there  emerge,  not 
mysticism,  but  the  conclusion  that  ultimately  there 
is  one  law  of  all  spiritual  things.  To  discern  the  mean- 
ing of  the  mystical  insight  is  to  see  that  the  implied 
law  or  unity  gives  a  basis  for  a  philosophy  of  the 
Spirit.  To  emphasise  the  emotional  factor,  the  feeling- 
element  or  sentiency,  is  indeed  to  degenerate;  hence 
mysticism  is  rightly  denominated  intellectual  degenera- 
tion. But  to  distinguish  between  the  particularity  of 
the  experience  and  the  universality  of  the  insight  may 
well  be  to  discover  sufficient  material  for  an  entire 
philosophic  system.  Hence  "the  spiritual  experi- 
ence" no  doubt  underlies  some  of  the  greatest  systems 
in  human  thought.  The  philosophers  do  not  narrate 
their  experience,  for  they  well  recognise  that  it  is 
merely  particular.  What  they  give  is  the  result  of 
their  reflection. 

Likewise  in  the  tests  to  which  we  put  our  faith,  it  is 
not  experience  that  proves  the  law;  experience  merely 
supplies  additional  data  for  further  judgment.  The 
way  out  of  our  straits,  when  we  are  caught  in  the 


The  Witness  of  the  Spirit  373 

narrows  of  agnostic  criticism  is  undoubtedly  empirical, 
that  is,  pragmatic;  but  pragmatism  is  merely  a  tem- 
porary method.  If  we  are  so  beset  by  doubts  as  to  be 
unable  to  believe  in  God,  the  resource  is  to  adopt  one 
of  our  childhood's  beliefs  tentatively,  then  see  how 
it  " works/'  If  the  demands  of  practical  life  are  met 
by  the  belief  that  there  is  a  guiding  Spirit,  a  divine 
Father  who  provides  for  every  need,  we  have  splendid 
evidence  which  we  may  forthwith  develop  into  a  phi- 
losophy of  religion.  If  the  conception  of  an  immanent 
Spirit  meet  our  religious  demands,  we  may  then  take 
this  doctrine  as  a  starting-point  for  a  complete  phi- 
losophy, and  compare  it  with  other  doctrines.  Thus 
"the  spiritual  experience"  may  well  give  the  clue  to 
all  experience. 

To  find  a  working  conception  that  applies,  an  idea 
of  God  that  pragmatically  "works,"  is  a  great  step  in 
advance,  yet  it  by  no  means  takes  the  place  of  a 
thorough-going  reconstruction  of  our  faith.  So  far  as 
merely  practical  conceptions  go  we  are  still  in  the 
region  of  ambiguities.  The  otherwise  splendid  re- 
sults of  Professor  James's  Varieties  of  Religious  Ex- 
perience well  illustrate  this.  In  that  book  you  have 
an  unusually  liberal  description  of  experiences,  and 
a  capital  psychological  explanation  of  their  occurrence. 
But  the  psychological  theory  is  so  excellent  that  one  is 
free  to  conclude  either  that  there  is  or  that  there  is 
not  a  real  spiritual  world  corresponding  to  these  ex- 
periences. On  psychological  grounds  one  is  totally 
unable  to  resolve  the  difficulty.  Worse  yet,  Professor 
James  offers  metaphysical  alternatives.1  Only  by 
accepting  a  system  of  first  principles  on  other  than 

1 1  have  criticised  this  book  more  at  length  in  Man  and  the  Divine 
Order,  Chap.  III. 


374          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

merely  psychological  or  pragmatic  grounds  is  one  able 
to  return  to  the  difficulty  and  resolve  it.  Professor 
James  inclines  towards  a  curious  pluralistic  view.  In 
the  preceding  pages  we  have  steadily  advanced  towards 
a  monistic  conclusion. 

The  choice  between  the  belief  that  the  Spirit  is  one 
and  that  it  is  many  cannot  be  decided  on  merely 
empirical  grounds.  If  comparison  of  experiences 
reveals  the  fact  that  all  the  guidances  of  the  spiritual 
life  imply  one  law,  we  have  thus  much  evidence  in 
favour  of  a  teleological  idealism.  But  the  contrasts 
between  so-called  good  and  so-called  evil  forces  may 
suggest  an  ultimate  dualism,  and  this  implication  must 
be  compared  with  the  teleological  implication.  If  the 
mystical  insight  be  deemed  conclusive — that  is,  the 
monistic  mystical  insight — it  remains  to  be  tested  in 
the  light  of  other  considerations.  Hence  the  supreme 
witness  of  the  Spirit  is  the  one  which  shall  guide 
the  way  even  through  the  mazes  of  the  age-long  dia- 
lectic of  the  One  versus  the  Many.  This  is  so  long  a 
way  that  few  care  to  walk  therein,  for  it  implies  the 
complete  development  of  a  constructive  idealism. 

To  what  extent,  then,  does  the  witness  of  the  Spirit 
throw  light  on  the  nature  of  reality?  Judging  by  the 
fact  that  a  belief  has  long  prevailed  that  the  universe 
is  a  manifestation  of  Spirit,  this  witness  has  proved  to 
be  of  widespread  and  fundamental  significance.  To 
us,  living  in  a  more  critical  age,  this  witness  can  afford 
a  clue  only  so  far  as  we  are  able  to  find  a  way  from 
mere  immediacy,  unreflective  insight,  guidance,  faith 
and  intuition,  to  reconstructive  reason. 

Our  inquiry  into  the  nature  of  reality  is  necessarily 
incomplete.  We  found  that  immediacy  of  experience 
is  the  primary  reality,  that  is,  first  in  point  of  time; 


The  Witness  of  the  Spirit  375 

but  we  concluded  that  only  through  analysis  and 
criticism  can  the  immediate  be  distinguished  from 
appearance.  We  were  unable,  then,  to  adopt  any 
form  of  immediatism,  not  even  mysticism  with  its 
convictions  regarding  the  direct  presence  of  God. 
Our  psychological  studies  pointed  to  a  definite  con- 
ception of  reality,  inasmuch  as  we  rejected  the  theory 
that  there  is  a  special  "faculty"  for  the  apprehension 
of  spiritual  reality,  and  concluded  that  only  by  esti- 
mating the  pronouncements  of  reason,  as  well  as  those 
of  feeling,  emotion,  intuition  and  the  experiences  of  our 
sensibility  in  general,  can  what  is  real  be  ascertained. 
Thus  while  psychological  considerations  proved  in 
themselves  ambiguous,  the  clues  they  afforded  sug- 
gested some  form  of  critical  idealism  as  the  probable 
theory  of  what  is  real.  On  other  than  psychological 
grounds,  that  is,  in  terms  of  faith,  we  concluded  that 
there  is  a  higher  order  of  being  corresponding  to  the 
values  of  religious  experience.  Hence  we  resolved 
the  ambiguity  by  adopting  as  conclusive  the  demands 
of  practical  life,  namely,  that  spiritual  things  shall  be 
real.  Moreover,  the  conclusion  that  the  natural  and 
the  spiritual  are  intimately  related  tended  to  confirm 
this  view. 

Everywhere  we  have  found  that  it  is  inner  experi- 
ence that  affords  the  direct  clue  to  what  is  real  in  the 
higher  sense  of  the  word,  and  in  this  sense  we  ac- 
knowledged that  there  is  a  truth  in  mysticism.  But 
we  discovered  that  the  truth  of  inner  experience  is  far 
from  plain  on  the  surface,  inasmuch  as  there  are  mis- 
conceptions attendant  upon  intuition,  feeling,  and  emo- 
tion, and  conflicting  interpretations  of  parallel  facts. 
In  contrast  with  detached  guidances  and  particular 
insights,  we  indicated  the  fundamental  character  of 


376          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

the  central  guidance  which  pertains  to  man's  eternal 
welfare.  This  fundamental  clue  furthered  the  pro- 
bability that  there  is  divine  providence,  or  purpose; 
and  thus  again  our  investigation  afforded  an  idealistic 
clue,  namely,  in  favour  of  a  teleological  doctrine. 
Again,  our  discussion  tended  towards  theism,  rather 
than  pantheism;  monism  instead  of  pluralism;  and 
towards  emphasis  upon  one  power  resident  in  all 
activities,  as  opposed  to  a  dualism  of  conflicting  good 
and  evil  forces.  We  could  not,  however,  accept  op- 
timistic fatalism,  and  say,  ''all  is  good,  there  is  no 
evil/'  "whatever  is,  is  right";  for  we  noted  that 
everything  exists  in  order  and  degree,  from  lower  to 
higher;  a  thing  or  quality  is  good  in  its  appropriate 
place,  and  our  theory  of  the  spiritual  life  is  through 
and  through  ethical. 

It  was  inevitable  that  we  should  encounter  limitations 
in  the  development  of  a  theory  of  the  divine  nature, 
inasmuch  as  our  inquiry  was  specifically  concerned 
with  God  as  Spirit,  as  progressively  present  to  human 
experience,  accomplishing  ends  in  concrete  life.  The 
practical  man  and  the  pragmatist  would  be  content  to 
stop  here,  as  much  as  to  say,  If  your  theory  meets  the 
needs  of  practical  life  what  more  is  wanted?  We  are 
reminded,  however,  of  the  service  which  reason  has 
been  to  us  from  the  start,  and  of  the  idealistic  clues 
mentioned  above.  We  have  scarcely  given  reason  an 
opportunity  to  declare  its  type  of  revelation  of  the 
divine  nature. 

To  develop  an  idea  of  God  in  the  more  complete 
sense,  it  would  be  necessary  to  begin  afresh  with  an 
idealistic  analysis  of  experience.  Thus  far  we  have 
kept  close  to  experience,  and  while  mere  experience 
has  proved  inadequate  we  have  discovered  realities 


The  Witness  of  the  Spirit  377 

there  which  many  intellectualists  have  left  out  of 
account;  we  have  found  abundant  evidence  that 
human  experience,  especially  religious  experience,  can- 
not be  accounted  for  without  a  wealthier  conception  of 
actually  known  reality  than  that  of  the  meagre  rela- 
tivism of  our  time.  That  is  to  say,  even  the  inade- 
quacies of  experience  imply  a  larger  conception  than 
agnostic  intellectualism  affords. 

That  we  should  find  it  difficult  to  account  for  higher 
types  of  experience  on  the  basis  of  merely  human 
powers,  by  an  analysis  of  faculties,  intuitions,  emotions, 
feelings,  and  the  like,  is  precisely  what  should  be  ex- 
pected, if  there  be  but  one  Power  that  is  efficient, 
one  Reality  that  creates  experience  in  us.  That  all 
spiritual  or  other  experience  is  given  through  relations, 
that  no  independent  immediacy  is  discoverable,  is 
indeed  a  profound  fact.  If  we  experience  nothing 
apart  from  relations,  we  surely  know  nothing  apart 
from  them.  Both  the  human  and  the  divine  factors 
must,  then,  be  taken  into  account.  The  truth  that 
eludes  us  if  we  revert  to  the  mere  immediate,  however 
authoritative  the  revelation,  is  discoverable  through 
the  dialectic  pursuit  now  of  sentiency  and  now  of 
thought,  now  of  the  human  and  again  of  the  divine. 
Through  movement,  life,  the  truth  is  found. 

The  same  conclusion  follows  if  we  consider  the 
practical  bearings  of  our  inquiry.  Inasmuch  as  no 
emotion,  feeling,  guidance,  or  intuition  is  adequate  by 
itself,  the  moral  is,  By  all  means  preserve  spontaneity, 
learn  obedience,  seek  the  leadings,  clues,  and  guidances 
of  spiritual  immediacy  and  follow  them  whithersoever 
they  lead;  but  also  seek  the  rationally  reconstructed 
clue  which  implies  a  conception  of  the  divine  purpose. 
There  is  surely  priceless  wisdom  involved  in  such 


378          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

immediacies,  but  both  experience  (including  failures) 
and  reason  (including  criticism)  are  needed  to  render 
that  wisdom  fully  available.  One  is  sent  back  to  the 
simple  life  of  fidelity  to  spontaneous  inner  leadings 
with  new  conviction,  since  criticism  has  proved  them 
unexpectedly  valuable.  But  the  necessity  for  right 
interpretation  has  thus  become  greater.  The  fun- 
damental truth  is  this,  namely,  that  there  is  a  pathway 
of  the  Spirit,  a  course  which  the  Spirit  pursues  in  and 
through  us.  This  is  the  law  in  things.  This  is  the 
great  gift  of  the  immediate.  Our  part  is  to  recognise, 
then  to  move  with  the  Spirit.  Hence  the  ideal  is 
poise,  adjustment,  in  accordance  with  the  standards  of 
the  eternal  'type  of  life ;  not  poise  in  self,  not  mere 
submission,  but  co-operation  in  line  with  our  concep- 
tion of  the  one  Efficiency.  This  ideal  includes  the 
promptings  to  individuality  and  originality,  it  is 
inclusive  of  the  Greek  moral  principle  of  self-realisation. 
While,  then,  our  inquiry  leads  us  to  emphasise 
the  one  Efficiency,  it  does  not  involve  the  denial  of 
the  individual  self.  All  along  we  have  gathered  clues 
which  imply  a  conception  of  the  finite  self,  as  the 
centre  of  self-consciousness,  the  possessor  of  mental 
powers,  the  recipient  of  guidance,  the  being  that  has  in- 
sights, grows  in  faith,  loves,  wills,  and  reflects.  All 
experience  is  mediated  through  the  self  and  without  it 
nothing  can  be  understood.  The  revelations  of  the 
Spirit  through  the  inner  life  and  in  nature  are  repro- 
duced in  the  finite  selfhood,  and  accompanying  the 
progressive  life  of  the  Spirit  there  is  an  attendant  finite 
thought.  This  thought  is  not  to  be  scorned,  but  de- 
veloped to  the  full.  For,  what  is  it  in  the  last  analysis 
if  not  the  revelation  of  the  presence  of  God?  Who 
gives  that  thought  its  objects  if  not  the  larger  Self 


The  Witness  of  the  Spirit  379 

without  whom  there  were  no  reality  and  no  truth? 
But  the  self,  like  the  larger  idea  of  God  mentioned 
above,  is  plainly  a  construct;  there  is  no  single  ex- 
perience, no  immediacy  which  shows  what  it  is.  Hence 
constructive  idealism  must  complete  what  is  here 
merely  outlined.  It  is  experience  that  reveals  the 
clues,  it  is  the  Idea  that  renders  them  explicit. 

The  greater  truth  which  our  inquiry  suggests  is  the 
utter  dependence  of  the  finite  self  upon  God.  Ac- 
knowledging the  results  of  modern  criticism,  with  its 
emphasis  upon  the  facts  of  self-consciousness,  we 
nevertheless  insist  that  to  put  emphasis  first  of  all 
upon  man  is  to  put  it  in  the  wrong  place.  No  merely 
factual  analysis  of  human  experience  can  reveal  the 
presence  of  God.  There  is  an  element  of  values,  a 
witness  of  the  Spirit,  that  surpasses  the  utmost  that 
descriptive  analysis  affords.  God  reveals  His  presence 
in  and  through  and  despite  the  limitations  of  finite 
experience.  Human  experience  and  even  the  human 
intellect  is  relatively  passive  in  the  presence  of  that 
mighty  Power.  Of  himself  man  is  and  can  do  nothing. 

To  put  too  great  emphasis  on  the  fundamental  truth 
that  there  is  but  one  Efficiency  would,  however,  be 
to  neglect  the  supplementary  truth  that  God  is  known 
and  manifested  by  the  individual.  To  speak  of  the 
one  Life  alone  would  imply  a  wholly  negative  concep- 
tion of  the  individual,  as  if  man  were  a  merely  passive 
observer  of  a  supreme  immediacy.  We  have  found 
no  such  immediacy.  Not  even  in  man's  most  recep- 
tive moments  is  he  wholly  negative.  He  not  only 
responds,  reacts,  but  prior  to  his  response  approaches 
the  experience  in  an  attitude  of  expectancy  implying  a 
preconception  or  interpretation  of  such  experience. 
He  not  only  receives  but  reacts  in  terms  of  conduct 


380          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

and  of  thought.  The  immediacy  is  but  one  element. 
Moreover  the  immediacy  is  knowable  by  what  it 
leads  to,  is  life,  rich  in  implications.  The  divine 
presence  is  life,  and  is  lifegiving.  What  man  is  led 
to  do  shows  what  the  divine  presence  means  to  him. 
Unless  a  man  does  that  which  manifests  life  he  has 
hardly  apprehended  the  divine  presence.  In  the 
larger  sense,  then,  that  presence  is  known  not  through 
mere  receptivity  but  through  co-operation. 

To  place  stress  on  the  mere  universal,  therefore, 
is  to  neglect  the  particular  which  gives  it  content 
and  meaning.  The  mere  immediacy  of  the  Spirit  is 
purely  general,  universal;  the  significant  consideration 
is  the  specific  guidance,  the  particular  purpose  or  in- 
dividual tendency  which  develops  out  of  that  im- 
mediacy. It  is  a  question  not  of  the  power  of  God, 
which  exists  for  all,  but  of  the  person  whom  God 
means  us  to  be.  To  insist  upon  the  mere  divine 
efficiency  is  to  paralyse  human  endeavour.  Without 
that  efficiency  man  is  indeed  nothing  and  can  do 
nothing.  But  it  is  a  question  what  man  is  and  can  do 
when  he  moves  with  that  efficiency.  Man  is  naught 
only  when  he  tries  to  be  somewhat  by  himself.  When 
he  is  his  true  self  the  power  of  God  manifests  itself 
through  him  towards  definite  ends. 

It  is  of  fundamental  significance,  therefore,  that  the 
presence  of  God  is  known  as  life,  through  life.  Were 
God  merely  static,  were  He  an  inflexible  king  of  iron  will 
whose  decrees  had  arranged  every  moment  of  our  lives, 
mere  passive  resignation  would  indeed  be  called  for. 
Were  there  an  authoritative  voice  which  we  could  all 
hear,  one  which  should  always  tell  us  precisely  what  to 
do,  why  we  exist,  who  we  are,  then  our  course  would 
be  unmistakable.  But  in  the  real  life  which  each  of  us 


The  Witness  of  the  Spirit  381 

knows  by  painful  experience,  struggle,  and  defeat, 
leading  to  slowly  won  victory,  the  divine  life  is  discover- 
able only  by  degrees  and  amidst  fluctuations,  ques- 
tionings, and  extensive  reasoning.  To  fall  in  line  with 
what  we  take  to  be  the  divine,  whether  we  know  it  to 
be  such  or  not,  and  discover  by  trying  where  it  leads  is 
the  surest  method.  Whatever  we  may  become,  the 
result  will  be  a  co-operative  product  of  many  factors, 
some  explicitly  distinguishable  as  divine,  some  per- 
taining to  the  life  of  impulse,  some  springing  from  the 
life  of  reason,  others  from  social  influences.  What  we 
are  is  simply  indescribable  apart  from  the  life  we  lead. 
Through  transition,  movement,  the  deeper  realities 
are  seen,  not  through  anything  stationary.  However 
fixed  the  divine  purposes  may  be,  we  at  any  rate  ap- 
prehend them  through  the  perpetual  flux. 

We  arrive  at  the  important  conclusion,  then,  as  a 
result  of  our  inquiry,  that  the  experience  of  the  pres- 
ence of  God  must  be  taken  account  of  whenever  men 
would  answer  the  great  question,  What  is  reality? 
Thought  cannot  arrogate  to  itself  the  power  of  deter- 
mining what  is  real  by  imposing  its  own  static  uni- 
versal. The  true  universal  is  dynamic,  and  its  content 
is  discoverable  by  waiting  patiently  upon  life.  The 
resource  for  the  sceptic,  the  agnostic,  the  man  who  has 
lost  the  power  of  belief  in  God  because  of  reiterated 
emphasis  put  upon  the  human  factors  of  experience,  is 
to  throw  himself  in  line  with  life  and  learn  whither  it 
leads.  The  power  of  return  to  the  sources  is  not  lost. 
Within  each  of  us  there  is  at  least  a  spark  of  the  divine 
light  left  and  this  may  be  kindled  whenever  we  will. 
Out  of  the  paralysed  state  of  mind  in  which  we  cannot 
see  the  wood  for  the  trees  there  is  a  way  of  escape, 
that  is,  through  faith,  receptivity,  responsiveness. 


382          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

If  man  will  simply  live,  and  take  his  clues  from  life, 
in  due  course  he  will  be  able  to  make  life's  tendencies 
articulate  in  terms  of  an  ideal. 

Our  investigation  thus  brings  us  into  possession  of  a 
method  alike  for  practical  life  and  for  scientific  pur- 
poses. The  first  step  is  to  discover  what  is  given  or 
immediate,  not  merely  from  the  point  of  view  of  fact 
but  from  what  is  active  in  the  immediate.  The  next 
step  is  reaction,  criticism,  exposition,  and  analysis 
of  that  which  the  immediate  has  given,  even  though 
it  be  apparently  self-contradictory.  This  is  the  stage 
in  which  immediatism  contends  with  intellectualism, 
when  because  of  paradoxes  and  conflicts  the  devotee 
of  immediatism  counsels  return  to  nature  or  to  mystic 
ecstasy,  and  when  reason  encourages  man  to  persist. 
No  antitheses  could  be  sharper  than  some  that  emerge 
in  this  period.  The  serious  question  is  repeatedly 
raised  whether  education  really  educates,  whether 
man  has  a  right  to  depart  from  or  try  to  improve  upon 
nature.  To  depart  seems  to  be  a  necessity,  yet  to 
depart  is  to  fall  into  endless  doubts.  But  a  third 
period  is  attained  when  the  harmony  of  experience  and 
of  thought  is  seen.  For,  lo  and  behold,  they  are 
from  the  same  source.  The  same  God  who  prompts 
us  through  our  impulses  quickens  us  through  our 
reason.  There  is  one  Reality  revealed  in  and  through 
all.  The  life  that  gives  the  thinker  his  facts  also  yields 
the  dialectic  through  whose  progressive  movement  the 
Idea  is  discoverable.  Reality  is  both  immediate  and 
mediate ;  the  larger  truth  is  found  through  their  union. 
There  is  no  single  finite  point  of  view  from  which  the  en- 
tire truth  can  be  seen.  There  is  no  individual  whose 
revelatory  experience  is  complete.  But  all  men,  all 
points  of  view  are  needed,  that  the  total  revelation 


The  Witness  of  the  Spirit  383 

may  be  made.  Hence  each  man  must  be  true  to  what 
his  individuality  reveals  and  develop  it  to  the  full, 
believe  in  himself  to  the  end,  while  constantly  learning 
the  truths  which  other  men  declare. 

Out  of  the  wealth  of  considerations  which  our  in- 
quiry has  brought  into  view  we  may  single  out  certain 
propositions  of  prime  significance.  We  declare  (i) 
that  the  Spirit  is  (appreciatively  speaking)  an  awaken- 
ing, progressively  revealed  life  which  pursues  a  cer- 
.tain  course  through  the  world  and  through  men;  (2) 
that  the  Spirit  is  the  basis  of  the  natural  as  well  as  of  the 
spiritual  world,  that  the  two  worlds  are  in  the  most  in- 
timate relation,  such  that  it  is  a  question  of  order  and 
degree  from  the  lowest  levels  of  nature  up  to  the 
heights  of  the  beatific  vision;  (3)  that  the  Spirit  is 
revealed  through  a  gradation  of  realities,  through  a 
descent  and  an  ascent,  an  involution  and  an  evolution, 
hence  everything  is  intelligible  as  real  according  to  its 
place  or  level,  not  at  random,  as  if  all  things  were 
equally  real;  (4)  that  the  clue  to  goodness  is  found  in 
this  gradation  of  realities  from  lower  to  higher,  not 
that  all  things  are  equally  good;  (5)  that  the  clue  to 
truth  is  found  in  this  same  gradation,  rendered  in- 
telligible through  progressive  dialectic  from  the  lowest 
immediate  to  the  absolute  Idea;  (6)  that  within  man's 
consciousness  this  orderly  life  of  the  Spirit  is  reproduced 
in  terms  of  relation  such  that  knowledge  of  reality  is 
possible;  and  (7)  that  in  relation  to  this  progressively 
revealed  life  of  the  Spirit  the  human  self  is  made  known 
amidst  an  activity  based  on  a  natural  flux,  a  natural 
response,  and  ideal  interests  culminating  in  a  central 
purpose  through  which  the  will  of  God  is  achieved. 
The  life,  activity  or  flux  is  thus  everywhere  the  starting- 
point,  the  initial  clue,  the  general  immediacy  out  of 


384         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

which  the  various  differentiations  lead  onward  and 
upward  to  the  beautiful,  the  true,  and  the  good.  The 
Spirit  comes  that  we  may  have  life  and  have  it  more 
abundantly,  and  that  out  of  this  life  the  fulness  of  the 
divine  love  and  wisdom  may  be  revealed. 


SUPPLEMENTARY  ESSAY 

THE  ELEMENT  OF  IRRATIONALITY  IN  THE 
HEGELIAN   DIALECTIC 


335 


'  FOREWORD 

THE  following  Essay,  accepted  by  Harvard  Univer- 
sity as  a  part  of  the  requirements  for  the  degree  of 
Doctor  of  Philosophy,  was  originally  one  of  several 
studies  in  the  concept  of  immediacy  begun  under  the 
instruction  of  Professor  Josiah  Royce,  in  the  Logical 
Seminary  at  Harvard.  It  was  due  to  the  fruitful 
suggestions  and  kind  advice  of  Professor  Royce, 
at  various  critical  junctures,  that  the  investigation 
finally  led  to  a  problem  in  the  logic  of  Hegel  as  the 
culminating  issue.  To  Professor  Royce  I  am  also  in- 
debted for  valuable  suggestions  in  regard  to  the  relative 
worth  of  the  various  books  on  Hegel.  To  be  put  on 
what  proved  to  be  the  right  track  from  the  start  was  of 
such  consequence  that  I  venture  to  make  a  few  sug- 
gestions to  others  who  may  be  going  over  the  same 
ground,  and  to  publish  the  results  of  my  own  investi- 
gations. For  the  results  as  here  stated  I  am  alone 
responsible,  since  the  thesis  did  not  receive  the  criticism 
of  Professor  Royce,  nor  have  those  who  passed  judg- 
ment upon  it  communicated  their  opinions.  So  far, 
then,  as  I  am  indebted  to  Professor  Royce,  or  other 
philosophers,  the  reader  must  infer  from  the  foot-notes 
or  references  to  Hegelian  literature.  The  thesis  has 
been  slightly  revised  and  condensed,  with  the  addition 
of  a  few  notes  and  criticisms. 

It  is  safe  to  assume  that  the  reader  who  is  sufficiently 
interested  in  Hegel  to  make  a  study  of  his  works,  and 
of  the  best  books  about  him,  is  already  familiar  with 
the  history  of  thought  and  needs  only  a  hint  in  regard 

387 


388          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

to  the  order  in  which  one  may  best  read  Hegelian 
literature.  A  thorough  study  of  the  history  of  philo- 
sophy has  perhaps  convinced  him  that  Hegel  is  above 
all  others  worthy  of  serious  consideration.  In  this 
case  a  work  like  Professor  Royce's  The  Spirit  of  Modern 
Philosophy  will  refresh  his  mind  in  regard  to  historical 
problems  leading  from  Kant  to  Hegel.  Recently  a 
work  has  been  published  which  combines  the  study 
of  the  history  of  philosophy  with  that  of  metaphysics, 
and  leads  directly  from  Descartes  to  Hegel,  whose 
system  is  regarded  as  the  logical  fulfilment  of  preceding 
systems.1  Readers  of  works  such  as  Bradley's  Ap- 
pearance and  Reality,  Taylor's  Elements  of  Metaphysics, 
and  Royce's  The  World  and  the  Individual,  would  natur- 
ally turn  to  Hegel  in  further  pursuit  of  the  issues 
raised  by  these  writers.  Or,  the  issues  may  be  logical 
rather  than  metaphysical  and  may  have  arisen  through 
a  study  of  Bradley's  Logic,  Bosanquet's  Logic,  and 
works  by  Hibben  and  others  who  have  treated  the 
Hegelian  logic  appreciatively.  It  is  more  likely, 
however,  that  Stirling's  The  Secret  of  Hegel,  and  the 
expository  volumes  by  Wallace,  Caird,  and  McTaggart, 
mentioned  below,  have  prepared  the  way.  Any  one 
of  these  groups  of  books  would  serve  to  introduce  the 
student  into  the  fundamental  issues. 

Since  the  present  Essay  was  written,  two  works 
have  appeared  in  Germany  which  will  greatly  facili- 
tate the  study  of  Hegel,  namely,  Die  Jugendgeschichte 
Hegels,  Wilhelm  Dilthey,  Berlin,  1905;  and  Hegel's 
theologische  Jugendschriften,  edited  by  Hermann  Nohl, 
Berlin,  1907.  At  the  moment  of  writing  there  has 
appeared  a  centennial  editon  of  the  Phdnomenologie 

i  The  Persistent  Problems  of  Philosophy,  by  M,  W.  Calkins.  New 
York,  Macmillan,  1907^ 


Supplementary  Essay  389 

des  Geistes,  the  revised  text  of  which  is  edited,  with  an 
introduction,  by  Georg  von  Lasson;  Leipsig,  Verlag 
der  Diirr'schen  Buchhandlung,  1907.  This  edition, 
moderate  in  price,  will  bring  Hegel's  great  introductory 
work  within  the  reach  of  all. 

In  Edward  Caird's  little  work,  Hegel,  Edinburgh, 
1883,  one  finds  a  brief  account  of  Hegel's  life  and  a 
compact  but  instructive  exposition  of  his  philosophy, 
together  with  statements  which  throw  light  on  the 
problem  of  the  present  Essay.  W.  Wallace's  Pro- 
legomena to  the  Study  of  Hegel's  Philosophy  and  espe- 
cially of  his  Logic,  second  edition,  Oxford,  1904,  is  a 
work  to  be  read  both  before  and  after  beginning  the 
thorough  study  of  Hegel ;  also  the  same  author's  essays 
prefixed  to  his  translation  of  Hegel's  Philosophy  of 
Mind.  On  the  whole,  Wallace  is  the  surest  guide, 
from  first  to  last.  Kuno  Fischer's  culminating  work 
on  the  history  of  philosophy,  Hegel's  Leben,  Werke  und 
Lehre,  contains  clear  expositions  of  the  various  works, 
with  brief  explanations  and  comments.  The  chief 
biographical  works,  other  than  the  two  new  volumes 
mentioned  above,  are  Rosenkranz's  Hegel's  Leben, 
Berlin,  1844;  and  Haym's  Hegel  und  seine  Zeit,  Berlin, 

1857- 

Hegel's  two  most  fundamental  works,  the  Phdno- 
menologie  des  Geistes  and  the  Wissenschaft  der  Logik, 
must  be  read  in  the  original  text.  The  student  is 
not  likely  to  choose  Hegel  as  the  first  German  philo- 
sopher to  be  read  in  the  original,  but  will  begin  rather 
with  Schopenhauer,  or  a  work  such  as  Paulsen's 
Einleitung  in  die  Philosophie.  When  he  turns  to  Hegel 
he  will  find  little  assistance  by  consulting  a  Worterbuch, 
but  will  be  compelled  to  work  his  way  into  the  text 
until  he  is  acquainted  with  Hegel's  peculiar  termi- 


39°          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

nology.  Professor  Hibben's  Hegel's  Logic  contains  a 
brief  glossary  of  Hegelian  terms,  and  Sterrett's  The 
Ethics  of  Hegel  contains  a  list  of  ethical  key- words.1 
The  best  aid,  however,  will  be  found  by  constant  refer- 
ence to  the  article  on  the  Hegelian  terminology  in 
Baldwin's  Dictionary  of  Philosophy.  The  section  on 
Quality  in  the  Wissenschaft  der  Logik  has  been  rendered 
into  his  own  peculiar  English  by  Stirling,  in  his  The 
Secret  of  Hegel,  of  which  a  new  edition,  revised,  was 
published  in  1898,  New  York,  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons. 
One  may  begin  to  translate  the  Logik  by  reference  to 
Stirling's  rendering  and  annotations.  A  higher  stand- 
ard has  been  set  by  Wallace  in  his  rendering  of  the  En- 
cyclopddie.  Wallace  has  appended  to  his  translation  of 
the  smaller  Logic  various  notes  and  illustrations  which 
throw  light  on  difficult  terms  and  passages. 

Stirling's  unique  book  is  an  aid  chiefly  to  those  who 
are  working  their  way  into  Hegel  and  is  profitable  only 
in  part.  If,  as  some  allege,  the  author  kept  "the  se- 
cret of  Hegel"  to  himself,  he  has  at  least  made  known 
the  problems  which  students  encounter  who  are  work- 
ing their  way  into  Hegel,  and  he  has  steadily  insisted  on 
the  close  connection  between  Kant  and  Hegel.  Har- 
ris's Hegel's  Logic  also  exhibits  the  processes  of  a  mind 
engaged  in  grasping  Hegel,  and  is  a  valuable  aid  if 
read  at  an  early  stage  of  one's  studies.  Hibben's 
little  work,  mentioned  above,  contains  an  exposition  of 
the  Logic  of  the  Encyclopddie  only,  and  is  not  a  critical 
study.  Noel's  La  Logique  de  Hegel  contains  an  excel- 
lent exposition  of  the  dialectic,  together  with  passages 
which  throw  light  on  difficult  transitions.  There  are 
many  valuable  aids  and  criticisms  in  the  Journal  of 
Speculative  Philosophy,  especially  Harris's  exposure 

'P.  57- 


Supplementary  Essay  391 

of  the  misconceptions  of  Paul  Janet,  i:  251 ;  his  refuta- 
tion of  Trendelenburg,  ix:  73;  and  the  explication  of 
four  Hegelian  paradoxes,  xvi:  119.  The  Journal  also 
contains  translations  of  important  passages  in  various 
portions  of  Hegel's  works. 

McTaggart's  excellent  Studies  in  the  Hegelian  Dia- 
lectic *  is  invaluable  from  first  to  last,  but  inasmuch  as  it 
is  critical  as  well  as  expository  the  study  of  it  may 
well  be  postponed  until  one  is  acquainted  with  the  orig- 
inal text.  The  same  writer's  Studies  in  the  Hegelian 
Cosmology *  logically  belongs  to  a  still  later  period  .of 
one's  studies.  In  the  latter  work  the  author  departs 
more  widely  from  the  strict  interpretation  of  the  text 
and  one  is  not  always  able  to  follow  him. 

In  Haym's  book,  mentioned  above,  one  becomes 
acquainted  with  a  .polemic  of  the  Hegelian  system; 
also  in  Seth's  Hegelianism  and  Personality.  Baillie's 
The  Origin  and  Significance  of  Hegel's  Logic  is  a  study 
of  the  Logic  in  the  light  of  the  earlier  writings,  but  is 
of  little  value  when  it  is  a  queston  of  the  more  funda- 
mental connection  between  the  Phdnomenologie  and  the 
Wissenschaft  der  Logik.  A  work  such  as  Mackintosh's 
Hegel  and  Hegelianism  is  of  small  value  from  any  point 
of  view.  Dr.  Mackintosh's  objections  do  not  win 
our  confidence.  A  work  on  Hegel  prepared  for  "  The 
World's  Epoch  Makers"  series  should  be  written  from 
the  point  of  view  of  a  comprehensive  study  of  the 
original  works  and  in  the  light  of  their  influence  on 
the  history  of  thought  in  the  nineteenth  century.2 

One  derives  comparatively  little  help  from  .  histo- 
ries of  philosophy,  on  account  of  the  brief  and  often- 

1  Cambridge,  The  University  Press. 

2  For  an  account  of  Hegel's  works,  the  various  editions  and  trans- 
lations, see  Miss  Calkins's  work  mentioned  above,  pp.  545-549. 


The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

times  disparaging  expositions  of  the  Hegelian  system. 
Schwegler's  Handbook  of  the  History  of  Philosophy  is 
translated  and  annotated  by  Stirling.1  Windelband's 
History  of  Philosophy  contains  a  conceptual  exposi- 
tion of  some  of  the  problems  which  the  critical  stu- 
dent must  early  consider.2  Pfleiderer's  Development  of 
Rational  Theology  since  Kant  contains  an  instructive 
exposition  of  Hegel's  Philosophy  of  Religion.  The  best 
logic  for  parallel  study  is  undoubtedly  Bosanquet's 
Logic,  2  vols. 

>  See  especially  pp.  315,  429  ff.       2  See  pp.  611  ff.,  Eng.  trans. 


THE  ELEMENT    OF  IRRATIONALITY  IN  THE 
HEGELIAN  DIALECTIC 

1.  THE  purpose  of  this  discussion  is  to  examine  a 
prevalent  view  in  regard  to  the  Hegelian  system,  and 
plead  for  a  counter-interpretation.     The  aim  as  thus 
stated  appears  to  be  a  large  one,  and  it  at  once  suggests 
the  most  comprehensive  metaphysical  interests.     In 
reality  the  inquiry  is  concerned  with  a  single  issue, 
and   metaphysical   questions  are   for  the   most   part 
subordinate  to  the  sharply  defined  investigation  of  one 
concept.     The  problem  of  interpretation  is  an  ulterior 
interest,  without  which  the  investigation  would  not 
have  been  undertaken.     Yet  the  method  employed  is 
such  that  one  may  arrive  at  final  conclusions  in  regard 
to  the  central  logical  contentions  without  subscribing 
to  the  Hegelian  system  of  categories  as  a  whole,  or 
grappling  with  the  epistemological  and  metaphysical 
problems,  which  are  for  the  most  part  postponed.     The 
present  discussion  is  properly  an  introduction  to  the 
larger  issues.     If  the  logical  investigation  be  complete, 
so  far  as  the  narrowly  defined  issues  are  concerned, 
the  way  will  be  clear  for  the  consideration  of  the  re- 
maining problems.     For  the  removal  of  a  supposably 
fatal  objection  will  put  the  entire  system  in  a  different 
light. 

2.  The  situation  which  we  must  meet  is  this:    A 
certain  opinion  in  regard  to  the  method  and  value  of 
the  Hegelian  system  has  so  long  prevailed,  and  this 
point  of  view  possesses  such  apparent  authority,  that 
the  entire  question   of  the  worth  of  the  system  is 

393 


394          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

seemingly  settled.  To  remove  this  long-established 
opinion  it  is  necessary  to  pass  beyond  mere  questions 
of  interpretation,  and  concern  ourselves  with  the  de- 
tails of  what  may  be  denominated  dialectic  facts. 
The  opinion  in  question  is  connected  with  popular 
estimates  of  certain  of  Hegel's  doctrines,  and  chiefly 
relates  to  his  secondary  works,  to  the  neglect  of  the 
more  fundamental.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to  call 
attention  anew  to  the  decisive  considerations  out  of 
which  the  entire  system  has  grown.  That  is,  there  is 
an  unsuspected  element  implied  in  the  initial  analyses 
of  the  system  and  it  is  impossible  to  estimate  the  va- 
rious branches  of  the  system  without  taking  this  neg- 
lected element  into  account.  To  discover  the  existence 
of  this  significant  element  and  assess  it  at  its  proper 
worth  one  must  disabuse  the  mind  of  apparently  deci- 
sive estimates,  lay  aside  all  preconceptions  with  regard 
to  Hegel,  and  study  his  works  anew.  Yet,  in  thus 
insisting  upon  an  unbiassed  study  of  the  text,  we  may 
so  far  give  weight  to  the  opinion  in  question  as  to  insist 
upon  the  significance  of  many  dialectic  details  which 
might  otherwise  be  passed  by.  For,  although  the  pre- 
valent opinion  is  unsound,  it  serves  as  a  point  of  de- 
parture for  those  who  are  concerned  to  put  the  system 
in  its  true  light,  and  by  contrast  leads  to  the  discovery 
of  unsuspected  wealth.  In  thus  bringing  into  promin- 
ence one  element  at  the  expense  of  others,  and  dwelling 
upon  the  structural  significance  of  a  single  concept,  we 
run  the  risk  of  distorting  the  whole  dialectic,  hence  of 
doing  further  injustice  to  the  system.  But  with  the 
exigencies  of  the  case  thus  explicitly  stated,  it  would 
seem  possible  to  avoid  all  misunderstanding. 

3.     The  opinion  in  question  is  so  well  known  that  a 
few  references  will  suffice  to  suggest  it.     Hegel's  system 


Supplementary  Essay  395 

is  popularly  regarded  as  the  quintessence  of  "  absolute 
idealism, "  and  the  absolutism  is  supposed  to  be  so  far 
sufficient  that  no  connection  with  the  world  of  fact  is 
necessary.  That  is  to  say,  the  system  is  supposed  to 
begin  and  end  in  the  Absolute  Idea,  not  in  the  world 
of  experience.  So  far  as  there  is  any  reference  to 
experience,  the  Idea  is  said  to  supply  the  connection 
so  that  even  the  historical  order  of  events  is  knowable 
a  priori. 

.  This  opinion  is  often  summarised  by  quoting  He- 
gel's own  words,  namely,  ''What  is  rational  is  real;  and 
what  is  real  is  rational."1  The  term  "wirklich,"  here 
translated  "real,"  without  the  much  needed  explana- 
tion of  the  sense  in  which  Wirklichkeit  (actuality)  is  to 
be  understood,  is  taken  to  mean  everything  that  exists ; 
whereas,  as  we  shall  see,  decisive  considerations  depend 
upon  the  interpretation  of  Wirklichkeit.  Inasmuch 
as  Hegel  is  supposed  to  include  whatever  exists  in  the 
category  of  the  rational,  all  that  is  necessary  in  order 
to  guarantee  the  rationality  of  an  event  is  to  indicate 
the  fact  that  it  has  taken  place.  To  discover  what  is 
real  in  the  domain  of  the  Idea  is  to  learn  that  which  is 
presently  to  exist.  On  the  other  hand,  to  point  to  the 
strife  and  evil  of  the  world  would  apparently  prove 
such  a  view  absurd. 

The  implied  interpretation  and  criticism  of  Hegel 
involved  in  this  general  view  have  also  been  extended 
to  other  parts  of  the  system.  It  is  supposed,  for  exam- 
ple, that  Hegel's  theory  of  nature  is  meant  to  take  the 
place  of  all  scientific  induction,  as  if  nature  could  be 
deduced  from  the  Idea.  It  is  held  that  Hegel  has 
carried  out  the  same  speculative  point  of  view  in  his 
theory  of  religion  and  history  of  philosophy.  What 

1  Philosophy  of  Right,  Eng.  trans.,  xxvii. 


396          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

we  have,  then,  in  these  and  other  special  disciplines  is  an 
arbitrary  account  of  the  development  of  nature  or  of 
history.  It  is  supposably  a  sufficient  confutation  of 
this  point  of  view  to  indicate  the  discrepancies  between 
the  facts  of  nature  and  the  romantic  speculations 
which  Hegel  offers  in  place  of  the  exact  sciences. 

4.  The  reaction  against  this  romanticism,  together 
with  the  fact  that  the  Hegelian  system  long  ago  fell 
into  disrepute  in  Germany,  has  been  regarded  even 
by  historians  of  philosophy  as  sufficient  evidence  of 
the  failure  of  the  doctrine. 1  Hence  in  the  books  which 
so  often  shape  the  views  of  students  of  philosophy 
one  finds  Hegel  dismissed  in  a  manner  which  tends 
to  prejudice  the  reader  against  him. 

Hoffding  regards  Hegel  as  a  representative  of  the 
Romantic  school,  and  deems  him  even  more  arbitrary 
than  Schelling.2  Turner  says:  "  The  speculative  or  a 
priori  method  consists  in  laying  down  a  principle, 
such  as  the  Hegelian  principle  that  the  succession  of 
schools  corresponds  to  the  logical  succession  of  the 
categories,  and  deducing  from  such  a  principle  the 
actual  succession  of  schools  and  systems,"3 

Weber  says :  ' '  The  defects  of  the  Hegelian  method 
and  the  errors  of  fact  following  from  it  are  due  to  the 
rationalistic  prejudice  of  which  the  system  is  the  classic 
expression.  According  to  Hegel,  the  absolute  is  idea, 
thought,  reason,  and  nothing  but  that;  whence  he  con- 
cludes that  the  idea,  or,  as  the  School  says,  the  form, 
is  also  the  matter,  of  things.  When  he  assumes  that 

»  Recently  there  have  been  signs  of  a  reaction  from  this  extreme 
view.  See,  for  example,  an  article  by  Dr.  Ewald,  "Philosophy  in 
Germany,"  Philosophical  Review,  May,  1907. 

2  History  of  P kilos.,  Eng.  trans.,  ii.,  183. 

*Op.  cit.,  p.  2. 


Supplementary  Essay  397 

the  ideal  world  of  science  can  be  deduced  from  reason 
alone,  it  is  because,  according  to  him,  the  real  world, 
the  world  of  beings,  is  derived  from  reason  and  from 
reason  alone."  1 

Again,  Paulsen  says:  "  The  fundamental  conviction 
that  a  system  of  absolute  knowledge  of  reality  can  be 
produced  by  a  new  process  of  purely  conceptual 
thinking,  independently  of  experience  and  the  empirical 
sciences,  characterises  the  philosophies  of  Fichte, 
Schelling,  and  Hegel.  ...  In  Hegel  speculative 
philosophy  reaches  its  completion.  He  constructs  the 
whole  of  reality  out  of  concepts.  .  .  .  Never 
before  had  philosophy  spoken  in  so  proud  a  strain."  2 
According  to  Paulsen,  Hegel  was  simply  reading  his 
own  nature  into  the  world,  as  Schopenhauer  did  later. 
"Hegel,  too,  regards  the  world-process  as  directly 
converging  in  his  philosophy.  Thus  the  philosopher 
interprets  the  universe  according  to  his  own  nature 
and  highest  aspirations.  The  world-process  invari- 
ably passes  through  the  head  of  the  philosopher. "  3 

In  rejoinder,  it  seems  sufficient  to  writers  like  Paul- 
sen  to  plead  for  the  will  as  fundamental,  and  dismiss 
the  intellectualistic  view  without  further  hearing. 
Others,  taking  their  clue  from  Schopenhauer,  who  long 
ago  set  the  fashion  by  abusing  Hegel,  heap  ridicule 
where  they  are  unable  to  confute.  The  climax  in  this 
direction  comes  when  Professor  James,  in  his  essay 
"On  Some  Hegelisms,"4-  propounds  jokes  at  Hegel's  ex- 
pense. Such  an  essay  should  not,  of  course,  be  taken 


1  History  of  Philos.,  Eng.  trans.,  p.  534. 

2  Op.  cit.,  pp.  28,  29. 


'  Op.  cit.,  pp.  314,  315. 

4  See  The  Will  to  Believe,  p.   263.     James's  Principles  of  Psy- 
chology also  abounds  in  unappreciative  comments  on  Hegel. 


398         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

seriously,  but  it  nevertheless  tends  to  emphasise  a  pre- 
vailing opinion.  On  the  authority  of  historians  of 
philosophy,  or  of  critics  of  Hegel,  students  of  philo- 
sophy arrive  at  adverse  conclusions  without  even 
turning  to  Hegel  to  learn  whether  he  has  been  cor- 
rectly expounded. 

5.  Hegel  has  also  been  accused  of  starting  in  a 
peculiar  way  with  his  own  presupposition.     Trendel- 
enburg  maintains  that  the  dialectic  of  "pure  thought" 
attempts  to  create  and  to  form  the  whole  content  of 
the  Logic.     For,    "the  self-movement  of  self -related 
thought  is  at  the  same  time  the  self-creation  of  Being. 
.     .     .     The  Logic  tries  to  presuppose  nothing  but  pure 
thought,   which   possesses   no   external   intuition,    no 
image,  but  simply  itself;  but  by  creating  from  itself, 
produces  the  conceptions  and  the  determinations  of 
Being."  1     "It  has   been  supposed  by  such  critics," 
says   Professor  Royce,   "that   Hegel    deliberately  in- 
tended to  deduce  the  empirical  element  in  knowledge 
wholly  from  the  other,  or  spontaneous,  factor  of  'pure 
thought ' ;  and  Hegel  has  been  blamed  for  failing  in  this 
essentially  hopeless  enterprise."2 

6.  If,  as  usual,  Trendelenburg's  criticisms  are  not 
deemed  final,  those  of  Seth  are  often  taken  to  be  so.     In 
Seth's  Hegelianism  and  Personality  one  reads,  for  ex- 
ample, that  in  the  development  of  the  categories,  "as 
elsewhere,  in  the  exposition  of  his  system,  Hegel  has 
suppressed  the  reference  to  experience    .    .    .    through- 
out the  Logic    .    .    .    Hegel  has  been  nowhere  in  direct 
contact  with  facts  or  factual  existences.      The  Logic 
deals  from  beginning  to  end  with  abstractions    .    .    . 

1  See  an  article  summarising  his  views,  translated  by  T.  Davidson, 
Journal  of  Spec.  Phil.,  v.,  349.  357.  35$. 

2  Baldwin's  Dictionary,  i.,  455. 


Supplementary  Essay  399 

thought  out  of  its  own  abstract  nature  gives  birth  to 
the  reality  of  things."1 

7.  Furthermore,  there  is  a  tendency  to  judge  Hegel 
by  the  utterances  of  some  of  the  English  philosophers 
who  hold  doctrines  that  are  adversely  criticised  by 
writers  whose  views  are  by  no  means  identical  with 
Hegel's.     In  J.  Caird's  Philosophy  of  Religion,  and  in 
E.    Caird's   Evolution   of   Religion,    the  Neo-Hegelian 
positions  are  not  always  so  prominent  as  in  E.  Caird's 
Evolution   of    Theology  in   the  Greek  Philosophers,    a 
work  in  which  the  presuppositions   are   so   much  in 
evidence  that  one  finds  some  of  the  interpretations  of 
the  Greek  philosophers  of  little  value.     Anything  that 
arouses  suspicion  in  regard  to  the  fundamental  princi- 
ples of  the  English  Hegelians  tends  to  increase  the 
doubt  concerning  Hegel  himself.     References  to  Brad- 
ley and  other  English  philosophers  are  often  made  in 
such  a  way  as  seemingly  to  disparage  all  "absolutists," 
hence  to  discredit  the  supposed  prince  of  absolutists, 
Hegel.     Worse  still,  generalities  are  indulged  in  which 
their  authors  could  by  no  means  make  good  by  refer- 
ence to  any  "absolutist"  in  particular.2 

8.  It  is  clear  that  an  investigation  which  strikes  at 
the  root  of  the  opinions  mentioned  above  will  directly 
relate  to  the  interpretation  of  the  entire  system.     If 
it  can  be  shown,  for  example,  that  the  meaning  of 
Wirklichkeit    (actuality)     has    been    overlooked,    the 
foundation  will  be  removed  from  a  general  line  of  ad- 
verse criticism.     Another  point  will  be  gained  by  an 
explanation  of  the  term  "pure  thought"  with  reference 
to  the  starting-point  and  method  of  the  dialetic.     If 
it  shall  appear  that  Hegel  first  arrived  at  the  principles 

1  Second  edition,  pp.  96,  108,  118. 

2  This  is  especially  true  of  the  writings  of  modern  pragmatists. 


400         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

which  led  to  the  dialetic  through  an  analysis  of  expe- 
rience, from  which  the  dialectic  is  never  wholly  sun- 
dered, the  entire  development  of  the  categories  will 
be  put  in  a  different  light.  If,  moreover,  it  shall  ap- 
pear that  provision  is  made  for  the  irrational,  the 
necessity  for  a  revision  of  opinion  will  be  still  more 
apparent.  In  the  end  it  may  prove  that  the  Hegelian 
method  throughout  implies  an  idealistic  interpretation 
of  the  world  which  we  all  know,  and  by  no  means  in- 
volves an  attempt  to  deduce  nature  with  its  temporal 
events  from  the  Idea.  Nevertheless,  the  method  may 
prove  arbitrary  in  some  respects,  that  is,  in  the  manner 
in  which  it  is  applied. 

9.  In  brief,  the  opinions  quoted  above  resolve  them- 
selves into  the  central  contention  that  Hegel  has  de- 
veloped an  abstract  system  of  categories  which  suffices 
for  the  deduction  of  the  actual,  temporal  order  of  events 
in  the  world,  and  hence  renders  all  scientific  induc- 
tion unnecessary.  In  rejoinder,  we  shall  endeavour 
to  show  that  Hegel's  entire  interest  is  to  seize  upon 
the  essential  elements  in  any  branch  of  science  with 
which  he  is  engaged,  and  develop  these  scientific  essen- 
tials into  the  logical  system  which  thy  imply.  In  the 
case  of  his  Wissenschaft  der  Logik,1  Hegel's  interest 
is  to  develop  the  various  categories  in  their  most  uni- 
versal aspects,  the  categories,  namely,  which  find  more 
concrete  exemplification  in  the  special  disciplines.  It 
will  be  shown  that  the  dialectic,  or  logical  system  as 
a  whole,  begins  in  each  case  with  the  concrete  facts  of 
the  world  and  eventuates  in  the  Idea.  Thus,  while 
the  Idea  will  in  truth  prove  to  be  the  central  interest 
in  the  system  as  a  whole,  the  data  which  it  construc- 

1  To  be  briefly  denominated  his  Logic. 


Supplementary  Essay  401 

lively  stands  for  will  be  found  to  have  due  recognition 
in  their  proper  place. 

10.  It  will  be  made  plain,  then,  that  Hegel's  sys- 
tem, to  be  understood,  must  be  classified  as  an  idealistic 
interpretation  of  human  experience  as  we  know  it,  and 
as  such  should  be  judged  in  comparison  with  other 
idealistic  reconstructions  of  experience.     For,   it  will 
be  seen  that  Hegel  attains  his  end,  not  by  beginning 
with  "pure"  or  abstract  thought,  devoid  of  all  empiric 
presuppositions  and  references,  but  by  starting  with 
an  analysis  of  given,  finite  consciousness  as  known  by 
direct  inspection.     It  will  further  be  made  plain  that, 
even  with  the  conception  of  absolute  science  before 
him,  Hegel  does  not  at  once  proceed  to  the  formulation 
of  ideal  meanings;  but  begins  with  the  category  which 
is  primary  in  all  experience,  and  does  not  introduce 
the  conception  of  scientific  essentiality  in  its  fullest 
sense  until  he  has  adequately  provided  for  the  contin- 
gencies of  ordinary  experience  and  thought. 

11.  Of   particular   consequence    for   our   purposes 
will  be  the  greatly  neglected  transition  from  Existenz 
(existence  in  a  subordinate  sense,   mere  immediacy) 
to  Wirklichkeit  (actuality  in  a  significant  sense)  in  Book 
II  of  the  Logic,  with  the  implied  relationships  to  con- 
tingency and  the  irrational,  on  the  one  hand;  and  to 
the  Idea,  on  the  other.     For,  unlike  many  who  refer 
to  or  quote  Hegel,  we  do  not  propose  to  ignore  his 
confessedly  most  fundamental  work,  the  larger  Logic. 
Nor  can  we  neglect  the  important  question  of  the  rela- 
tionship of  the  Phdnomenologie  des  Geistes l  to  the  Logic. 
If  it  has  been  by  reference  to  the  Propadeutik,  or  to  the 
smaller  Logic  of  the  Encyclopddie,  that  the  adverse 

1  To  be  briefly  denominated  the  Phenomenology. 
26 


402          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

opinions  have  been  chiefly  substantiated,  it  is  high 
time  to  correct  these  views  by  a  study  of  the  actual 
text  of  Hegel's  two  leading  works,  the  Phenomenology 
and  the  Logic. 

12.  In  order  to  make  good  this  outline  of  what  may 
be  expected  in  the  present  discussion,  we  propose  to 
undertake,  in  the  first  place,  a  general  study  of  the 
character,  scope,  and  meaning  of  Unmittelbarkeit  (im- 
mediacy) in  the  Phenomenology,  the  Encyclopedia,  and 
the    Logic.      This    preliminary    inquiry    will    prepare 
the  way  for  the  specific  subject  of  our  investigation, 
namely,  the  discovery  and  significance  of  the  element 
of  irrationality  in  the  Logic.     That  is  to  say,  the  field 
of  immediacy  is  the  larger  background  whereon   we 
shall  forthwith  locate  the  element  of  irrationality. 

13.  Our  general  thesis  therefore  is  that  the  study  of 
the  structural  significance  of  immediacy  in  the  Hegelian 
dialectic  throws  new  light  on  that  dialectic  by  revealing  an 
element  of  irrationality;  and  hence  supplies  a  central  clue 
to  the  interpretation  of  the  system  as  a  whole,  besides  un- 
dermining the  objections  referred  to  above.     The  study 
of  immediacy  begins  at  the  point  where  the  dialectic 
starts,  in  the  Phenomenology,  and  continues  throughout 
the  Logic  and  into  the  various  branches  of  the  system. 
But  the  nature  and  scope  of  irrationality  are  not  thus 
early  discoverable,   nor  are  all   parts  of  the  system 
equally    available    for   its    interpretation.     Hence    we 
emphasise  the  structural  significance  of  immediacy  as 
essential  to  the  system  from  first  to  last,  reserving  the 
right  to  interpret  immediacy  in  the  proper  place. 

14.  In  this  study  of  immediacy  we  emphasise  the 
essentially  logical  character  of  the  investigation.     That 
is,  we  are  to  consider  immediacy  as  a  concept  and  ob- 
serve the  phenomena  of  its  dialectical  development. 


Supplementary  Essay  403 

It  is  not  our  province  to  examine  each  of  the  above 
mentioned  objections  in  epistemological  and  metaphys- 
ical detail,  but  rather  to  supply  the  data  for  such  exam- 
ination. The  development  of  the  concept  of  immediacy 
will  be  considered  throughout  with  the  objections  in 
mind,  yet  that  development  will  be  kept  as  free  as  pos- 
sible from  all  interpretative  criticism,  until  the  point  is 
reached  where  the  general  question  of  irrationality 
may  most  satisfactorily  be  considered.  The  main 
contention  of  the  inquiry  will  be  established,  if  the 
structural  investigation  be  carried  out  as  promised. 
What  is  added  by  way  of  interpretation  will  be  for  the 
most  part  suggestive,  so  far  as  the  system  in  general  is 
concerned,  inasmuch  as  the  main  interest  is  to  call 
attention  to  neglected  portions  of  the  Logic. 

15.  In  our  preliminary  inquiries  we  shall  begin  with 
psychical  immediacy,  but  the  main  interest  from  the 
start  will  be  to  trace  the  development  of  the  logical 
concept.  For  the  moment,  we  take  the  Hegelian  term 
Unmittelbarkeit  (immediacy)  for  what  it  obviously 
represents,  that  is,  the  given  or  unmediated;  and  pro- 
ceed with  its  developmental  description.  It  is  a  word 
of  many  meanings,  and  its  significance  is  best  seen  in 
its  various  usages.  In  certain  cases  we  shall  use  the 
German  words  interchangeably  with  the  English,  or 
leave  them  untranslated.  The  advantage  of  retaining 
the  German  term  is  plain  in  the  case  of  Begriff  (usually 
translated  the  Notion),  or  aufgehoben  (sublated  or 
transmuted).  To  tender  the  latter  word  "annul"  is 
to  be  as  misleading  as  the  English  Hegelians  are  when, 
for  example,  they  use  such  expressions  as  "swallowed 
up,"  "absorbed,"  "destroyed,"  or  "blended."  It  is 
well  to  let  Hegel  speak  for  himself  when  there  is  any 
doubt. 


404         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

1 6.  In  order  to  understand  the  full  bearing  of  imme- 
diacy in  its  important  aspects,  it  is  necessary  to  know 
how  Hegel  begins  the  inquiry  in  which  the  logical  inter- 
est is  first  discovered.     Very  much  in  Hegel  depends 
upon  the  beginnings  and  the  endings.     If  we  discover 
precisely  where  he  starts,  what  he  assumes  and  what 
not,  we  shall  be  in  a  position  to  make  important  infer- 
ences.    To  make  sure  that  we  know  what  the  first  pos- 
tulates are,  it  will  be  well  to  start  far  back  of  Hegel's 
beginning  in  the  Logic.     We  shall  then  ascertain  what 
he  means  by  "pure  thought,"  and  pass  to  a  general 
definition  of  immediacy.     Our  inquiry  thus  falls  under 
the  following  heads:  (i)  the  differentiation  of  imme- 
diacy as  a  logical  concept,  (2)  immediacy  as  the  begin- 
ning of  the  dialectic,  (3)  meanings  of  the  concept,  (4) 
contingency  and  irrationality  as  aspects  of  the  imme- 
diate, and  (5)  immediacy  at  the  end  of  the  Logic,  with 
references  to  other  parts  of  the  system. 

17.  Hegel  expressly  states  that  the  Phenomenology  is 
his  direct  presupposition,  and  that  he  carries  over  to  the 
Logic  from  the  study  of  consciousness  in  its  phenomenal 
stages  the  conception  of  absolute  knowledge.     Thus  he 
begins  with  a  highly  mediated  result,  howbeit  he  starts 
afresh  in  the  Logic  with  a  logical  object,  a  specific  kind 
of  immediacy,    far  removed   from  immediacy  in  the 
strictly  psychic  sense  of  the  term.     It  is  clear  that  the 
Phenomenology  is  in  a  sense  a  broader,  freer  inquiry. 
Hence  we  must  begin  with  the  larger  field  in  order  to 
understand  how  the  issues  are  narrowed.     Hegel  does 
not  specifically  refer  to  the  passage  on  which  we  are 
about  to  place  considerable  stress,  but  his  references  to 
the  conclusion  of  the  Phenomenology  as  his  presupposi- 
tion, obviously  imply  a  further  allusion  to  the  analysis 
whereby  the  concluding  conception  was  obtained. 


Supplementary  Essay  405 

In  his  Introduction  to  the  Logic  Hegel  says :  '  *  In  the 
Phanomenologie  des  Geistes  I  have  exhibited  conscious- 
ness in  its  progress  from  the  first  immediate  antithesis 
of  itself  and  its  object  to  absolute  knowledge.  This 
course  passes  through  all  forms  of  the  relation  of  con- 
sciousness to  its  object,  and  has  the  conception  of 
science  as  its  result."1  Hegel  refers  of  course  to  his 
present  science  of  logic.  He  contends  that  this  concep- 
tion requires  no  other  justification  in  the  Logic,  aside 
from  the  general  outcome  of  the  Logic,  inasmuch  as  that 
conception  has  already  been  justified  in  the  Phenome- 
nology. Moreover,  the  conception  is  capable  of  no 
other  justification  than  its  production  by  consciousness, 
the  study  of  whose  forms  results  in  this  conception  as 
their  truth.  "The  conception  of  pure  science  and  the 
deduction  of  it  are  presupposed  in  the  present  treatise 
in  so  far  as  the  Phanomenologie  des  Geistes  is  nothing 
else  but  the  deduction  of  the  same."  2 

At  the  beginning  of  Book  I,  Hegel  refers  to  this  pas- 
sage in  the  introduction,  and  more  explicitly  reiterates 
his  statements  by  pointing  out  that  the  beginning  of  the 
science  of  logic,  although  logical,  and  made  in  the  ele- 
ment of  free,  independent  thought,  is  nevertheless 
mediated,  since  the  conception  of  pure  thought  is  the 
last  absolute  truth  of  consciousness.  "To  this  extent 
the  logic  has  the  science  of  the  phenomenal  spirit  as 
its  presupposition.  That  science  contains  and  displays 
the  necessity,  hence  the  proof  of  the  truth  of  the  stand- 
point of  absolute  knowledge,  also  its  mediation. 3  That 
science  of  the  phenomenal  spirit  begins  with  empirical 

i  Werke,  iii.,  31,  tie  Aufl. 
*  Op.  cit.,  p.  32. 

3  Hegel  refers  of  course  to  the  process  whereby  the  conception 
was  obtained. 


406          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

sensuous  consciousness,  that  is,  with  the  proper  imme- 
diate knowledge.  .  .  In  that  treatise  immediate  know- 
ledge is  also  the  first  and  immediate  [that  is,  it  is  the 
initial  consideration  or  datum  with  which  Hegel  begins] 
of  the  science,  as  well  as  its  presupposition.  In  the 
Logic,  however,  that  is  the  presupposition  which  had 
proved  to  be  the  result"  [of  the  preceding  investiga- 
tion].1 

The  beginning  of  the  Logic,  then,  is  explicitly  and 
directly  related  to  the  Phenomenology,  and  the  reference 
exhibits  the  unmistakable  clue  which  guides  us  to  the 
origins  of  our  concept.  Although  the  logical  inquiry 
is  restricted  to  a  field  of  its  own,  it  bears  reference  to 
actual  experience  in  precisely  the  way  that  is  most 
significant,  namely,  to  experience  as  directly  appre- 
hended. We  are  not  only  justified,  therefore,  in  begin- 
ning with  the  preliminary  inquiry,  but  we  are  directly 
referred  to  it  as  to  that  which  must  first  be  understood 
before  the  logical  investigation  can  be  rightly  inter- 
preted. Obviously,  if  immediate  sensuous  experi- 
ence is  the  original  presupposition,  the  entire  inquiry 
assumes  an  empirical  character.  The  immediately 
empirical  aspect  of  consciousness  is  thus  seen  to  bear 
an  intimate  relation  to  the  whole  problem,  later  to 
become  a  decidedly  logical  problem.  The  bearing  of 
this  upon  the  objections  above  mentioned  will  become 
evident  as  we  proceed. 

1 8.  How,  then,  does  the  Phenomenology  begin? 
Hegel's  assumptions  in  regard  to  philosophy  and  science 
are  no  more  bold  than  any  thinker  would  make  who 
proposes  to  be  thorough-going.  Philosophy  is  said  to 
belong  essentially  to  the  realm  of  universality.  The 

'Pp.  57,  58. 


Supplementary  Essay  407 

true  form  of  truth  is  its  scientific  system.  The  true 
is  the  whole,  and  there  is  no  inner  necessity  that  know- 
ledge shall  complete  itself  in  the  Begriff.1  Yet  Hegel 
takes  his  age  as  he  finds  it,  and  regards  philosophic 
science  as  an  ideal  to  be  striven  for.  There  may  be 
profound  implications  in  data  which  we  already  possess, 
but  one  may  as  well  insist  that  a  building  is  done  when 
its  foundations  are  laid  as  to  declare  that  the  Begriff 
(notion)  of  the  whole  is  the  whole  itself.  The  whole 
becomes  the  true  whole  through  its  self-development; 
the  Absolute  is  essentially  a  result,  it  is  first  at  the  end 
what  it  in  truth  is.  The  human  embryo  is,  if  you 
please,  a  man,  implicitly,  but  is  not  truly  man  until 
man  has  made  himself  such  through  the  life  of  reason. 
Consciousness  is  to  find  itself  through  its  otherness,  its 
movement  or  becoming.  Knowledge  at  first  is  mere 
sensuous  consciousness. 

Hegel  therefore  proposes  to  write  a  natural  history 
of  this  "becoming"  of  consciousness.  In  so  far  as 
this  undertaking  already  implies  a  science,  it  is  the 
science  of  experience,  the  system  of  experience  or 
phenomena  of  the  spirit,  as  the  substance  is  observed 
and  its  activity  becomes  an  object.2  The  relation  of 
phenomena  to  knowledge  in  the  exact  sense  is  to  be  con- 
sidered, the  reality  of  cognition  is  to  be  investigated, 
and  the  truth  of  knowledge  ascertained.3  In  short,  the 
inquiry  is  to  begin  as  such  an  inquiry  would  naturally 
start,  with  the  given  existence  of  consciousness  and  its 
two  moments,  subject  and  object.4  Doubts  might  arise 
whether  what  we  term  the  essence  of  experience  is 
simply  its  essence  for  us,  merely  our  knowledge  of  it. 
Consciousness  on  the  one  side  is  knowledge  of  the 

»  Vorrede,  zte  Aufl.,  pp.  3,  6,  15.  *Op.  cit.,  pp.  27,  29. 

«Pp.  64,  65.  4  p.  27. 


408          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

object;  on  the  other,  consciousness  of  itself;  the 
consciousness  of  (i)  what  to  it  is  true,  and  (2)  the  con- 
sciousness of  that  consciousness.  If  from  the  compar- 
ison of  these  relationships  it  appears  that  consciousness 
must  change  its  knowledge  to  make  itself  conformable 
with  the  object,  then  we  must  take  into  account  the 
fact  that  in  the  changing  of  knowledge  the  object  also 
changes:  the  present  knowledge  was  also  knowledge  of 
the  object.1  That  is,  consciousness  knows  something; 
there  must  be  a  given  object  wherewith  to  begin.  The 
given  object  is  naturally  regarded  from  the  point  of 
view  of  its  essence,  its  implicitness.  But  this  its  im- 
plicitness is  plainly  such  from  a  point  of  view,  and  the 
point  of  view  must  be  taken  into  account.  The  con- 
sciousness for  which  the  object  is  appears  at  first  to  be 
simply  the  reflection  of  consciousness  into  itself,  a 
representation  rather  than  an  object.  But  the  first 
object  already  appears  in  a  different  light:  it  has  ceased 
to  be  merely  implicit,  has  become  an  object  to  that  for 
which  it  was  implicit,  and  this  second  moment  becomes 
an  object  in  a  complex  sense.  The  second  object  con- 
tains the  denial  of  the  first.  The  new  object  has 
become,  through  a  turning  about  of  consciousness. 

Hegel  is  not,  then,  regarding  the  moments  of  con- 
sciousness as  ''abstract,"  "pure,"  moments,  but  pre- 
cisely as  they  are  for  concrete  consciousness.  What 
he  seeks  is  the  whole  system  of  the  data  and  laws  of  this 
concrete  experience — the  science  of  the  experience 
of  consciousness.2  He  begins  with  consciousness  as 
he  finds  it,  and  of  course  at  once  meets  the  per- 
plexities which  beset  analytical  introspection.  He 
is  in  search  of  the  universal,  but  the  universal  must 

1  P.  67.  2  p.  69. 


Supplementary  Essay  409 

comprehend  the  particulars  of  this  actual,  living  ex- 
perience, with  its  concretely  given  perplexities  and 
relations. 

What,  then,  are  his  postulates?  He  makes  as  few 
assumptions  as  possible  in  order  to  begin  the  inquiry. 
We  may  state  these  as  follows:  Consciousness  exists, 
as  a  fact  of  given  experience.  But  consciousness  is 
not  merely  existential,  immediate;  it  is  awareness  of 
objects,  and  becomes  aware  of  itself  as  thus  aware. 
Thus  mediation  springs  out  of  immediacy  and  proposes 
an  ideal  (Begriff)  of  its  own  complete  mediation.  There 
is  a  given  moment  which  when  made  explicit  points 
forward  and  may  be  made  more  explicit.  By  follow- 
ing this  clue  consciousness  becomes  aware  of  its  own 
deeper  reality  and  meaning.  This  progressive  becom- 
ing is  necessary,  for  without  it  consciousness  is  unable 
to  discover  its  own  significance.  Consciousness  as 
given,  then,  already  contains  the  implications  of  its 
own  full  meaning.  The  consciousness  wherewith  we 
start  might  be  yours  or  any  man's.  If  the  account  of 
consciousness  be  universal  any  one  may  verify  the 
reference  to  it  as  psychically  real,  as  possessing  an  in- 
structive movement,  and  as  pointing  forward  to  its  own 
complete  meaning.  There  might  be  other  aspects  of 
consciousness  than  those  selected  as  significant,  but  it 
is  just  now  a  question  of  the  essentials  wrought  into  a 
system. 

19.  The  significance  of  Hegel's  beginning  becomes 
apparent  when  we  follow  the  introductory  analysis  of 
consciousness  as  first  presented.  It  is  natural  to 
regard  consciousness  as  the  sensuously  presented, 
without  at  first  raising  the  question  whether  any- 
thing be  truly  presented,  or  what  it  is  that  is  given. 
Thus  Hegel  takes  up  sense-certainty  as  simple 


410          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

knowing.1  In  so  far  as  the  subject  of  this  knowing 
is  to  be  regarded,  it  is  to  be  taken  as  immediately 
receiving,  without  altering  what  it  apprehends,  and 
without  comprehending  it.  Here  we  have  psychic  im- 
mediacy in  its  simplest  guise.  We  may  say:  (i)  that 
the  psychic  moment  as  felt  is  the  immediate,  (2)  that 
the  moment  is  immediate  because  it  is  directly  our 
object,  (3)  that  it  is  immediate  because  it  is  direct 
knowing,  or  (4)  that  it  is  immediate  because  it  is  know- 
ledge of  that  which  is.  All  these  aspects  of  the  imme- 
diate are  indicated  in  Hegel's  analysis.  For  purposes 
of  logical  investigation  it  is  the  existential  consideration 
that  is  of  most  consequence.  Hegel  does  not  at  first 
penetrate  behind  the  knowing  or  the  being  to  ascertain 
which  is  prior.  At  first  it  is  plain  that  to  be  is  to  know, 
to  be  is  to  be  known,  and  to  know  or  to  be  known  is  to 
be.  Obviously  one  cannot  at  first  discriminate  further 
than  this,  for  that  would  be  to  mediate,  and  we  seek 
the  immediate.  It  is  plain  that  our  meaning  shifts 
when  we  undertake  to  state  what  the  immediate  is. 
But  to  remove  the  ambiguity  were  to  mediate.  The 
most  precise  statement  is  that,  knowing  is.  The  terms 
employed  need  not  be  taken  to  mean  that  "a"  being  is, 
for  the  "  is  "  refers  rather  to  the  knowing.  To  shift  the 
mode  of  statement  is  not  to  be  ambiguous,  but  to  ex- 
press more  adequately  what  immediacy  is  as  knowing. 
To  regard  the  knowing  either  from  the  subjective  or  the 
objective  side  would  be  to  regard  typically  the  same 
immediacy.  If  it  seems  impossible  to  regard  an  object 
as  immediate  in  the  sense  in  which  Hegel  takes  it,  with- 
out modification  on  the  part  of  the  recipient,  there  is  at 
least  the  bare  fact  that  immediacy  momentarily  is,  and 
that  it  aims  to  be  what  Hegel  says  it  is.  Immediacy 
«P.  71. 


Supplementary  Essay  411 

as  immediate  to,  in  the  barest  sense  of  "  knowledge  of 
acquaintance" — this  is  what  Hegel  endeavours  to  set 
forth. 

With  this  bare  characterisation  to  start  with,  let 
us  see  what  else  may  be  said  about  this  mere  knowing. 
Since  nothing  has  been  excluded  from  it,  we  may  as- 
sert that  it  is  immediately  the  wealthiest  knowledge, 
as  if  it  wrere  an  infinite  kingdom  in  which  we  could  find 
no  limit.  Or  we  might  allege  that  it  is  the  truest, 
since  it  has  rejected  nothing  from  the  object,  but  has 
the  object  before  it  in  entire  completeness.  Yet,  from 
another  point  of  view,  it  is  the  poorest,  the  most  ab- 
stract truth;  for  all  that  we  can  say  is  that  it  is.  If 
we  mediate  sufficiently  to  mention  the  ego,  we  can  only 
say  that  it  is  mere  ego,  pure  "  this"  in  relation  to  pure 
"that,"  as  object.  Neither  terms  of  the  relation  can 
be  taken  as  manifold.  The  ego  is  merely  recipient  of 
an  object  which  we  are  now  regarding  from  its  own 
side.  On  its  own  side  the  object  is  not  supposed  to 
have  produced  a  manifold  of  conditions  whereby  it  got 
itself  known.  Nor  is  it  said  to  possess  a  variety  of 
conditions  or  relationships.  The  reference  to  it  as  im- 
mediate is  not  its  own  work.  It  is  through  its  nextness 
to  the  ego  that  it  takes  on  this  character  of  immediacy. 
Hence  neither  the  object  as  known,  nor  the  ego  as 
percipient,  produces  the  immediacy.  The  immediacy 
merely  is  since  it  is.  Certitude  is  implied,  namely, 
that  immediacy  is  actually  present,  is  felt;  but  this 
is  at  first  simply  the  certainty  of  sense,  the  instant's 
feeling  of  direct  apprehension,  which  is  undeniable, 
since  it  is.  This  simple  immediacy  constitutes  its  sole 
present  truth. 

Note,  then,  that  Hegel  faces  the  sensuously  given 
moment  and  puts  the  utmost  acumen  into  the  effort 


412          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

to  detect  precisely  what  the  empirically  given  is.  He 
finds  certain  characteristics  and  describes  them.  He 
seeks  the  truth  of  this  given  moment  in  the  guise  in 
which  that  moment  seeks  to  be  known.  He  is  at  once 
compelled  to  state  the  laws  of  the  sensuously  given  as 
such,  and  does  not  enunciate  the  laws  which  an  a  priori 
theory  might  impose.  This  description  is  an  example 
of  immediacy.  Whatever  the  other  differences,  the 
immediate  falls  apart  into  the  "this"  as  apprehending, 
and  the  "that"  as  object.  Again,  to  reflect  upon 
either  term  of  the  relation  as  "immediate"  is  already 
to  pass  beyond  it  to  the  mediate.  Here,  again,  Hegel 
states  a  law  of  the  given.  Sense-certitude  is  after  all 
certainty  through  an  other,  and  this  "other"  is  through 
the  ego.  It  is  not  we  who  make  the  difference  between 
the  essence  and  the  instance  of  it ;  we  find  it  in  our  con- 
sciousness, and  it  is  to  be  taken  in  the  form  in  which 
the  distinction  appears,  not  as  we  might  determine  it. 
The  essence  is  the  thing  itself,  the  object;  the  unessen- 
tial in  this  case  is  our  own  mediation.  The  object 
regarded  as  true,  essential,  is  indifferent  whether  it  be 
known  or  not.  It  remains,  whether  or  not  it  be  known, 
whereas  the  knowing  is  not  without  the  object.  Surely, 
Hegel  here  gives  full  recognition  to  the  reality  of  the 
object.  If  unable  to  seize  upon  a  single  aspect  of  im- 
mediacy to  which  an  independent  meaning  can  be 
attached,  the  striking  feature  of  his  account  is  his 
fidelity  to  precisely  the  baffling  aspects  of  consciousness 
which  any  acute  observer  may  verify.  The  further 
he  carries  the  analysis,  the  more  is  he  compelled  to 
follow  the  dialectic  of  two  tendencies  of  this  baffling 
givenness,  (i)  the  peculiar  character  of  the  object  when 
further  examined,  and  (2)  the  significant  developments 
of  consciousness  in  its  endeavour  to  interpret  the  given. 


Supplementary  Essay 

The  endeavour,  for  example,  to  follow  the  moment's 
presentation  and  to  identify  it  with  a  specific  object, 
involves  the  discovery  that  the  alleged  definite  descrip- 
tion of  the  "now"  as  present  moment  no  longer  fits 
when  the  moment  has  gone.  The  now  or  the  here  is 
indifferently  day  or  night,  a  tree  or  a  house.  As 
simply  immediate,  the  apprehended  moment  is  utterly 
indifferent  as  regards  content.  There  is  always  some 
here  or  now  present,  but  what  it  shall  contain  the  mere 
immediate  cannot  show.  What  is  meant  by  the  appre- 
hended moment  cannot  be  told  until  the  moment  is 
gone.  We  meant  to  mean  some  particular  thing;  but 
it  is  mediation  that  makes  explicit  the  particularity: 
the  immediate  as  such  is  the  simple  universal.  The 
same  results  follow  if  we  drive  the  certitude  out  of  the 
object  into  the  ego  and  declare,  The  now  is  day  because 
"I"  see  it,  the  tree  is  a  tree  because  I  see  it.  Another 
ego  sees  the  house  and  asserts,  The  here  is  not  a  tree 
but  a  house.  Both  truths  have  the  same  evidence, 
the  immediacy  of  sight,  and  the  testimony  of  each  ego 
is  in  regard  to  what  is  immediately  known.  But  it  is 
the  ego,  now,  that  is  indifferent.  We  meant  a  single 
ego  in  particular,  but  we  are  as  little  able  to  say  imme- 
diately what  we  mean  as  when  we  referred  to  the  now 
and  the  here.  The  essence  of  immediacy,  therefore, 
seems  to  be  neither  in  the  object  nor  in  the  ego. 
Both  the  object  and  the  ego  are  unessentials,  so  far 
as  the  mere  presentness  is  concerned;  in  neither  does 
the  here  remain.  In  neither  is  the  "here"  that  we 
mean. 

20.  Thus  Hegel  already  begins  to  indicate  how  the 
immediate  is  later  to  be  considered,  in  the  third  mo- 
ment of  thought  wherein  the  antitheses  are  assimilated. 
Yet  just  because  of  this  richer  dialectic  moment  one 


414          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

is  the  better  able  to  return  to  the  presented  now  or  here, 
and  say,  "Yes,  Hegel  is  right;  the  immediacy  is  the 
whole,  the  living  now,  so  roomy  and  so  general,  yet 
so  persistently  itself  that  no  mediation, can  rob  it  of 
its  reality." 

As  psychic,  immediacy  is  always  the  moment  that 
just  now  is.  If  we  attempt  to  seize  it,  it  is  gone. 
Hence  we  describe  it  as  it  was.  But  it  is  not  essentially 
what  it  was;  it  ever  is  in  the  moment  of  presentation. 
The  "here"  which  we  really  mean,  when  we  undertake 
to  specify,  would  be  a  point.  Yet  there  is  no  such 
moment  of  immediate  knowing,  but  rather  an  activity. 
Instead  of  simple  sensation,  or  pure  instant  of  feeling, 
what  is  really  given  is  constant  movement.  This  the 
most  tantalising  aspect  of  immediacy  begins  to  be  for 
Hegel  its  profoundest  aspect.1  For  the  dialectic  of 
sense-certainty  is  for  him  the  simple  history  of  this 
activity-experience.  That  is,  the  real  certainty,  in  the 
last  analysis,  is  just  the  assurance  of  the  presence  of 
this  ceaseless  activity.  It  is  impossible  to  deduce  from 
this  activity  as  such  the  particularity  of  the  given  mo- 
ment— for  example,  this  house  is  now  present.  For 
the  immediate  object  is  not  the  tree  or  house  but  the 
psychic  movement.  If  we  declare  that  the  movement 
now  makes  known  the  tree  or  the  house,  we  do  not  cor- 
rectly state  what  is.  The  "this"  is  merely  general; 
the  sensuous  this  that  is  meant  is  unattained ;  the  like- 
ness of  objects  as  sensuously  apprehended  is  expressed, 
rather  than  the  difference.  If  I  say  that  a  particular 
thing  is  signified,  I  affirm  what  is  general;  all  things 
are  particular,  and  "this  thing"  is  any  thing  you  please. 

21.  Thus  the  sensuously  immediate,  as  it  is  popu- 
larly supposed  to  exist,  retreats  farther  and  farther. 

'  P.  78. 


Supplementary  Essay 

What  remains  is  an  exceedingly  subtle  piece  of  media- 
tion. Is  there,  then,  no  real  immediate?  Certainly 
there  is,  but  it  is  not  what  it  was  reputed  to  be  as  di- 
rectly giving  information  that  now  I  apprehend  this 
tree  as  an  independent  thing.  What  I  immediately 
apprehend  is  not  to  be  described  until  it  is  gone — then 
what  we  possess  is,  description.  We  meant  something 
that  is  felt,  and  this  immediacy  of  sensuous  apprehen- 
sion can  by  no  means  be  denied.  Nor  are  we  able  to 
reduce  it  to  mere  thought.  We  can  at  best  suggest 
its  truth  as  it  exists  for  experience  by  pointing  out 
that  what  we  directly  apprehended  was  the  general 
activity  in  which  we  retrospectively  differentiated  what 
we  took  to  be  just  this  object.  Since  our  certitude 
pertains  rather  to  the  psychic  activity,  and  is  not  the 
supposed  assurance  that  we  just  now  apprehended  this 
particular  external  object  and  no  other,  we  are  con- 
strained to  admit  that  we  really  do  not  know  sensuous 
objects  immediately,  but  rather  through  mediation. 
What  we  cannot  know  immediately  we  can  indeed 
perceive,  but  perception  is  already  a  mediate  form  of 
knowing,  and  does  not  now  concern  us.  The  impor- 
tant consideration  is  that  "Die  unmittelbare  Gewissheit 
nimmt  sick  nicht  das  Wahre,  denn  ihre  Wahrheit  ist  das 
Allgemeine"  1 

22.  Hegel  thus  cuts  the  foundation  away  from  all 
sensationalism.  Sensuous  reality  exists  as  such  for 
thought.  Our  immediate  object  is  a  flux  of  mental 
states.  Into  the  thought  which  refers  to  these  states 
we  inject  a  judgment  so  rapidly  that  we  seem  to  possess 
physical  objects  as  large  as  life,  directly  before  us. 
Hegel's  analysis  dispels  the  illusion  and  shows  that  the 
alleged  immediate  content  of  the  psychic  moment  is 

'P.  82. 


416          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

through  and  through  mediate,  else  it  could  not  be 
known.  Hegel  does  not  deny  aught  that  is  real.  He 
takes  away  no  genuine  certitude  or  knowledge.  But 
he  points  out  the  utter  generality  of  the  psychic  imme- 
diate, when  regarded  apart  from  mediating  judgments. 
That  reality  exists  is  indeed  immediately  known ;  what 
it  is,  thought  alone  can  tell.  The  logical  significance  of 
this  conclusion  is  clear.  Since  it  is  only  through  thought 
that  the  reality  of  sense-presentations  can  be  known, 
the  plain  course  is  to  carry  mediation  to  the  end.  But 
this  does  not  mean  that  thought  is  to  create  out  of  itself 
that  which  cannot  be  learned  immediately,  to  pursue 
its  own  romantic  devices,  then  inflict  them  on  a  disap- 
pointed world.  We  must  recollect  that  Hegel  has 
pointed  out  the  boundless  wealth  of  the  implicit  imme- 
diate. The  given  is  in  fact  so  wealthy  that  practically 
everything  is  there.  But  just  because  so  much  is 
there,  mere  immediacy  can  tell  us  nothing  we  want  to 
know  about  it.  All  that  succeeding  moments  can 
ever  tell  us  is  that  the  merely  general  psychic  activity 
is  present.  Wherein  one  moment  differs  from  another, 
the  mere  moment  as  such  can  never  tell.  But  that 
which  mere  immediacy  fails  to  accomplish,  mediation, 
ever  referring  to  fresh  immediacy,  can  attain.  What 
promised  to  be  a  psychical  concept,  based  on  merely 
sensuous  certitude,  turns  out  to  be  decidedly  logical. 
Yet  at  every  moment  the  dialectic  of  the  immediate 
refers  to  its  own  living  moment,  and  draws  its 
material  from  that  boundless  reservoir,  a  mere  section 
of  which  might  be  spread  as  it  were  in  space  and 
no  limit  be  found  in  it.1  If  we  are  to  draw  in- 
ferences they  can  never  be  such  as  might  be  dictated 
by  mere  immediacy.  But  it  is  no  less  clear  that 
.P.  71. 


Supplementary  Essay  4*7 

mediation    is   forever  determined  by,  bound  to,  the 
immediate. 

23.  Two  courses  are  therefore  open  before  us.  We 
may  continue  the  process  of  gradual  mediation  of  the 
wealth  of  the  directly  given,  as  such  mediation  takes 
place  in  the  natural  history  of  consciousness.  Or  we 
may  start  with  the  profoundest  implication  of  the  fore- 
going analysis,  namely,  with  Being  as  the  fundamental 
category,  and  develop  the  logical  implications  of  this 
firstness,  mediate  the  discovery  that  immediacy  is 
utterly  general.  The  former  course  would  lead  through 
the  Phenomenology  in  detail  until  we  should  arrive 
at  the  highest  type  of  cognition,  namely,  absolute 
knowledge.  The  second  would  lead  at  once  to  the 
Logic,  as  already  indicated  in  Hegel's  references  to  his 
presupposition.  In  either  case,  be  it  noted,  it  is  with 
the  spontaneity  of  the  empirically  given  that  we  have 
first  of  all  to  deal.  For,  out  of  the  great  wealth  of  the 
given,  certain  tendencies  have  now  furnished  the  clues 
alike  for  the  historical  and  for  the  logical  interest, 
(i)  The  psychically  given  possesses  a  life  or  activity, 
it  surges  on.  Although  it  ever  presents  the  same  gen- 
eral character,  it  may  ever  be  returned  to  afresh  and 
found  productive;  and  hence  that  which  we  meant  to 
mean  immediately  can  be  shown  mediately,  i.e.,  now 
this  tree,  now  that  house.  The  life  of  the  moment  ever 
changes  and  brings  new  wealth ;  what  immediacy  shall 
bring  forth  its  further  moments  alone  can  show. 
The  succession  of  apprehended  events  belongs  essen- 
tially to  the  immediate;  consciousness  has  a  natural 
history  exhibiting  laws,  and  consequently  it  must  in 
the  first  place  be  accepted.  (2)  The  endeavour  to  un- 
derstand the  wealth  of  the  given  leads  to  the  discovery 
of  an  immanent  dialectic  movement  which  must  also 

a? 


4i 8          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

be  accepted,  but  which  may  then  be  observed  for  the 
sake  of  learning  the  logic  of  the  given  from  a  study  of 
the  given  itself.  In  other  words,  mediation,  although 
contributing  a  principle  which  immediacy  fails  to  sup- 
ply, nevertheless  must  derive  its  material  and  take  its 
clues  from  presented  experience.  That  Hegel  should 
first  state  what  immediacy  first  appears  to  be,  then  be 
compelled  to  negate  this  account,  only  to  pass  forward 
to  the  larger  truth  of  the  first  statement,  is  a  procedure 
genuinely  expressive  of  the  whole  character  of  imme- 
diacy as  any  one  may  discover  it.  The  entire  wealth 
to  be  rationalised  is  indeed  found  to  be  in  the  first  place 
a  gift  of  experience,  spontaneously  revealing  itself. 
Reason  starts  with  its  data,  it  does  not  create  them ;  it 
discovers  itself  as  the  power  which  develops  the  imma- 
nent implications  of  the  given;  in  this  sense  it  even 
begins  with  itself  as  found,  given.  Reason  then  dis- 
covers its  own  method  of  reacting  on  the  data  of  ex- 
perience. What  is  more  natural  than  that  it  should 
wish  to  abstract  that  which  is  most  essential  to  its 
avowed  interest,  namely,  to  pursue  to  the  end  the 
implications  of  the  logical  immediate? 

24.  To  turn,  then,  from  the  natural  history  of  con- 
sciousness to  the  study  of  the  logical  implications  of  the 
immediate  is  not,  therefore,  to  enter  a  realm  of  "pure 
thought"  in  an  artificial  sense  of  the  word;  but  to  bear 
in  mind  this  astonishing  wealth  which  the  foregoing 
analysis  reveals  and  proceed  to  develop  it  systematic- 
ally. What  Hegel  discards  is  not  the  concrete  content 
of  the  given;  he  leaves  behind  the  psychological  point 
of  view,  that  he  may  investigate  the  logical  categories, 
then  turn  once  more  to  Nature  and  Spirit.  There  is 
such  wealth  in  the  category  of  Being  that  it  is  important 
to  pause  and  mediate  it  simply  as  a  logical  category,  in 


Supplementary  Essay  419 

barest  abstraction.  Becoming,  too,  has  been  found  to 
possess  not  only  a  psychological  but  a  logical  aspect. 
Hence  the  question  arises,  How  does  Becoming  dia- 
lectically  behave  when  freed  from  temporal  consider- 
ations? The  whole  problem  of  the  Logic,  its  method, 
and  many  of  its  results,  are  already  implied  in  the 
course  thus  marked  out. 

25.  It  is  well  known  that  Hegel  covers  practically 
the  same  ground' with  different  considerations  in  mind 
in  each  of  his  important  works,  and  the  Phenomenology 
is  often  spoken  of  as  the  essence  of  his  system.  But 
Hegel's  commentators  lay  little  stress  on  the  pages 
just  passed  in  review.  Baillie,  who  devotes  much 
space  to  the  Phenomenology  as  a  whole,  fails  to  see 
the  significance  of  these  pages.  Professor  Royce  re- 
states their  significance  in  his  own  terms  and  the 
present  interpretation  agrees  essentially  with  that  of 
his  Spirit  of  Modern  Philosophy.1  Staudenmaier, 
who  devotes  an  extended  analysis  to  the  pages  in 
question,  introduces  his  criticism  by  asking  what 
course  Hegel  takes  in  order  to  cognise  the  sensuously 
presented  as  it  actually  is.  The  answer  is  short,  he 
says:  "Hegel,  guided  by  a  false  presupposition,  namely 
that  only  the  universal  possesses  actuality,  does  not 
try  to  understand  concrete  being  as  such,  but  devotes 
all  his  energy  to  the  endeavour  to  resolve  the  concrete 
which  he  has  condemned  to  the  empty  universal.  "  2 

The  highly  important  question  of  the  nature  and 
place  of  actuality  we  will  reserve  for  a  later  dis- 
cussion.3 The  foregoing  has  prepared  us  to  see  the 
superficiality  of  this  criticism.  There  is  no  mere 

1  P.  204. 

2  Darstellung  und  Kritik  des  Hegelschen  Systems,  p.  261. 
^  Sec.  78  ff. 


420          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

concrete  being;  every  particular  thing  as  presented 
is  given  in  a  psychic  context.  One  might  well  mediate 
further  and  consider  what  the  tree  is,  or  what  the 
house  is;  that  would  be  an  inquiry  for  botany,  or  for 
physics  and  chemistry.  Or  one  might  further  mediate 
the  psychic  content;  and  this  Hegel  does  in  the  Phe- 
nomenology. The  merely  immediate  particularity  of 
the  given  object  has  been  shown  to  be  incidental. 
The  utmost  that  sense-certitude  can  do  is  to  reveal 
being  in  its  particularity,  so  far  as  external  objects 
are  concerned.  But  the  single  object  is  apprehended 
in  a  universal  mode,  and  this  mode  is  the  object  of 
another  kind  of  inquiry,  one  that  by  no  means  denies 
the  related  reality  of  particular  things.  We  now 
propose  to  consider  how  to  think  particular  things  in 
their  system.  Thought  is  interested  to  mediate  both 
the  particularity  and  the  universality  (of  the  mode 
of  apprehension),  and  pass  on  to  a  richer  moment. 
Hence,  again,  everything  depends  (i)  on  the  correct 
understanding  of  what  Hegel  proposes  to  do;  (2)  on 
the  willingness  of  the  reader  to  pursue  the  logic  of  the 
situation  to  the  end.  For  the  time  being,  we  have 
dismissed  immediacy  in  one  of  its  aspects,  for  we  are 
now  concerned  with  the  logical  implications  of  the  cate- 
gory of  Being,  which  has  proved  to  be,  not  " empty," 
and  not  "abstract, "  but  in  a  surprising  degree  concrete. 
26.  It  might  seem  necessary  at  this  point  to  con- 
sider how  Hegel  derives  and  concludes  with  the 
absolute  knowledge  which  he  explicitly  states  is  a  pre- 
supposition of  the  Logic;  for  it  might  appear  that  we 
are  selecting  the  more  plausible  phase  of  the  presuppo- 
sition and  endeavouring  to  enter  the  logical  world  with 
the  Absolute  tucked  away  somewhere.  The  suspicion 
is  groundless.  All  that  we  are  carrying  forward  is 


Supplementary  Essay  421 

the  concrete  environment  amidst  which  Hegel  dis- 
covers his  logical  problem.  The  fact  that  the  Phe- 
nomenology ends  with  an  absolute  is.  a  consideration 
for  the  Logic  to  deal  with  in  the  proper  place.  Hegel 
by  no  means  regards  the  logical  aspect  of  the  question 
as  settled.  The  problem  wherewith  the  psychological 
history  ends  is  a  fresh  question  for  an  inquiry  which 
must  exhibit  its  own  demonstration.  We  are  just 
now  concerned  with  the  beginning,  not  with  the  end, 
of  the  psychological  inquiry.  The  Logic  must  go 
back  to  that  beginning  and  cover  the  same  ground 
in  another  way.  When  the  absolute  again  appears, 
let  it  be  sharply  dealt  with,  if  you  please;  at  present 
we  make  no  claims  for  it.1 

II 

27.  The  critic  may  now  be  ready  to  admit  that  we 
have  established  a  number  of  points  in  favour  of  our 
thesis,  that  we  have  won  the  right  to  study  immediacy 
in    the    light    of    decidedly    empirical    considerations. 
But  he  may  be  disinclined  to  turn  at  once  to  a  strictly 
logical  investigation  of  our  concept,  inasmuch  as  there 
might  be  other  points  of  view  from  which  immediacy 
may  be  regarded.     For  such  Hegel  has  provided  by  his 
references  to  the  Encyclopedia.2     We  shall  not  be  able 
to  devote  to  this  remaining  preliminary  inquiry  the 
attention  which  it  deserves,  but  a  brief  reference  is 
important. 

28.  Hegel  is  entirely  willing  to  acknowledge  the 

1  Even  if  Hegel  had  undertaken,  as  some  maintain,  to  deduce 
a  priori  man's  psychological  history,  instead  of  analysing  and 
developing  the  various  typical  attitudes  of  the  Spirit,  we  would 
be  justified  in  pursuing  our  inquiry  into  the  Logic,  in  which  the 
fundamental  interest  is  conceptual,  not  psychological. 

a  In  the  second  edition  of  the  Logic,  Werke,  iii.,  56. 


422          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

lesson  of  empiricism,  namely,  that  "man  must  see 
for  himself  and  feel  that  he  is  present  in  every  fact  of 
knowledge  which  he  has  to  accept,"1  and  this  is  im- 
portant for  our  purposes,  since  it  indicates  that  Hegel 
is  concerned  with  experience  as  it  exists  for  the  ordinary 
man.  But  when  empiricism,  undertaking  to  rationalise 
the  immediacy  on  whose  reality  it  has  insisted,  em- 
ploys the  categories  of  metaphysics  "in  a  style  utterly 
.  .  .  uncritical,"  it  is  necessary  to  subject  its  doctrines 
to  the  most  searching  examination.  Empiricism  tries 
to  hold  fast  to  the  realities  of  sense  by  making  sense- 
perception  the  form  in  which  fact  is  to  be  apprehended, 
meanwhile  thinking  it  has  kept  sensuous  immediacy 
in  its  original  shape  throughout  the  analytical  media- 
tion to  which  that  immediacy  has  been  steadily  sub- 
jected. But  all  the  while  it  has  been  transforming 
the  concrete  into  the  abstract,  and  proposing  results 
for  consideration  which  cannot  be  tested  by  sense- 
experience,  but  only  by  rigorous  criticism.  "Matter," 
for  example,  is  an  abstraction  which  cannot  be  per- 
ceived. Yet  on  this  theoretical  construct  empiricism 
would  rear  a  mighty  structure.2 

29.  Kant  performed  a  great  service  by  pointing  out 
that  the  unity  that  was  supposed  to  reside  in  the 
objects  was  only  in  our  minds3  and  by  showing  that 
the  unity  is  not  even  in  the  sensation.  Hence  Kant 
removed  many  claims  for  the  immediate,  and  pointed 
out  that  the  objects  of  immediate  experience  are 
mere  appearances  (p.  93).  Kant's  criticism  attacks 
empirical  theorising  for  being  a  syllogising,  i.  e.t  a 
transition  from  the  immediate.  Perceptions,  and  that 
aggregate  of  perceptions  which  we  call  the  world, 

»  Sec.  38,  Wallace's  trans.,  second  edition,  p.  78. 

2  P.  81.  »P.  89. 


Supplementary  Essay  423 

exhibit  as  they  stand  no  traces  of  that  universality 
which  they  afterwards  receive  from  the  purifying 
act  of  thought. 

30.  But  it  is  to  his  chapter  on  the  third  attitude 
of  thought  to  objectivity  that  Hegel  directly  refers. 
There  we  find  an  analysis  of  various  claims  for 
immediacy,  such  as  the  plea  for  spiritual  intui- 
tion, religious  feeling,  innocence,  simple  trust,  love, 
fidelity,  natural  faith.  Once  more,  Hegel  is  ready  to 
acknowledge  the  realities  of  experience ;  what  he  rejects 
is  the  claim  that  through  them  Reality  is  immediately 
or  authoritatively  known.  In  each  instance  what 
seemed  to  be  an  immediate  leap  beyond  the  finite 
into  the  infinite — that  is,  mere  religious  immediacy 
—proves  to  be  the  familiar  process  of  mediation. 
"Faith,"  for  example,  is  often  contrasted  with  know- 
ledge. But  faith  is  obviously  put  forward  as  a  form 
of  knowledge;  what  we  believe  is  in  our  consciousness 
— which  implies  that  we  know  about  it.  In  the  second 
place,  this  belief  is  a  certainty  in  our  consciousness — 
which  implies  that  we  know  it.  * 

It  is  what  we  inferentially  claim  to  know  through 
this  our  already  mediated  experience  that  is  of  import 
for  faith.  It  is  a  question,  then,  of  a  philosophy  of 
faith,  whether  authoritative  in  the  Christian  sense, 
or  a  merely  personal  doctrine.  As  for  the  claim  that 
God  is  immanent  in  the  mind,  Hegel  is  ready  to  accept 
the  fact,  even  to  make  more  of  it  than  the  intuitionists 
themselves.  But  he  seems  surprised  that  the  claim- 
ants of  immediate  knowledge  set  themselves  up  against 
philosophy.  It  is  precisely  philosophy  which  brings 
out  the  implications  of  this  greatest  of  facts.  If  the 
thought  of  God  is  inseparably  bound  up  with  the  being 

iSec.  63. 


424          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

of  God,  there  is  every  reason  why  this  relationship 
should  be  made  explicit.  It  is  thought  that  brings 
out  the  certainty  that  God  immanently  is;  the  mere 
existential  judgment  is  the  barest  beginning.  It 
remains  for  philosophy  to  prove  the  unity  between 
thought  and  being  which  faith  postulates.  The 
relation  of  immediacy  to  mediation  is  a  logical  problem, 
and  the  prime  difficulty  in  the  case  of  the  intuitionists 
is  their  refusal  to  examine  the  implications  of  their 
own  claims.  Let  the  claims  in  behalf  of  instinct, 
implanted  ideas,  common  sense,  natural  reason,  and 
Platonic  reminiscence,  be  as  great  as  they  may — the 
greater  they  are  the  more  mediation  through  develop- 
ment, education,  and  training  is  demanded  to  reveal 
their  wealth. 

31.  The  great  error  in  the  popular  theorising  based 
on  these  claims  for  the  immediate  is  the  wholly  ar- 
bitrary separation  between  immediacy  and  mediation. 
Hegel  points  out  that  the  essence  of  the  intuitionists' 
claim  concerning  the  unity  of  thought  and  being  is 
the  demand  for  mediation.  The  mere  idea  of  God 
is  of  no  moment;  it  is  the  transition  to  being  that  is  of 
consequence.1  Mere  being,  moreover,  is  of  no  moment 
alone;  it  is  the  idea  that  reveals  its  truth.  To  reject 
mere  immediacy  either  in  the  case  of  the  idea  or  in  the 
case  of  being  (regarded  as  indefinite,  empty)  is  pre- 
cisely to  take  the  step  which  Hegel  deems  the  most 
important.  Hence  he  is  ready  to  go  as  far  as  any 
one  in  his  claims  for  immediate  knowledge;  the  know- 
ledge is  the  essential,  not  the  bare  fact  of  being.  The 
content  of  religious  faith  is  the  important  consideration, 
not  the  form  of  the  experience.  The  faith-philosophy 
erroneously  selects  as  its  criterion  the  factual  aspect 

*  Sec.  69. 


Supplementary  Essay  425 

of  consciousness;  hence  many  conclusions  follow  in 
which  the  emphasis  is  put  in  the  wrong  place.  The 
immediacy  of  religious  experience  involves  particular 
and  accidental  elements  which  must  be  stripped  off, 
to  discover  the  universal  tacitly  implied  in  the  appeal 
to  the  consensus  gentium.  "The  form  of  immediacy 
is  altogether  abstract;  it  has  no  preference  for  one  set 
of  contents  more  than  another,  but  is  equally  sus- 
ceptible of  all."  1  Immediacy  on  the  whole  means  an 
abstract  reference-to-self,  that  is,  an  abstract  identity 
or  universality. 

32.  McTaggart  points  out  that  in  his  criticism  of 
the  intuitionists  Hegel 

denies  one  immediacy  and  admits  another,  both  of  which 
are  called  by  the  same  name  in  English.  He  denies  the 
validity  of  intuition,  if  by  intuition  is  meant  Jacobi's  un- 
mittelbares  Wissen,  which  perceives  immediately  the  unity 
of  thought  and  being.  But  he  admits  that  intuition,  if 
we  mean  by  it  the  Kantian  Anschauung,  is  essential  to 
knowledge,  for  without  "the  sensible  and  finite  beings  of 
the  world"  the  idea  has  no  truth.  ...  It  is  quite  con- 
sistent to  deny  the  immediate  knowledge,  while  admitting 
the  existence  of  an  immediate  element  in  knowledge. 
Indeed  the  assertion  that  all  knowledge  consists  in  the 
mediation  of  the  immediate  at  once  affirms  that  there  is 
an  immediate,  and  denies  that  it  is  knowledge.2 

33.  Hegel  arrives,   then,   at  the  same   conclusion 
by  another  road  which  we  found  so  important  in  our 
study  of  the  Phenomenology.     What  appeared  to  be 
the  most  important  factor,  the  presentedness  of  ex- 
perience, proves  to  be  the  poorest;  for  the  true  wealth 
is  the  content  and  the  inferences  made  from  it.     Hence 
Hegel  assimilates  the  intuitionist  argument  and  finds 

i  Sec.  74.  2  Heg.  Dial.,  p.  41. 


426          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

a  firmer  basis  for  it.  He  denies  no  experience,  but 
refuses  to  accept  unfinished  reasoning.  That  he 
holds  in  high  esteem  the  great  realities  of  religion  is 
plain  throughout.  But  those  realities  are  put  in  a 
different  light  by  his  analysis.  Already  in  an  earlier 
section  of  the  Encyclopedia  he  had  pointed  out  that 
"the  unutterable  feeling  or  sensation — far  from  being 
the  highest  truth,  is  the  most  unimportant  and 
untrue."1  Thus  he  relieves  religious  thought  of  a 
source  of  vast  misconception.  The  question  of  au- 
thority in  religion  is  shown  to  be  an  affair  of  mediation. 
And  the  chief  problem  is  the  one  with  which  our  other 
inquiry  ended:  What  is  the  significance  of  the  cate- 
gory of  Being,  which  proves  to  be  at  once  the  most 
barren  and  the  most  fundamental?  If  "the  im- 
mediate consciousness  of  God  goes  no  further  than  to 
tell  us  that  He  is  ...  so  that  God  as  an  object  of 
religion  is  expressly  narrowed  down  to  the  indetermi- 
nate supersensible,  God  in  general,  and  the  significance 
of  religion  is  reduced  to  a  minimum, "  2  then  it  is  clear 
that  there  must  be  a  thorough  inquiry  into  the  whole 
subject  of  immediacy  before  it  will  be  possible  to 
consider  what  God  is,  and  thereby  give  theology 
positive  content. 

34.  Our  inquiry  should  not,  then,  be  disturbed  by 
questions  which  do  not  yet  concern  us,  questions, 
for  example,  in  regard  to  other  possible  experiences 
which  might  prove  to  possess  superior  reality  or 
authority.  To  examine  moral,  aesthetic,  and  other 
immediacies  would  obviously  be  to  discover  the  same 
need,  namely,  for  a  prior  inquiry  into  the  general 
character  of  the  immediate.  We  may  say  once  for 
all  that  the  worth  or  authority  of  these  immediacies 

»Sec.  20.  2  Sec.  73. 


Supplementary  Essay  427 

Hegel  by  no  means  denies.  He  acknowledges  all 
immediacy  that  is  intimately  akin  to  mediation,  and 
fails  to  find  any  that  is  not.  He  is  a  keen  student 
of  human  nature,  and  he  draws  his  data  from  ex- 
perience. If  he  later  departs  into  a  realm  that  seems 
for  the  time  entirely  separated  from  experience,  it  is 
only  because  the  analysis  of  experience  compels  him  to 
do  so. 

35.  The  question  is,  granting  the  empirical  worth 
of  immediacy  for  the  man  who  feels  it — as  contrasted 
writh  the  one  who  merely  learns  about  it — how  are  we 
to  represent  in  our  theory  this  type  of  reality?  It 
is  clear,  in  the  first  place,  that  immediacy  will  bear 
with  it  to  the  most  abstract  heights  of  logic  an  em- 
pirical reference  which  can  never  be  overcome.  But 
let  this  be  once  clearly  understood,  and  there  need  be 
no  fear  lest  thought  shall  try  to  do  without  or  deny 
feeling.  Therefore  let  no  one  as  he  leaves  the  world 
of  religious  experience,  to  consider  the  logical  bearings 
of  immediacy,  complain  that  we  are  departing  from 
the  world  of  real  life.  It  is  precisely  that  we  may 
solve  the  problems  which  these  three  attitudes  to 
objectivity  fail  to  solve  that  we  limit  the  issue  for  a 
time.  The  real  immediacy  that  we  mean  in  our 
logical  inquiry  is  precisely  the  immediacy  which  gives 
life  its  zest.  Hegel  has  now  taught  us  that  the  theories 
of  immediacy  implied  in  these  attitudes  are  one  and 
all  based  on  the  well-nigh  unconscious  judgments 
which  have  been  stealthily  reared  on  the  bare  ex- 
istential judgment,  now  fully  before  us  in  its  typical 
form.  Thus  we  are  beginning  to  see  what  he  means 
by  logic,  and  we  are  in  a  position  to  follow  him  without 
misunderstanding  what  he  means  by  "pure  thought." 
If  to  have  immediate  consciousness  of  external  things 


428          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

is  "the  slightest  of  cognitions,"  it  would  seem  very 
important  to  see  how  far  thought  can  go  in  the  en- 
deavour to  mediate  in  earnest.1 

in 

36.  We  are  now  to  consider  precisely  how  the 
Logic  begins,  and  what  the  assumptions  are  other  than 
those  which  are  carried  over  from  the  preliminary  in- 
quiries. We  soon  obtain  an  idea  of  the  relatively 
superior  position  which  reason  holds  in  the  dialectic. 
The  dialectic  consists  in  negatively  dealing  with  the 
apparently  hard  and  fast  determinations  of  the  under- 
standing, in  reducing  them  to  naught :  yet  in  positively 
developing  the  implied  universal,  and  comprehending 
the  particular  contained  therein.2  Thus  reason,  al- 
though attaining  a  height  where  it  is  to  be  character- 
ised as  Spirit,  begins  by  reconstructing  the  concrete 
determinations  of  the  ordinary  understanding,  i.e., 
with  the  first  simple  item  of  experience.  Thus  a 
productive  activity  of  a  high  order  is  discovered  in 
its  simplicity,  which  proves  to  be  the  immanent  de- 
velopment of  the  Begriff,  the  absolute  method  of 
cognition,  as  well  as  "the  immanent  soul"  of  the 
content.  Only  in  this  self-construing  manner  of 
development  does  Hegel  believe  it  possible  for  phi- 
losophy to  become  a  demonstrative  science.  In  this 
way  he  has  already  investigated  consciousness  re- 
garded as  concrete  Spirit;  to  logic  belongs  the  in- 
vestigation of  the  nature  of  the  pure  essences  implied 
in  the  form-activity  of  the  object  of  such  consciousness, 
in  the  development  of  all  natural  and  spiritual  life. 
The  problem  of  pure  cognition  thus  discovered  arose 
out  of  the  consciousness  of  the  phenomenal  Spirit 

i  Sec.  76  (3).  2  Vorrede  zur  ersten  Auft.,  p.  7. 


Supplementary  Essay  429 

which,  freeing  itself  from  its  immediacy  and  its  ex- 
ternal concreteness,  gradually  arrived  at  the  point 
where  these  pure  essences  came  into  view.  Hence 
the  conception  of  ''pure  thought"  was  suggested  by 
the  mental  history  of  the  thinking  Spirit. 

37.  In  the  preface   to   the   second   edition,    Hegel 
again  reverts  to  the  rich  content  of  our  thoughts  on 
natural  and  spiritual  things,  a  content  which  possesses, 
as  it  were,  a  soul  and  a  body,  a  Begriff  and  a  relative 
reality.     The  deeper  basis,  the  soul  of  such  thoughts, 
is  the  pure  Begriff,  which  is  further  characterised  as 
the  inmost  life  of  the  mind.1     The  problem  is  to  bring 
to   consciousness,    make   explicit,    the   logical   nature 
which   thus   gives   to   the   mind   its   profoundest  life. 
The  important  consideration  is  not  so  much  the  re- 
lation of  the  implicit  character  of  the  mind  to  its 
actuality  as  its  capacity  for  self-knowing.     As  matter 
of  fact,  this  its  self-cognition  is  the  fundamental  de- 
termination   of    its    actuality.     To    bring    into    clear 
light,  "to  elevate  into  freedom  and  truth,"  the  im- 
plied categories,  which  at  first  are  like  latent  instincts, 
is  the  noblest  undertaking  of  logic.     In  all  this  the 
beginnings  of  other  meanings  of  the  immediate  are 
seen. 

38.  Ultimately  speaking,   it  is  not  a  question  of 
things  but  of  intelligible  objects;  and  not  an  affair  of 
concepts  alone  but  of  the  Begriff  itself  through  which 
the  entire  totality  of  things  and  thoughts  is  known.2 
The  Begriff  defined  as  thought  in  general,  the  universal, 
is  an  infinite   representative   of   the   individuality  of 
things,  in  all  their  indeterminateness  of  perception  and 
figurate    thinking    (Vorstellungen).     But    the    Begriff 
is    itself    determinate,    inasmuch    as    it    makes    the 

1  Werke,  zweite  A.ufl.,  iii.,  17.  2  P.  19. 


430          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

completed  system  of  reason  possible.  The  Be  griff,  then, 
has  these  two  aspects — a  representative  power  di- 
rectly referring  to  things  as  they  are,  and  to  the  plain 
man's  thought  concerning  them;  and  the  power  by 
which  it  possesses  the  categories  as  their  unitary 
ground.  The  Be  griff  does  not,  then,  create  the  things 
to  which  it  refers;  it  possesses  the  capacity  to  think 
them  in  their  full  meaning. 

39.  The  logic  is  made  as  formal  and  abstract,  at 
the  outset,  as  possible  without  overlooking  the  fact 
that  the  Be  griff  is  concrete.     Hegel  is  an  entire  dis- 
believer in  the  old-time  logic,  which  undertook  to  be 
entirely    formal.     The    object    is    never   out    yonder, 
devoid  of  all  connection  with  thought;  nor  is  thought 
ever  merely  subjective.     Thought  is  always  an  aspect 
of   experience   and    must   know   itself   in   relation   to 
the  object.     As  the  Phenomenology  started  with  the 
first    antithesis    between     thought    and     experience, 
so  the  logical  investigation  begins  with  an  antithetical 
relation  which  in  a  sense  persists  to  the  end  as  an 
empirical  relation.     Hegel  indeed  declares  that  with 
no  other  aid   than  its  own  immanent  dialectic  the 
system  of  the  Begriff  is  able  to  erect  and  complete 
itself.     But,  taking  our  clue  from  Hegel's  references 
to  the  Phenomenology,  we  have  seen  *   that  this  im- 
manent   dialectic    is    discovered    by    an    analysis    of 
experience,  with   its  given  implications.     The  dialectic 
is  not,  then,  an  a  priori  construct  out  of  which  the 
data  of  experience  are  to  be  deduced.     It  is  highly 
important,  therefore,  to  understand  from  the  outset 
precisely  what  Hegel's  conception  of  logic  is. 

40.  It  is  also  important  to  refrain  from  reading 
too  much  into  the  beginning  of  the  Logic.     Hegel's 

1  Sec.  19. 


Supplementary  Essay  431 

Absolute  is  by  no  means  the  "solid  block, "  to  which 
nothing  is  added,  which  it  is  popularly  supposed  to 
be.  On  general  principles  it  is  well  not  to  take  the 
terms,  "Absolute,"  "Idea,"  and  Begriff  to  mean 
aught  more  than  the  text  in  question  makes  explicit. 
It  will  be  time  to  consider  to  what  extent  the  end  of 
the  Logic  is  the  same  as  the  beginning  when  we  reach 
the  end.1  Nor  is  it  justifiable  to  introduce  assump- 
tions until  the  text  shows  them  to  be  made.  There 
are  tacit  assumptions,  such  as  those  of  the  preliminary 
inquiries,  for  example,  (i)  that  reason  in  the  logician 
corresponds  to  reason  in  that  which  is  to  be  mediated ; 
and  (2)  the  implication  that  the  barest  aspect  of  the 
dialectic  bears  some  relation  to  the  Absolute.  But 
whatever  the  assumptions  in  regard  to  the  immediate, 
they  imply  a  temporary  point  of  view,  demanding 
the  correction  which  is  the  fate  of  everything  im- 
mediate. The  fear  that  Hegel  is  stealthily  introducing, 
in  some  of  these  immediates,  a  principle  out  of  which 
he  pretends  that  nature  is  deduced,  is  a  suspicion  that 
may  be  left  to  its  own  destruction. 

41.  Our  inquiry  begins,  then,  with  a  logical  object, 
which  reflection  selects  as  its  starting-point.  Looking 
from  the  point  now  reached  back  into  the  Phenome- 
nology, there  is  mediation,  to  be  sure.  But  looking 
forward,  there  is  as  yet  no  distinction,  hence  simply 
the  pure  Being  of  this  logical  object  of  thought.  The 
presupposition  in  so  far  belongs  to  another  universe 
of  discourse  that  we  can  in  large  part  ignore  it,  and 
insist  that  we  now  have  before  us  indeterminate  im- 
mediacy in  its  purest  (logical)  form.  The  beginning 
is  not  determinate  until  specified  as  the  beginning  of 
the  Logic. 

»  See  Sec.  96  ff.       • 


432          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

For  logic  the  beginning  is  absolute,  the  beginning 
of  an  entire  science,  which  need  not,  however,  be 
proved  at  the  outset,  since  the  science  which  rests  on 
this  foundation  is  the  proof.  The  immediate  or  "  first" 
in  question  is  Unmittelbarkeit  selbst,  that  is,  not  a 
special  immediacy,  such  as  we  have  considered,  but 
the  fundamental  logical  aspect  of  all  immediates. 
The  category  of  Being,  which  proved  to  be  the  im- 
plication of  immediacy,  however  we  regarded  it,  is 
now  to  be  taken  in  its  simplest  guise,  as  reine  Seyn. 
Being  may  indeed  be  far  more  than  now  appears,  but 
it  is  our  part  at  first  to  regard  it  as  it  appears.  The 
beginning  is,  however,  by  no  means  merely  provisional, 
problematical,  or  hypothetical,  but  is  rendered  positive 
by  the  character  of  the  subject-matter  when  fully 
developed.  Nor  is  it  an  arbitrary  beginning,  as  much 
as  to  say,  the  logician  starts  where  he  wills;  for  the 
primary  category  proves  to  be  such  by  analysis  of 
given  experience  and  thought.  The  beginning  is  of 
course  necessarily  regarded  as  one-sided  at  first,  else 
were  it  no  beginning,  no  immediate.  To  regard  the 
beginning  in  its  full  wealth,  or  even  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  barest  contrast,  would  not  be  to  regard 
it  as  the  "first."  The  beginning  is  not  a  first  and 
an  other.1  It  has  not  yet  undergone  contradiction. 
But  the  beginning  is  by  no  means  the  differenceless 
unity  of  the  I dentitdts system. 

Perhaps  one  could  best  characterise  it  as  adequate, 
as  sufficiently  rich  to  enable  the  dialectic  to  proceed, 
but  not  so  wealthy  as  some  critics  suppose,  since 
wealth  is  to  be  added  along  the  way.  Trendelenburg 
deems  this  added  wealth  a  theft  from  experience,  after 
the  dialectic  has  severed  connection  with  experience. 

'P.  65. 


Supplementary  Essay  433 

He  overlooks  the  fact  that  the  empirical  connection 
is  never  wholly  broken,  hence  that  there  is  nothing 
illegitimate  in  the  development  of  empirical  content. 
The  very  Becoming  which  enables  Being  to  be  some- 
thing more  than  Nichts,1  and  to  escape  from  Nichts, 
is  the  movement  which  in  the  presupposed  universe 
of  discourse  was  the  life  of  the  psychological  analysis. 
This  Becoming  is  the  bearer  of  more  items  in  the  one 
case  as  truly  as  in  the  other ;  nobody  doubts  its  wealth- 
bringing  power  in  the  psychic  sense  of  the  term; 
there  is  no  valid  reason  against  the  contributions  of 
its  logical  development. 

42.  What,  now,  is  the  "pure  thought"  in  question? 
A  principle  or  procedure  no  more  to  be  suspected 
than  any  study  of  concepts  in  the  light  of  their  sys- 
tematic meanings.  The  term  "pure"  implies  a  certain 
objectivity,  the  point  of  view  of  an  impartial  ob- 
server, concerned  with  truth  for  its  own  sake.  Hegel 
has  a  remarkable  power  of  abstracting,  hence  of  ob- 
jectifying, as  if  the  principle  or  item  under  considera- 
tion were  a  thing  of  flesh  and  blood  by  itself.  He  is 
able  to  select  a  specific  aspect  of  an  abstruse  determi- 
nation and  make  it  speak,  as  it  were.  But  one  should 
be  no  more  disconcerted  by  the  abstraction  than  by 
the  seeming  personification.  It  is  because  of  this 
unusual  power  that  Hegel  is  able  so  successfully  to 
treat  the  concept  of  immediacy.  Knowing  well  that 
there  is  no  immediate  which  is  really  what  the  im- 
mediate pretends  to  be,  that  is,  independent,  real 
by  itself,  directly  authoritative;  and  knowing  well 
that  he  cannot  abstract  all  empiric  references,  Hegel 

»  The  term  Nichts  will  be  used  in  the  following  pages  to  show  that 
Hegel  means  a  dialectic  moment,  not  "nothing,"  as  this  word  is 
ordinarily  employed. 
28 


434          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

is  free  to  speak  as  if  the  determination  in  question 
were  literally  "pure."  The  implied  principle  of 
movement  (Werderi)  is  once  for  all  of  decidedly  em- 
pirical origin,  as  we  have  already  seen.  For  we  made 
the  acquaintance  of  pure  thought  in  our  attempt  to 
regard  sense-certainty  as  what  it  appears  to  be.1 
Hegel  is  so  well  aware  of  these  retrospective  references 
that  he  never  forgets  that  it  is  self-consciousness  which 
gives  the  type  of  all  cognition.  With  all  this  in  mind 
he  may  well  regard  the  beginning  of  the  Logic  in  as 
abstract  a  fashion  as  possible.  It  is  the  end  of  the 
Logic  which  shows  what  the  abstractions  mean,  and 
precisely  in  what  sense  they  are  abstractions. 

In  general,  then,  the  "pure"  determination  is  one 
which  for  the  moment  is  regarded  by  itself  in  its  own 
universe  of  discourse,  in  order  to  discover  how  it 
develops  from  this  its  immediacy  into  the  relation- 
ships which  it  possessed  all  along.  At  large,  pure 
thought  is  logical  thought  in  dialectic  development. 
The  interest  is  not  so  much  to  discover  how  knowledge 
is  possible,  as  to  learn  what  knowledge  implies,  granted 
its  existence.  Pure  thought  in  sheer  dialectic  ex- 
ercise likes  to  regard  a  determination  as  "pure," 
unmittelbar  (immediate).  But  this  thought  is  not 
content  until  it  mediates  that  which  for  the  moment 
was  taken  as  if  it  were  independent.  Hence  the  term 
"pure"  has  a  close  connection  with  our  concept.  But 
it  is  often  synonymous  with  "mere,"  and  Hegel  knows 
as  well  as  his  English  devotees  who  use  this  term  that 
there  is  no  "mere"  thought.  Hence  one  must  be  on 
the  alert  for  the  deeper  meaning.  We  shall  see  how 
faithfully  Hegel  follows  the  possibilities  of  all  mereness, 
and  how  poor  a  thing  a  "pure"  determination  often  is. 

i  See  above,  Sec.  19. 


Supplementary  Essay  435 

43.  It  is  obviously  necessary  to  assume  that  some- 
thing is,  in  order  to  consider  immediacy  as  it  at  first 
appears  to  be.  But  having  tacitly  or  otherwise  as- 
sumed your  something,  you  are  at  liberty  to  regard  the 
"is"  as  if  it  were  independent.  Hence  reine  Seyn  (pure 
Being)  becomes  an  object  of  "pure  thought."  Thus, 
as  Stirling  says,  "Our  Werden  is  the  pure  thought 
of  all  actual  Werdens. "  *  "Logic,"  says  Wallace, 
"becomes  the  all-embracing  research  of  'first  prin- 
ciples.' .  .  .  But  these  first  principles  were  only  an 
abstraction  from  complete  reality — the  reality  which 
nature  was  when  unified  by  mind — and  they  presuppose 
the  total  from  which  they  were  derived. "  2 

In  the  same  illuminating  spirit,  McTaggart  says: 

Of  course  Hegel  is  not  dealing,  in  the  Logic,  with  the 
concrete  activities  of  cognition  and  volition,  any  more  than 
he  is  dealing,  rather  earlier  in  the  Logic,  with  the  concrete 
activities  of  mechanism  and  chemistry.  The  Logic  deals 
only  with  the  element  of  pure  thought  in  reality ;  and  when 
its  categories  bear  the  names  of  concrete  relations,  this 
only  means  that  the  pure  idea,  which  is  the  category  in 
question,  is  the  idea  which  comes  most  prominently 
forward  in  that  concrete  relation,  and  which  therefore  can 
be  usefully  and  significantly  called  by  its  name. 3 

This  explanation  applies  in  particular  to  the  moments 
of  pure  thought  which  seem  most  remote  from  concrete 
experience. 

But  even  if  pure  thought  could  start  from  itself 
in  the  strictest  sense  of  the  word,  its  own  .existence 
would  in  some  sense  be  a  fact  of  brute  immediacy, 
and  to  this  extent  it  would  be  unlike  the  function 

1  The  Secret  of  Hegel,  p.  45. 

2  Hegel's  Philos.  of  Mind,  p.  xvii, 

3  Stud,  in  Heg.  Dial,  p.  226, 


436          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

peculiar  to  thought,  namely,  mediation  of  the  given. 
In  this  brute  givenness  the  first  category  would  be 
involved;  and  thought  would  have  the  same  problem 
on  its  hands  which  actually  confronts  it  in  the  Hegelian 
logic.  In  any  event,  then,  "the  existence  of  thought 
requires  the  existence  of  something  given.  It  is  un- 
deniable that  we  think.  But  we  could  not  think 
unless  there  were  something  to  think  about.  This  is  all 
the  world  of  Nature  and  Spirit  which  we  can  deduce 
from  the  Logic.'1 1 

44.  We  are  to  understand,  then,  that  the  pure 
thought  of  Hegel's  Logic  derives  its  content  partly 
from  its  empirical  presuppositions  and  partly  from 
its  own  immanent  developments  and  later  empirical 
references,  that  the  form  is  not  to  be  entirely  dis- 
tinguished from  the  content,  and  that  the  content 
makes  a  difference  to  the  form.  The  implied  judg- 
ments are  not  developed  in  isolation  from  what  is 
real  and  what  is  true,  but  constructively  develop  the 
true  and  the  real.  The  judgments  do  not  literally 
create  the  world,  for  judgment  derives  both  its  matter 
and  its  clues  from  the  given  which  it  must  accept. 

When  one  clearly  faces  the  issue  between  logic  and 
the  other  sciences  it  is  evident  that  logic  is  in  a  far 
worse  plight  than  they  are  in.  It  is  not  necessary  for 
a  special  science  to  make  good  its  foundations  in  the 
ultimate  sense  of  the  word.  A  special  science  starts 
with  certain  postulates  and  a  method  of  inquiry  and 
proceeds  to  the  development  of  its  particular  data. 
In  logic,  however,  the  content  and  method  are  at  the 
same  time  the  ultimate  principles.  There  is  no  envi- 
roning field  which  one  may  take  for  granted.  Logic's 
field  is  the  very  home  of  all  sciences  which  begin  with 

»  Heg.  Dial.,  p.  114. 


Supplementary  Essay  437 

unscrutinised  postulates.  Hence  there  is  every  reason 
why  the  one  self-dependent  science  should  receive 
the  most  searching  examination.  The  very  idea  of 
science  is  logic.  What  logic  is,  then,  cannot  be  stated 
in  advance  of  those  considerations  which  prove  it  to 
be  at  once  its  own  content  and  its  own  law,  the  science 
of  sciences,  the  demonstration  of  all  demonstrations. 
The  utmost  which  one  can  hope  to  accomplish  in  ad- 
vance is  to  show  wherein  logic,  as  thus  conceived, 
differs  from  logic  considered  in  a  far  more  restricted 
sense.1 

45.  According  to  the  view  that  logic  is  concerned 
with  the  bare  form  of  cognition,  while  the  matter  must 
be  found  elsewhere,  logic  can  by  no  means  show  what 
the  truth  really  is.  This  view  involves  the  assumption 
that  logic  is  able  to  abstract  from  all  content,  and  is 
concerned  merely  with  the  laws  of  thought.  That 
this  is  a  false  assumption  is  clear  from  the  fact  that 
thought  and  its  laws  are  part  of  the  content  of  logic. 
Hence,  to  deprive  logic  of  all  content  would  be  to  make 
logic  impossible.  It  is  a  decidedly  uncritical  view 
which  holds  that  the  form  of  thought  is  somehow 
filled  with  content  by  an  outlying  matter  ready  at 
hand.  If  the  separation  of  form  and  content  is  arti- 
ficial, unwarranted,  the  separation  of  form  and  cer- 
tainty, or  truth,  is  no  less  so.  Thought  refers  to  an 
object,  and  it  is  as  thus  referring,  as  possessing  content, 
that  we  are  concerned  with  it,  hence  with  the  truth 
of  that  reference.  Thought,  regarded  as  receiving 
content,  does  not  come  down  from  some  abstract  height 
and  become  different  from  what  it  conceivably  was 
as  form.  To  possess  content  is  for  thought  to  be  thus 
far  modified.  Obviously,  then,  if  we  are  to  discover 

»  Op.  cit.,  p.  25. 


The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

the  laws  and  character  of  thought  we  must  consider 
it  as  actually  engaged  in  that  activity  which  specifically 
constitutes  it. 

The  old  metaphysic,  with  all  its  defects,  had  a  higher 
notion  of  thought  than  the  abstract  doctrine  which 
we  are  considering.1  That  is,  according  to  that  meta- 
physic, that  which  thought  knows  regarding  things 
is  true,  not  as  things  are  immediately  given  but  as 
thought  about.  Thought  and  its  categories  are  not 
alien  to  objects,  but  are  rather  their  essence.  Things 
and  thought  are  harmonious,  possess  one  and  the 
same  content.  But  reflective  understanding  broke 
into  this  position  by  insisting  that  thoughts  are  only 
thoughts;  what  things  are  in  themselves  is  not  known. 
The  result  of  the  critique  of  the  forms  of  the  under- 
standing was  that  those  forms  have  no  application  to 
things.  This  can  only  mean  that  those  forms  are  some- 
what untrue.  If  not  determinations  of  things,  the 
forms  are  still  less  determinations  of  the  understand- 
ing. Evidently  there  is  need  of  entire  reconsideration 
of  the  place,  scope,  and  ultimate  value  of  logic,  if 
escape  is  to  be  made  from  the  maze  of  difficulties 
which  this  sort  of  criticism  implies. 

46.  While,  then,  Hegel  does  not  pretend  to  justify 
his  conception  of  logic  in  advance  of  its  actual  demon- 
stration, it  is  plain  that  for  him  there  is  the  closest 
relation  between  thought  and  its  object.  The  object 
is  no  Kantian  Ding  an  sich,  nor  does  it  even  remain 
impervious  to  thought's  judgments;  but  both  con- 
tributes and  is  contributed  to.  If  logic  cannot  get 
behind,  or  break  free  from  the  whole  in  which  both 
content  and  form,  both  data  and  laws,  are  found,  it 
can  at  least  break  into  the  whole  somewhere  and  begin 

»P.  27. 


Supplementary  Essay  439 

to  justify  its  fundamental  character  by  its  works. 
The  Phenomenology  contained  such  a  justification  of 
its  particular  undertaking.  It  is  the  necessity  of  the 
science  that  proves  logic.  Hegel  says  explicitly  that 
the  notion  of  pure  science  and  its  deduction  in  so 
far  as  it  involves  presuppositions  needs  no  other 
justification  than  that  which  the  Phenomenology  con- 
tains; and  this  explicit  difference  would  no  doubt 
alone  justify  the  prominence  which  we  have  given  to 
that  work.1  The  development  traced  in  that  work 
from  "the  first  immediate  antithesis"  of  consciousness 
and  its  object  is,  as  we  have  seen,  an  illustration  of 
the  logical  method  now  to  be  pursued.  The  absolute 
cognition  is  the  truth  of  that  psychological  history 
just  because  it  developed  out  of  the  concrete  inquiry 
itself,  and  was  able  to  overcome  the  antitheses  of  the 
successive  stages. 

Since  the  present  "pure  science"  presupposes  this 
victory  over  the  antitheses,  it  obviously  begins  with 
thought  taken  in  intimate  relation  with  its  object. 
It  contains  thought  in  so  far  as  it  is  precisely  the  in- 
telligible object,  or  the  intelligible  object  in  so  far  as 
it  is  pure  thought.2  Truth,  thus  regarded  as  science, 
is  pure  self-developing  self-consciousness  and  has  the 
form  of  the  self.  The  cognitive  side  of  the  Begriff  and 
its  being  are  in  closest  relation  in  the  objective  thought 
which  is  the  content  of  pure  science.  This  science  is 
hence  so  little  formal,  it  disregards  so  little  the  matter 
of  actual  and  true  cognition,  that  its  content  is  rather 
absolute  truth  itself.  The  matter  is  not  in  any  way 
external  to  the  form,  its  form  is  the  absolute  form  of 
pure  thought.  Logic  is  thus  to  be  regarded  as  both 
the  system  of  pure  reason  and  the  kingdom  of  pure 

1  P.  32-  '  P.  33- 


440         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

thought — the  kingdom  of  the  truth,  revealed  in  all  its 
glory,  without  let  or  hindrance.  Hence  its  content 
even  bears  reference  to  God,  regarded  in  His  eternal 
essence  before  the  creation  of  nature  and  of  a  finite 
spirit. 

Hence  Hegel's  Logic  aims  to  discover  the  First 
in  the  strictest  sense  of  the  word,  to  refer  to  God  in  His 
eternal  nature  and,  as  it  were,  endeavours  to  think 
His  thoughts  after  Him;  hence  there  will  be  neither 
content  nor  form  left  out  of  account.  God,  if  He 
were  thinking  as  we  finite  creatures  think,  would 
begin  with  the  same  category.  In  this  sense  the 
beginning  of  the  Logic  is  with  the  Immediate  of  im- 
mediates.  Yet,  once  more,  this  is  the  beginning  of 
pure  science,  not  of  theology  or  the  philosophy  of 
religion.  It  is  with  the  most  barren  aspect  of  the 
divine  Being  that  this .  brief  reference  is  concerned. 

Logic,  then,  is  the  pure  form  of  the  ultimate  prin- 
ciple of  the  universe.  It  does  not  deal  with  thought 
about  this  principle  simply,  but  with  the  principle 
itself.  There  is  no  need  to  look  beyond;  there  is  no 
beyond  not  already  implied  in  our  science  in  so  far 
as  it  properly  has  place  in  the  science.  The  principle 
of  movement  is  inherent  in  the  necessity  which  drives 
the  science  forth  through  all  the  stages  of  its  develop- 
ment; the  solution  of  its  problems,  the  resolution  of 
its  difficulties,  is  implied  in  the  immanent  dialectic 
itself.  The  content  is  immanent,  the  law  is  inherent, 
and  the  whole  coheres  within  itself.  No  system  could 
find  itself  in  the  end  in  possession  of  the  truth  unless 
it  thus  possessed  everything  requisite  to  make  it 
absolutely  complete.  To  deny  its  verity  must  be  at 
the  same  time  to  affirm  it,  and  thereby  to  pass  to  a 
higher,  truer  insight  into  that  which  was  denied.  Any 


Supplementary  Essay  441 

objection  that  can  be  raised  must  make  the  logical 
structure  the  stronger. 

47.  One  of  the  distinguishing  features  of  Hegel's 
Logic  is  this  endeavour  to  penetrate  farther  than  most 
logical  analyses  in  quest  for  the  absolute  beginning. 
One  might  almost  say  that  Hegel  seeks  to  penetrate 
back  of  God  Himself,  for  only  by  the  endeavour  to 
carry  the  search  for  an  ultimate  category  as  far  as  the 
minutest  analysis  makes  possible  is  one  able  to  point 
to  the  result  as  an  absolute  demonstration.  Insist, 
if  you  will,  that  such  thought  moves  in  a  realm  of  pure 
fancy.  Nevertheless,  it  is  by  starting  far  out  on  thin 
air,  as  it  were,  before  Being  becomes  in  any  respect 
determinate,  that  one  is  able  to  discover  where  that 
which  is  substantial  begins;  or,  more  accurately, 
where  Being  eternally  is,  as  the  basis  of  all  qualities. 
If  pure  thought  resorts  to  such  devices,  it  is  merely 
to  make  its  hold1  upon  truth  the  more  secure. 

An  important  part,  then,  of  Hegel's  dialectic  in  the 
opening  passages  of  Book  I,  and  its  transition  to  Book 
II,  is  the  logical  excursion  which  he  makes  into  a  realm 
that  is  confessedly  ''pure"  in  the  negative  sense  of  the 
word.  Hence  the  apparently  absurd  identification  of 
Seyn  and  Nichts,  the  seemingly  contentless  movement 
from  Nothing  into  Something.  Only  by  the  strict 
process  of  demonstration  which  this  dialectic  involves 
is  Hegel  able  to  show  that  he  possesses  the  absolute 
science,  the  ultimate  category.  Pure  thought  must  do 
its  utmost  to  take  the  immediate  seriously,  must  regard 
it  from  all  sides  in  its  barest  aspects,  before  it  wins 
the  right  to  proceed  with  the  rich  implications  which 
these  dialectic  excursions  involve.  To  see  the  signifi- 
cance of  this  dialectic  is  to  remove  the  last  of  the 
objections  which  have  been  made  regarding  Hegel's 


442         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

beginning,  also  to  see  how  important  for  him  is  the 
concept  of  immediacy. 

48.  We  may  now  regard  the  account  as  closed,  so 
far  as  the  derivation  of  the  concept  of  immediacy  is 
concerned.  It  seemed  necessary  to  dwell  at  length  upon 
the  preliminary  inquiries  in  order  to  point  out  the 
empirical  relationships  of  the  concept;  to  show  that 
it  is  the  analysis  of  the  given  that  supplies  the  clues 
and  suggests  the  logical  inquiry;  to  show  why  Hegel 
rejects  all  theories  which  try  to  rear  themselves  on  the 
mere  immediate;  and  to  remove  the  objections  which 
have  been  made  by  those  who  overlooked  the  signifi- 
cance of  Hegel's  references  to  the  Phenomenology. 
It  was  also  necessary  to  explain  what  is  meant  by 
"pure  thought,"  and  thus  to  justify  the  beginning 
of  the  Logic,  that  is,  the  investigations  which,  while 
starting  with  a  confessedly  mediate  result  that  has 
had  a  long  history,  must  in  its  own  interest  regard  that 
result  as  "an  immediate"  in  the  strictest  sense  of  the 
word.  The  immediacy  with  which  the  Logic  begins 
is  explicitly  another  aspect  of  an  empirically  given 
consideration  which  can  never  be  wholly  sundered 
from  mediation.  The  difficulty  with  previous  attempts 
on  the  part  of  philosophers  to  make  a  beginning  has 
been  their  endeavour  to  start  with  either  a  determin- 
ate principle  of  physical  things,  or  with  a  specific 
subjective  determination.  Or,  again,  there  has  been 
an  attempt  to  start  either  with  the  immediate  in  a 
particular  sense  (ein  Unmittelbares) ,  or  with  a  particu- 
lar mediate.  Now  it  is  clear,  in  the  first  place,  that  the 
beginning  must  be  absolutely  universal;  and,  in  the 
second  place,  that  there  is  nothing  in  heaven  or  on 
earth  that  is  not  at  once  mediate  and  immediate.1 

*Op.  cit.,  p.  56. 


Supplementary  Essay  443 

Since  these  two  determinations  are  unseparated  and 
inseparable,  what  is  more  reasonable  than  to  start,  not 
with  a  theoretic  principle,  but  with  precisely  the  prin- 
ciple which  experience  itself  yields  ?  Instead  of  invent- 
ing a  world  of  "pure  thought"  from  whose  artificial 
immediate  the  cosmos  of  logic  and  of  nature  shall 
be  deduced,  it  is  just  at  this  point  that  Hegel  refers  to 
the  Phenomenology,  in  which  immediate  and  mediate 
have  been  found  inseparable.1  The  preliminary  science 
has  already  begun  where  all  thinking  naturally  would 
begin,  i.  e.  with  empirical,  sensuous  consciousness. 
At  the  close  of  that  inquiry  a  point  was  reached  where 
the  Idea  was  no  longer  set  over  against  itself  as  object 
in  an  alien  sense,  but  where  it  contained  the  object 
within  itself.  Hence  it  is  that  the  Logic  can  start  with 
an  object  with  which  the  Idea  is  already  at  home,  with 
the  first  question  regarding  immediacy  finally  settled. 
But,  granted  an  immediate-mediate  which  it  must 
accept,  and  hence  give  over  its  vain  wanderings,  pure 
thought  is  now  free  to  regard  that  gift  of  earlier  thought 
as  a  "new  immediate"  in  which  all  reference  to  an 
other  and  all  mediation  (of  the  preliminary  type)  have 
been  taken  up  into  itself  (aufgehoben) .  The  only  pos- 
sible beginning  is  already  (immediately)  at  hand,  and 
the  Absolute  itself  could  not  make  it  aught  less  than 
both  the  mediate  and  the  immediate. 

49.  The  term  "simple  immediacy,"  then,  is  con- 
fessedly an  expression  employed  by  reflection,  and 
should  not  be  taken  to  mean  the  negation  of  the  em- 
pirical content  of  the  presupposed  mediation.  For 
purposes  of  reflection  it  is  permissible  to  treat  the  new 
beginning  as  if  it  were  merely  immediate,  hence  to 
regard  it  as  devoid  of  all  differences;  and  to  speak  of 

1  P.  57.     See  above,  Sec.  19  ff. 


444         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

it  as  a  unity  in  which  pure  knowledge  "goes  together 
with  itself,"  ceases  to  be  knowledge  and  becomes 
simple  immediacy  in  the  strictest  sense  of  the  word.1 
That  is,  this  expression  which  reflection  makes  use 
of — "  simple  immediacy  "  (the  absence  of  all  differences) 
—is  the  foundation  of  another  inquiry  (reine  Seyn), 
regarded  as  devoid  of  all  determination  and  "filling." 
From  one  point  of  view,  our  beginning  has  the  utmost 
possible  fulness  of  content ;  yet  from  another  it  has  no 
content  at  all,  no  determination  other  than  the  sim- 
ple consideration  that  it  is  just  Being,  since  we  are 
not  entitled  to  consider  the  "filling"  except  so  far 
as  it  is  progressively  developed  in  the  course  of  the 
dialectic.2 

50.  We  are  prepared,  therefore,  to  accept  Hegel's 
peculiar  terminology  and  follow  the  developments  of 
the  dialectic.    Plainly,  the  beginning  must  be  regarded 
as  absolute,  i.  e.  the  first  immediate,  beyond  which 
thought  cannot  go.     The  beginning  can  take  nothing 
for  granted  beyond  this  its  now  well  marked  universe 
of    discourse,    it   is    mediated    through    nothing.      Or 
rather,  it  is  itself  the  ground  of  all  scientific  mediation. 
As  such,  then,  the  beginning  is  strictly  the  immediate. 
Since  it  can  have  no  determination  with  reference  to  an- 
other, it  can  at  first  have  none  within  itself;   for  that 
were  to  possess  difference,  and  hence  mediation:   and 
we  are  now  taking  the  beginning  as  the  unmediate. 

51.  It  may  occur  to  the  reader  that  if  the  logical 
beginning  is  at  once  mediate  and  immediate  in  such 
wise  that  there  is  naught  beyond  it,  even  speculatively 
prior,  the  movement  away  from  it  is  in  reality  a  return 

1  Ibid.,  p.  58. 

2  Compare  our  analysis  of  the  preliminary  description  of  psychic 
immediacy;   see  above,  Sec.  19  ff. 


Supplementary  Essay  445 

to  itself.  Hegel  is  ready  to  admit  this.1  Implicitness 
is  one  of  the  great  principles  of  the  Logic,  a  highly 
important  characteristic  of  immediacy.  Absolute 
truth  is  already  the  inmost  truth  of  the  logical  begin- 
ning; were  it  otherwise  the  beginning  would  not  be 
what  it  claims  to  be.  But  it  is  retrospect  that  discovers 
in  what  sense  the  first  is  last,  and  the  derived  result 
is  to  be  understood  in  another  sense  than  that  of 
the  one-sided  point  of  view  which  first  concerns  us. 
Strictly  speaking,  the  beginning  is  the  undeveloped. 
Not  until  the  close  of  Book  III  is  it  possible  adequately 
to  mediate  the  beginning.2 

52.  At  certain  points  the  description  of  the  begin- 
ning approaches  the  notion  of  a  differenceless  unity, 
and  one  sees  why  the  beginning  has  been  taken  to  be 
the  same  as  Schelling's.  The  difficulty  is  that  the 
beginning  is  a  twofold  principle,  and  a  differentiated 
ground ;  that  what  it  is  as  an  immediate  we  are  unable 
to  state  until  we  have  begun  to  mediate  this  its  two- 
fold wealth.  Only  in  retrospect,  once  more,  can  we 
state  what  we  meant.  Yet  it  is  important  to  try 
repeatedly  to  state  what  we  mean,  for  we  hereby 
exhibit  one  of  the  chief  characteristics  of  immediacy. 
To  catch  it  in  the  act,  as  it  were,  of  revealing  itself  by 
passing  over  into  the  mediation  which  is  well-nigh 
indistinguishable  from  it,  is  to  see  that  prior  to  its 
first  moment  it  was  really  implicitly  what  in  that 
moment  it  explicitly  became.  Hence  Hegel  is  right 
in  clinging  to  the  differentiation-pole  of  his  concept, 
rather  than  to  the  differenceless;  and  when  he  says 
that  "only  the  beginning  is  present"  he  means  a 
pregnant  beginning,3  as  we  shall  see  by  running  over 

1  Op.  cit.,  pp.  60,  61.  2  See  below,  Sec.  100  ff. 

3  Op.  cit.,  p.  63. 


446         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

a    few    of    the    details    of   his    minutely   descriptive 
pages. 

The  differentiation  of  the  beginning  is  not  as  such 
statable,  because  the  beginning  is  not  yet  contrasted 
with  any  of  the  determinations  which  are  presently 
to  appear.  There  is  no  Etwas  (content)  wherewith 
to  make  the  beginning  aught  more  explicit  than  it 
is  as  simply  the  beginning.  If  we  term  the  beginning 
Seyn,  it  is  still  true  that  anything  which  might  give 
determinateness  to  Being  is  excluded.  Only  the 
beginning  is  posited,  and  it  remains  to  be  seen  what  the 
beginning  is.  We  have  as  yet  no  object  in  particular, 
yet  the  beginning  of  all  objects  in  general.  Our 
beginning  is  simply  Nichts,  and  is  about  to  become 
something.  The  beginning  is  not,  however,  pure 
nothing,  but  a  Nichts  from  which  something  is  to  go 
forth.1  Being  is  thus  already  contained  in  the  begin- 
ning. The  beginning  contains  both  Being  and  Nichts  ; 
it  is  not  Nichts  in  general  but  nothing  which  already 
so  far  is  that  something  shall  come  out  of  it.  It  is 
thus  in  a  sense  the  unity  of  Being  and  Nichts,  since  it 
already  has  two  aspects.  Or,  if  you  please,  it  is  at 
once  Being  and  non-Being;  it  is  not  mere  nothing, 
yet  as  a  Nichts  which  is  to  become  it  can  be  said  to  be 
something  only  so  far  as  it  simply  is.  It  is  not  abso- 
lute non-Being.  Still  it  is  not  yet  Being  in  any  sense 
which  is  to  be  more  explicitly  differentiated  from  non- 
Being.  Without  positing  its  non-Beingness,  one  could 
not  fully  state  what  it  is  and  what  it  is  not.  Thus 
Being  already  refers  to  an  other  (Nichts  or  non- 
Being)  ;  and  Nichts  (or  non-Being)  plays  its  part  as 
referring  to  its  other  (Being).  Hence  we  find  Being 
moving  forward  through  the  postulation  of  its  own 
K*M  p.  63. 


Supplementary  Essay  447 

antitheses,  the  sublation  (transmutation)  of  that  which 
it  is  not. 

That  which  begins  is  then  already  not  somewhat 
else.  The  antithetical  propositions,  Seyn  ist,  Seyn 
ist  nichts,  are  fundamentally  one,  an  immediate  unity; 
or,  again,  a  differentiated  unity,  in  view  of  the  way  in 
which  we  have  defined  Nichts.  The  analysis  of  our 
beginning  thus  makes  known  the  unity  of  Being  and 
Nichts  as  "a  form  of  reflection."  This  action  may 
be  regarded  as  the  first,  most  abstract  definition  of  the 
Absolute.  All  further  definitions  may  then  be  deemed 
the  further  development  of  this  conception.  The 
conception  of  the  beginning  is  the  first  point.  The 
analysis  of  the  conception  as  presupposed  is  the  second. 
No  sooner  do  we  recognise  it  as  immediate,  as  seemingly 
simple  unity,  than  we  pass  beyond  what  we  thought 
we  possessed  to  its  first  stage  of  mediation.  To  analyse 
the  beginning  is  to  find  that  after  all  it  is  no  absolute 
unit  implying  nothing,  but  is  already  synthetic,  cannot 
even  be  posited  as  absolute  beginning  without  involv- 
ing the  exposition  of  what  it  is  not ;  it  what  sense  it  is 
and  is  not  Nichts,  and  in  what  sense  its  other  (Nichts) 
produces  it,  in  the  reference  which  tries  to  show  that 
it  is  not  mere  nothing  but  implicitly  Being  in  the  ab- 
stractest  sense  of  the  word. 

The  beginning  considered  as  simply  itself  is  unana- 
lysable, unfilled  immediacy,  utterly  empty  Being. 
When  it  is  a  question  of  the  implications  of  Being  in 
this  its  most  abstract  form,  we  have  already  left  the 
beginning  as  such  and  taken  the  first  step  in  the  long 
dialectic  which  leads  to  the  absolute  Idea.  We  must 
then  distinguish  the  beginning  from  that  which  starts 
with  it.  Yet  we  are  free  to  note  how  rich  the  beginning 
proves  to  be  when  we  begin  to  move  away  from  it. 


448          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

53.  Hegel  devotes  a  few  paragraphs  to  an  alleged 
beginning  with  the  Ego. l    This  conception  arose  partly 
out  of  the  reflection  that  from  the  first  truth  all  that 
follows  must  be  derived ;  and  partly  from  the  need  that 
the  first  truth    must  be  well  known  and  immediate 
(unmittelbar    Gewisses).    But    the    alleged    immediate 
beginning  does  not  prove  to  be  the  immediate  it  seems 
to  be.    Hegel  shows  that  there  is  much  more  mediation 
in  this  conception  than  is  suspected,  and  that  the  term 
"Ego"  is  used  with  a  number  of  meanings:  as  simple 
self -certitude    (as   distinguished   from   the   content   of 
self-consciousness) ;   as  the  most  concrete ;   and  as  not 
immediate,  but  the  familiar  "self"  of  our  every-day 
consciousness.    To  pursue  these  mediations  would  be  to 
run  back  into  the  Phenomenology  and  take  up  again 
the  various  attitudes  of  self-consciousness  from  which 
Hegel  has  already  derived  the  prevailing  implication, 
the  category  of  Being. 

54.  If,  as  a  final  resort,  it  be  contended  that  the 
beginning  should  be  made  with  the  intuition  of  God, 
since  in  this  conception  there  is  richer  content  than 
in  pure  Being,  our  reply  in  behalf  of  Hegel  is,  Let  the 
content  be  as  rich  as  it  may,  it  is  determinate ;  whereas 
the  beginning  must  be  simple  immediacy.     Our  start 
is  made  with  an  "empty  word."     Let  the  critic  not 
forget   this   explicit   statement   by   Hegel.      Devotees 
of  Fichte  and  others  who  propose  beginnings  of  phi- 
losophy may  well  consider  the  profundity  of  what  at 
first  glance  seems  so  empty.    As  McTaggart  suggests, 
Hegel  may  not  have  been  fully  aware  of  the  deep  sig- 
nificance of  his  own  beginning  with  the  category  of 
Being.2    But,  starting  as  we  have  with  the  introductory 

»  Ibid.,  p.  66  ff. 

*  Studies  in  the  Hegelian  Dialectic,  introductory  chapters. 


Supplementary  Essay  449 

analysis  and  gradually  leading  to  the  present  point,  we 
have  had  opportunity  to  see  the  thoroughness  of 
Hegel's  demonstration.  If  we  have  at  certain  points 
made  Hegel  more  explicit  than  his  text,  it  has  been  by 
making  use  of  the  material  implied  in  his  own  refer- 
ences to  other  works.  Hegel  gives  hints  enough,  and 
one  is  inclined  to  believe  that  he  saw  the  full  signifi- 
cance of  his  "voyage  of  discovery."  Examination 
of  the  literature  produced  by  those  who  have  struggled 
into  Hegel  shows  that  they,  too,  went  upon  a  voy- 
age of  discovery;  and  it  is  not  clear  how  many  of 
them  except  Wallace  ever  succeeded  in  putting  their 
results  together.  Hence  even  the  friends  of  Hegel 
sometimes  put  the  inquirer  on  the  wrong  track  by 
unduly  emphasising  the  thought-element  in  Hegel. 
If  our  own  "  voyage"  has  brought  forth  the  result  that 
one  must  take  full  account  of  the  empirical  presup- 
positions which  guided  Hegel  in  formulating  his  logic, 
the  way  is  clear  for  an  impartial  consideration  of  the 
significance  of  the  dialectic  element  with  which  we 
have  been  concerned  from  first  to  last.  For  we  have 
to  do  not  with  a  mere  thought-idealism,  but  with  a 
logical  investigation  which  seeks  to  penetrate  beneath 
all  mere  thought  and  all  mere  experience,  while  at  the 
same  time  taking  account  of  the  category  implied 
in  all  such  starting-points.  The  personal  " voyage" 
of  the  logician  himself  is  itself  indicative  of  the  subtle 
meaning  of  our  concept. 


IV 


55.  One  important  meaning  of  immediacy  now 
lies  definitely  before  us.  Stated  in  abstract  terms, 
the  dialectic  of  the  logical  beginning  is  barren  enough, 

39 


450          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

and  it  is  no  wonder  that  Hegel  has  been  ridiculed  for 
alleging  that  Being  and  Nothing  are  the  same.  Looked 
at  from  the  point  of  view  of  its  references  backwards 
and  forwards  to  reality,  the  dialectic  proves  rich  in 
content.  For  Hegel  is  unable  to  abstract  real  Being, 
that  is,  exclude  it  from  the  Logic.  He  resolutely 
tries  to  think  out  into  thin  air.  But,  lo  and  behold, 
even  the  naught  which  he  finds  is  essential  to  the 
conception  of  Being.  The  most  barren  reference  to 
an  alleged  somewhat  lying  beyond  is  in  fact  a  vitally 
rich  reference  to  the  First,  beyond  which  there  is  no 
other.  The  very  dryness  and  wearisomeness  of  the 
argument  show  the  utter  futility  of  the  attempt  to 
pass  beyond  the  concrete;  all  this  is  a  part  of  the 
absolute  demonstration.  The  baffled  endeavours  of 
the  argument  are  like  the  vain  flutterings  of  a  caged 
bird.  The  confines  of  the  Absolute  are  given  once  for 
all ;  the  attempt  to  pass  beyond  them  is  comparable  to 
the  attempt  to  find  a  mere  immediacy  in  the  Phenom- 
enology. It  is  not  until  thought  turns  about  and  dis- 
covers that  what  it  has  is  Werden  (becoming)  that 
the  profound  significance  of  what  appeared  to  be  so 
futile  is  seen.  The  abstractions  do  not  exist  outside 
of  pure  thought  in  experimental  exercise.  What  is 
really  present  is  the  activity  of  thought  which,  amidst 
the  apparent  barrenness,  is  all  the  time  making  head- 
way. There  is  no  pure  immediacy  and  there  is  no  mere 
mediation.  But  there  is  a  developing  moment  which 
contains  both  immediacy  and  mediation,  and  what  we 
really  meant  all  along  now  begins  to  be  plain. 

56.  Thought  can  indeed  exercise  some  choice  in 
the  details  of  its  mediating  activities,  but  nothing  could 
be  sterner  than  the  ultimate  law  within  which  it  moves. 
It  reaches,  as  it  were,  the  point  where  the  majestic 


Supplementary  Essay  45 1 

voice  of  the  Almighty  is  heard:  Thus  far  shalt  thou 
go,  and  no  farther.  But  just  because  one  has  attained 
the  majestic  height,  one  can  turn  about  with  absolute 
surety  and  think  even  as  God  might  think — with  the 
principle  of  principles.  That  principle  one  must  start 
with.  It  is  the  absolute  gift.  Without  it  there  were 
no  thinker  and  no  thought.  One  need  not  prove  it, 
for  it  is  the  ground  of  all  proof.  One  cannot  deny  it, 
for  to  deny  is  to  affirm.  The  same  intuitive  insight  that 
shows  it  to  be  the  ultimate  of  ulti mates  also  shows 
it  to  be  the  ground  of  all  existence  and  of  all  thinking. 
For  in  that  principle  one  finds  both  the  world  of  ob- 
jects and  the  world  of  judgments  concerning  them. 
The  whole  universe  is  given  in  that  moment,  and  in 
that  moment's  insight  one  sees  the  true  unity  of  thought 
and  Being.  But  that  unity  is  so  far  from  being  what 
some  critics  suppose  it  to  be  that  the  utmost  we  are 
permitted  to  say  about  it  is  that  it  exhibits  the  prin- 
ciple which  makes  our  science  possible,  gives  the 
barest  starting-point  for  logical  thought.  If  we  did 
not  begin  with  our  object,  if  we  did  not  first  possess 
our  universal,  we  should  never  find  it;  and  should  be 
at  sea,  like  the  philosopher  of  "pure  experience" 
who  never  passes  beyond  detached  particularity. 

57.  Yet  the  genius  of  a  Hegel  is  needed  to  show 
how  poor  a  thing  our  starting-point  is.  The  signifi- 
cance lies  so  little  in  the  immediacy  that  the  first 
moment  of  mediation  has  barely  life  enough  to  move 
away  from  Nichts.  But  when  at  last  it  has  moved  far 
enough  away  from  the  abyss  over  the  edge  of  which 
nothing  lies,  to  look  about  and  discover  where  it  is, 
it  finds  itself  possessed  of  a  warm,  pulsing  life  which 
will  in  due  course  lead  to  profound  knowledge.  Hence 
we  must  again  warn  the  critic  not  to  read  too  much 


452          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

into  Hegel's  Seyn :  rather  he  should  see  as  little  in  it 
as  he  can.  On  the  other  hand,  if  he  sees  all  there  is 
in  it  he  is  prepared  to  take  up  the  Logic  in  detail  with- 
out likelihood  of  misunderstanding. 

Briefly  speaking,  the  immediate  of  our  absolute 
science  (i)  makes  that  science  possible,  gives  what  we 
should  not  otherwise  possess,  that  which  reason  in  its 
supremest  "pure"  moment  could  not  invent;  and 
(2)  exhibits  the  beginnings  of  the  dialectic  activity 
which,  if  followed,  will  make  all  else  clear  that  is  essen- 
tial. For  our  purposes  it  is  not  important  to  follow 
the  endless  shades  of  meaning  of  the  dialectic.  Our 
first  interest  was  to  discover  immediacy  in  its  incipi- 
ency.  The  account  is  no  doubt  inadequate,  but  it  is 
the  nature  of  the  immediate  to  reveal  itself  only  little 
by  little.  Not  until  the  end  of  Book  III  of  the  Logic, 
when  the  absolute  method  is  under  discussion,  will  it 
be  possible  to  make  a  final  estimate  of  the  immediacy 
of  the  beginning.1 

58.  Are  we  to  understand,  then,  that  the  imme- 
diacy of  Book  I  has  many  empirical  references?  That 
would  be  to  mistake  the  significance  of  this  part  of 
our  inquiry.  The  initial  analysis  of  the  Phenomenology 
is  in  close  relation  with  consciousness  as  directly 
presented.  From  that  point  there  is  a  gradual  ascent 
to  the  heights  of  pure  thought.  At  the  point  where 
the  logical  analysis  makes  Being  theoretically  identical 
with  Nichts  the  discussion  reaches  the  extreme  summit 
of  dialectic  abstraction.  What  we  have  there  as 
concrete  reference  is  only  the  pure  thought  of  imme- 
diacy, hence  the  sort  that  is  least  psychical.  We 
dwelt  at  length  on  that  point  in  the  discussion  in  order 
to  show  what  Hegel  means  by  pure  thought,  and  to 

»  See  below,  Sec.  99, 


Supplementary  Essay  453 

remove  all  misconceptions.  But  from  that  pinnacle 
there  is  a  descent  to  the  richer  concreteness  of  the 
immediate,  until  at  an  important  point  in  Book  II 
the  dialectic  touches  the  levels  of  contingency  and 
irrationality.  Not  until  our  discussion  has  attained 
that  point  shall  we  see  how  empirically  rich  in  concrete 
references  the  Logic  is. 

59.  The  secondary  meanings  of  immediacy  do  not 
here  concern  us.     In  general,   immediacy  as  a  first 
moment  is  negated  in  the  second  or  mediating  moment, 
and  the  third  moment  is  both  a  synthesis  of  the  two 
that  preceded  and  a  new  immediate  requiring  further 
mediation.      The    movement    from    Being,    regarded 
as  not  yet  determined,  through  Nichts  and  Werden 
to  Daseyn  (determinate  Being)  is  typical  in  the  funda- 
mental sense  of  the  detailed  secondary  movements, 
as  the  dialectic  proceeds  from  Quality  through  Quan- 
tity to  Measure.     In  due  time,  the  entire  category  of 
Being  proves  to  be  the  immediate  with  respect  to  the 
threefold  division  of  the  dialectic.     Before  explicitly 
considering  the  negating  category  of  Wesen  (Essence) 
it  may  be  well  to  pause  a  moment  to  consider  the 
general  significance  of  immediacy. 

60.  We  first  distinguish  between  immediacy  as  it 
really  is,  and  immediacy  as  it  is  temporarily  in  dia- 
lectic description.    Generally  speaking,  the  immediate 
claims  to  be  that  which  is  not  pre-related.    It  is  the 
first  of    its  kind,   if    not    of    all   kinds.     As  such   it 
seems  to  be  an  absolute  gift.     It  is  dialectically  prof- 
itable to  treat  immediacy  as  if  it  were  what  it  claims 
to  be.     Thus  Hegel  regards  psychical  immediacy  when, 
in  the  Phenomenology,  he  for  the  moment  ignores  the 
varied  pre-relationships  of   the  sensuously  presented 
The  result  we  have  seen.    There  is  no  such  immediate. 


454          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

But,  again,  the  limitations  of  mediation  are  such  that 
without  immediacy,  regarded  as  presentness,  there 
is  naught  to  mediate.  Immediacy  in  the  dependent 
sense  is  therefore  decidedly  real.  It  is  through  the 
transitions  of  its  own  dependency  that  immediacy 
shows  what  it  really  is.  Yet  further,  we  have  seen 
that  out  of  the  wealth  of  the  directly  presented,  when 
inspected  still  more  closely,  the  life  of  all  dialectic  is 
discovered.  Immediacy,  then,  has  a  psychical  and  a 
logical  Becoming  that  is  remarkably  fruitful. 

61.  In  the  Logic  Hegel  follows  the  same  method. 
He  confessedly  approaches  the  immediate  presup- 
position which  has  given  the  critics  so  much  difficulty 
as  if  it  were  what  his  critics  take  it  to  be.1  For  the 
time  being  Hegel  ignores  the  fact  that  his  presuppo- 
sition is  a  mediated  result,  and  once  more  takes  it  as 
a  first  or  "pure"  immediate.  Hence  he  takes  pure 
thought  as  much  in  earnest  as  possible.  The  alleged 
pure  immediate  proves  to  be  the  same  as  Nichts,  and 
well  it  might.  But  there  is  no  pure  immediate,  and 
this  preliminary  dialectic  was  meant  to  prove  it.  It 
is  only  in  transition  (Werden)  that  the  genuine  Unmit- 
telbar  (the  not-yet-mediated)  is  discovered.  On  the 
other  hand,  what  could  be  more  satisfactory  than 
Hegel's  attempt  to  find  what  is  not?  The  first  moment 
of  pure  Being  is  an  abstraction:  there  is  no  such  entity. 
Let  no  one  think  that  Hegel  tries  to  deduce  the  world 
from  that.  Let  no  Trendelenburg  allege  that  Hegel 
must  borrow  from  experience,  or  have  naught  to 
mediate.  What  went  before  was  merely  a  preliminary 
skirmish.  For  the  moment  Hegel  has  said  that  he 
would  ignore  the  fact  that  this  simple,  logical  imme- 
diate was  a  highly  mediate  affair,  freshly  brought  over 

i  See  above,  Sec.  5. 


Supplementary  Essay  455 

from  the  stream  of  consciousness.  He  was  endeavour- 
ing to  make  an  absolute  start.  But  so  far  from  rinding 
the  logical  immediate  what  it  pretended  to  be,  he  dis- 
covered that  its  implicit  category  (Being)  is  connected 
with  every  item  of  experience. 

62.  There  could  be  an  absolute  first  only  in  the 
sense   which  every  one  since  Aristotle  must  admit, 
namely,  that  since  something  is,  something  eternally 
has  been;    nobody  can  penetrate  behind  Being  as  in 
some   sense  eternal.     But  what  one  must  postulate 
in  order  to  make  a  beginning  at  all,  one  learns  only 
after  persistent  mediation.    The  real  first  is  the  Being 
implied  in  all  presentness,  whether  of  experience  or 
of  thought ;  and  it  is  that  real  presentness  that  makes 
known   the   Becoming  whose  moments  of  transition 
exhibit  the  truth  of  immediacy.    The  unreal  first  was 
an   hypothetical    immediate   which   claimed   to   have 
no  p re-relations. 

63.  Even  when  taken  at  its  apparent  face  value, 
then,  immediacy  is  ambiguous.    For  (i)  it  refers  to  the 
psychical  presentness  in  what  proves  to  be  an  illusory 
sense;     (2)    it    claims    a    psychological    independence 
which  no  analysis  can  substantiate ;  and  (3)  it  assumes 
a  logical  independence  which  proves  to  be  a  myth.    As 
a  result  of  the  attempt  to  take  immediacy  for  what  it 
appears  to  be,  we  are  compelled  to  conclude  that  no 
fact,  whether  regarded  psychically  or  in  any  other  way, 
is  knowable  apart  from  its  relations.    Things  that  seem 
immediately  to  stand  alone  prove  to  be,   (i)  results 
of   relations;     (2)    existing    in    relations;     (3)    appre- 
hended through  relations  (sensation,  etc.) ;   (4)  known 
by  means  of  relations   (perception,  and  so  on) ;    and 
•(5)  thinkable  in  terms  of  relations  (categories,  logic, 

metaphysic,  etc.). 


456          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

64.  Taken,   then,   as  what  it  appears  to  be,  the 
entire  category  of  immediacy  is  imperfect,  as  Professor 
Royce  points  out.1     As  contrasted  with  the  mediate, 
immediacy    claims   to    be   the   unrelated,    the   given, 
elementary,  initial ;  but  is  more  accurately  describable 
in  Royce's  terms  as  the  "  unwon,"  the  "  unearned."  2 
Hence  the  transiency  of  every  finite  fact.     Hence  the 
utter  abstraction   of    "pure   immediacy."     Yet  such 
is  the  surprising  character  of  immediacy  that,  although 
entirely  illusory  in  its  independence,   it  nevertheless 
involves    a    quality    inseparable    from   all    experience 
and    from    all    knowledge.      Mediation,    regarded   as 
constituting   an    independent   category,    would   prove 
to  be  no  less  one-sided.    It  is  futile  to  seek  any  category 
that  stands  by  itself.     If  you  want  the  truth  at  all  you 
must  accept  it  in  the  related  form  in  which  it  comes. 
But  what  does  this  mean  if  not  that  the  conditions 
of  thinking  are  as  undeniably  given  as  the  hardest  fact 
of  the  world  of  sense?     Rationalise  the  given,  if  you 
will,  and  labour  unceasingly  to  show  that  the  connec- 
tion of  all  this  which  we  are  compelled  to  know  relat- 
edly  is  through  and   through  rational.     But   do  not 
forget  that  the  initial  items  of  thought  were  gifts  of 
that  wonderful  somewhat  called   "experience"  which 
thought  characterises  as  well  as  it  may. 

65.  Thus  far  we  have  found  that  immediacy  is  an 
irreducible  element  of  all  sentiency  and  all  thought. 
More  strictly  speaking,  the  immediate  is  the  matter 
of  thought,  while  thought  is  the  mediate  form.    Fur- 
thermore, it  is  a  first  way  of  taking  any  determination  as 
what  it  appears  to  be,  however  that  appearance  must  be 
qualified.   Hence  immediacy  is  the  first  step  in  a  method, 
and  this  method  is  capable  of  the  widest  application. 

1  Baldwin's  Dictionary  of  Philos.,  i.,  456.  2  Ibid.,  p.  458. 


Supplementary  Essay  457 

66.  Illustrations  of  this  starting-point  as  applied 
to  concrete  inquiries  are  found,  for  example,  in  the 
Encyclopedia,  where  the  ethical  spirit  in  its  immediacy 
is  the  first  moment  of  an  investigation  which  begins 
with   the  individual   as  a   "natural   factor."     Again, 
the   sensuous   externality  pertains    to   the    beautiful; 
the  "form  of  immediacy  as  such"  is  a  starting-point 
in  the  study  of  art.1     But,  again,  the  immediate  may 
be  a  much  higher  starting-point.     Thus  the  considera- 
tion (moment)  which  was  abstract  and  formal  in  the 
Logic  now  becomes  more  concrete.     "The  finite  from 
which  the  start  is  now  made  is  the  real  ethical  self- 
consciousness.  "2 

67.  In  general,   Hegel   is  inclined   to  take  things 
as  they  appear  at  first — the  point  of  view  of  common 
thought.     The  whole  category  of  Seyn  (Being)  stands 
for  an  external  way  of   thinking.     Hegel  could   not 
make  this  explicit  at  first,  for  he  was  dialectically  com- 
pelled to  take  Being  for  what  it  appeared  to  be,  and 
it  claims  to  be  strictly  immediate,  hence  independent. 
But  when  we  pass  to  the  next  general  division  of  the 
Logic,  we  discover  an  internal  method  of  thought  which 
undermines   the   pretensions   of   mere   Being.     Taken 
by  itself,  Being  is  what  it  externally  appears  to  be; 
regarded  from  the  point  of  view  of  its  essence,  it  is 
condemned    as    "show."     But    its    reality    is    by    no 
means  denied  in  this  process  of  negation.     The  " show" 
is  indeed  transmuted,  but  that  transmutation  is  only 
one  phase  of  the  first  moment  of  dialectical  transmu- 
tation.    Being  is  to  remain  with  us  to  the  end  and  its 
defensible  truth  is  to  be  seen.     In  general  the  entire 

1  See  Sections  518,  552,  557,  Wallace's  translation,  HegeVs  P  kilos- 
of  Mind,  pp.  121,  154,  169. 

2  Sec.  552. 


458          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

category  of  Being  is  immediate,  in  comparison  with 
which  Wesen  (Essence)  is  the  category  of  mediation. 
In  attempting  thus  early  to  characterise  immediacy 
as  one-sided  and  dependent,  we  have  anticipated 
results  for  which  we  must  now  find  a  more  explicit 
place. 


68.  At  the  beginning  of  Book  II,  we  find  the  sug- 
gestive sentence,  "The  truth  of  Being  is  Essence."1 
That  is,  if  one  wishes  to  know  what  Being  is,  in  and 
for  itself,  one  must  not  remain  at  the  stage  of  the 
immediate  and  its  determinations,  but  press  through 
these  with  the  presupposition  that  behind  or  beyond 
there  is  an  "other"  which  will  make  known  its  truth. 
The  inquiry  thus  enlarges,  for  the  truth  as  found  in 
the  sphere  of  Essence  is  not  found  in  Essence  alone, 
but  starts  with  an  other  (Seyn),  passes  through  this 
preliminary  stage,  and  leads  to  the  discovery  that  in 
the  immediate  the  truth  is  nowhere  to  be  found.  To 
pass  beyond  Being  is  to  see  how  inadequate  it  was. 
Yet  even  in  that  which  has  been  one  recognises  an 
aspect  of  that  truth  which  now  is  discovered  in  this 
mediate  category.  The  beginning  is  still  seen  to  be 
necessary,  but  the  departure  from  it  was  no  less  neces- 
sary; it  is  the  absolute  beginning  only  in  case  thought 
actually  begins.  When  the  beginning  is  already 
behind,  the  truth  is  more  fully  seen  that  it  was  ab- 
solutely the  beginning,  yet  consequently  nothing 
more.  Yet  in  another  sense  this  movement  away  from 
Seyn  is  the  activity  of  Being  itself.  To  discover  its 
nature  is  to  see  that  it  implies  far  more  than  as  Being 

i  Werke,  iv.,  3 


Supplementary  Essay  459 

it  is;   hence  to  pass  to  the  category  which  exhibits 
its  fuller  truth. 

69.  We  sen    (Essence)    stands   between   Being   and 
the  Begriff  (the  Notion  which  reveals  the  Idea),  con- 
stitutes   the   middle   category   of   the   latter   and    its 
transition  from  Being  to  the  Begriff  proper.     Essence 
(i)  "shines"  in  itself,  is  reflection;  (2)    it  appears;  and 
(3)  it  reveals  itself.     Hence  there  is  movement  towards 
more  and   more  explicitness,   a  movement  in  which 
three  determinations  are  distinguished.     In  the  first, 
Essence   is    "simple,"    immediate;   in   the   second,    it 
"steps  forth"  into  determinate  Being,  Existenz  (merely 
immediate  existence),  appearance;  and  in  the  third, 
it  is  one  with  its  appearance,  is  Wirklichkeit  (actuality). 
It  is  the  transition  from  the  second  to  the  third  of 
these    determinations    that    has    special    significance 
for  us. 

70.  Essence  at    first    simply  "shines  into    itself," 
but    presently    becomes    an    existent    somewhat,    or 
thing.     When  all  the  conditions  of  a  thing  are  present, 
it  steps  forth  into  Existenz.     The  thing  is  (possesses 
Being  in  the  sense  in  which  we  have  found  this  de- 
termination dialectically  serviceable)  before  it  "exists" 
in  the  technical  sense  in  which   Hegel  employs  the 
term  Existenz.1     Everything,  then,  that  possesses  Be- 
ing (is  not  simply  an  item  of  pure  dialectic)  exists. 
Essence   has    now    "gone    forth"    from    the    dialectic 
stage  which   so   long   concerned  us  (mere  unqualified 
immediacy)     and    has     become     determinate    as    an 
existent  Ding.     The  thing  regarded  apart  from  this  its 
determinate   existence   would   be   merely   "possible," 
the  Gedankending  which  as  such  is  not  said  to  exist.2 
But  taken  objectively,  the  thing  may  now  be  regarded 

iQp.  cit.,  p.  113.  ,  *  Ibid.,  p.  121. 


460         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

by  itself  (that  is,  as  immediate)  as  possessing  prop- 
erties. The  multiplicity  of  things  exist  in  reciprocity 
through  their  properties,  and  a  thing  is  naught  without 
these  its  properties  existing  in  reciprocal  relation. 

71.  Note,  then,  that  while  immediacy  has  all  along 
possessed  the  implied  empiric  references  for  which  we 
have  pleaded,  the  dialectic  has  been  so  far  concerned 
with  abstractions  that  it  is  not  until  the  point  is 
reached  where  Existenz  appears  that  immediacy  refers 
to  things  as  you  and  I  know  them  in  ordinary  ex- 
perience. This  is  a  highly  important  point.  It  has 
taken  all  this  time  for  the  dialectic  to  reach  the  stage 
where,  having  gradually  worked  away  from  pure 
Being,  at  first  postulated  as  identical  with  Nichts, 
it  is  possible  to  connect  the  dialectic  explicitly  with 
experience.  The  references  to  things  in  their  im- 
mediacy is  now  legitimate  inasmuch  as  the  immediacy 
with  which  we  are  really  concerned  has  never  been 
divorced  from  experience,  but  has  been  treated  as  if 
it  were  devoid  of  the  mediation  of  .the  preliminary 
inquiries,  taken  in  its  most  abstract  form ;  and  then, 
by  a  progressive  dialectic,  has  been  restored,  has  had  its 
content  given  back.  We  have  all  along  analysed 
the  same  rich  immediacy  which  we  met  at  the  outset, 
save  that  we  have  concealed  its  deeper  significance 
until  our  investigation  had  reached  the  proper  point 
to  make  it  known.  Under  the  head  of  Existenz, 
Hegel  is  now  able  at  last  to  give  a  more  complete 
recognition  to  immediacy.  Let  us,  then,  discover 
precisely  what  Existenz  means,  before  we  reach  the 
stage  where  immediacy  passes  from  mere  appearance 
to  actuality. 

72.     To  consider  a  thing  apart  from  its  properties, 
the   stuff  of  which   it   consists,   would   obviously   be 


Supplementary  Essay  461 

to  regard  it  abstractly,  not  as  ordinary  experience 
reveals  it.  Hence  Hegel  moves  forward  to  the  notion 
of  diversity,  manifoldness  in  the  thing,  the  "matters" 
through  which  it  subsists,  and  attains  the  stage  where 
it  is  possible  to  particularise  this  thing.1  Existenz, 
then,  attains  completion  in  the  specific  thing,  becomes 
Erscheinung  (appearance).  That  is,  in  popular  speech, 
the  thing  is  said  to  exist  out  yonder  as  if  wholly  in- 
dependent. Hegel  dialect ically  accords  the  thing  its 
full  seeming  immediacy,  as  if  it  wholly  consisted  of 
self-subsistent  "stuff."  But  having  said  thus  much 
he  is  compelled  to  declare  that  the  thing  possesses 
only  unwesentliches  Existenz  (non-essential,  insignifi- 
cant, or  merely  apparent  existence),  that  is,  what  we 
have  before  us  is  a  set  of  appearances.  Existenz, 
therefore,  stands  for  the  immediate,  external,  seem- 
ingly independent  existence  of  things. 

The  house  out  yonder,  for  example,  possesses  Ex- 
istenz, has  a  slate  roof,  two  chimneys,  and  so  on.  Or 
Existenz  is  my  own  moment  of  psychic  immediacy: 
the  present  state  of  consciousness  brings  a  sense  of 
fatigue  which  I  describe  precisely  as  it  comes  in  wholly 
unscientific  terms.  I  can  say  of  the  house,  It  is  (Seyn), 
or  I  may  specify  its  existence  in  detail.  I  may  speak 
now  of  the  slate  roof,  and  now  of  the  two  chimneys; 
and  finally  characterise  it  as  one  existent  object 
(Daseyn).  There  is  being,  a  thing,  I  affirm.  Here  is 
my  fatigue.  But  have  I  uttered  the  truth  of  the  ex- 
istence of  this  house  or  of  this  moment  of  feeling? 
No,  according  to  Hegel,  for  I  have  merely  stated  its 
appearance,  the  guise  in  which  it  is  first  apprehended. 
The  existent  thing  does  not  yet  (as  merely  immedi- 
ate) possess  complete  Essence.  What  I  have  said 

1  Quantitative  reference,  p.   133. 


462          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

concerning  it  is  rather  unwesentlich  than  significant; 
for  the  thing  does  not  in  reality  thus  exist  by  itself, 
but  only  in  an  other.1  When  we  carry  the  alleged 
independence  of  things  as  far  as  possible,  we  are  ready 
to  enter  another  stage  of  the  dialectic  and  discover 
the  real  character  of  the  thing,  its  Wirklickkeit  (ac- 
tuality) when  seen  in  the  light  of  its  (dependent) 
relationships. 

73.  The  dialectic  has  abundant  room,  then,  for 
Existenz  as  a  subordinate  category,  hence  for  the  data 
on  which  the  ardent  advocate  of  objective  indepen- 
dence insists.  It  is  when  one  undertakes  to  mediate 
the  detached  particularity  which  delights  the  em- 
piricist, that  one  sees  the  utter  inadequacy  of  the 
categories  which  stop  with  the  merely  existential. 
The  utmost  we  can  say  of  Existenz  as  such  is  that  it  is 
"reflected"  immediacy,  that  is,  immediacy  so  far 
rendered  explicit  as  to  merit  the  name  of  "appearance.'" 
There  is  a  respect,  then,  in  which  Existenz  may  rightly 
be  regarded  as  a  phenomenon,  namely,  in  so  far  as  it 
is  postulated  as  independent.2  When  Essence  merely 
"shines,"  it  returns  to  itself  with  nothing  achieved. 
But  when  it  erscheint  (appears)  it  is  realer  Schein, 
and  when  appearance  (the  unity  of  Schein  and  Ex- 
istenz) is  mediated,  it  is  found  to  possess  diversity 
of  content  and  a  law.  Hence  Hegel  discriminates 
between  the  abiding  and  the  reciprocally  acting 
(changing).  The  positive,  abiding  aspect  of  phenom- 
ena is  law.  Law  and  appearances  have  the  same 
content;  the  identical  content  is  the  foundation  of  ap- 
pearances.3 The  law  is  not  then  beyond  or  outside 
of  the  appearances,  but  is  immediately  present  in 
them;  the  two  constitute  one  totality.  The  world 

'P.    135.  2  P.    140.  3  Pp.    144,145. 


Supplementary  Essay  463 

which  we  have  just  been  characterising  as  possessing 
mere  Existenz  is  now  regarded  from  the  point  of  view 
of  a  higher  category,  which  proves  to  be  Actuality, 
when  the  dialectic  has  fully  made  the  transition. 
The  existent  world  is  now  known  as  the  kingdom  of 
law;  the  appearances  exemplify  the  law,  and  the  law 
gives  unity  to  the  appearances.  There  are  many 
appearances  and  many  laws,  yet  both  in  the  kingdom 
of  appearances  and  in  the  reign  of  law  the  same  Essence 
everywhere  exists,  abides.  The  world  regarded  as  in 
and  for  itself  is  the  totality  of  Existenz,  and  there  is  no 
other  beyond  it.  But  regarded  as  referring  to  itself 
antithetically,  the  world  divides  itself  into  (i)  the 
essential  world,  and  (2)  the  world  of  its  own  otherness, 
the  world  of  appearances  or  phenomena.1  The  es- 
sential world  is  the  determinate  ground  of  the  phe- 
nomenal. It  is  possible,  then,  to  pass  logically  from 
appearance  to  ground,  and  from  ground  to  diversity 
of  appearance ;  the  relationship  is  everywhere  intimate. 
The  world-in-and-for-itself  is  one  in  the  totality  of 
the  manifold  content  of  the  worlds  above  distinguished. 
The  world-in-and-for-itself  is  also  termed  the  "super- 
sensible"— in  contrast  with  the  apparently  existent, 
defined  as  the  sensible,  the  realm  of  perception,  in 
immediate  relation  to  consciousness.2  There  is  a 
sense  in  which  the  term  Existenz  is  still  applicable  to 
the  supersensible  world,  but  the  Existence  now  in 
question  is  "reflected,"  whereas  sensible  existence 
is  not  yet  in  reflected  form.  Das  Ding  ist  der  Beginn 
der  reflectirten  Existenz, — it  is  an  immediacy  whose 
meaning  has  not  yet  been  made  explicit.  It  is  not 
until  the  sensuous  representation  has  been  overcome 
—when  thought  passes  beyond  the  immediacy  of 
i  P.  148.  2  P.  150.'- 


464          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

Gefuhl   and    Anschauung — that    its   real    character   is 
discovered. 

74.  Thus  Hegel's  dialectic  provides  for  various 
stages  of  apprehension  of  sensible  objects,  namely, 
as  (i)  things,  possessing  seeming  independence,  and 
supplying  thought  with  its  first  data;  (2)  as  sensuously 
apprehended,  namely,  the  subjective  aspect  of  im- 
mediacy, Anschauung,  Gefuhl;  (3)  as  detached,  par- 
ticular, disparate  phenomena;  (4)  as  unified  in  terms 
of  law,  mediated  with  reference  to  system,  totality; 
(5)  and  as  grounded  in  the  supersensible  (essential) 
order  of  the  universe.  Note  that  the  transition  is 
made  from  the  given  aspects  of  things  as  they  appear, 
into  the  realm  of  law ;  that  the  things  which  give  the 
"essential''  cosmos  its  content  are  precisely  the  same 
things  which  were  formerly  said  to  be  merely  existent. 
The  sensible  world  is  not,  then,  created  out  of  or 
deduced  from  the  realm  of  Actuality,  but  the  world 
of  things  when  no  longer  regarded  as  the  sphere  of 
mere  appearances  is  the  world  of  actual  meanings. 
What  is  left  behind,  as  we  shall  soon  see  more  clearly, 
is  the  unessential  (merely  existential)  aspects  of  things, 
their  contingency,  irrationality.  The  point  of  view 
of  the  immediate  (the  irrational)  is  one  aspect  of 
things;  their  rationality,  or  actuality,  is  another.  To 
regard  things  from  the  point  of  view  of  their  totality 
is  obviously  to  view  them  from  one  side,  merely,  and 
is  by  no  means  to  deny  their  particular,  sensuous 
aspects,  or  to  declare  that  everything  is  actual,  or 
rational.  There  are  two  poles,  two  points  of  view — 
that  is  the  chief  consideration  just  now  to  be  noted. 
The  law  is  realised,  the  meaning  exemplified  by  the 
particulars.  The  particulars  do  not  as  yet  possess 
actuality.  There  is  far  more  in  the  mere  particularity, 


Supplementary  Essay  465 

the  detachedness  of  things,  than  need  be  taken  account 
of  in  the  idealistic  reconstruction;  the  unimportant 
particulars  remain  behind,  below,  as  non-essential; 
yet  the  significant  whole  of  things  is  precisely  this 
erstwhile  insignificant  collection,  but  considered  now  in 
the  light  of  system,  connectedness. 

75.  Otherwise  stated,  we  have  before  dealt  with 
various    elements    in    unorganised    guises;    we    now, 
having   reached    the   turning-point   in   the    dialectic, 
begin  to  organise  our  data  in  terms  of  law.     The  law 
is  the  unity  or  identity  in  the  manifold  of  appearances. 
We  began  with  the  least  degree  of  determinateness 
(reine  Seyn),  we  brought  Daseyn  (determinate  Being) 
into  view,  then  Existenz  (or  grounded  Daseyn),  and 
Existenz  in   its  most  highly  organised  form  (wesent- 
liche  Existenz).     The  relativities  of  immediacy  extend 
far  into  the  second  book  of  the  Logic,  and  if  the  dia- 
lectic were  unable  to  pass  beyond  immediacy  mere 
relativity   would    endure   to   the    end.     Without   the 
relativities  there  could  be  no  absolute,  yet  the  rela- 
tivities as  such  abound  in  irrelevances.     Or,  as  Bradley 
puts  it,    "Existence  is  not  reality,  and  reality  must 
exist.     Each  of  these  truths  is  essential  to  an  under- 
standing of  the  whole,  and  each  of  them,  necessarily 
in  the  end,  is  implied  in  the  other."1 

76.  One    who    has    not    understood    the    dialectic 
bearings  of  immediacy  at  the  beginning  of  the  Logic 
would  indeed  fail  to  see  how  Seyn  could  have  any 
empiric  references  whatever.     But  to  understand  what 
Hegel  means  by  pure  thought  is  to  see  why  Being  must 
so  long  be  barren.     Through  all  the  details  of  Book 
I,  and  well  into  Book  II,  Hegel  has  gathered  by  pro- 
gressive analyses  the  determinations  of  the  concrete, 

1  Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  400. 
30 


466          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

immediate  thing.  When  all  the  materials  are  at  hand, 
the  thing  "steps  forth, "  as  we  have  seen,  into  Existenz. 
The  thing  is  the  typical  immediate.  Hence  the  dia- 
lectic has  reached  the  point  where  any  one  can  discover 
the  empiric  references,  and  retrospectively  learn  what 
was  meant  by  pure  thought  in  its  most  abstract 
guise.  But  having  apprehended  what  is  meant  by 
immediacy  the  reader  is  in  a  position  to  mediate 
in  earnest  those  determinations  which,  while  con- 
cretely present,  "real "  for  the  plain  man,  have 
nevertheless  shown  their  inability  to  be  more  than 
appearances. 

77.  Returning  to  our  text,  we  note  that  the  law 
under  which  the  phenomena  are  gathered  is  char- 
acterised as  "the  essential  relation,"  that  is,  the  com- 
pletion of  the  "form-unity"  of  the  totality  of  objects. 
The  "truth"  of  appearance  is  the  essential  relation, 
which  is  not  a  third  with  respect  to  Essence  and  Ex- 
istenz, but  the  determinate  unity  of  both,  further 
mediated  as  the  whole  and  the  parts.  The  whole  is 
self-dependent,  constitutes  the  world-in-and-for-itself ; 
the  parts  are  the  immediate  existences  which  con- 
stitute the  phenomenal  world.1  From  one  point  of 
view,  the  whole  is  self-dependent,  and  the  parts  exist 
only  in  this  unity.  From  another  point  of  view, 
the  parts  are  self-dependent  (that  is,  immediate), 
and  their  reflected  unity  (their  idealistic  reconstruction 
in  terms  of  law,  meaning)  is  merely  a  moment.  The 
whole  consists  out  of  the  parts,  and  is  naught  without 
them  (note  this) ;  that  which  constitutes  the  totality 
is  its  (the  whole's)  other,  and  it  therefore  subsists  not 
in  itself  but  in  its  other.  The  whole  is  not  an  abstract 
unity,  but  the  unity  of  distinguished  manifoldness, 

*  Op.  cit,,  p.  158. 


Supplementary  Essay  467 

the  determinateness  whereby  the  part  is  part.1  By 
das  Ganze  Hegel  does  not,  then,  mean  a  whole  into 
which  the  parts,  the  items  of  particular  experience, 
are  "absorbed"  (as  the  English  Hegelians  are  fond 
of  saying),  but  a  determinate  ground  of  the  parts 
without  which  the  whole  would  not  be;  and  a  unity 
of  "reflection"  which  still  leaves  room  for  the  con- 
sideration of  the  parts  as  they  severally  appear  to  be.2 
The  parts  supply  the  content  without  which  there 
were  naught  to  unify.  They  constitute  the  determi- 
nate moments  of  our  thinking.  The  whole  is  con- 
fessedly for  a  point  of  view.  The  parts  still  "exist" 
—in  a  subordinate  category.  It  is  perfectly  legitimate 
to  regard  them  as  isolated — up  to  a  certain  point — 
then  equally  legitimate  to  take  them  together.  The 
parts  as  parts  are  not  the  whole;  they  are  in  a  sense 
"indifferent"  to  one  another;  each  of  the  sides  (aspects) 
refers  merely  to  itself.  Taken  entirely  by  themselves 
they  "destroy"  one  another.  The  whole  which  is  "in- 
different" to  the  parts  is  of  course  abstract.  "Each 
[side]  has  its  independence  not  in  itself  but  in  the 
other."3  The  truth  of  their  relation  is  not  discovered 
in  their  mere  givenness,  but  in  their  mediation.  Thus 
the  relation  of  the  whole  and  the  parts  passes  over 
into  the  relation  of  force  and  its  manifestations,  a 
relation  which  involves  still  further  reference  to  con- 
crete existence  in  our  natural  world.  Hegel  at  first 
considers  force  as  it  ordinarily  seems  to  exist,  as  ex- 
ternal (immediate),  related  to  detached  things  (durch 
eine  fremde  Gewalt  eingedruckt)  .4  The  activity  of 
force  consists  in  this,  that  it  externalises  itself.  Yet 

i  On  the  conception  of  the  Totalitdt,  see  Royce,  Spirit  of  Mod. 
Philos.,  p.  502. 

*Ibid.,  p.  161.  3  p.  162.  «P.  166. 


468         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

its  externality  is,  from  another  point  of  view,  its 
internality.  Hence  the  dialectic  passes  to  the  relation 
of  inner  and  outer.1  Being,  formerly  posited  as 
external  (immediate),  now  returns  to  its  ground  as 
"inner";  that  is,  that  which  a  thing  really  is,  in  its 
externality,  is  what  "reflection"  shows  it  to  be, 
through  the  Essence  which  it  exhibits.  Hence  the 
essential  relation  is  regarded  from  the  higher  point 
of  view  which  we  have  several  times  approached  in 
our  exposition  of  the  dialectic. 

78.  At  first  glance,  it  might  seem  like  hair-splitting 
to  distinguish  between  Existenz  and  Wirklichkeit,  and 
apparently  most  students  of  Hegel  have  passed  by  the 
transition  from  the  one  determination  to  the  other 
without  giving  much  attention  to  it.  Yet  not  only 
has  the  dialectic  led  up  to  and  made  such  a  distinction 
necessary,  but  the  analysis  of  all  systematic  thinking, 
as  contrasted  with  a  mere  succession  of  thoughts, 
shows  that  the  distinction  is  founded  on  a  real  differ- 
ence. In  the  living  world  of  everyday  events,  we 
find  an  abundance  of  facts  which,  as  presented  (im- 
mediate, detached,  seemingly  independent),  appear  to 
be  utterly  out  of  keeping  with  law,  order,  and  righteous- 
ness; and  so  indeed  they  are  while  they  are  regarded 
as  merely  existential,  until  we  ask,  What  universal 
principles  do  they  exemplify?  How  may  the  de- 
tached facts  be  ordered?  What  ought  to  be?  Our 
studies  in  immediacy  have  taught  us  little  if  they  have 
not  enforced  this  distinction  between  the  appearance 
of  the  directly  presented  and  its  truth  as  mediately 
discovered.  Hegel's  dialectic  would  indeed  be  far 
from  true  to  life  and  to  human  thinking  if  it  did  not 


171 


Supplementary  Essay  469 

leave  a  large  place  for  the  mere  givenness  of  things  in 
all  their  barbarous  nakedness. 

79.  The  fundamental  category  implied  in  all  this 
bruteness  of  presented  fact  is  the  category  of  Being. 
These  things  are.     No  sane  man   would  deny  that, 
and  in  various  parts  of  his  system  Hegel  gives  recog- 
nition to  the  darker  facts  of  life.1     The  existential 
judgment  (Seyri)  stands  first,  then  the  qualitative,  then 
the  quantitative,  and  so  on. 

But  in  due  course  it  becomes  a  question  of  the  sub- 
stance and  power  present  in  the  given  phenomena. 
Hence  reflection  passes  more  and  more  into  the  sphere 
of  theoretic  reconstruction.  All  determinations  ex- 
cept the  constructively  important  are  forthwith  left 
out  of  account  as  irrelevant.  That  does  not  imply 
their  entire  rejection,  I  insist.  What  makes  possible 
the  given  events  is  what  is  actual;  that  which  is  es- 
sential to  their  rationalisation  is  their  relationship 
when  taken  together.  What  else  could  one  say  of 
the  actual,  as  thus  defined,  than  that  it  is  rational? 
Having  passed  beyond  the  sphere  of  mere  Existenz, 
we  are  explicitly  searching  for  the  rationality  of  things, 
for  their  value  when  taken  as  a  whole.  That  the  parts 
possess  other  values  in  themselves  is  just  now  another 
matter.  If  a  man  prefers  mere  disparateness,  the 
detached  values  of  individual  facts,  that  is  an  affair 
of  his  own  interests,  of  his  own  will  to  believe;  and 
if  he  is  sceptical  about  the  point  of  view  of  the  Begriff, 
we  do  not  propose  to  coerce  him  into  "absolutism." 

80.  Hegel  has  opened  nearly  half  of  his  dialectic 
to  the  interests  of  the  merely  immediate.     It  is  now 
time  to  narrow  the  issues.     Even  if  it  were  a  question 
just  now  of  the  problem  of  evil — and  this  is  surely 

»  For  example,  in  the  Philosophic  des  Rechts.    See  below,  Sec.  115. 


470         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

the  most  difficult  problem  of  bare  immediacy — one 
would  not  desire  to  linger  for  ever  at  the  stage  of 
immediacy.1  It  is  not  the  province  of  the  Logic  to 
specify  the  given  data,  but  to  supply  a  basis  of  thought 
sufficiently  broad  to  conduct  any  givenness  through 
all  the  details  of  precisely  its  own  dialectic  to  the  end, 
where  its  Begriff  is  seen.  While,  therefore,  the  Logic 
seems  to  have  no  particular  reference  to  real  experience, 
just  because  it  is  dispassionately  general,  it  applies 
to  all  experience  whatsoever.  The  only  danger  is 
that  one  shall  read  into  its  terms  more  than  Hegel 
intended,  and  hence  miss  his  meaning. 

81.  Actuality  is  briefly  definable  as  the  unity  of 
Essence  and  Existenz.  That  is,  formless  Essence  and 
unstable  appearance  are  brought  into  intelligible  shape, 
their  "truth"  is  made  known.  We  have  seen  that 
there  is  one  identical  basis  throughout,  a  totality 
which,  involving  both  inner  and  outer,  we  now  dis- 
cover to  be  absolute.  The  term  "absolute"  as  here 
used  has  little  significance  for  our  present  purposes. 
In  a  sense,  the  entire  logical  movement  is  the  ex- 
position of  the  absolute.  But  what  is  meant  by  the 
term  in  the  larger  sense  the  sequel  must  show;  here 
the  term  means  little  save  the  bare  identity  of  the 
totality  which  occupies  us  all  along.  It  is  rather  the 
content  of  the  absolute  that  now  concerns  us,  not  the 
mere  identity  of  form;  and  this  content  is  actuality.3 
Actuality  is  not  the  total  absolute,  but  its  manifes- 
tation. It  belongs  on  a  higher  level,  however,  than 
Existenz:  for  actuality  manifests  itself,  it  really  is 
in  its  manifestation,  its  own  externality.4  More 

1  With  reference  to  Hegel's  recognition  of  evil,  see  below,  Sec. 

"5- 

2  Op.  cit.,  p.  178.  *  P.  187.  4  P.  194. 


Supplementary  Essay  47  * 

explicitly,  it  is  actual  as  contrasted  with  possibility. 
The  reference  of  actuality  and  possibility  to  each 
other  constitutes  a  third,  namely,  necessity.  In  the 
first  place,  actuality  is  immediate,  unreflected.  From 
the  point  of  view  of  its  implicitness  it  is,  however, 
already  possible.  Actuality  is  the  reflected  unity 
of  itself  and  possibility.  •  Possibility  is  not  yet  all 
actuality,  for  of  real  and  absolute  actuality  it  is  not 
yet  a  question.  All  we  are  entitled  to  say  is,  all  that 
is  possible  in  general  has  Being  or  Existenz.1 

82.  This  unity  of  actuality  and  possibility  is  con- 
tingency (Zufdlligkeit).     The  contingent  is  an  actual 
that  is  determined  as  only  possible,  whose  other  or 
opposite  is  equally  possible.     This  actuality  is  there- 
fore mere  Being  or  Existenz.     Yet  it  is  posited  in  its 
truth,  and  shown  to  possess  the  value  of  explicitness. 
On  the  other  hand,  possibility  regarded  as  reflection  - 
into-itself,  or  as  implicit,  is  posited  as  explicit:  what 
is  possible  is  actual  in  this  sense  of  actuality,  it  pos- 
sesses only  the  value  of  contingent  actuality,  is  itself 
contingent.     The  contingent  is  thus  found  to  possess 
two  aspects.     In   so  far  as  it  immediately  contains 
possibility  it  is  not  in  a  state  of  explicitness,  is  un- 
mediate  actuality,  has  no  ground.2     Hence  even  the 
actual  is  to  be  characterised  as  contingent,  groundless. 
In   the   Enclycopedia    Hegel    says,   "The  contingent, 
roughly  speaking,  is  what  has  the  ground  of  its  being, 
not   in    itself,    but   in   somewhat   else."3     McTaggart 
explains,    "contingency  consists  in  explanation  from 
the   outside. '  4 

83.  The  contingent  has  no  ground  in  so  far  as  it  is 
contingent.     But  it  also  has  a  ground  precisely  because 

»  p.  198.  2P.  199. 

»  Sec.  145,  note.  «  Heg.  Dial.,  p.  66. 


472          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

it  is  contingent,  must  have  a  basis  for  its  occurrence. 
Whatever  happens  has  Seyn,  for  it  exists,  is  thus  far 
no  mere  possibility  but  is  actual,  cannot  be  undone. 
To  trace  it  to  its  ground  is  therefore  to  discover  that 
in  a  sense  it  was  necessary.  The  possibility  of  a  thing 
is  the  determinate  manifoldness  of  the  circumstances. 
Necessity,  then,  is  at  first  regarded  as  relative,  since 
it  starts  with  the  contingent.  The  merely  necessary 
is  merely  because  it  is,  it  has  as  yet  no  condition  or 
ground.1  It  is  not  until  we  pass  to  absolute  necessity 
that  we  discover  the  truth  and  unity  of  actuality  and 
possibility.  In  short,  contingency  is  an  aspect  of  the 
dialectic  until  the  higher  stage  of  the  absolute  relation 
is  attained. 

84.  It  might  seem  paradoxical  to  characterise  con- 
tingency as  that  which  is  groundless  yet  possesses  a 
ground.  But  contingency  regarded  as  groundless 
pertains  to  the  immediate,  to  Existenz,  is  purely 
external.  To  regard  it  as  possessing  a  ground  is  to 
pass  to  the  actuality  in  question,  hence  to  pass  beyond 
the  immediate.  Contingency  is  the  most  external 
aspect  of  things;  it  stands  for  the  attempt  to  explain 
things  precisely  as  they  appear.  Hence  this  category 
is  representative,  first  of  all,  of  the  givenness  of  things, 
their  Eocistenz.  Under  this  head  are  to  be  classified 
not  only  the  ordinary  aspects  of  things  as  at  first 
apprehended,  but  the  most  contradictory  and  ap- 
parently alien  items  of  human  experience.  All  such 
items  are  to  be  taken  at  first  precisely  as  they  appear, 
even  though  they  seem  to  be  utterly  irrational.  For 
only  by  frankly  admitting  the  irrationality  of  things 
may  we  hope  to  prove  their  essential  rationality. 
The  merely  given  is,  as  such,  irrational;  and  the  only 

i  Werke,  iv.,  208. 


Supplementary  Essay  473 

explanation  that  can  be  offered  for  it — when  viewed 
from  the  outside,  as  immediate — is  a  contingent 
explanation,  a  statement  of  its  irrationality.  Our 
whole  concept  of  immediacy  is,  then,  a  concept  of  the 
irrational;  and  we  undertook  this  long  and  minute 
inquiry  in  order  to  bring  immediacy  into  view  in  its 
own  unrationalised  aspects.  The  element  of  irration- 
ality which  we  started  out  to  find  we  have  had  with  us 
all  along.  It  was  not  an  element  produced  by  reason, 
but  .reason,  face  to  face  with  it,  given  it — given  its 
own  existence,  too, — has  been  seeking  to  organise  it 
by  first  permitting  it  to  make  its  characteristics  known. 
85.  We  shall  find  reason,  after  a  consideration 
of  the  Idea,  to  distinguish  between  contingency  and 
immediacy — for  we  are  to  have  immediacy  with  us 
to  the  end,  but  not  Existenz,  not  Zufdlligkeit — hence 
we  shall  be  able  to  differentiate  irrationality  more 
sharply.1  But  already  we  are  so  far  anticipating  as 
to  point  out  that  immediacy  (as  Existenz)  is  contingent, 
the  irrational,  in  comparison  with  Wirklichkeit.  As 
immediacy  is  in  general  a  first  way  of  taking  things, 
and  as  things  vary  in  apparent  independence,  ob- 
viously there  are  grades  of  irrationality.  We  are 
unable  to  mediate,  hence  to  grade  the  various  imme- 
diacies, until  we  reach  the  point  in  the  dialectic  where 
Existenz  fully  gives  place  to  Actuality.  We  then  see 
more  and  more  clearly  the  empirical  character  of 
immediacy,  and  learn  that  by  the  term  Wirklichkeit 
Hegel  does  not  mean  things  as  they  ordinarily  appear, 
but  their  significant  totality  as  they  exist  for  highly 
mediate  thinking.  As  men  of  affairs  we  are  interested 
in  tangible  things.  As  men  of  science  we  seek  their 
rationality.  Hence  it  is  Actuality  which  brings  us 

1  See  below,  Sec.  119. 


474          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

in  sight  of  our  goal.  From  the  point  of  view  of  Ac- 
tuality we  can  say  unqualifiedly,  What  is  actual  is 
rational,  for  we  know  that  it  forms  part  of  one  system. 
86.  By  the  term  "actual,"  then,  Hegel  means, 
4 '  not  what  is  at  any  time  found  existing,  but  the  under- 
lying spirit  by  which  the  movement  of  history  is  carried 
on.  It  is  the  business  of  ethics  to  bring  this  clearly 
to  light."1  The  concept  of  actuality  is  hard-won. 
The  long  dialectic  which  leads  up  to  it  is  needed 
to  make  the  demonstration  complete.  The  dialectic 
which  went  before  is  no  less  important  than  that  which 
follows;  for  the  rational  is  such  only  in  contrast  with 
the  irrational.  The  rational  is  progressively  dis- 
covered amidst  the  given ;  it  is  a  conclusion,  established 
by  a  series  of  progressive  inferences,  that  the  ultimate 
principle  of  the  universe  is  rational.  If  in  a  certain 
sense  Reason  is  at  last  discovered  to  have  been  the 
underlying  principle  which  gave  appearances  their 
connection,  it  by  no  means  follows  that  Reason  is  an 
immediate.  The  Reason  which  is  discovered  at  the 
close  of  the  Logic  (as  implicit  from  the  start),  is  the 
essential,  or  universal.  But  one  cannot  deduce  par- 
ticular occurrences  from  this  principle.  The  particular 
is  always  the  given ;  as  such  it  belongs  to  the  category  of 
Being.  The  universal  is  discovered  by  reflection ;  hence 
it  belongs  to  the  category  of  interpretation,  the  Idea. 
No  logic  of  the  Idea  would  be  complete  which  should 
fail  to  reserve  a  permanent  place  for  the  appar- 
ent; hence  even  the  category  of  the  contingent  is 
permanently  significant.  The  universal  is,  therefore 
from  first  to  last  a  concrete  universal,  with  respect  to 
the  particulars  which  at  once  supply  the  necessary 
content  and  the  contrast  by  virtue  of  which  it  is  in 

1  Mackenzie,  Manual  of  Ethics,  p.  284,  note. 


Supplementary  Essay  475 

very  truth  seen  to  be  the  universal.  The  universal 
is  a  selective  principle  which  explains  the  unessentials 
left  behind  as  irrelevant  and  assimilates  the  particulars 
which  give  it  content.  It  no  more  absorbs  or  denies 
the  data  which  gave  it  content  than  it  assumes  to 
have  created  the  immediacies  which  give  fulness  to 
the  essential.  Hence  the  concept  of  the  immediate 
in  general,  of  the  contingent  in  particular,  and  of  the 
irrational  as  opposed  to  actuality,  is  germane  to  the 
system. 

87.  There  are  two  ways,  then,  of  taking  immediacy: 
(i)  it  may  represent  that  which  is  accepted  as  it  ap- 
pears to  be,  and  (2)  it  may  be  regarded  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  dialectic  form  which  assimilates  it. 
Taken  in  the  former  sense,  it  is  specifically  characterised 
by  Hegel  as  the  contingent.  That  is,  as  Kuno  Fischer 
explains, 

the  contingent  belongs  to  the  realm  of  external  actuality, 
it  pertains  to  the  surfaces  of  things,  which  refer  to  one  an- 
other externally,  and  affect  one  another  contingently.  .  .  . 
Such  an  occurrence  has  no  inner  ground;  hence  the  con- 
tingent is  groundless.  Since,  however,  nothing  happens 
without  a  ground  every  chance  or  happening  has  its 
ground.  It  arises  out  of  the  connection  of  things.  l 

Hegel  says  in  the  Encyclopedia:  "An  important  step 
has  been  taken,  when  we  cease  in  our  thinking  to  use 
phrases  like:  Of  course  something  else  is  also  possible. 
While  we  so  speak,  we  are  still  tainted  with  contin- 
gency; and  all  true  thinking,  we  have  already  said, 
is  a  thinking  of  necessity."2  Again,  wrhen  expounding 
Existenz,  he  says,  "  In  this  motley  play  of  the  world, 
if  we  may  so  call  the  sum  of  existent s,  there  is  nowhere 

1  Hegel's  Leben  Werke  u-nd  Lehre,  ii.,  519. 

2  Sec.  119,  Wallace's  trans.,  p.  222. 


476          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

a  firm  footing  to  be  found :  everything  bears  an  aspect 
of  relativity,  conditioned  by  and  conditioning  some- 
thing else."1 

88.  In  connection  with  a  reference  to  Plato  and 
Aristotle,  Hegel  mentions  "the  vulgar  conception  of 
actuality  which  mistakes  for  it  what  is  palpable  and 
directly  obvious  to  the  senses";  whereas  philosophic 
actuality  is  the  Idea.2  Finally,  the  exposition  in  the 
Encyclopedia  reaches  the  point  we  have  attained  in 
the  Logic: 

Whether  a  thing  is  possible  or  impossible,  depends  al- 
together upon  the  subject-matter;  that  is,  on  the  total 
elements  in  actuality,  which,  as  it  opens  out,  discloses 
itself  to  be  necessity.  .  .  .  When  .  .  .  valued  at  the  rate 
of  mere  possibility,  the  actual  is  Contingent  or  Acciden- 
tal, and  conversely,  possibility  is  mere  Accident  itself, 
or  Chance.3 

Hegel  believes  it  to  be  the  province  of  science  to 
overcome  "the  actuality  which  first  comes  before 
consciousness,  and  which  is  often  mistaken  for  Wirk- 
lichkeit,  "just  as  it  is  the  end  of  action  to  rise  above 
the  Zufdlligkeit  des  W aliens  oder  der  Wilkiir."  In 
what  follows  he  gives  abundant  recognition  to  the 
contingency  so  often  admired  in  nature,  "a  contin- 
gency losing  itself  in  vagueness."  He  then  discusses 
contingency  in  the  inner  world,  and  contrasts  the 
opinion,  will,  caprice,  and  arbitrary  humour  of  man 
with  the  decrees  of  God,  which  express  necessity  and 
are  superior  to  accident  from  within  and  from  without. 
The  contingent  is  contrasted  with  the  personality  of 
man  as  something  "not  to  be  denied  or  nullified"  but 

1  Ibid.,  Sec.  123,  note;  Wallace,  p.  231. 

2  Ibid.,  Sec.  142,  note;  Wallace,  p.  259. 

3  Sec.  143,  note;  Wallace,  p.  262. 


Supplementary  Essay  477 

to  be  "preserved."  "No  doubt,"  says  Hegel,  "there 
is  much  chance  in  what  befalls  us.  This  chance  ele- 
ment is  grounded  in  the  naturality  of  man."  These 
passages  speak  for  themselves,  and  go  far  towards  elu- 
cidating the  less  explicit  statements  of  the  Logic. 1 

VI 

89.  Now  that  we  have  made  the  dialectic  transi- 
tion into  Actuality,  and  discovered  that  immediacy 
as  such  is  the  irrational,  we  might  pass  at  once  to  the 
consideration  of  evidences  of  the  irrational  in  other 
parts  of  the  system.  But  in  order  to  make  our  demon- 
stration complete  it  is  necessary  briefly  to  examine 
the  Begriff.  This  is  necessary  for  two  reasons:  we 
have  seen  that  what  immediacy  is,  is  to  be  known  in 
its  fulness  only  through  insight  into  its  meaning; 
and  the  impression  is  prevalent  that  the  end  of  the 
Logic  is  the  same  as  the  beginning.  It  might  seem 
that,  however  much  Hegel  has  said  regarding  con- 
tingency, all  this  is  a  mere  "concession"  to  finite 
thought,  and  is  presently  to  be  "overcome"  by  the 
Idea. 

Now,  this  is  a  far  more  shallow  opinion  than  any 
we  have  considered,  and  hardly  need  be  examined  in 
detail.  We  have  already  intimated  that  the  place 
assigned  to  the  irrational  is  permanently  significant, 
that  the  transition  from  Existenz  to  Actuality  is 
profoundly  important  to  the  end.  To  understand 
this  transition  is  to  admit  the  main  point  for  which 
we  are  contending,  hence  to  see  precisely  why  the 
end  cannot  be  merely  what  the  beginning  was.  Yet, 
having  considered  the  existential  portion  of  the 


I*    V    AAAtj  V^V^iJ-WJAVJ-V^X  X^V-i.  V.L.A.V  \_^».JLVJ  VN^AA  VAU**  k. 

»  See  op.  cit.,  Sec.  147,  note;  Wallace,  p.  267  ff. 


478          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

dialectic,  it  behooves  us  to  turn  to  the  interpretative. 
Only  by  understanding  the  rational,  the  actual,  may 
one  truly  understand  the  irrational,  the  existential. 
We  beg  leave,  then,  to  give  still  further  attention 
to  wearisome  detail,  with  the  prospect  before  us  that 
complete  demonstration  is  to  be  our  reward. 

90.  We  have  warned  the  reader  not  to  see  too  much 
in  Hegel's  beginning.     We  must  now  warn  him  against 
attributing  too  many  absorbing  powers  to  the  Begrifj. 
"  The  true  meaning  of  the  Begriff, "  says  Stirling,  "must 
be  seen  into;  and  he  who  understands  Hegel's  Begrifj 
understands   Hegel."1      "What  the  character  of  the 
Begrifj  is,"   says   Hegel,    "can  as  little  be  conveyed 
immediately  as  the  conception  of  any  other  object."  2 
The  Begrifj  is  a  result,  yet  it  is  far  more.     Seyn  and 
Wesen  have  not  only   "gone  over  into  it,"   but  are 
therein  "contained,"  "preserved."     Regarded  as  hav- 
ing "gone  over,"  Being  and  Essence  are  of  course  no 
longer  merely  Seyn  and  Wesen:  but  they  retain  their 
essential  places  in  the  organic  unity.     To  illustrate, 
Hegel  devotes  considerable  space  to  an  analysis  of 
"Substance,"  and  he  is  free  to  acknowledge  the  place 
it  holds  in  Spinoza's  system.     But  the  reality  which 
the    conception    stands    for   he    carries    forward    and 
restates  from  a  higher  point  of  view. 

91.  Such -a   statement  as  Harris's  concerning  the 
Begriff,  namely,  that  if  Hegel  had  called  it  "person  or 
personality"  at  the  outset  "the  student  would  have 
seen  the  drift  of  the  entire  system,"   is  exceedingly 
misleading. 3     Hegel    does    indeed    use    the    term    in 
reference  to  the  ego,4  and  then  he  makes  an  acute 
analysis  of  the  Kantian  significance  of  the  term  as 

1  The  Secret  of  Hegel,  p.  52.  2  Werke,  v.,  5. 

3  Hegel's  Logic,  p.  349-  *  Op.  cit.,  p.  13. 


Supplementary  Essay  479 

applied  to  the  transcendental  unity  of  apperception. 
One  may  very  well,  he  holds,  speak  of  the  Begrif)  of  the 
ego,  and  refer  to  the  ego  as  possessing  Begriffe.  But 
these  meanings  of  the  term  are  only  partial.1  Being 
and  Essence  are  in  general  the  larger  moments  of 
approach.  We  are  concerned  not  alone  with  the  act 
of  self-consciousness,  not  with  the  subjective  under- 
standing alone,  but  with  the  Begriff  (in-and-f or- itself ), 
which  includes  both  the  Spirit  and  Nature.2  Not  until 
we  pass  forward  to  the  Idea  are  we  entitled  to  say  what 
the  Begriff  is.  We  shall  then  see  how  superficial  is 
Shadworth  Hodgson's  classification  of  the  Logic  as 
"the  psychology  of  that  vast  self-conscious  mind 
(Begriff)  into  which  he  [Hegel]  imagines  he  has  re- 
solved the  universe."3  And  we  shall  be  surprised 
that  an  Hegelian  could  speak  of  the  Logic  as  "psy- 
chological ontology."4 

92.  To  allege  that  the  Begriff  is  a  mere  "notion," 
as  much  as  to  say,  "There  is  far  more  in  the  real  world 
of  sensible  objects  than  your  abstract  concepts  take 
into  account,"  is  once  more  to  miss  the  point.     To 
allege  that  the  fleeting  and  superficial  appearance  of 
things  is  the  important  consideration,   is  to  neglect 
the  comprehensive  insight  which  reveals  the  reality 
of  the  sensibly  presented.5     The  Begriff  is  precisely 
a  seizing  (begriffen)  of  the  reality  of  the  directly  given. 
Yet  although  Anschauung  conditions  the   Begriff,   it 
is  now  a  question  of  the  truth,  not  of  the  natural 
history.6 

93.  There   is   much   important  detail   in   the   dis- 
cussion of  the  Begriff  which  we  must  pass  by,  with 

»P.  16.  a  P.  19. 

3  The  Metaph.  of  Exper.,  i.,  pref.,  x. 

4  Harris,  Hegel's  Logic,  p.  44. 

«  Werke,  v.,  p.  20.  *P.  21. 


480         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

the  remark  that  it  tends  to  confirm  our  conclusions, 
notably  the  sections  devoted  to  formal  logic.  1  It  is 
clear  that  much  depends  on  Hegel's  theory  of  the 
judgment,  and  the  place  assigned  to  the  particular  and 
the  universal.2  Hegel's  insight  into  the  fundamental 
character  of  the  judgment  lies  at  the  root  of  our  in- 
quiry. We  have  found  him  ready  to  admit  the  ex- 
istential immediacy  of  the  given.  Hence  for  him  the 
existential  judgment  is  fundamental.  But  when  the 
devotee  of  immediacy  of  whatever  type  tries  to  enter 
the  world  of  exact  thinking  with  either  his  particular 
or  his  general  immediacy,  and  put  it  forward  as  if  it 
were  complete  in  itself  and  untampered  with,  Hegel 
remorselessly  exposes  the  tacit  mediation  and  shows 
that  there  is  no  true  universal.  He  shows  that  there 
is  judgment  from  the  start.  Simply  to  judge  that  a 
psychosis  is,  is  already  to  begin  to  reconstruct.  What 
seems  like  a  priori  formalism  in  Hegel  is  an  explication 
of  the  process  which  we  are  constantly  employing 
when  we  consider  the  immediate.  He  is  exhibiting 
to  thought,  as  well  as  to  feeling,  its  own  unsuspected 
wealth.  He  is  not  attempting  to  impose  the  syllogism 
on  the  world,  and  deduce  all  nature's  content  there- 
from. He  discovers  that  nature  and  thought  exhibit 
the  same  principle.  Nature  has  an  evolution.  Man, 
in  relation  to  nature,  observes,  collects  data,  and  in- 
ductively reconstructs  what  he  has  perceived.  Hence 
it  is  natural  that  the  dialectic  should  make  explicit 
the  laws  and  resemblances.  To  understand  what 
Hegel  means  by  induction,  is  to  have  a  direct  clue 
to  the  significance  of  immediacy. 

» Op.  tit.,  p.  63  ff. 

2  On  Hegel's    theory  of  the  universal,  see  Royce,  Spirit  of  Mod- 
Philos.,  p.  493  ff. 


Supplementary  Essay  481 

94.  Passing  by  the  instructive  section  devoted 
to  Objectivity,  where  the  familiar  determinations  of 
immediacy  are  still  more  fully  exemplified,  we  turn 
to  a  brief  consideration  of  the  Idea,  the  adequate 
Be  griff.  The  highest  kind  of  Actuality  belongs  under 
this  head.  1  Anything  that  possesses  truth  has  it  in 
so  far  as  it  is  Idea.  The  actuality  or  truth  is  not  some 
far-off,  unapproachable  thing,  remaining  jenseits:  but 
everything  possesses  actuality  by  virtue  of  the  Idea. 
The  objective  and  subjective  world  is  not  merely  con- 
gruent with  the  Idea,  but  is  itself  the  congruence  of  the 
Be  griff  and  reality.  Any  reality  which  did  not  corre- 
spond with  the  Be  griff  would  be  appearance,  con- 
tingent. If  it  should  be  said  that  there  is  nothing  in 
experience  which  is  completely  congruent  with  the 
Idea,  that  would  be  to  set  up  a  subjective  standard 
over  against  actuality.  What  sort  of  thing  anything 
actual  would  be  which  should  not  have  the  Begriff 
in  it,  would  be  impossible  to  say,  because  there  is 
no  such  thing.  The  mechanical  and  chemical  ob- 
jects, likewise  the  spiritless  subject,  do  not  possess 
their  particular  characteristics  through  their  own  free 
forms;  but  contain  something  true  only  so  far  as  they 
are  the  union  of  the  Begriff  and  reality.  Otherwise 
they  would,  as  it  were,  be  bodies  without  souls.  The 
whole,  the  state,  the  church— if  the  unity  of  their 
Begriff  with  reality  is  resolved,  thereby  cease  to 
exist.  Yea,  the  Spirit  itself,  were  it  not  the  Idea, 
were  dead,  a  mere  material  object.2  Thus  explicitly 
is  the  Idea  linked  with  the  concrete.  Finite  things 
are  finite  in  so  far  as  they  do  not  possess  the  reality 
of  the  Begriff  completely  an  ihnen  selbst,  but  re- 
quire an  other,  to  be  complete.  The  highest  point 

i  Op.  dt.,  p.  231.  8  P.  232. 

31 


482         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

which  they  can    attain,  as    finite,    is    external    pur- 
posiveness. 

95.  The  absolute  Idea  is  in  the  stricter  sense  of 
the  word  the  object  and  content  of  philosophy,  since 
it   is   the   essence   and   contains   all   determinateness. 
The  logical  method  of  regarding  the  Idea  is  the  univer- 
sal method  in  which  all  particulars  are  revealed.     The 
determinateness  of  the  Idea,  and    the    whole  course 
of    this    determinateness,    constitutes    the    object    of 
logical  science.     Regarded  entirely  as  form,  the  Idea 
is  strictly  universal.     Hence  in  this  last  stage  of  the 
inquiry  we  are  no  longer  concerned  with  the  content 
as  such,  but  with  the  universal  of  the  form  of  the  Idea, 
that  is,  with  the  method,  the  final  form  of  the  logical 
immediate. 

96.  Hegel  refers  back  to  the  whole  course  of  the 
logical  Idea,   "wherein  all  forms  of  a  given  content 
were  present."     It  is  no  longer  a  question  of  "ex- 
ternal  and   contingent   determinations,"    but   of   far 
higher  truth.     Object  is  no  longer  set  over  against 
subject  in  an  external  sort  of  way.     "Die  Methode  ist 
daraus  als  der  sick  selbst  wissende,  sick  als  das  Absolute, 
sowokl  subjective  als  objective,  zum  Gegenstande  kabende 
Begriff,  somit  als  das  reine  Entsprecken  des  Begriffs 
und  seiner  Realitat  .  .  .  kervorgegangen. ' ' l 

97.  It   is  this   peculiar   phraseology,   wherein  the 
Begriff  is  well-nigh  personified,  and   the  method  said 
to    "know  itself,"  that   so  easily  permits  of  misin- 
terpretation.    Unless  one   bear  in  mind  the   precise 
limitations   of   the   whole    inquiry,    and   the    specific 
character  of  its  beginnings,  one  may  charge  Hegel  with 
the  reduction  of  every  determination  to  an  artificial 
type  of  "pure  thought,"  as  if  thought,  method,  and 

» P.  320. 


Supplementary  Essay  483 

logician  were  identical.  The  difficulty  is  in  part  due 
to  the  fact  that  as  the  dialectic  draws  to  a  close  there 
is  less  distinction  between  the  nature  of  the  dialectic, 
the  nature  of  the  self  and  the  Absolute.  Yet  the 
fact  that  there  is  intimate  relationship  is  no  reason 
for  concluding  that  there  is  absorption  or  identification. 

98.  Already  in  the  Phenomenology,  the  preliminary 
inquiry  began  with  consciousness,  and  a  way  was 
sought  whereby  the  fundamental  category  of  con- 
sciousness could  be  mediated  in  ultimate  terms.1  It 
is  reasonable  to  expect  the  type  of  ultimate  knowledge 
to  be  found  in  self -consciousness,  inasmuch  as  the 
Phenomenology  showed  that  to  be  the  highest  type 
of  experience.  There  was,  then,  an  intimate  con- 
nection with  the  self  in  the  presupposition  wherewith 
the  Logic  began.  In  a  sense  we  have  been  defining 
the  self  and  the  Absolute  all  along.  The  logician 
is  precisely  such  a  self  as  to  have  this  categorising 
experience.  The  same  Essence  resides  in  him,  in  his 
logical  processes,  in  nature,  and  in  the  ultimate  Ground 
of  all.  The  dialectic  exhibits  that  Essence  in  its  de- 
velopment from  simple  to  complex.  But  that  de- 
velopment involves  both  nature  and  inner  human 
experience,  both  the  dialectic  movement  and  the  life 
of  the  Absolute.  What  is  more  natural,  then,  than 
this  gradual  drawing  together  at  the  end — when  the 
external  as  such  is  behind — of  the  various  determina- 
tions that  are  well-nigh  indistinguishable?  For  did 
we  not  explicitly  start  out  to  observe  the  activities 
of  immediacy,  while  permitting  the  concept  to  exhibit 
its  own  immanent  dialectic?  We  agreed  to  isolate 
it,  as  if  it  had  an  independent  life.  But  as  we  pro- 
ceeded we  were  compelled  to  point  out  its  limitations. 

»  Werke,  ii.t  71;  see  above,  Sec.   19. 


484         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

We  now  continue  the  work  of  mediation  still 
further. 

99.  By  the  term  "  method  "  Hegel  means,  in  general, 
the  entire  movement  of  the  Begriff,  whose  immanent 
life  is  absolute  self-activity,  self-determining  and  self- 
realising.  Hence  the  method  is  without  qualification 
universal.  As  completely  infinite  power,  this  activity 
meets  no  object  that  can  withstand  it,  that  is,  no 
object  remains  external  to  it,  as  merely  immediate. 
The  method  is  therefore  the  "soul  and  substance," 
and  nothing  is  to  be  comprehended  in  its  truth  except 
as  completely  subject  to  the  method.  Here  we  have 
the  true  significance  of  its  universality.  Here,  too, 
we  have  not  only  the  absolute  power  of  reason,  but 
its  highest  and  most  individual  tendency  (Trieb), 
namely,  through  itself  to  find  and  cognise  itself  in  all 
things.1 

The  method  is  constituted  by  the  determinations 
and  references  of  the  Begriff,  and  it  consists,  first  of 
all,  as  we  have  seen,  in  starting  with  the  immediate. 
Since  the  Logic  starts  at  the  beginning,  its  content 
is  an  immediate  such  that  it  has  the  meaning  and 
form  of  abstract  universality.  Be  it  a  content  either 
of  Being,  Essence,  or  the  Begriff,  it  is  so  far  received, 
found,  postulated  as  the  immediate  (Aufgenommenes, 
Vorgefundenes,  Assertorisches) ,  and  all  this  in  the  sense 
of  an  unmediate  of  thought,  that  is,  "simple";  whereas 
if  it  were  an  object  of  sensuous  intuition  it  would  be 
manifold,  individual.2  The  immediate  as  thought 

»P.  321. 

2  The  best  that  Hegel  could  do  in  the  Phenomenology  was  to 
differentiate  the  one  psychic  instant  amidst  a  psychically  immediate 
manifold;  but  thought  starts  with  the  simplicity  of  the  immediate 
as  such,  disregards  the  psychic  singleness,  and  considers  the  general 
character  of  immediacy  in  all  moments. 


Supplementary  Essay  485 

regards  it,  then,  has  first  the  significance  of  Being  in 
abstract  self-reference  (requiring  no  derivation  other 
than  the  one  which  the  Logic  gives  it),  and  is  so  poor 
"an  sick'1  that  there  is  scarcely  anything  to  sublate.1 
Literally,  the  universal  itself  is  this  immediate,  since 
as  abstract  it  is  just  this  abstract  self-reference  which 
Being  is.  (Thus  we  learn  more  definitely  that  im- 
mediacy is  in  an  abstract  sense  the  universal  wherewith 
all  logical  thinking  necessarily  begins.  It  was  not, 
after  all,  the  mere  presentness  of  psychic  immediacy 
which  was  so  important;  but  the  fact  that  in  the 
givenness  of  the  immediate  there  was  already  implied 
the  great  treasure  which  philosophers  go  out  to  seek — 
the  universal.  Hence  the  Logic  began,  not  merely  with 
particularity,  but  already  with  universality,  the  first 
proposition  concerning  which  was,  It  is.)  It  was 
first  a  question  of  the  form  of  the  beginning,  then  of 
its  determinateness.  The  credentials  of  the  content 
seemed  to  lie  behind  it;  as  matter  of  fact,  its  authen- 
ticity lay  in  the  forth-going. 

100.  Thus  we  begin  to  see  the  complete  meaning 
of  the  movement  from  immediacy  which  for  the  dia- 
lectic is  so  important.  The  "consciousness  of  the 
Begriff,"  its  method,  begins  in  a  formal,  external 
reflection.  Since  the  form  is  objective,  the  immediacy 
of  the  beginning  (an  ihm)  is  defective,  endowed  with 
a  desire  to  press  on.  The  universal  wherewith  the 
movement  begins  is  not  the  mere  abstraction  it  seemed 
to  be,  but  is  already  the  ''object-universal."  That  is, 
it  is  implicitly  (an  sich)  concrete  totality;  although 
not  yet  explicit,  nor  yet  set  forth  as  what  it  really 
is  (fur  sich).  Even  the  predicate  "einfache"  must  be 
qualified,  for  the  universal  as  abstract  is  already 

'  7.  e.,  to  transmute,  p.  323. 


486          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

postulated  as  possessing  a  negation.  There  is,  then, 
says  Hegel,  neither  in  actuality  nor  in  thought  any 
such  "Einf  aches"  or  " Abstractes " \  such  a  "Simple" 
is  a  mere  meaning — for  purposes  of  logical  abstraction. 
What  is  meant  by  the  immediacy  of  the  universal 
is  the  implicitness  without  the  explicitness. 

Hegel  is  ready  to  admit,  then,  that  every  beginning 
must  be  made  with  the  Absolute,  just  as  all  advance 
is  only  exposition  of  the  same.  Yet  he  is  obliged 
explicitly  to  qualify,  inasmuch  as  the  implicitness  is 
merely  an  abstract,  one-sided  moment;  hence  not  the 
Absolute,  not  the  explicit  Begriff,  not  the  Idea.  The 
advance  (forth -going)  is  not  a  kind  of  "overflow." 
It  might  be  this  were  the  beginning  already  the  Ab- 
solute in  the  complete  sense  of  the  term.  The  advance 
consists  rather  in  this,  that  the  universal  determines 
itself,  and  seeks  to  become  explicit  (fiir  sick  das  All- 
gemeine):  only  in  its  completion  is  it  the  Absolute.1 

All  this  in  Hegel's  clearest  language  is  highly  im- 
portant. For  him,  the  Absolute — hence  the  im- 
mediacy of  the  logical  beginning — is  not  a  "First" 
in  Plotinus's  sense  of  the  term — a  "One"  from  whose 
fulness  an  "overflow"  occurs  which  is  indifferent  to 
it  and  adds  nothing  to  reality;  and  from  which  there 
must  be  an  escape  (that  is,  from  the  world  caused  by 
the  overflow)  by  an  ecstasy  in  which  all  mediation 
has  been  transcended.  For  firstness  in  this  sense 
there  is  no  place  in  the  Hegelian  system.  There  is 
genuine  need  of  mediation  of  the  first  immediate. 
The  return  to  union  with  the  immediate  is  not  mystical, 
but  is  analytically  intelligible  in  the  highest  degree. 
The  Absolute  is  obviously  such  that  whatever  came 
out  of  it  could  have  come  forth — an  Absolute  which 

'P.  3*5. 


Supplementary  Essay  487 

makes  experience  and  knowledge  possible,  a  real 
Universal.  But  this  is  only  "  ansichseyende"  possi- 
bility as  compared  with  that  which  comes  forth. 
The  concept  of  immediacy  is  therefore  cleared  of  any 
possible  misconception  at  both  ends  of  the  line. 

A  mere  overflow  would  imply  a  sort  of  accidental, 
superfluous  activity,  in  which  the  Absolute  had  no 
purposive  part.  But  for  Hegel  the  Absolute  is  chiefly 
made  through  its  forth-going.  What  that  advance 
from  implicitness  to  explicitness  means  it  is  the  prov- 
ince of  the  Idea  to  show.  Hence  a  reference  is  already 
implied  beyond  the  mere  formality  of  the  dialectic 
to  the  Absolute  as  actual  Being.  And  when  we  pause 
to  ask  what  that  Being  is,  there  is  no  excuse  for  falling 
back  on  mere  immediacy,  for  we  are  already  in  pos- 
session of  a  highly  mediate  result. 

10 1.  In  order  finally  to  estimate  and  classify  the 
logical  immediate,  we  turn  now  to  the  more  minute 
account  of  the  method,  and  gradually  approach  the 
point  where  even  the  method  must  be  sublated,  when 
it  passes  into  "system."  This  is  one  of  the  most 
important  transitions  in  the  dialectic. 

Briefly  outlined,  the  progress  of  the  dialectic  is  as 
follows:  A  universal  First  is  considered  in  and  for 
itself  as  the  other  of  itself.1  Thus  universally  re- 
garded, the  immediacy  therein  involved  may  be  taken 
as  a  mediate  referring  to  an  other.  The  Second  is 
the  negative  of  the  First,  the  first  negative.  The  im- 
mediate is  thus  negatively  regarded  as  having  gone 
over  into  the  other.  The  other  is  not  a  mere  (leere) 
negative,  but  is  the  other  of  the  First.  It  is  also 
determined  as  mediate.  As  thus  determined,  it  con- 
tains the  negative,  but  retains  and  preserves  the 

*  Ibid.,  p.  330. 


488          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

determination  of  the  First.  That  is,  even  in  the  first 
observation  regarding  immediacy  we  begin  to  take 
it  as  the  other  of  itself.  We  then  take  this  other  in 
a  mediate  sense,  and  regard  it  as  the  second  stage  of 
the  dialectic.  The  "other"  is  the  negative  of  the 
immediate,  but  explicitly  as  containing  its  determina- 
tion, not  as  mere  negation.  Hence  we  are  entitled 
to  restate  it  positively.  We  do  not  then  lose  im- 
mediacy, but  immediacy  itself  becomes  mediate  as 
soon  as  we  regard  it.  Well  may  Hegel  say  that  the 
positive  held  fast  in  its  negative,  the  result  (the  con- 
tent of  the  presupposition),  is  "the  most  important 
step  in  rational  cognition." 

In  the  second  stage,  then,  the  mediate  becomes  in 
turn  an  immediate  and  passes  into  the  third  stage 
in  which  the  truth  of  the  contrast,  the  contradiction, 
is  made  explicit.  The  negative  is  not  an  "other"  in 
an  indifferent  sense;  else  were  it  no  true  other.  It  is 
the  other  of  an  other.  Thereby  it  includes  its  own  other 
in  itself.  The  negativity  constitutes  the  turning  of 
the  movement  of  the  dialectic;  it  is  the  innermost 
spring  of  all  activity,  the  dialectic  "soul"  which  con- 
tains all  truth.  For  on  this  alone  rests  the  subla- 
tion  (transmutation)  of  the  antithesis  between  the 
Be  griff  and  reality. 

102.  At  this  turning-point  in  the  method,  the 
course  of  cognition  returns  into  itself.  This  second 
immediacy  is  in  the  whole  course  of  the  dialectic  the 
third  to  the  first  immediacy,  and  to  the  mediation. 
Since  the  result  is  unity,  the  whole  form  of  the  triple 
method  is  in  a  sense  superficial  and  external.1  The 
reference  to  numbers  is  not  the  fundamental  con- 
sideration. While  the  dialectic  is  passing  through 

1  P.  334- 


Supplementary  Essay  489 

the  threefold  form,  there  is  still  a  truth  that  is  more 
"inner."  The  truth  is  found  in  the  total  dialectic 
(as  we  began  to  see  when  Hegel's  account  passed  from 
Existenz  to  Actuality) .  To  stop  at  the  first  immediacy 
is  surely  not  to  possess  the  truth.  To  attain  the  second 
stage  is  to  be  nearer.  When  the  dialectic  passes  to 
the  third  stage  in  the  final  movement  we  at  last  see 
the  law  of  the  threefold  form.  To  possess  the  whole 
truth  is  to  comprehend  the  unity  which  the  entire 
dialectic  expresses.  This  truth  is  as  much  immediacy 
as  mediation.1  For  it  is  the  Begrif),  and  we  have  seen 
that  this  is  the  comprehending  Idea  which  possesses 
truth  without  externality.  Hence  the  immediacy  as 
we  have  previously  regarded  it  is  now  completely 
assimilated  into  a  unity  where  the  full  truth  of  the 
former  alleged  independency  is  seen.  The  method 
all  along  remained  the  same  up  to  this  point.  Thought 
all  along  started  with  the  given.  But  now  we 
are  able  to  point  to  the  result  as  derived  and 
proved. 

103.  The  method  broadens  through  this  important 
result  into  a  system.2  Hegel  now  throws  new  light 
on  the  immediacy  of  the  beginning,  which  we  regarded 
as  if  it  were  as  independent  and  indeterminate  as  it 
claimed  to  be.  The  determinateness  which  the  dia- 
lectic has  been  developing  now  "denounces"  as  "in- 
complete" the  beginning  as  at  first  regarded.  Since 
the  beginning  when  compared  with  the  determinate- 
ness  proves  to  be  determined,  it  was  not  strictly 
speaking  immediate,  but  already  derived  and  mediate. 3 
For  the  method  it  is  indeed  matter  of  indifference 
that  the  beginning  must  thus  be  negated,  whether 
the  determinateness  appertain  to  form  or  to  content. 

1P.  335-  *P.  336.  *P.  337- 


490          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

But  from  the  point  of  view  of  system,  the  conclusions 
we  are  now  reaching  are  highly  important. 

It  is  not  the  contentlessness,  the  alleged  indetermi- 
nateness  of  the  beginning  which  constitutes  it  abso- 
lute. No  sooner  did  we  regard  that  most  abstract 
of  all  moments  than  it  proved  to  have  determinateness 
with  respect  to  its  own  first  moment,  previously  deemed 
indeterminate.  If  the  beginning  had  no  content, 
thought  could  not  begin  with  it.  The  barest  im- 
mediate, then,  which  pure  thought  was  able  to  dis- 
cover proves  to  have  possessed  content.  Hence  it 
was  not  strictly  speaking  an  original  but  a  derived 
moment.  Therefore  it  must  be  accounted  for.  But 
Hegel  had  already  accounted  for  it  in  this  its  largest 
sense  by  his  references  to  the  Phenomenology,  which 
gave  us  the  clue  to  all  the  considerations  with  which 
this  discussion  was  at  the  outset  concerned.  We 
stated  explicitly  that  in  the  Logic  he  was  abstracting 
from  the  immediate-mediate  and  regarding  it  for  di- 
alectic purposes  as  if  it  were  a  "leere"  "reine"  im- 
mediate. We  also  warned  the  reader  that  we  could 
not  explain  this  until  the  last.1 

104.  The  first  discovery  about  the  beginning,  then, 
told  us  something  about  the  alleged  indeterminate 
first  moment,  and  we  learned  that  it  was  not  really 
indeterminate.  We  then  developed  the  implied 
wealth,  and  proceeded  with  the  dialectic.  So  much 
for  the  method.  But  in  another  sense  of  the  inquiry 
we  were  constantly  returning  to  the  first  immediacy, 
and  learning  more  about  it,  when  viewed  in  the  to- 
tality of  its  relationships.  This  totality  is  a  far  more 
comprehensive  consideration  than  simply  the  steps 
of  the  method.  This  totality  is  system.  To  find  a 

'  See  above,  Sec.  48  ft. 


Supplementary  Essay  491 

way  to  interpret  this  totality  was  really  our  interest 
at  the  outset.  We  found  a  way  to  make  the  absolute 
beginning  for  methodological  purposes.  But  we  omit- 
ted considerations  which  pointed  beyond  the  method. 

The  beginning  was  in  simplest  determinateness ; 
the  succeeding  moments  brought  richer  determina- 
tions into  view,  and  carried  them  forward  so  that 
nothing  was  lost  but  everything  was  borne  along 
enriched.1  This  enlargement  may  be  regarded  as  the 
moment  of  the  content,  and  in  the  whole  as  the  first 
premise.  The  universal  is  communicated  in  the 
kingdom  of  the  content,  is  immediately  preserved  in 
it.  The  enrichment  proceeds  through  the  necessity 
of  the  Begrifj;  each  new  step  of  the  outgoing  is  also 
an  ingoing;  the  greater  extension  is  the  higher  in- 
tension. The  wealthiest  result  is  at  the  same  time 
the  most  concrete  and  the  most  subjective.  The 
highest  point  attained  is  pure  personality,  which, 
through  the  Absolute,  comprehends  and  contains  all 
in  itself. 

Each  step  of  the  forth -going  is  a  further  determina- 
tion, more  removed  from  the  beginning,  yet  in  a  sense 
a  nearer  approach  to  it,  since  the  dialectic  is  a  pro- 
gressive discovery  of  the  ground  of  the  beginning. 
The  method  moves  in  a  circle  from  the  complete  to  the 
complete,  yet  cannot  anticipate  the  truth  that  the 
beginning  is  already  as  such  derived.  For  purposes 
of  logical  science,  the  beginning  was  the  indeterminate 
immediate,  the  simple  universal.  Hence  the  start 
was  provisional.  But  in  the  end,  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  totality,  we  discover  that  there  was 
nothing  provisional.  The  beginning  was  incomplete, 
because  it  was  the  beginning.  But  this  incompleteness 

iOp.cit.,p.  339, 


492          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

was  essential;  the  truth  is  to  be  won  only  through 
the  negativity  of  immediacy.  In  reality  our  science 
is  a  circle  of  circles  which  includes  all  sciences,  the 
ground  of  the  presuppositions  of  the  special  sciences. 
Thus  the  Logic  returns  in  the  absolute  Idea  to  the 
unity  which  is  its  beginning.  Pure  Being  is  now 
understood  through  the  Idea;  but  it  is  now  "filled" 
Being,  concrete.  Absolute  science  now  possesses  its 
complete  Begriff.  In  the  Idea  of  absolute  cognition 
it  comes  to  its  content  in  the  largest  sense.1  It  is 
the  pure  Begriff  which  has  itself  for  object,  which 
penetrates  the  totality  of  its  determinations. 

105.  There  is  a  profound  sense,  then,  in  which 
the  immediate  persists  throughout.  The  real  Being 
implied  in  the  beginning  was  far  more  than  was  then 
clear,  was  more  intimately  connected  with  experience 
than  was  apparent.  What  we  sought  was  the  Idea 
of  all  experience.  We  suspected  that  the  truth  was 
obtainable  only  through  knowledge  of  the  whole. 
But  we  agreed  to  take  each  determination  for  what 
it  appeared  to  be.  Therefore  we  began  with  the  most 
elementary  category  and  followed  its  implications 
to  the  end.  Our  method  gradually  changed  from 
analysis,  in  so  far  as  analysis  proved  to  pertain  to 
appearances  only.  The  seemingly  detached  imme- 
diate lost  its  independence  only  to  reveal  its  higher 
truth  in  the  third  or  synthetic  stage  of  the  dialectic. 
Every  new  " third"  proved  to  be  a  fresh  starting- 
point  until  it  became  clear  that  Werden  (transition) 
ihust  itself  be  sublated,  or  the  process  would  be 
infinite.  While,  then  the  meaning  of  the  first  imme- 
diate was  found  only  through  transition,  the  sig- 
nificance of  transition  was  discovered  through  the 

1  Ibid.,  p.  342. 


Supplementary  Essay  493 

abiding,  the  actual.  The  immediate  as  such  was 
only  an  element,  a  moment.  But  the  final  truth  is 
no  moment,  nor  is  it  a  mere  collection  of  moments  or 
elements.  The  endeavour  to  give  immediacy  in  its 
abstract  form  liberty  to  be  its  own  independent  self 
was  confessedly  a  device  of  external  reflection.  But 
reflection  itself  is  no  device;  it  is  a  living  activity 
which,  when  complete,  is  as  much  inner  as  outer,  for 
there  is  no  longer  any  unmediated  item.  Only  the 
Idea  is  really  independent.  But  the  Idea  is  no  mere 
immediate.  Nor  is  pure  mediation  to  be  identified 
with  the  Idea.  It  is  the  third,  mediate-immediate, 
stage  which  comprehends  the  totality  of  actuality, 
that  pertains  essentially  to  the  Idea.  Thus,  although 
the  Idea  was  in  a  sense  implied  from  the  first,  what 
it  is  can  be  understood  only  through  this  highest 
synthesis  at  the  end  where  the  total  wealth  gained 
along  the  way  is  made  explicit. 

1 06.  To  insist  that  the  immediacy  of  the  end  of  the 
Logic  is  the  same  as  that  of  its  beginning  would  be  to 
miss  the  significance  of  immediacy  from  first  to  last. 
If  the  end  added  nothing,  the  one  identical  content 
of  the  dialectic  would  be,  either  like  the  First  of  the 
Neo-Platonic  system,  the  differenceless  unity  of  the 
I dentitdts system — and  this  we  have  shown  to  be 
essentially  different  from  the  Hegelian  conception,— 
or  an  all-sufficient  Thought  which  deduces  all  con- 
tent out  of  itself  in  a  way  that  renders  all  induction 
superfluous.  In  either  case,  the  alleged  differences 
which  " flowed  out"  from,  or  were  produced  out  of 
the  One,  would  be  illusions;  there  would  be  no  additive 
mediation.  But  in  the  Hegelian  system  it  is  precisely 
the  additive  determinations  that  are  of  most  worth 
That  is,  it  is  the  dialectic  with  its  criticism  and 


494         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

development  of  the  immediate,  its  transition  into  Act- 
uality, and  its  profound  principle  of  negation,  which 
at  last  brings  us  into  possession  of  the  Idea  with  its 
highly  differentiated  totality. 

107.  Hegel's  return,  at  the  close  of  the  Phenom- 
enology, and  again  in  the  Logic,  is  not  a  mystical 
union,  not  a  relapse  or  "collapse."  The  differences 
are  not  overcome  or  "destroyed."  These  differences 
remain,  in  the  first  place,  to  give  meaning  to  Existenz, 
as  a  subordinate  category;  and  in  the  second  place, 
to  give  content  to  Actuality,  hence  to  the  Idea. 
What  is  overcome  is  the  antithesis  of  subject  and 
object  which,  so  long  as  the  dialectic  remains  below 
the  stage  of  Actuality,  sunders  things  in  their  im- 
mediacy from  the  Idea.  The  antitheses  which  keep 
the  significance  of  objects  from  being  discerned  must 
of  course  be  sublated.  But  if  the  differences  were 
"swallowed  up,"  as  the  English  Hegelians  carelessly 
say,  the  Idea  would  be  meaningless.  The  immediate 
of  the  end  of  the  Logic  is  no  longer  the  dialectically 
experimental  immediacy  of  the  beginning — the  unwon, 
the  independent,  the  merely  existential.  At  the 
end,  the  Wander jahre  of  thought  are  over  and  the 
systematic  period  has  begun.  The  limitations  of 
the  detached,  the  finite,  the  simply  presented,  are  seen 
once  for  all.  The  door  is  closed  into  the  sort  of  pure- 
thought  world  in  which  the  dialectic  is  supposed  to 
move.  Thought  has  been  shown  to  be  dependent 
upon  the  givenness  which  first  supplies  it  with  content. 
But  that  givenness  is  now  seen  to  be  akin  to  the  me- 
diation which  makes  it  explicit,  hence  what  remains 
is  the  mediate-immediate.  The  truth  is  immanent 
in  the  net-work  of  relativities  which,  when  regarded 
merely  as  appearances,  seem  so  perplexing.  There 


Supplementary  Essay  495 

is  no  other  than  this  immediate  world  and  it  were 
futile  to  seek  another.  That  world  seems  wholly 
contingent  at  first,  if  not  irrational;  and  the  plain 
man  explains  it  contingently.  Contingent  or  ir- 
rational it  will  always  seem  from  external  points  of 
view,  as  a  mass  of  fragments,  appearances.  The  Idea 
recognises  this  result  as  part  of  its  meaning,  when 
it  stands  over  against  the  world,  still  seeking  that 
meaning.  But  the  Idea  finds  that  meaning  in  deepest 
truth  only  when  it  learns  at  last  through  much  toiling 
that  the  rationale  of  the  world  is  its  own  self. 

If  by  a  sudden  insight  one  recognises  that  the  Idea 
at  the  end  is  the  Idea  implied  in  the  beginning,  this 
insight  marks  a  great  advance,  namely,  to  the  higher 
stage  of  reflection  which  was  entered  at  the  level  of 
Actuality.  The  transition  from  method  to  system  is 
by  no  means  a  denial  of  the  validity  of  the  method, 
but  the  discovery  of  the  rich  content  which  has  now 
raised  itself  into  intelligible  totality.  However  quick 
the  insight  is,  it  is  the  work  of  logic,  the  compelling 
power  of  reason;  not  a  "feeling"  that  this  is  true, 
not  a  popular  "intuition."  It  would  be  strange 
indeed  if  one  should  "  feel"  any  great  sense  of  kinship 
with  the  Idea,  beyond  that  which  cool  logic  involves. 
For  the  Idea  is  not  as  the  Logic  exhibits  it  the  com- 
plete Absolute,  the  entire  God  of  truth  and  reality. 
It  is  once  more  a  "new  immediate,"  demanding 
further  mediation.  It  is  an  immediate  in  the  sense 
of  system,  a  completely  rational  whole.  As  thus 
differentiated  it  is  the  starting-point  of  other  inquiries. 
The  reference  is  forward,  not  back.  Having  com- 
pleted this  the  logically  absolute  science,  it  remains 
to  develop  the  other  divisions  of  the  system,  the  science 
of  nature,  and  the  philosophy  of  Spirit. 


496          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

The  Idea  regarded  as  logical  is  still  in  a  measure 
subjective,  shut  into  the  realm  of  thought,  howbeit 
that  realm  is  the  sphere  of  the  divine  Begriff.1  Since 
the  Idea  is  thus  "  eingeschlossen"  it  still  possesses 
desire  (Trieb)  to  sublate  this  its  subjectivity  and  be- 
come explicitly  what  it  is  implicitly,  "the  beginning 
of  another  sphere  and  science."  The  Idea  is  therefore 
to  be  regarded  in  another  guise  as  nature;  not  as  a 
totality  which  has  become  (ein  Gewordenseyn) ,  or  a 
mere  transition,  but  as  an  objectivity  which  the  Idea 
freely  permits  itself  to  possess,  while  still  remaining 
secure  within  itself.  The  point  of  view  of  freedom, 
resolve  (Entschluss)  carries  our  inquiry  forward  to  the 
philosophy  of  Spirit.  The  Idea  once  more  seems 
well-nigh  personal.  There  is  no  determination  above 
or  beyond;  else  were  this  not  the  absolute  science; 
else  were  philosophy  not  higher  than  religion.  But 
having  attained  the  highest  logical  form,  it  remains 
for  other  sciences  to  complete  the  logical  content  of  this 
all-sufficient  form;  and  by  the  same  method  made 
more  concrete,  that  is,  by  beginning  with  the  imme- 
diate, the  particular  facts.  Hence  the  Logic  proceeds 
as  far  as  it  properly  can  and  as  properly  comes  to  a 
close. 

1 08.  Only  in  a  very  slight  sense,  then,  is  the  end 
of  the  Logic  the  same  as  the  beginning.  The  dialectic 
has  steadily  advanced  to  the  higher  stage  of  (syn- 
thetic) immediacy.  Such  immediacy  refers  back  to 
the  immediacies  of  the  Phenomenology  and  the  En- 
cyclopedia, since  it  has  been  found  impossible  to  deny 
the  original  source  of  logical  content;  and,  further, 
because  the  Logic  seeks  to  include  all  the  determinations 
of  reality.  But  the  synthetic  type  is  by  no  means 

» Ibid.,  p.  342. 


Supplementary  Essay  497 

identical,  let  us  repeat,  with  the  existential  type.  In 
the  latter  determination,  there  was  an  express  interest 
in  "mere,"  hence  in  external,  immediacy.  But  the 
subtle  mediations  of  the  preliminary  inquiries,  and  of 
the  Logic,  forbid  a  return  to  the  immediate  merely 
as  immediate;  for  no  such  immediacy,  devoid  of 
mediating  judgments,  has  been  found  to  exist.  Yet 
this  by  no  means  precludes  the  reference  to  immediacy 
as  experienced.  As  matter  of  fact,  the  dialectic  ends 
with  a  reference  to  immediacy  as  experienced,  namely, 
to  the  world  of  nature,  which  is  first  to  be  regarded 
as  external,  contingent. 

Moreover,  the  transition  from  method  to  system 
showed  that  the  profounder  bearings  of  the  immediacy 
of  the  beginning  of  the  Logic  had  been  ignored,  that 
there  really  was  no  such  one-sided  immediate.  There 
was,  however,  a  deeper  implication  present,  namely, 
a  genuine  First,  the  Idea.  Inasmuch  as  what  the 
Idea  proves  to  be  it  must  already  have  been  poten- 
tially, there  is  a  sense  in  which  the  beginning  is  the 
same  as  the  end ;  and  it  would  be  strange  if  there  were 
not  an  identity  of  this  sort.  For  there  is  one  and  the 
same  system  throughout.  Unless  the  circuit  were 
complete,  the  demonstration  would  not  be  absolute. 
One  must  recognise  in  the  end  the  truth  one  meant 
in  the  beginning.  Yet,  having  said  thus  much,  there 
is  nothing  more  to  admit,  and  there  is  nothing  dama- 
ging in  this  admission. 

Therefore  the  critic  who  insists  that  the  end  is 
identical  with  the  beginning,  without  understanding 
in  precisely  what  sense  the  term  identity  is  used  by 
Hegel,  will  miss  the  point.  The  notion  of  identity 
does  not  carry  us  far.  As  opposed  to  contradiction, 
identity  is  merely  the  characteristic  of  the  simple 


498          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

immediate.  Contradiction,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the 
source  of  activity  and  life;  only  so  far  as  anything 
has  contradiction  in  itself  is  it  vital,  capable  of  going 
forth  into  productive  movement.  It  is  negativity, 
not  identity,  which  reveals  the  truth.  It  has  been 
established  that  first  immediates,  whether  of  thought 
or  of  feeling,  whether  postulates  or  not,  are  a§  such 
untrue.  The  true  point  of  view  is  retrospective  (medi- 
ate-immediacy), comprehending  the  whole.  The  iden- 
tity that  survives  criticism  is  implied,  preserved,  in  the 
discovery  that  the  negativity  has  not  destroyed  the 
reality  of  the  first  immediate  but  has  positively  as- 
similated it,  in  true  form.  From  the  third  moment 
back  to  the  mere  first  there  is  no  return.  The  firstness 
which  "  reine  Unmittelbarkeit  "  meant  to  be,  the  reality 
of  the  third  stage  is.  There  has  been  great  gain,  and 
no, genuine  loss.  The  true  immediate  has  at  last  been 
won.  There  is  no  other,  no  beyond,  no  externality 
that  has  not  been  overcome — so  far  as  the  logical 
principle  is  concerned.  But  the  erstwhile  abstruse 
dialectic  of  Being  and  Nothing  retains  its  profound 
meaning  to  the  end.  The  demonstration  is  absolute. 
As  thus  proving  itself  to  be  complete,  the  Idea  looks 
forward  rather  than  back  to  that  which  is  to  furnish 
verification  in  detail.  Out  from  the  height  now  at- 
tained there  proceed,  as  it  were,  various  lines  of  refer- 
ence, each  of  which  exemplifies  the  Idea  according 
to  the  principles  of  the  dialectic.  One  who  has  under- 
stood thus  far  can  hardly  misunderstand  the  remain- 
der of  the  system. 

VII 

109.     Doubtless  in  our  eagerness  to  bring  forward 
the  neglected  concept  of  immediacy,  and  to  defend 


Supplementary  Essay  499 

Hegel,  the  exposition  has  distorted  the  dialectic. 
Imperfect  at  best,  immediacy  is  put  in  an  unfortunate 
position  by  separate  treatment,  especially  since  the 
great  lesson  of  a  specific  study  of  it  is  that  it  cannot 
be  understood  alone.  But  if  the  importance  of  the 
concept  be  clear,  the  leading  point  has  been  gained. 
For  it  is  plain,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  critics  of 
Hegel  have  for  the  most  part  failed  to  take  the  signifi- 
cance of  immediacy  into  account.  Hence  their  con- 
clusions need  revision  from  first  to  last.  In  the  second 
place,  it  is  plain  that  we  are  in  possession  of  the  clue 
to  the  understanding  of  "pure  thought,"  and  other 
apparently  ambiguous  principles,  elements  and  cate- 
gories of  the  system.  It  is  clear,  for  example,  (i) 
that  the  dialectic  is  dependent  upon  material  supplied 
by  experience;  (2)  the  initial  clues  of  the  dialectic 
are  discovered  by  analysis  of  presented  experience; 

(3)  the  central  clue,  namely,  the  conception  of  absolute 
science,   is   found   by  means  of  this  initial  analysis; 

(4)  the  universal  through  which  all  particulars  are 
mediated  is  an  implied  necessary  condition  of  mediating 
experience;    (5)    the  empirical  particulars  are  always 
essential  to  the  mediating  universal,  under  wrhich  they 
are  subsumed,  even  when  it  is  no  longer  a  question  of 
Existenz ;   (6)   particular  facts,  historical  events,   and 
particular  persons  are  not  deducible  from  the  Logic,  but 
must  always  be  given  in  and  by  experience,  by  real 
history;    (7)   inductions  from  experience   will   always 
have  their  place,  inasmuch  as  the  particulars  of  future 
experience  are  not  deducible  from  "  pure  thought " ;   (8) 
empirical  deductions  based  upon  the  immediate,  the 
given,  the  contingent,  the  irrational,  are  of  permanent 
importance  for  the  dialectic;    (9)  the  Idea  is  itself  a 
development  of  inductions  based  upon  the  mediation 


500         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

of  experience,  as  given,  and  is  not  an  existential  but  an 
interpretative  principle,  not  all-producing  but  all- 
explaining;  and  (10)  the  Logic  is  only  the  "pure 
thought"  of  a  system,  is  incomplete,  hence  must  be 
understood  in  relation  to  other  parts  of  the  system. 

no.  Heretofore,  our  investigation  has  been  mainly 
morphological,  and  we  have  been  concerned  with  the 
Logic  and  its  presupposition.  We  may  now  branch 
out  somewhat  freely  in  general  interpretation  of  the 
element  of  irrationality,  and  make  use  of  data  dis- 
covered outside  of  the  Logic.  The  reasons  for  this 
will  become  plain  as  we  proceed. 

in.  One  of  the  chief  points  gained  by  our  sum- 
mary of  the  meanings  of  immediacy  that  bear  upon 
the  nature  of  the  Idea  is  the  additional  light  thrown 
upon  the  nature  of  pure  thought.  Guided  by  this 
insight,  we  have  been  enabled  to  refer  again  to  the 
beginnings  of  the  Logic  and  discover  precisely  what 
Hegel  meant  by  his  formal  beginning.  But  that  dis- 
covery was  a  further  justification  of  our  reference 
to  the  empirical  analysis  of  the  Phenomenology.  Hence 
we  learned  by  contrast  what  Hegel  meant  by  the 
"pure  thought"  of  immediacy,  also  that  a  certain 
ambiguity  lurked  in  the  use  of  the  term  in  the  Logic. 
(i)  It  is  a  decidedly  empirical  concept  and  was 
developed,  in  the  first  place,  by  analysis  of  given, 
conscious  experience;  and  it  is  empirical  throughout, 
particularly  when  Existenz  is  under  consideration. 
But  (2)  the  character  of  Hegel's  discussion  precluded 
him  from  developing  all  the  bearings  of  immediacy, 
for  in  the  Logic  he  could  be  concerned  only  with  the 
pure-thought  aspects  of  even  this  empirical  concept. 
Plainly,  one  must  take  into  explicit  account  what  is 
meant  by  immediacy  in  these  its  purest  aspects,  in  order 


Supplementary  Essay  501 

to  be  prepared  to  consider  outside  of  the  Logic  the 
bearings  of  the  concepts  which  do  not  specifically 
belong  within  it.  Already  in  our  study  of  contingency 
we  have  found  concrete  references  to  the  contingent 
in  the  empirical  sense  of  the  term,  hence  we  are  in 
sight  of  the  fuller  significance  of  the  element  of  irra- 
tionality. But  having  now  pursued  the  pure-thought 
aspect  of  our  concept  to  the  end,  and  found  its  rela- 
tionship to  the  Idea,  we  are  in  a  position  to  refer 
beyond  the  Logic  to  other  parts  of  the  system. 

Already  in  noting  the  transition  from  Existenz  to 
Actuality  we  came  in  sight  of  the  notion  of  system.1 
The  significance  of  the  transition  was  in  fact  the  change 
from  particularity  to  law,  meaning.  Our  summary 
of  the  idea  brought  out  the  larger  meanings  of  system, 
but  to  a  large  extent  pointed  forward.  It  is  important 
to  notice  these  larger  implications  for  two  reasons. 
In  the  first  place,  we  clearly  see  what  questions  can  be 
settled  by  reference  to  the  Logic,  as  containing  the  pure 
thought  of  whatever  principle  may  be  in  question. 
Hence  it  becomes  clear  that  some  of  the  objections  made 
to  the  Logic  do  not  apply.  In  the  second  place,  we 
discover  the  references  which  must  be  traced  beyond 
the  Logic,  in  order  fully  to  understand  what  Hegel 
means.  It  would  be  unfair,  then,  to  estimate  Hegel's 
treatment  of  the  irrational  solely  by  reference  to  the 
Logic.  While  the  Logic  in  a  sense  stands  by  itself, 
Hegel's  system  is  so  closely  wrought  that  only  by 
reference  to  the  system  at  large  can  one  be  sure  one 
possesses  his  complete  meaning.  That  this  is  a  just 
observation  has  already  been  shown  in  part  by  our 
references  to  the  Phenomenology  and  the  Encyclopedia. 
It  will  become  more  apparent  when  we  refer  beyond 

i  Sec.  78. 


502          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

the  Logic  in  search  of  other  evidences  that  Hegel's 
doctrine  involves  an  element  of  irrationality. 

112.  In  our  references  beyond  the  Logic  we  are 
not,  be  it  noted,  passing  beyond  the  Idea.    The  Idea 
regarded  as  essentially  concrete  includes  the  totality 
of  things,  refers  to  all  things.     The  Idea  -is  not  all 
things;  for,  as  we  have  seen,  the  unessential  belongs 
to  mere  Existenz,  not  to  significant  actuality,  and  we 
are  soon  to  see  that  there  are  other  discarded  contin- 
gencies.   Nothing  can  exist  wholly  devoid  of  the  Idea,1 
yet  some  things  can  be  relatively  separate.    The  Idea 
is  the  profound  truth  of  the  whole,  the  unity  or  system, 
in  contrast  with  the  apparent  actuality  and  truth  of 
detached  things.    The  more  acquainted  we  are  with  the 
finite  wealth  the  better  prepared  are  we  to  grasp  the 
Idea.    The  Logic  has  made  plain  the  form  under  which 
immediacy  is  to  be  reflected  as  a  concept,  it  has  shown 
the  types  of  the  immediate,  and  the  dialectic  structure 
of  its  contingencies.    Hence  it  has  supplied  us  with  the 
pure  Idea  of  the  irrational,  with  its  specific  universe  of 
discourse.     But  in  order  to  grasp  the  pure  or  formal 
element  in  detail,  we  must  follow  the  references  of  the 
pure-thought    element   into   the   realm   of   the    more 
explicitly  concrete,  there  to  learn  how  Hegel  applies 
his  dialectic. 

113.  Before  we  turn,  however,  to  other  parts  of 
the  system  it  is  well  to  remind  ourselves  that  Hegel  has 
been  attacked  at  this  point  too.    For  there  are  those 
who,   while   admitting   the   validity  of    the  dialectic 
within  its  own  field,  nevertheless  maintain  that  Hegel 
has  undertaken  to  deduce  the  worlds  of  Nature  and 
Spirit  from  the  pure  thought  of  the  Logic.    It  is  hardly 

»  Ency.,  Sec.  213. 


Supplementary  Essay  503 

necessary  to  examine  this  criticism,  for  we  have  dis- 
carded the  interpretation  of  pure  thought  on  which 
it  rests.  The  "  pure  thought"  of  Hegel's  Logic  is  never 
divorced  from  reality,  but  involves  as  much  reference 
to  it  from  the  beginning  as  is  compatible  with  the 
character  of  the  dialectic  at  its  various  stages,  cul- 
minating in  Existenz,  in  the  first  place,  and  in  the  Idea, 
in  the  second.  The  fact  that  such  thought  is  confessedly 
an  abstraction  implies  the  existence  of  the  remainder 
of  reality,  not  for  the  moment  included,  but  reserved 
for  consideration  at  the  proper  point.  An  immediate 
element  persists  to  the  end  and  is  never  reduced  to 
mere  thought.  Hegel  makes  no  attempt  to  dispense 
with  sentient  reality  and  substitute  another  source  of 
content  for  pure  thought.  From  pure  thought,  general 
considerations  can  alone  be  deduced.  To  obtain 
particulars,  it  is  necessary  to  refer  to  experience. 
Hence  Hegel  is  justified  in  completing  by  means  of  more 
concrete  inquiries  that  which  can  be  considered  only 
in  the  most  general  way  in  the  Logic.  1 

Caird  justifies  the  transition  to  Nature  at  the  end  of 
the  Logic  as  an  exemplification  of  the  Hegelian  method, 
namely,  the  step  from  an  imperfect  conception  to  its 
opposite : 

«  McTaggart  has  minutely  examined  the  objections  which  have 
been  made  regarding  the  transition  to  Nature  and  Spirit,  and  ad- 
mirably justified  Hegel's  position  (Hegel.  Dial.,  p.  55  ff.,  in  refuta- 
tion of  Seth,  and  p.  1 14  ff.).  Seth  most  unwarrantably  thinks  that 
Hegel  has  made  a  deliberate  attempt  at  the  close  of  the  Logic  to 
11  deduce  Nature  from  the  logical  Idea."  It  is  the  characteristic, 
he  holds,  "of  an  absolute  philosophy  that  everything  must  be  de- 
duced or  constructed  as  a  necessity  of  thought.  Hegel's  system, 
accordingly,  is  so  framed  as  to  elude  the  necessity  of  resting  any- 
where on  mere  fact.  .  .  .  The  concrete  existence  of  the  categories 
(in  Nature  and  Spirit)  is  to  be  deduced  from  their  essence  or  thought- 
nature.  " — Hegelianism  and  Personality,  pp.  113,  115,  117. 


504          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

In  truth  we  cannot  separate  the  pure  unity  of  self-con- 
sciousness from  its  correlate,  the  world  in  space  and  time. 
.  .  .  Either  the  whole  conception  of  the  nature  of  thought 
as  it  is  expressed  in  the  Hegelian  logic  must  be  rejected, 
or  this  step  must  be  taken  as  one  of  the  most  luminous 
and  natural  illustrations  of  it.  ...  This  greatest  of  all 
antagonisms  cannot  be  understood  except  as  based  upon 
a  still  more  complex  and  concrete  unity,  .  .  .  the  con- 
sciousness of  God.1 

114.  As  we  turn,  then,  to  other  parts  of  the  system, 
we  may  also  remind  ourselves  that  it  is  these  specific 
portions  of  Hegel's  doctrine,  notably  the  Philosophy 
of  History  and  the  History  of  Philosophy,  which  have 
given  rise  to  the  opinions  regarding  the  whole  system 
to  which  we  referred  at  the  outset.     Observing  that 
Hegel  connects  the  course  of  history  with  the  pro- 
gressive development  of  the  categories,  and  noticing 
that  there  is  a  discrepancy  between  real  history  and  the 
order   of   the    Hegelian    categories,    the   critics   have 
inferred  that  Hegel  attempted  to  deduce  the  actual 
order  of  events  from  the  world  of  pure  a  priori  thought. 
Now,  in  the  light  of  our  investigation  we  have  seen  that 
it  is  unfair  to  judge  the  Hegelian  dialectic  by  particular 
parts  of  the  system,   instead  of  studying  the  much 
neglected  Logic,  where  the  distinction  between  Exis- 
tenz  and  Wirklichkeit  is   made  plain.     On   the   other 
hand,  it  is  to   these  portions  of  the  system  that  we 
turn  for  light  on  specific  aspects  of  irrationality,  for 
example,  the  nature  of  evil,  on  which  the  Logic  throws 
light  only  in  the  most  general  sort  of  way. 

115.  We  may    illustrate,    in    the    first    place,    by 
a  brief  reference   to   the  Philosophy  of  Right,  where 
abundant  evidence  is  found  of  the  recognition  given 

1  Evolution  of  Theology  in  the  Greek  Phil.,  ii.,  246-248. 


"Supplementary  Essay  505 

to  contingency,  hence  to  immediacy  as  irrationality. 
We  note,  in  passing,  Hegel's  complaint  of  his  age  that 
"Theories  now  set  themselves  in  opposition  to  reality, 
and  make  as  though  they  were  absolutely  true  and 
necessary."1  As  opposed  to  this  kind  of  pure- thought 
or  a  priori  procedure,  Hegel  declares  that  "  Philosophy, 
as  the  thought  of  the  world,  does  not  appear  until 
reality  has  completed  its  formative  process,  and  made 
itself  ready."2  The  ethical  inquiry  proper  begins  with 
the  conception  of  freedom,  and  becomes  significant 
for  our  purposes  with  the  statement  that  man  possesses 
free-will,  hence  caprice  becomes  possible.3  Caprice  is 
not  freedom  as  Hegel  rationally  regards  it,  but  is 
the  contradiction  of  the  will.  The  content  of  the 
caprice  is  not  formed  by  the  nature  of  the  will  but 
by  contingency.4  It  is  the  man  who  acts  perversely 
who  exhibits  particularity.  In  the  opposition  of  the 
will  lies  the  possibility  of  evil.5  Hence  the  particular 
will,  when  governed  by  caprice,  random  desire,  and 
insight,  is  the  basis  of  wrong.6  The  particular,  inde- 
pendent will  is  indeed  capricious  and  erratic  choice.7 
As  we  should  expect,  then,  wrong  is  "external," 
temporary,  belongs  to  the  domain  of  appearance,  the 
unessential;  whereas  right  pertains  to  the  intrinsi- 
cally universal  will,  to  the  realm  of  actuality.  "  Wrong 
is  the  mere  outer  appearance  of  essence,  giving  itself 
forth  as  independent."8  "It  is  of  the  nature  of  the 
finite  and  particular  to  make  room  for  accidents. 
Collisions  must  occur,  since  we  are  at  the  stage  of  the 
finite."  9 

Once  more,  then,  it  is  the  universal,  the  essential, 

1  Pref.,   xx.,   note,   Eng.   trans.  2  Ibid.,  xxx. 

3  Pp.  11,24.  *P.  26.  s  P.  70.  6P.  85. 

'  P.  86.  «  P.  88.  »  P.  89. 


506          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

which  is  of  primary  concern,  and  Hegel  holds  that 
when  a  man  becomes  rational,  free  in  the  true  sense  of 
the  word,  man  wills  the  right.  For  Hegel,  therefore, 
there  is  no  ultimate  element  of  evil  which  cannot  be 
overcome.  Hence  he  assigns  evil  to  a  lower  grade  of 
reality.  But  this  should  not  blind  us  to  the  fact  of  his 
full  and  frank  admission  of  it,  as  existential,  together 
with  an  explanation  of  its  existence,  and  a  reason 
for  its  being  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Idea.  The 
least  that  one  can  say  of  Hegel's  doctrine  is  that  it  is 
a  typical,  defensible  point  of  view  with  respect  to  evil. 
For  Hegel,'  indeed,  the  entire  conception  of  right 
would  be  impossible  without  the  conception  of  wrong. 
Or,  more  technically,  the  universal  cannot  be  achieved 
without  the  particular.  And  in  the  moral  world  this 
means  that  the  particular  will  may  set  itself  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  universal.1 

Self -consciousness,  affirming  to  be  vanity  all  otherwise 
valid  marks  of  action,  and  itself  consisting  of  pure  inward- 
ness of  will,  may  possibly  convert  the  absolute  principle 
into  mere  caprice.  It  may  make  a  principle  out  of  what  is 
peculiar  to  particularity,  placing  it  over  the  universal,  and 
realising  it  in  action.  This  is  evil. 

That  is,  evil  is  due  to  the  particular  setting  itself 
up  against  the  universal.  The  desires  and  impulses 
in  their  mere  naturalness  are  contingent  and  might 
lead  to  either  good  or  evil.  But  when  the  will  sets 
itself  against  universality  these  tendencies  eventuate 
in  evil.  Thus,  according  to  Hegel,  man  is  evil  both 
by  nature,  or  of  himself,  and  through  reflection  within 
himself.  Evil  in  a  certain  sense  is  a  necessity.  But 
just  this  necessity  becomes  the  possibility  of  good- 

1  P.  133- 


Supplementary  Essay  507 

ness.  There  is  a  respect  in  which  evil  pertains 
even  to  the  Idea,  for  it  is  the  nature  of  the  Idea  to 
find  distinctions  within  itself  and  establish  itself  as 
negative.  If  the  Idea  remained  merely  good  it  would 
be  forever  one-sided,  abstract.  But  having  admitted 
that  evil  bears  reference  to  the  Idea,  Hegel  very  care- 
fully guards  himself  from  attributing  too  great  a  de- 
gree of  reality  to  evil.  After  all,  evil  springs  from  the 
will  of  man.  "  It  is  of  the  nature  of  evil  that  man 
may  will  it,  although  he  is  not  forced  by  necessity 
to  do  so.  "*  Evil  is  that  which  is  to  be  superseded. 
In  short,  Hegel  would  have  its  possibility  and  exist- 
ence fully  recognised,  but  he  insists  that  "we  must 
not  remain  at  this  standpoint,  or  cling  to  the  par- 
ticular as  though  it  in  contrast  with  the  universal 
were  essential."2  Thus  having  acknowledged  a  par- 
ticular case  of  immediacy,  Hegel  is  as  usual  concerned 
to  press  forward  to  the  Idea. 

In  institutions,  states,  and  laws,  as  they  exist  in  the 
world,  Hegel  once  more  recognises  the  contingent 
element.  " Since,"  he  says  "to  constitute  a  thing 
is  to  give  it  outer  reality,  there  may  creep  into  the 
process  a  contingency  due  to  self-will  and  other  ele- 
ments of  particularity."3  "Reason  itself  recognises 
that  contingency,  contradiction,  and  appearance  have 
their  sphere  or  right,  limited  though  it  is,  and  is  not 
at  pains  to  rectify  these  contradictions."4  "This 
contingency  is  itself  necessary.  If  one  were  to  argue 
from  the  presence  of  contingency  that  a  code  of  laws 
was  imperfect,  he  would  overlook  the  fact  that  perfec- 
tion of  such  a  kind  is  not  to  be  attained.  Law  must, 
hence,  be  taken  as  it  stands."  In  the  world  which 
each  of  us  knows  there  is  abundant  imperfection. 

1   P.    137.  2    P.     134.  3   P.    209.  *   P.    211. 


508          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

"Ever  not  quite"  is  the  result  when  we  compare  the 
world  of  things  as  they  are  with  the  world  of  the  Idea. 
At  best,  our  legislation  endlessly  approaches  perfec- 
tion.1 The  essential,  or  ideal,  state  is  indeed  the  march 
of  God  in  the  world.2  When  it  is  a  question  of  the 
ideal,  "  we  must  not  have  in  our  mind  any  particular 
state,  or  particular  institution,  but  must  rather  con- 
template the  Idea,  this  actual  God,  by  itself."  But 
in  the  state  as  found  there  is  caprice,  it  is  "  not  a  work 
of  art.  It  is  in  the  world,  in  the  sphere  of  caprice, 
accident,  and  error."3  It  is  in  spite  of  such  defects 
that  the  philosopher  of  the  Idea  is  enabled  to  discover 
a  perfect  type  towards  which  existent  states  may  be 
said  to  be  tending.  The  state  as  found  is  pre-emi- 
nently individual,  particular.  "  Particularity  belongs 
to  history."  Is  is  only  when  the  Spirit,  transcending 
the  particularity  of  existent  states,  unites  them, 
judges  them,  that  the-  Idea  is  seen. 

If,  then,  all  history  is  particular,  and  it  is  "only 
Spirit  which  presents  itself  as  the  universal  and  effi- 
cient leaven  of  world-history,"4  it  is  clear  that  there 
is  need  of  distinction  from  first  to  last  between  existent 
states  and  the  interpretation  of  such  states  in  terms 
of  an  ideal  not  yet  achieved.  These  explicit  statements 
by  Hegel  give  a  perfectly  definite  basis  of  discrimination 
of  everything  historical,  and  one  wonders  how  Hegel's 
critics  missed  points  so  clear  and  illuminating. 

1 1 6.  The  same  principles  are  made  clear  in  Hegel's 
History  of  Philosophy.  Both  in  his  inaugural  address 
and  in  the  lectures  which  follow,  Hegel  gives  abundant 
recognition  to  the  usual  external  points  of  view,  but 
pleads  for  an  inner  principle  of  interpretation.  Real 
philosophers  have  lived  and  thought,  and  histories 

i  See  p.  213  #.  2  P.    247.  3  p.  247.  4  p.  248. 


Supplementary  Essay  509 

have  been  written  narrating  the  facts  connected  with 
them.  But  thought  has  not  yet  arrived  at  full  con- 
sciousness. Hence  there  is  need  of  another  sort  of 
inquiry.  Accordingly,  Hegel  begins  with  an  exposi- 
tion of  the  historical  point  of  view — the  principle  of 
evolution  whereby  we  have  acquired  what  we  now 
think.  He  treats  the  evolution  of  philosophy  as  the 
history  of  Thought  finding  itself;  Thought  only  exists 
and  is  actual  in  thus  rinding  itself.  By  "Thought" 
Hegel  of  course  means  that  which  is  essential,  the 
rationally  wrought-out  elements  of  eternal  truth. 
The  aim  of  philosophy  is  to  know  this  one  truth  as  the 
immediate  source  from  which  all  else  proceeds.  The 
Idea  and  it  alone  is  truth.1  Here  by  "immediate" 
Hegel  means  the  necessary  potentiality.  It  is  essen- 
tially in  the  nature  of  the  Idea  to  develop,  and  only 
through  development  to  arrive  at  truth.  Both  the 
capacity,  power,  Being-in-itself,  and  the  Being-for- 
itself,  actuality,  are  needed.  Change  inevitably  occurs 
in  the  process  of  development,  yet  the  Idea  remains 
essentially  one  and  the  same.  In  itself  the  Idea  is 
concrete,  for  it  is  the  union  of  the  different  determi- 
nations. The  sequence  of  systems  of  philosophy  in 
history  is  similar  to  the  sequence  in  the  logical  deter- 
mination of  the  Begriff.  To  divest  the  fundamental 
conceptions  of  their  outward  forms  is  to  discover 
the  various  stages  in  the  logical  determinations. 
Hence  from  Hegel's  point  of  view  every  philosophy 
has  been  and  still  is  essentially  necessary,  that  is, 
fundamental  principles  are  retained,  the  most  recent 
philosophy  being  the  result  of  all  preceding.  Hence 
no  philosophy  has  ever  been  refuted. 

Whatever  errors  Hegel  may  have   fallen  into,   in 

i  Werke,  zte.  Aufl.,  xiii.,  32;  Eng.  trans.,  i.,  5,  19. 


5 10         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

his  zeal  to  trace  the  development  of  the  Idea,  as  if 
history  had  really  followed  the  dialectic  stages  of 
his  own  system,  it  is  plain  that  he  is  concerned  with 
the  same  distinctions  which  we  have  so  often  found 
reason  to  emphasise.  That  is,  Hegel  is  concerned 
with  the  essentials  which,  taken  in  their  logical  order, 
constitute  eternal  truth.  Logical  analysis  is  not 
temporal  analysis.  On  the  other  hand,  the  logic  of 
history  must  find  its  data  in  the  world  of  time.  "  Phi- 
losophy begins  where  the  universal  is  comprehended  as 
the  all-bracing  existence,  or  where  the  existence  is  laid 
hold  of  in  a  universal  form,  and  where  thinking  about 
it  commences.  Where,  then,  has  this  occurred?  .  .  . 
That  is  a  question  of  history."1  The  central  principle 
is  this  conceptual  interpretation  of  the  real  history 
of  real  events  and  doctrines,  a  conception  which  has 
borne  remarkable  fruit.2 

117.  Again,  in  the  Philosophy  of  History  Hegel 
begins  with  the  contingently  presented  but  is  once 
more  primarily  interested  in  the  Idea,  which  does  not 
"create"  but  explains  history.  Granted  the  proper 
clue,  he  firmly  believes  that  the  history  of  the  world 
presents  us  with  a  rational  process,  namely,  reason 
is  the  essence  and  truth.  He  admits — notice  this 
admission — that  it  is  only  an  inference  from  the  history 
of  the  world  that  its  development  has  been  a  rational 
process.  Hence  he  holds  that  the  interpretation  of 
history  must  proceed  historically,  empirically;  must 
take  history  as  it  stands,  and  faithfully  study  all  that 
is  historical.  He  by  no  means  denies  the  darker  facts 
of  life,  but  seeks  their  place  in  the  whole,  that  he  may 
set  forth  the  ideal  meaning  of  events,  exhibit  the 

1  Ibid.,  Eng.  trans.,  i.,  94. 

?  Cf.  Windelband,  Gesch,  der  Phil. 


Supplementary  Essay  511 

coherent  rationality  that  obtains,  despite  the  evil  and 
the  strife.  The  history  of  the  world  is  the  record  of  the 
progress  made  in  the  consciousness  of  freedom.  The 
means  which  freedom  uses  are  external  and  phenomenal. 
The  passion  of  man,  the  unreason,  the  vice  and  ruin, 
the  taint  of  corruption — all  this  is  seen  in  a  different 
light  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Idea.  Physical 
nature  plays  its  part  in  this  process.  But  the  corrup- 
tion and  vice  are  not  the  work  of  nature  alone  but  also 
of  the  human  will.  Through  all  this  process  the  Spirit 
is  working  out  the  knowledge  of  what  it  is.  The  Spirit 
is  so  far  dependent  on  man  that  it  needs  his  co-opera- 
tion in  the  widest  sense  of  the  word.  Yea,  the  power 
which  puts  events  in  motion,  and  gives  them  deter- 
minate existence,  is  the  need,  instinct,  inclination, 
passion,  of  men.  Nothing  great  has  been  accomplished 
in  the  world  without  passion.1 

Hegel  is  not  then  concerned  with  the  mere  individual. 
In  the  individual  there  is  much  that  is  disappointing. 
The  forms  which  states  assume  may  be  of  a  limited 
order,  and  consequently  belong  to  the  domain  of 
nature,  hence  subject  to  the  sway  of  chance.  Hegel 
leaves  plenty  of  room  for  the  element  of  chance, 
caprice,  passion.2  The  history  of  man  does  not  begin 
with  a  conscious  aim  of  any  kind.  Man  has  a  real 
capacity  for  change.  But  what  Hegel  is  concerned 
with,  once  more,  is  the  essential  considerations  which 
exhibit  the  constructive  development  of  the  Idea. 
He  gives  abundant  evidence  of  dependence  upon 
historical  data,  and  shows  that  his  judgment  is  more 
or  less  conditioned  by  the  facts  at  his  disposal.3  His 

1  Einleitung,  p.  21  ff.\  Eng.  trans.,  p.   17  ff. 

2  See,  for  example,  Einleitung,  p.  45. 

3  McTaggart  mentions  other  contingent  aspects  of  the  Philosophy 
of  History  in  his  Heg.  Dial.,  pp.  237,  245. 


512          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

own  predilections  are  also  in  evidence  and  certain  of 
his  conclusions  are  decidedly  dogmatic  in  tone.  But 
taken  as  a  whole  his  book  is  an  interpretation  of  pre- 
cisely the  history  which  we  all  know,  with  precisely 
the  general  distinction  we  make  between  the  immediacy 
of  fact  and  the  meaning  of  fact. 

1 1 8.  Yet,    again,    in    the   Philosophy   of   Religion, 
the  same  principles  are  made  clear.    Hegel  points  out 
that  in  the  act  of  knowledge  man  starts  with  the 
organisation  and  order  of  nature  as  something  given; 
the  content  of  his  science  is  a  material  outside  of 
him.    Yet  the  natural  world  regarded  as  merely  exist- 
ing is  contingent,  is  only  appearance;    it  is  when  we 
reflect,  that  nature  is  for  us  Idea.    Hence  to  note  the 
mere  existence  of  nature  is  one  thing;  to  show  the 
necessity  and   meaning  of  nature  is   quite   another.1 
The  development  of  thought  in  the  Logic  is  the  devel- 
opment of  the  universal  element.     "The  development 
of  God  in   Himself  is  consequently  the  same  logical 
necessity  as  that  of  the   universe."  2     But  there  are 
other  ways  of   regarding   the  world.     To    understand 
the  identity  of  reason  in    God    and    in    the  world  is 
to  take  up  a  special  point  of  view. 

119.  But  it  is  the  Naturphilosophie  which  the  critic 
is  most  likely  to  have  in  mind  when  he  insists  that 
Hegel  has  attempted  to  deduce  the  whole  content  of 
thought  from  abstract  concepts.    Space  will  not  permit 
a  detailed  study  of  contingency  in  nature  as  interpreted 
by  Hegel,  but  a  few  references  to  the  literature  of  the 
subject  are  essential.     Hegel  does  not  in  the  Logic 
explicitly  extend  the  study  of  contingency  thus  far. 
But  to  see  how  the  Logic  is  applied  is  the  better  to 
understand  the  dialectic  element  of  irrationality. 

i  Eng.,  trans.,  i.,  in,  112.  a  Ibid.,  p.  114. 


Supplementary  Essay  513 

The  subject  of  contingency  in  nature  has  been 
very  little  dwelt  upon  by  Hegel's  commentators. 
Wallace  devotes  ten  instructive  pages  to  the  subject 
of  the  a-logical  in  nature,  "  the  impotence  of  nature  "- 
afterwards  termed  "the  irrational  will"  by  Schopen- 
hauer— and  other  matters  which  tend  to  put  the 
Natur  philosophic  in  the  right  light.1  In  the  smaller 
Logic  Hegel  says,  "  Nature  is  weak  and  fails  to  exhibit 
the  logical  forms  in  their  purity."  2  Yet  he  does  not 
for  this  reason  reject  knowledge  of  nature.  "  Physics 
also  teaches  us  to  see  the  universal  or  essence  in  nature : 
and  the  only  difference  between  it  and  the  Philosophy 
of  Nature  is  that  the  latter  brings  before  our  mind  the 
adequate  forms  of  the  Notion  in  the  physical  world." 
It  is  therefore  a  question  of  degrees  of  truth  and 
reality. 

The  following  explicit  sentence  from  the  Naturphil- 
osophie  might  well  be  pondered  by  the  critics  of  Hegel : 
"  Not  only  must  philosophy  be  in  harmony  with 
experience,  but  empirical  natural  science  is  the  pre- 
supposition and  condition  of  the  rise  and  formation  of 
the  philosophical  science  of  nature."3  " Thought  has 
in  nature  gone  out  of  itself  into  its  '  other' — its  extreme 
opposite — irrationality;  and  that  is  why  nature  is  like 
a  wild  Bacchantic  god."  4  Ritchie  admirably  explains 
Hegel's  preference  for  the  emanation  theory.5  He 
traces  the  element  of  contingency  and  "weakness"  in 
nature,  as  interpreted  by  Hegel,  to  a  survival  of  the 
Platonic  and  Aristotelian  theory  of  matter.6 

Possibly   there   is   truth   in   Ritchie's   explanation. 

i  See  his  Prolegomena,  ad  ed.,  pp.  78-87.  *  Sec.   24    (2). 

*  Quoted  by  Ritchie,  Darwin  and  Hegel,  p.  53. 

*  \atiirphil.,  p.  24;  Ritchie,  p.  57. 

5  Ibid.,  p.  47  ft*  •  P.  57- 


514          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

There  are  points  of  resemblance  between  Plato's 
critique  of  immediacy  and  Hegel's,  and  no  doubt 
Hegel  in  part  derived  his  dialectic  from  Plato.  But 
both  in  regard  to  the  Idea  and  with  respect  to  the 
sensible  world  there  are  many  points  of  divergence. 
When  one  compares  the  mythical  interpretation  of 
nature  in  the  Timaeus  with  the  systematic  doctrine  of 
the  Natur philosophic,  the  difference  becomes  strongly 
marked.1 

For  Aristotle  there  is  an  irrationality  in  the  natural 
world  which  gives  him  much  perplexity  and  intensifies 
his  dualism  (see  Caird's  discussion  of  the  subject).2 
But  this  is  not  the  irrationality  of  Hegel's  system. 
For  Hegel,  there  is  a  much  closer  relationship  between 
the  rational  and  the  irrational  than  for  Plato.  We 
have  found  that  in  a  sense  everything  immediate  is 
irrational  for  Hegel,  yet  that  immediacy  gives  place 
to  a  higher  determination  which  resolves  antitheses 
and  solves  problems  which  prove  too  difficult  for  Plato 
and  Aristotle.  The  resemblance  between  Hegel  and 
Aristotle  is  perhaps  closest  where  logical  immediacy 
is  in  question.3  The  irrational  is  immediate  for  both 
Hegel  and  Aristotle.  For  Aristotle,  as  for  Hegel, 
there  is  contingency  in  the  immediate.  Both  distin- 
guish the  immediate  in  general,  the  givenness  of  matter, 

1  In  this  connection  one  might  note  Hegel's  explicit  reference  to 
Plato  in  Book  III  of    the  Logic.     The  subject  there  under  dis- 
cussion is  anthropology,  with  references  to  "the  dark  region  of  the 
terrestrial"     and    other    influences.     "  Zu    dieser    unvernunftigen 
Seite  gehort  ferner  das  Verhdltniss  des  Vorstellens  und  der  hohern 
geistigen  Thatigkeit,  insofern  sie  im  einzelnen  Subjects  dem  Spiele 
ganz    zufdlliger    korperlicher    Beschaffenheit,    dusserliche    Einflusse 
und  einzelner  Umstdnde  unterworfen  ist.  " — Werke,  v.,  263. 

2  Evolution  of  Theol.  in  the  Greek  Phil.,  chs.  xiii.  and  xiv. 

3  See  Anal.  Post.,  i,  3,  72b,  18,  where  Aristotle  considers  propo- 
sitions which  are  immediately  certain. 


Supplementary  Essay  515 

from  the  accidents,  enormities,  etc.,  of  nature.  There 
are  other  distinctions  made  by  Aristotle  which  might 
serve  Hegel  equally  well.  For  example,  Aristotle 
attributes  the  incidental  results  to  the  immediacy 
of  matter,  namely,  the  results  which  do  not  follow 
directly  from  the  form.  In  this  sense  "matter"  is 
the  cause  of  the  imperfect  and  the  accidental  in  nature. 
But  when  it  is  a  question  of  the  interpretation  of 
matter,  Aristotle  attributes  an  unruliness  to  matter 
with  respect  to  the  forms,  which  matter  in  part  defeats, 
in  such  wise  as  to  show  that  for  him  matter  was  more 
irrational  than  for  Hegel.  Matter  for  Hegel  is  not 
after  all  the  Platonic- Aristotelian  "  matter, "  discovered 
as  persistently  alien,  if  not  eternal.  Nor  is  it  the 
source  of  evil  as  in  the  Neo- Platonic  system.  It  is  not 
a  Ding  an  sick.  It  is  not  due  to  an  inexplicable  "  fall " 
from  the  primal  Being.  According  to  Hegel  God 
creates  nature  and  all  that  it  contains.  Hence  nature 
has  from  first  to  last  the  most  explicit  connection 
with  the  Idea.  It  is  once  more  a  question  of  the 
dialectic  modes  of  regarding  nature,  first  as  direct 
externality  abounding  in  irrelevant  contingencies, 
and  then  in  the  light  of  its  laws  and  meanings.  The 
following  from  Rosenkranz  in  explanation  of  Hegel's 
doctrine  throws  light  on  the  whole  question : 

Nature  is  in  itself  rational,  but  it  forms,  by  its  externality 
in  space  and  time,  the  opposition  of  the  logical  Idea,  for 
contingency  comes  into  existence  with  matter.  With 
contingency,  since  it  is  inseparable  from  existence  in 
space  and  time,  comes  into  existence  all  the  possibility 
of  irrationality.  Nature  realises  the  conception  of  the 
Idea,  but  it  remains  contingent  in  the  realisation  itself. 
.  .  .  Nature,  for  example,  brings  forth  in  the  spring 
thousands  of  the  most  gorgeous  blossoms,  which  ought  to 


5i 6          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

ripen  into  fruit,  but  a  frost  blights  them.  This  is  at 
bottom  an  irrational  occurrence,  but  is  on  account  of  the 
externality  of  existence  entirely  possible.  .  .  .  Hegel 
calls  it  the  impotence  of  Nature  to  hold  firm  the  Idea. 
.  .  .  The  realisation  of  the  Idea  in  the  individual  is  exposed 
to  chance.  .  .  .  Nature  is,  to  be  sure,  existence  rational 
in  itself,  but  existing  in  unconsciousness.  The  mind 
knows  what  is  rational,  but  makes  use  of  Nature  as  a 
subordinate  instrument.  Freedom  is  its  own  absolute 
end  in  thinking  and  willing.  In  Nature  there  exists  in- 
stinct but  not  will."1 


VIII 


120.  It  is  plainly  necessary  to  distinguish  between 
contingency  in  general,  as  pertaining  to  the  whole  of 
nature  in  immediate  form,  and  contingency  in  the 
sense  of  capricious  superfluity.  That  is,  contingency 
is  (i)  a  logical  category,  intimately  related  to  im- 
mediacy in  so  far  as  it  is  a  question  of  Existenz,  and  (2) 
is  representative  of  the  inability  of  Nature  to  realise 
the  Idea.  Contingency  in  the  second  sense  of  the 
term  is  not  our  primary  interest  in  this  thesis,  except 
that  the  recognition  given  to  it  by  Hegel  is  significant  as 
indicating  his  fidelity  to  fact  as  opposed  to  Actuality. 
But  contingency  in  the  logical  sense  of  the  term  very 
directly  concerns  us,  inasmuch  as  all  immediacy 
(to  the  point  where  Actuality  is  attained)  is  contingent. 
The  immediate  as  such  claims  to  be  external  and 
independent,  and  contingency  consists  in  explanation 
from  the  outside.  But  when  Actuality  is  attained, 
the  given  world  is  explained  from  within;  hence,  as 
McTaggart  points  out,  the  contingency  is  eliminated 

1  Introd.  to  Hegel's  Encyclopedia,  Von  Kirchmann's  ed., 
trans,  in  Journal  of  Spec,  Phil,  v.,  243. 


Supplementary  Essay  517 

but  the  immediacy  is  retained.1  The  immediate 
element  could  not  be  dispensed  with  without  depriv- 
ing the  Logic  of  all  content.  Hence  the  existence  of  the 
world  is  not  denied  when  the  actual  is  distinguished 
from  the  contingent.  All  sensuous  immediacy  is  as 
such  contingent,  and  ever  will  remain  so;  all  such 
immediacy  is  given,  not  deduced.  But  granted  the 
existence  of  such  immediacy,  dialectically  regarded 
as  what  it  really  is,  with  the  frank  admission  of  its 
irrationality,  immediacy  may  forthwith  be  treated 
from  the  point  of  view  of  its  ultimate  significance. 

121.  We  may  remark  in  passing  that  if  Nature  were 
the  product  of  pure  thought,  we  should  not  expect  it  to 
exhibit  the  superfluous  contingency  mentioned  above. 
McTaggart  points  out  that  if  Hegel  really  thought  he 
was   deducing   Nature  from  pure  thought  he  would 
hardly  have  "  slipped  by  mistake  into  the  assertion 
that  thought,  while  producing  the  whole  universe,  was 
met  in  it  by  an  alien  element."2     Were  immediacy 
''mere"  immediacy,  a  brute  element  which  could  not 
be  mediated,  it  would  indeed  be  alien  and  irrational. 
There  are  insignificant  respects  in  which  immediacy  does 
remain   merely   contingent,    hence    Existenz  contains 
more  data  than  Actuality.    But  we  have  seen  that  (i) 
the  contingent  world  is  not  "matter"  in  the  Platonic 
sense,  but  is  created  by  Spirit;    (2)  it  is  not  a  Ding  an 
sick,  but  exists  in  our  real  experience,  hence  is  not 
alien  in  an  utterly  external  sense ;  and  (3)  its  existence 
is  essential  to  the  very  being  of  the  dialectic,  of  the  Idea, 
alike  in  the  Logic  and  in  the  special  Hegelian  disci- 
plines.    In  short,  the  admission  of  the  existence  of  an 
irrational  element  is  not  fatal  to  the  dialectic. 

122.  We  may  also  note  that  the  irrationality  of 

»  See  Hegel.  Dial.,  p.  65  ff.  *  Heg.  Dial.,  p.  67. 


518          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

Nature  in  the  Hegelian  system  is  to  be  distinguished 
from  the  caprice  which  is  due  to  a  wandering  away 
of  the  will,  a  fortuitous  "  sinking  into  difference,"  in- 
asmuch as  for  Hegel  Nature  bears  a  decidedly  rational 
relation  to  the  teleology  of  the  Idea:  Nature  is  a  sub- 
ordinate domain  of  manifestation,  and  its  super- 
fluities and  caprices  are  still  more  subordinate.  As 
Nature  mounts  towards  Spirit,  it  offers  the  rich  fruits 
of  its  long  activities,  and  reason  selects  what  is  germane 
to  the  Idea.  In  thus  facing  Nature,  reason  meets  with 
that  which  for  the  moment  is  entirely  external,  almost 
alien.  In  that  sense,  Nature  is  distinctively  the  un- 
mediate.  But  reason  possesses  the  true  clue  to  all 
that  it  finds.  Having  acknowledged  the  gifts  thus 
bountifully  presented,  reason  proceeds  with  the  neces- 
sary discriminations. 

Again,  there  is  a  radical  difference  between  the 
relatively  unimportant  alienation  of  the  temporarily 
un-rational,  in  the  Hegelian  doctrine,  and  the  uncon- 
querable irrationality  of  many  mysticisms.  The 
immediate  for  Hegel  is  not  a  mystery.  It  is  not  unana- 
lysable. Nor  is  it  due  to  a  mystic  union  that  must 
simply  be  stated  as  brute  fact.  However  dark  and 
obscure  the  first  appearance,  the  obscure  element  proves 
to  be  the  least  consequential  for  Hegel;  whereas  it  is 
fundamental  for  mysticism. 

123.  The  stress  put  upon  contingency  and  irration- 
ality obviously  depends,  as  we  have  intimated,  upon 
one's  interests,  upon  the  chosen  or  logical  stopping- 
place.  In  a  general  way  we  have  noted  that  contin- 
gency is  formally  representable  as  simple  possibility; 
or,  again,  every  item  that  is  regarded  by  itself,  merely 
as  immediate.  If  one  cared  merely  for  facts,  apart 
from  their  interpretation,  if  mere  relativity  or  an 


Supplementary  Essay  519 

infinite  regress  sufficed,  one  would  stop  with  Existenz. 
But  one  need  not  linger  at  the  stage  of  the  merely 
contingent.  It  is  plainly  one  thing  to  recognise  the 
irrational  in  the  domain,  for  example,  of  history,  and 
another  logically  to  classify  it,  preparatory  to  passing 
on  to  its  idealistic  interpretation.  "  L'irrationel,"  says 
Noel,  "  est  dans  le  compose  V element  essentiellement 
negatif;  il  doit  de  plus  en  plus  se  subordonner  a  VIdee, 
jusqu'a  ce  que  celk-ci  s'en  affranchisse  en  Vabsorbant  .  . 
la  pensee  pure,  loin  d'exclure  le  monde  materiel,  le 
contient  et  le  presuppose;  que  c'est  en  pensant  la  nature 
.  .  .  que  la  pensee  supreme  se  pense  elle-meme." 1 
Noel  discusses  in  admirable  fashion  the  temporary 
realism  of  Hegel,  and  shows  how  convenient  yet  how 
inadequate  this  point  of  view  is.  He  points  out  that 
the  opposition  of  Nature  and  Idea  does  not  remain  a 
"  pure  donnee"  "  La  nature  est  en  un  sense  la  negation 
de  VIdee,  mais  une  negation  dans  VIdee  et  posee  par 
VIdee,  et  VIdee,  comme  pensee  absolue,  reste  consciente 
de  cette  relativite"  2 

Noel's  discussion,  while  recognising  the  dialectic 
element  for  which  we  have  been  pleading,  also  shows 
how  far  up  into  the  realm  of  the  Idea  the  irrational  is 
carried,  in  such  wise  that  the  Idea  itself  is  modified  by 
the  element  which  it  finally  assimilates.  Noel  regards 
1 'la  relativite  universelle"  as  the  central  principle  of  the 
entire  dialectic.  In  his  discussion  of  the  transition  of 
the  Idea  into  Nature,  he  points  out  that  the  concept 
of  the  absolute  Idea  as  such  is  intrinsically  incomplete.3 
"  Ce  concept  a  par  suite  pour  complement  necessaire 
celui  de  la  nature,  laquelk  est  tout  d'abord  particularisa- 
tion  absolue,  dispersion  indefinie,  eocleriorite  de  toute 

.      »  La  Logique  de  Hegel,  p.  121.  2  Ibid.,  p.   124. 

3  P.    126   ff. 


520          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

chose  a  toute  chose.  Ainsi  la  chame  diale clique  est 
renoute.  La  nature  continue  La  Logique.  La  contin- 
gence  du  sensible  el  son  illogisme  fondamental  cessenl 
d'etre  un  scandal  pour  noire  intelligence.  .  .  Cette  sphere 
d'ou  tout  d'abord  la  raison  semblait  absente,  qui  se  posait 
devant  elle  comme  sa  negation,  la  raison  elle-meme  nous 
niontre  la  necessite."1  While  finding  a  certain  incom- 
pleteness, then,  in  the  dialectic  of  the  contingently 
immediate,  so  far  as  the  Logic  is  concerned,  Noel  finds 
the  solution  of  this  crucial  problem  of  relativity  in  the 
Hegelian  system  as  a  whole.  The  immediacy  which  we 
have  been  pleading  for  throughout  is  shown  to  be 
germane  to  the  system,  but  not  fatal  to  its  integrity. 
In  other  words,  relativity  pertains  essentially  to 
Existenz  (so  we  have  shown),  and  there  is  a  sense  in 
which  relativity  pertains  to  the  entire  dialectic;  for, 
as  we  have  also  shown,  immediacy  persists  to  the  last. 
But  the  incompleteness  of  the  immediate  as  such 
proves  advantageous  to  the  Idea  which,  in  turn,  is 
forever  dependent  on  the  data  which  it  transforms 
and  which  transform  it. 

124.  Pure  thought  is  in  a  sense  as  little  free  as 
immediacy  itself.  The  same  defect  that  runs  through 
immediacy  in  a  measure  infects  mediation  also.  Or, 
rather,  it  is  precisely  this  ultimate  givenness  for  which 
immediacy  as  a  concept  in  general  stands,  which  con- 
stitutes the  hard  and  fast  character  of  the  dialectic 
process.  There  is  a  stern  necessity  in  the  world.  This 
necessity  proves  to  be  freedom,  when  we  pass  to  the 
third  book  of  the  Logic.  But  it  is  first  important 
to  recognise  it  for  all  that  it  immediately  is.  The 
character  of  the  world  is  once  for  all  given.  Mediating 
thought  is  not  responsible  for  that  character.  It  is  no 

'  P.  127. 


Supplementary  Essay 

doubt  disappointing  for  thought  to  acknowledge  this, 
for  it  would  fain  be  independent  and  free.  Thought 
is  profoundly  dependent.  It  must  learn  this  lesson 
once  for  all.  It  must  acknowledge  that  it,  too,  is 
other  than  it  has  appeared,  that  thought  also  has  its 
immediacy  and  its  Wirklichkeit.  But  this  fact  once 
acknowledged,  the  situation  in  which  thought  finds 
itself  is  by  no  means  unfortunate  but  precisely  what 
might  be  expected.  Thought,  as  well  as  the  sensuous 
immediate,  must  deny  itself  to  find  itself.  Negation 
is  the  profounder  lesson  of  the  Logic.  Hence  if  thought 
will  but  bow  in  acquiescence  and  acknowledge  what  is 
given  to  it,  it  will  find  itself  in  a  position  to  learn  the 
nature  and  place  of  even  the  irrational.  But  no  such 
discovery  is  lightly  made.  Thought  must  wrestle 
with  the  appearances  of  things  and  with  its  own 
claims,  before  it  shall  discover  the  true  Idea. 

125.  One  cannot  agree  with  Seth  that  the  admission 
of  an  element  of  contingency  on  Hegel's  part  is  very 
serious,  and  amounts  to  a  confession  that  rational 
philosophy  has  to  that  extent  failed.1  We  have  seen 
that  the  taint  of  contingency  runs  throughout  im- 
mediacy and  even  infects  thought  itself;  and  that 
"the  impotence  of  Nature"  is  only  a  greater  degree 
of  the  weakness  of  all  aspects  of  experience  or  thought 
in  its  first  form.  "  To  know  that  a  thing  exists,  is  to 
know  it  as  immediate  and  contingent,"  says  Mc- 
Taggart . 2  Only  on  the  supposition  that  *  'pure  thought ' ' 
endeavoured  to  create  the  world  a  priori  would  there 
be  any  reason  to  allege  that  rational  philosophy  has 
failed.  Our  entire  discussion  has  shown  the  impos- 
sibility of  the  alleged  "pure-thought"  undertaking. 

1  Hegelianism  and  Personality,  2d  ed.,  p.  146. 
-  Heg.  Dial.,  p.  221. 


522          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

Fundamentally  at  fault  in  his  interpretation  of  Hegel, 
Seth  concludes  that  the  dialectic  has  failed  because 
it  is  compelled  to  acknowledge  the  contingency  of 
things.  To  find  the  right  clue  in  regard  to  the  dialectic 
is  to  form  a  different  set  of  expectations  in  regard  to 
rational  philosophy,  hence  to  see  that  Hegel  has  suc- 
ceeded. That  reason  should  come  into  rude  contact 
with  the  contingent,  that  it  should  be  dependent  on  the 
given,  is  precisely  what  we  should  expect.  No  rational 
philosophy  can  expect  to  succeed  unless  it  start  with 
fact,  then  consider  the  implication  of  facts  and  their 
meaning,  all  the  time  taking  the  clue  from  further 
study  of  the  given.  And  it  may  be  added  that 
no  great  philosopher  ever  undertook  to  start  with 
"pure  thought"  alone  and  "suppress  all  reference  to 
experience." 

126.  For  every  philosopher  there  is  a  brute  element 
which  he  must  set  down  as  elementary  in  the  ultimate 
sense  of  the  word,  that  is,  as  "gegeben,"  "original." 
Even  for  Heraclitus,  who  makes  a  bold  attempt  to 
take  mere  flux  in  earnest,  there  is  a  brute  "  necessity  of 
stopping,"  an  immutable  law  of  change.  In  the 
tychistic  hypothesis  of  Pierce  and  James,  there  is 
necessarily  an  assumption  that  forces  and  "habit- 
forming  tendencies"  pre-existed,  in  order  for  a  begin- 
ning to  be  conceivable.  Here  we  have  the  brute 
element  reduced  to  the  minimum,  but  the  pragmatists 
are  unable  to  reduce  their  assumption  to  the  point 
where  they  can  first  hurl  the  stone  at  the  rationalists. 
No  one  can  in  fact  first  cast  the  stone.  The  ultimate 
given  may  be  a  whole  or  a  collection,  a  Being,  or  a 
chaos  of  atoms ;  but  whatever  it  is,  for  the  philosopher 
in  question  it  is  beyond  appeal.  Professor  James,  who 
tries  to  assume  least,  has  the  most  difficulty  in  making 


Supplementary  Essay  523 

coherent  headway.  Now,  in  a  situation  which  every 
one  must  make  the  best  of,  it  wrould  seem  rational  to 
start  with  a  universal  which  affords  an  adequate  ground 
of  explanation  of  experience  and  knowledge.  A 
tychistic  hypothesis  puts  an  enormous  strain  upon 
belief  by  postulating  an  artificial  principle  which 
the  facts  do  not  demand.  In  the  end,  no  explanation 
is  given,  for  the  good  reason  that  the  attempt  is  made 
to  explain  order  by  chaos,  the  higher  by  the  lower. 
But  for  Hegel  the  ultimate  immediate  is  taken  in  good 
earnest,  that  is,  the  start,  instead  of  being  made  with  a 
relatively  unimportant  or  artificial  immediacy,  is  made 
in  and  with  given  consciousness,  with  its  implied 
relation  to  an  object  and  its  implicit  universal  of  self- 
consciousness  in  its  highest  form.  Hence  there  is  no 
need  of  returning  every  little  while  to  inflate  the 
immediate  with  borrowed  wind.  For  Hegel,  the  posses- 
sion of  an  immediate  element,  tinged  with  contingency 
and  in  a  sense  irrational,  is  no  source  of  embarrass- 
ment, but  a  necessary  condition  of  the  entire  rational 
process.  For  there  is  no  mere  brute  element  left 
over — except  the  superfluous  contingencies  which 
prove  to  be  "  unwesentlich"  The  same  Being  that  is 
the  ground  of  the  mediation  is  the  basis  of  the  im- 
mediacy, hence  of  all  appearances,  even  the  super- 
fluously contingent.  The  irrationality  that  is  thrown 
out  of  account  as  unessential  gives  no  basis  for  scepti- 
cism concerning  the  rational.  The  irrational  can 
thus  be  taken  in  entire  seriousness. 

127.  There  are  not  two  realities,  two  meanings 
to  the  world,  the  one  rational,  and  the  other  irrational. 
The  Idea,  inasmuch  as  it  is  rational,  absolute,  com- 
prehends the  irrational.  There  is  no  ultimate  oppo- 
sition. The  Idea  contains,  is  the  rationale  of  the 


524          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

irrational;    it  is  the  justification  of  its  own  included 
element  of  irrationality.    There  is  nothing  that  is  not 
in  some  sense  the  Idea.     There  is  nothing  without 
God;    for  God  is  the  Creator,  the  ultimate  reality: 
there  is  no  other,  no  rival  reality. 

128.  For  us  finite  creatures  it  might  seem  like  a 
fatal  admission  that  the  world  is  tainted  with  irrational- 
ity.    But  once  more  there  is  no  adequate  finite  point 
of  view.     When  engaged  in  the  dialectic  process,  we 
are  inclined  to  judge  by  our  mere  finitude.     But  for 
each  and  all  there  is  the  one  great  lesson,  if  we  will 
but  learn  it — the  lesson  of  negativity.    To  learn  that 
lesson,  even  situated  as  we  are,  not  yet  in  possession  of 
absolute  knowledge,  is  already  to  possess  the  principle 
which  involves  adequate  rationalisation.     To  be  com- 
pelled  to  start  with,   postulate,   the   ultimate   Being 
of  the  world,  is  no  hardship,  when  we  learn  what  the 
character  of  that  Being  is. 

129.  Once  more,  then,  it  is  a  question  of  fact,  then 
of  logic.     Things  are  put  before  us  in  such  wise  that 
they  seem  to  be  independent.     We  may  regard  them 
in  the  mere  contingency  of  their  disparateness,  if  we 
choose.      We   may  dwell  on   the  superfluous  contin- 
gency of  nature,  in  her  wealth  of  over-production,  her 
caprices,  accidents,  and  the  like.     To  remain  at  the 
stage  of  immediacy  would  be  necessarily  to  confess 
that  nature  is  irrational  in  the  severest  sense  of  the 
term.     There  is  no  rationality,  ultimately  speaking, 
in  mere  finitude.    Hegel  is  fond  of  calling  attention  to 
the  limitations   and   "untruth"   of   the   finite.     The 
merely  detached   is  forever  irrational.     Rational  phi- 
losophy  would    be    impossible    if  thought  could   not 
transcend  mere  pluralism.     But  there  is  no  "mere" 
detachedness  in  the  actual  world  of  the  Idea;  there 


Supplementary  Essay  525 

are  no  such  ultimate  facts  as  the  radical  empiricist 
creates  by  speculative  abstraction.  The  real  world 
is  a  world  of  manifold  richness  of  presentations, 
forever  linked  within  and  without  to  the  experience 
by  which  it  is  known,  and  to  the  ultimate  Ground 
which  makes  it  possible. 

130.  The    acknowledgment   of    immediacy    is    in 
general  no  more,  then,  than  the  admission  of  a  char- 
acteristic of  this  our  rational  universe.    The  disparate- 
ness  is   essential   to   the  connectedness;  contingency 
is  a  first  mode  of  statement  of  necessity.     Unless  we 
first  acknowledge  the  partedness  we  shall  be  unable  to 
understand  the  organic  unity.     What  is  demanded  of 
us  is  that  we  shall  be  true  to  the  character  of  the  world 
when  regarded  from  its  highest  point  of  view,  that  is, 
as  a  logical,  eternal  whole,  not  merely  in  its  temporal 
aspect;    for  true  knowledge  of  things  is  a  system.     If 
there  be  no  element  that  resists  systematisation,  there 
is  no  reason  to  complain  that  all  elements  as  given 
are,  as  independent,  irrational.    That  the  Idea  becomes 
known  only  through  a  progress  from  the  irrational 
to  the  rational  is  no  reason  for  disparaging  the  Idea, 
howbeit  the  dependence  of  the  Idea  is  thereby  shown. 
It  is  plainly  one  of  the  purposes  of  the  dialectic  to 
make  just  this  inter-dependence  clear.    It  is  no  objec- 
tion to  point  out  that  the  world  is  what  it  is,  provided 
one  is  also  able  to  indicate  that  the  Idea  is  what  it  is 

—the  triumphant  principle  of  universal  reason. 

131.  That  it  is  possible  to  meet  the  objections  to 
which  we  have  repeatedly  referred,  yet  fail  to  accept 
Hegel's  treatment  of  irrationality  as  ultimately  con- 
clusive, is  clear  from  the  case  of  McTaggart.    Having 
defended  Hegel  against  the  charges  of  Trendelenburg, 
Hartmann,  Seth,  and  others,  McTaggart  pauses  when  it 


526          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

is  a  question  of  the  imperfection  of  the  world,  and  is 
at  first  rather  strongly  inclined  to  accept  the  relative, 
existential  judgments  of  the  plain  man,  rather  than 
the  optimism  of  Hegel.1  McTaggart  introduces  an 
exceedingly  profitable  study  of  the  alternative  ways 
of  regarding  irrationality,  and  finds  himself  unable 
either  to  adopt  Hegel's  solution  in  regard  to  the  exis- 
tence of  imperfection  or  to  reject  it,  inasmuch  as  all 
idealisms  are  in  an  equally  bad  plight;  and  there 
may  be,  after  all,  a  higher  synthesis  of  the  contra- 
dictions. One  is  not  convinced  by  McTaggart 's  argu- 
ment because,  in  the  first  place,  he  fails  to  examine  the 
contrast  which  we  have  found  so  important,  between 
Existenz  and  Wirklichkeit;  and,  second,  because  he  does 
not  turn  to  those  parts  of  the  Hegelian  system,  notably 
the  Philosophy  of  Right,  in  which,  as  we  have  seen, 
light  is  thrown  on  Hegel's  solution.2  But  the  whole 
discussion,  turning  as  it  does  on  the  nature  of  time, 
lies  for  the  most  part  beyond  the  province  of  the 
present  discussion. 

The  point  to  note  for  our  purposes  is  the  recognition 
given  by  this  critic  to  the  existence  of  an  element  of 
irrationality  in  the  dialectic,  together  with  the  issues 
raised,  the  point  of  view  with  regard  to  Hegel,  as  con- 
trasted with  the  popular  opinions  quoted  at  the 
beginning  of  our  discussion.  Our  first  plea  is  for 
such  recognition.  The  data  once  admitted,  it  is  then 
a  question  of  interpretation.  One  does  not  immediately 
know  that  a  thing  or  event  is  imperfect  or  evil; 
to  denominate  it  such  is  to  interpret  it.  It  is  first  a 
question,  then,  of  the  existence  of  the  items  adjudged 
evil.  It  remains  to  be  determined  whether  the  items 
in  question  are  properly  denominated  evil.  But  even 

1  Hegel.  Dial.,  ch.  v.  2  See  above,  Sec.  115. 


Supplementary  Essay  527 

granted  that  they  are  rightly  classified  as  evil — from 
a  contingent  point  of  view — there  remains  the  question 
of  further  interpretation  in  terms  of  higher  categories. 
We  have  seen  that  Hegel  admits  the  existential  items, 
that  he  gives  them  their  appropriate  dialectic  place, 
and  that  in  his  ethical  theory  he  has  a  principle  of 
ultimate  interpretation.  That  is  sufficient  for  our 
purposes.  To  defend  Hegel's  interpretation  of  imper- 
fection and  evil  is  not  within  the  province  of  our  dis- 
cussion. Suffice  it  that  in  the  evidence  adduced  from 
the  Philosophy  of  Right  the  defence  would  not  be  so 
difficult  as  it  seems  to  those  who  lack  the  clues  which 
our  investigation  supplies. 

132.  Dissatisfied  with  the  results  of  the  dialectic, 
McTaggart  undertakes  to  make  an  independent  develop- 
ment of  Hegelian  categories.  He  questions,  in  the  first 
place,  whether  philosophy  be  the  highest  stage  of 
reality,  and  concludes  that  it  is  not.  Since  philosophy 
is  at  best  intellectual,  we  must  still  learn  from  experi- 
ence; knowledge  does  not  exhaust  the  nature  of  Spirit; 
Spirit  is  also  feeling  and  will.  The  result  for  McTag- 
gart is  that  rational  knowledge  proves  secondary  to 
a  mystical  element,  with  a  hint  concerning  which  his 
book  ends. 

Thus  we  find  a  supposed  Hegelian,  whose  profound 
analysis  of  the  dialectic  has  been  of  service  to  us 
throughout,  deserting  Hegel  for  mystical  immediacy. 
To  accept  this  conclusion  would  be  to  lend  other 
meanings  to  the  element  of  irrationality,  to  carry 
forward  the  category  of  Existenz  far  beyond  its  place 
in  the  dialectic.  Here  one  cannot  follow,  for  Hegel's 
analysis  has  shown  that,  whatever  mystic  immediacy 
may  have  to  teach,  it  belongs  as  such  below  Wirklich- 
keit,  and  hence  is  to  be  interpreted  as  Hegel  has  already 


528         The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

suggested  in  his  critique  of  intuitionism  in  the  Ency- 
clopedia. 1  Philosophy  necessarily  has  the  last  word, 
be  the  existential  data  as  lofty  as  you  please.  Hence 
we  must  insist  on  the  completion  of  the  system  beyond 
the  Logic  as  the  appropriate  place  for  the  consideration 
of  the  items  for  which  McTaggart  pleads.  Reality 
is  indeed  more  than  thought,  as  we  have  found  Hegel 
constantly  acknowledging.  But  it  is  thought  that 
mediates,  and  however  many  times  one  may  revert  to 
brute  immediacy  the  final  appeal  is  to  the  Idea. 

133.  Another  critic  of  Hegel  maintains  that  for 
Hegel  reality  is  ' 'simply  synonymous  with  immediacy."2 
"In  immediate  experience,"  Baillie  maintains,  "we 
are  sharing  in,  are  indeed  fused  with,  the  very  being 
of  the  world.  To  be  'real'  is  to  be  absorbed  in  our 
direct  living  experience.  We  do  not  merely  'touch' 
reality  there,  we  are  real  in  that  way,  and  reality  is 
what  it  is  in  that  aspect  of  experience."3  Concerning 
this  interpretation  of  Hegel  we  remark,  in  the  first 
place,  that  it  is  interesting  to  contrast  it  with  the  con- 
ventional notion  that  for  Hegel  reality  is  Thought, 
for  we  see  how  widely  interpreters  differ.  But  even 
Baillie  finds  it  difficult  to  maintain  so  one-sided  an 
interpretation;  for  he  so  far  modifies  the  statements 
quoted  above  as  to  identify  immediacy  with  media- 
tion, hence  to  define  Hegel's  "reality"  as  "in  essence 
a  process  of  knowledge."4  Baillie  thereupon  proceeds 
to  assail  Hegel,  since  "such  an  identification  is  abso- 
lutely groundless."  Our  critic  holds  that  knowledge 
properly  begins  with  "fragments,"  which  "must  come 
separately  and  in  isolation."5  Thus  he  misses  the 

1  See  above,  Sec.  30. 

2  Baillie,  The  Origin  and  Significance  of  Hegel's  Logic,  p.  337. 
*Ibid.,  p.  338.  *P.  340.  s  P.  341. 


Supplementary  Essay  529 

significance  of  the  Logic,  which  indeed  insists  upon  the 
fragmentary  character  of  our  knowledge,  as  immediate, 
but  which  by  no  means  identifies  immediacy  with 
mediation.  Baillie  then  goes  on  to  say: 

This  identification  of  knowledge  and  Reality  was,  we 
seem  forced  to  maintain,  a  fundamental  claim  of  Hegel's 
system,  and  this  we  must  unhesitatingly  regard  as  the 
Ttp&TOV  i/>£vSo$  of  his  philosophy.  It  is  the  root  of  much 
that  ...  is  ambiguous  in  the  system.  The  supposition 
that  experience  proceeds  in  its  actual  life  by  a  method 
deliberately  adopted  for  purposes  of  Science,  makes  it 
impossible  for  us  to  know  in  actual  experience  (as  traced 
in  the  Phenomenology)  we  are  dealing  with  Science;  or 
again,  whether  in  what  is  admittedly  a  pure  science  (the 
Logic)  we  are  dealing  with  reality.  .  .  .  And  the  un- 
certainty is  due  solely  to  the  gratuitious  assumption  that 
because  knowledge  deals  with  the  immediate,  therefore 
it  is  reality. * 

And  so  on  through  many  pages,  the  gist  of  which  is 
always  Hegel's  alleged  "  identification  of  mere  imme- 
diacy for  knowledge  with  Reality."2 

It  seems  incredible  that  a  writer  who  shows  so 
much  insight  into  certain  portions  of  the  Phenomenology 
should  so  miss  the  point  when  he  endeavors  to  criti- 
cise the  Logic.  From  the  outset,  we  noted  how  little 
knowledge  Hegel  attributes  to  immediacy,  and  at  no 
point  have  we  found  him  identifying  knowledge  and 
immediacy,  or  concluding  that  immediacy  is  reality. 
Not  even  in  the  case  of  the  immediacy  of  the  Idea  is 
immediacy  either  the  same  as  reality  or  identifiable 
with  knowledge.  Immediacy  has  proved  to  be  a 
characteristic  of  all  experience,  and  an  element  of  all 
knowledge,  hence  an  aspect  of  reality.  But  if  it  could 
i  Pp.  342,343.  2  P.  347. 

34 


53°          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

be  identified  with  knowledge  or  reality,  the  significance 
of  the  distinctions  which  Hegel  draws  from  first  to  last 
between  the  given  and  its  meaning,  the  irrational  and 
the  rational,  would  be  lost.  It  would  be  more  nearly 
correct  to  say  that  for  Hegel  knowledge  and  reality  are 
synonymous  with  mediation.  But  it  is  not  a  question 
of  synonyms.  To  be  "real"  is  not  to  be  " absorbed" 
either  into  immediacy  or  into  mediation;  but  both  to 
be  and  to  be  known  by  means  of  relations  by  virtue 
of  which  the  differences  between  immediacy  and 
mediation  are  preserved.  In  its  mere  immediacy  the 
Idea  is  untried,  inexperienced;  it  must  go  forth  and 
be  roughly  handled,  meet  controversy,  be  brought  to 
self-consciousness.  The  insight  must  be  doubted.  To 
meet  the  doubts,  then  to  find  the  same  essence 
both  in  things  and  in  thoughts,  is  very  far  from 
identifying  reality  with  knowledge. 

To  be  "in  essence  a  process  of  knowledge,"  reality 
must  be  yet  more  fundamentally  a  process  of  Being. 
It  is  the  dynamic  relation  of  Being  that  gives  thought 
the  items  of  its  knowledge.  Hegel  nowhere  says  or 
implies  that  experience  follows  a  method  which  suits 
the  needs  of  science,  as  if  science  imposed  itself  upon 
experience;  he  shows  that  experience  when  under- 
stood as  an  actuality  exhibits  the  same  principles 
which  science  develops  in  its  processes  of  mediation. 
Nor  does  Hegel  hold  that  because  "knowledge  deals 
with  the  immediate,  therefore  it  is  reality."  We  have 
found  that  the  immediate  is  as  such  the  "unwon,"  the 
irrational.  To  win  it  even  in  its  higher  form  is  not  to 
possess  reality,  for  only  through  the  negativity  of  that 
moment  may  its  reality  be  seen.  It  is  the  immediate- 
mediate  that  is  reality. 

Baillie's   objections   therefore    fall   to    the   ground, 


Supplementary  Essay  531 

for  he  has  failed  to  grasp  either  the  Phenomenology  or 
the  Logic.  If  his  conclusions  were  sound  it  would  be  dif- 
ficult to  establish  our  thesis,  for  he  charges  Hegel  with 
an  inextricable  blending  of  immediacy,  reality,  and 
science.  Hegel  is  explicitly  clear  at  precisely  the  point 
where  he  is  said  by  Baillie  to  be  hopelessly  at  fault. 
The  understanding  of  the  transition  from  Existenz  to 
Wirklichkeit  enables  us  to  distinguish  between  empiri- 
cal reality  and  science.  In  fact,  the  distinction  is 
implied  in  the  entire  concept  of  immediacy.  Reality 
in  the  first  sense  of  the  word  is  sentient,  immediate; 
and  this  reality  is  present  to  the  end.  But  reality 
as  reflected  upon  is  distinguished  from  its  external 
appearance  and  exhibited  in  the  light  of  a  meaning 
which  also  includes  mediation  as  essentially  a  part 
of  it.  What  reality  is,  finally,  both  immediacy  and 
mediation  must  show;  for  reality  is  both  describable 
and  appreciable.  There  is  no  attempt  to  reduce  all 
reality  to  knowledge.  That  would  mean  the  denial 
of  the  content  which  gave  the  dialectic  its  progressive 
wealth.  The  main  point  is  that  mediacy  and  immedi- 
acy are  found  together,  at  the  outset,  and  that  they  are 
kept  together  to  the  end.  Hence  the  dialectic  is  a 
successful  development  of  the  interest  which  gave  rise 
to  it,  namely,  to  make  explicit  the  rich  implicitness 
of  that  which  was  at  the  outset  merely  given.  To 
understand  Hegel's  initial  analysis  in  the  Phenomenology 
is  to  find  the  enlightening  clue  which  guides  the  student 
of  the  dialectic  to  the  end.  To  understand  the  transi- 
tion from  Existenz  to  Wirklichkeit  is  to  be  able  to 
explain  the  difficulties  which  the  critics  have  met 
who  make  mere  generalisations.  We  find  it  impossible, 
then,  to  modify  our  results  in  the  light  of  Baillie 's 
criticisms. 


532          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

IX 

134.  Our  main  purpose  as  announced  at  the  outset 
has  been  accomplished,  and  our  thesis  has  been  estab- 
lished, if  we  have  shown  the  structural  importance 
of  immediacy  throughout  the  dialectic,  and  hence 
indicated  a  central  clue  to  the  system  as  a  whole. 
For,  we  have  shown  that  to  take  account  of  the  nature 
and  scope  of  immediacy  means,  (i)  to  consider  how 
Hegel  comes  by  the  fundamental  interests  of  the 
Logic  as  a  free  conceptual  development  of  principles 
which  are  more  concretely  investigated  in  other  parts 
of  the  system.  That  is  to  say,  taking  our  clue  from 
Hegel's  own  reference  to  the  Phenomenology  as  his 
presupposition,  we  have  found  that  in  the  initial 
analysis  of  that  work  Hegel  began  with  consciousness 
as  given  experience,  and  discriminated  yet  found 
inseparable  the  principles  or  determinations  (im- 
mediacy, mediation,  becoming)  which  he  then  pro- 
ceeded to  develop  dialectically  in  the  Logic,  beginning 
at  the  point  which  his  own  analysis  of  conscious 
experience  indicated  (with  Seyn)  and  taking  as  ideal 
the  highest  determination  which  self-consciousness 
revealed.  Thus  we  found  that  "pure  thought,"  far 
from  being  an  abstract  principle  out  of  which  the 
world  was  to  be  deduced,  was  a  principle  of  progressive 
analysis  which  began  by  ignoring  empirical  references 
as  much  as  possible  at  first,  and  gradually  restored 
those  references  up  to  the  point  where  it  again  became 
a  question  of  "things"  as  the  plain  man  knows  them. 
Thus  we  removed  a  fundamental  misapprehension 
and  earned  the  right  to  develop  the  meanings  of  im- 
mediacy as  actually  treated  in  the  dialectic,  as  opposed 
to  the  allegations  of  Trendelenburg.  By  referring  to 


Supplementary  Essay  533 

other  parts  of  the  system,  we  found  that  it  is  Hegel's 
customary  procedure  to  begin  with  immediacy,  what- 
ever the  field,  and  however  much  stress  he  might 
thereafter  put  upon  the  Idea  as  an  interpretative 
principle. 

The  beginnings  of  the  system  made  plain,  we  then 
found  (2)  that  to  take  account  of  immediacy  means 
to  discriminate  between  the  existential  character  of 
experience,  objects,  history,  etc.,  and  their  meaning, 
their  laws,  purposes,  when  regarded  as  forming  an 
actual  whole  or  system.  We  found  that  the  significance, 
if  not  the  fact,  of  the  transition  from  Existenz  to 
Wirklichkeit  had  been  generally  overlooked.  To  take 
account  of  this  transition,  we  saw,  means  to  regard  the 
remainder  of  the  dialectic  in  an  entirely  different  light. 

But  (3)  this  was  only  the  beginning;  for  we  dis- 
covered that  in  general  the  recognition  of  immediacy, 
as  the  starting-point  of  all  philosophic  disciplines 
involves  the  admission  of  an  element  of  the  irrational, 
not  merely  in  the  sense  of  contingent  superfluity 
and  contingency  as  an  external  point  of  view  (of 
Vorstellungen),  but  in  the  sense  of  a  constant  givenness 
which  the  Idea  must  accept.  Hence  we  found  that 
the  (actual)  rationality  of  things  is  their  systematic 
unity  when  that  unity  is  won  in  terms  of  the  Idea. 
The  merely  existential  is  the  not  yet  conquered,  and 
reason  must  accept  that  which  existentially  is  and 
discern  its  total  significance,  if  it  can.  We  found 
reason  to  believe  that,  despite  the  doubts  of  Hegelians 
such  as  McTaggart,  for  Hegel  the  irrationality  of  the 
world  can  be  overcome,  in  such  wise  that  the  admission 
of  its  existence  is  by  no  means  fatal  to  the  completion 
of  the  work  of  the  Idea.  But  having  reached  this  point 
we  found  our  thesis  already  established ;  for  it  was  not 


534          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

our  province  to  interpret  the  irrational,  but  to  secure 
recognition  for  it.  To  find  its  existence  admitted  by 
writers  so  diverse  in  points  of  view  as  McTaggart  and 
Seth  greatly  aided  our  task  of  demonstration.  Incident- 
ally, however,  we  suggested  that  to  return  to  the 
system  with  our  own  clues  in  mind,  would  be  for 
Hegel's  critics  to  arrive  at  quite  other  conclusions 
regarding  his  treatment  of  the  irrational.  On  the 
whole  our  concept  proved  to  be  decidedly  elementary, 
and  the  discovery  of  the  nature  and  scope  of  irrational- 
ity merely  introductory.  To  consider  the  profounder 
bearings  of  the  dialectic  would  be  to  investigate 
the  nature  and  significance  of  transition  (Werden), 
negativity,  the  Absolute,  and  the  like.  But  it  was 
precisely  because  of  the  introductory  character  of  our 
investigation  that  we  chose  it.  One  could  hardly  un- 
derstand the  nature  of  these  higher  determinations 
without  grasping  the  import  of  immediacy.  But  the 
way  is  clear  if  the  beginning  be  clear. 

135.  It  would  still  be  possible  to  declare  that 
"What  is  actual  is  rational."  For  the  Wirklichkeit 
here  in  question  is  not  the  actuality  of  figurate  think- 
ing (Vorstellungen),  but  the  essentiality  which,  taken 
as  a  whole,  constitutes  the  ultimate  system  of  things 
interpreted  from  the  point  of  view  of  law,  meaning, 
the  Idea.  Hence  it  would  be  no  (Hegelian)  justification 
of  history,  for  example,  to  allege  that  because  an 
event  takes  place  therefore  it  is  rational.  Hegel  does 
not  announce  that  "Whatever  is,  is  right."  His 
optimism  is  one  that  discerns  in  the  course  of  events 
their  ideal  logical  significance.  But  existing  states 
may  be  very  far  from  rational,  as  our  reference  to 
the  Philosophy  of  Right  has  already  indicated.1 

>  See  above,  Sec.  115. 


Supplementary  Essay  535 

It  is  also  true  that  "What  is  rational  is  actual." 
But  this  does  not  guarantee  that  whatever  is  rational 
already  exists.  Hegel  has  told  us  that  the  point  where 
rationality  begins  is  matter  of  history;  he  is  unable  to 
deduce  particular  exemplifications  of  the  Idea.  Hence 
the  logical  order  of  Wirklichkeit  must  be  distinguished 
from  the  chronological. 

136.  Scientific    induction    might    well    proceed    as 
usual,  and  it  would  then  be  a  question  of  the  idealistic 
interpretation  of  nature  as  part  of  a  system,  as  reveal- 
ing  essentially   the    same    principles    as    those    which 
the  Idea  embodies  in  other  parts  of  the  system.    The 
richer  the  results  of  the  special  sciences  the  more  one 
could  avoid  Hegel's  errors  of  judgment,  in  secondary 
matters,  while  developing  the  primary  principles  which 
his  theory  of  nature  exemplifies. 

137.  As    opposed    to    those    who    maintain    that 
Hegel  has  read  his  own  interpretation  into  the  world, 
that  is,  has  projected  his  temperament  into  things, 
one  points  out  that  he  has  made  a  remarkably  dis- 
passionate attempt  to  state  clearly,  convincingly,  and 
in  strictly  universal  terms  the  procedure  which  a  thor- 
ough-going mediation  exemplifies.      There  is  a  strong 
rationalistic  bent,  if  you  please,  but  we  protest  that 
this  is  very  far  from  being  an  "  intellectualistic  preju- 
dice."    That  reason  is  fundamental  in  the  universe, 
in  nature,  in  man,  and  that  it  is  possible  to  develop 
a  dialectic  system  in  which  the  same  rational  principles 
are    logically   ordered    which    in    the    temporal   world 
have  their  particular  exemplification,  we  take  to  be 
an    entirely    defensible    position.      Whether    it    be    a 
question  of  historical  fact  or  of  human  volition,  of 
immediacy  of  sentiment  or  of  the  divine  will,  we  point 
out  that  the  fact  in  question  is  particular,  its  rationale 


536          The  Philosophy  of  the  Spirit 

is  universal.  In  the  nature  of  the  case  it  must  be  the 
Idea  which  has  the  last  word,  inasmuch  as  the  Idea 
makes  explicit  the  implicitness  of  all  determinations 
whatsoever.  Insist  as  you  may  upon  the  primacy  of 
the  will,  you  still  have  before  you  the  question,  Granted 
the  givenness,  what  is  its  meaning,  as  discovered 
through  criticism,  restatement,  negation?  It  may 
be  that  the  divine  will  is  the  divine  love,  hence  that 
"God  is  love,"  and  what  love  is  is  to  be  appreciatively 
discovered,  not  described.  Or,  it  may  well  be  that 
the  will  is  through  and  through  irrational,  or  supra- 
rational,  as  compared  with  the  doctrine  that  the 
divine  will  is  the  divine  purpose  and  that  this  purpose 
is  rational.  Assume  whatever  you  like  as  true  of  the 
will  in  such  wise  that  one  must  discern  by  intuition 
what  the  divine  will  is.  Well,  whatever  you  say,  you 
have  brought  forward  a  rival  set  of  first  principles.  To 
say  the  least,  then,  immediacy  is  ambiguous;  and 
in  all  fairness  one  should  be  content  to  let  the  rival 
mediations  undergo  their  own  dialectic.  Ignore  if  you 
will  that  you  have  mediated.  Deny  the  content 
which  gave  life  to  your  dialectic.  Or,  on  the  other 
hand,  ignore  the  immediacy  and  insist  that  the  media- 
tion is  all-sufficient.  But  whatever  you  do,  do  not 
charge  Hegel  with  having  sought  to  maintain  the 
absoluteness  of  either  immediacy  or  mediation,  either 
content  or  form,  data  or  "  pure  thought."  Insist,  more- 
over, that  in  the  last  analysis,  Hegel's  ultimate  principle 
is  the  source  alike  of  the  content  and  the  form  of  the 
dialectic.  But  grant  Hegel  the  privilege  of  stating  what 
he  understands  this  Absolute  Being  to  be ;  do  not  on  the 
basis  of  the  mere  dialectic — without  reference  to  the 
Philosophy  of  Spirit  and  the  Philosophy  of  Religion — 
conclude  that  this  first  principle  is  " Thought"  alone. 


Supplementary  Essay  537 

138.  But  no  one  knows  more  surely  than  an  Hegelian 
that  no  mere  summary  or  suggestion  of  further  mean- 
ings at  the  close  suffices  to  put  a  doctrine  in  the  right 
light.  We  beg  leave,  then,  to  refer  to  our  entire  investi- 
gation. It  is  a  great  temptation  to  pass  beyond  the 
limits  outlined  at  the  beginning,  and  point  out  how 
grievously  Seth  has  failed  in  his  critique  of  Hegel 
from  the  standpoint  of  personality;  to  take  sides 
against  those  who  interpret  Hegel  pantheistically ; 
to  point  out  the  failures  of  various  Neo- Hegelian 
thinkers  who  have  lost  sight  of  the  central  clues  of  the 
dialectic.  Yet  one  must  refrain,  and  be  content  to 
rest  the  case  here.  Suffice  it  that  the  new  clue  which 
the  study  here  outlined  affords  demands  reinterpreta- 
tion  of  the  leading  doctrines  of  the  Hegelian  system, 
and  that  one  is  prepared  to  defend  the  present  interpre- 
tation by  further  references  to  Hegel's  works,  notably 
his  Philosophy  of  Religion.  It  is  a  great  merit  of  the 
Logic  that  one  cannot  resolve  the  ambiguities  attaching, 
for  example,  to  the  term  "Spirit,"  by  reference  to  the 
Logic,  for  the  Logic  is  meant  to  be  strictly  universal. 
If  the  problems  not  here  discussed  belong,  then,  beyond 
the  dialectic  and  can  only  be  resolved  by  reference  to  the 
special  disciplines,  we  have  a  right  to  close  the  discus- 
sion thus  abruptly,  at  the  most  engaging  point,  with 
the  reminder  that  the  included  immediacy  of  the  close 
of  the  Logic  is  rich  in  implications  for  further  treatment. 


INDEX 


[The  Supplementary  Essay  is  indexed  by  pages,  not  by  reference  to 

sections.] 


A 


Absolute,  the,   5,  43,  244,  250, 

.283;   of  Hegel,  407,  420,  431, 

443,  447.  45°.  47°.  483  ff.,  491. 

536 
Absolute  method,  the,  428,  482- 

498 

Absolutism,  395,  399,  469 
Actuality,  395,  399  ff.,  462  ff.; 

relation  to  Existenz,   468  ff., 

505  ff.,  516  ff.;   to  Idea,  481, 

493.  516-536 
Agnosticism,  3,  7,  69,   72,   105, 

261,  373 
Amiel,  87 

Aristotle,  141,  445.  476»  5I3~5I5 
Art,  87 
Attitude,  26,  77,  89,  98,  102,  104, 

150-152 
Authority,  58-72,  138,  161,  166, 

175,  180,  196,  247,  269 

B 

Baillie,39i,4i9,  528  ff. 
Baldwin,  34,  190,  241,  390,  398, 

456 

Beauty,  50,  89  ff.,  100,  356 
Becoming,   269,   407,   414,   419, 

Begriff,  403,  407,  409,  428  ff., 
439,  459>  469;  character  of, 

477  ff- 

Being,  as  immediate,  243,  255, 
270,  410,  424;  as  logical,  418 
ff.,  431,  440  ff.,  450  ff.,  469, 
492,  522;  relation  to  Nichts, 
446  ff.,  to  thought,  451,  528 
ff.;  to  Essence,  458  ff. 

Belief,  228,  230 

Bible,  the,  9,  13,  58  ff.,  136,  141, 
166,  282 

Bradley,  389,  399,  465 

Browning,  Mrs.,  230 


Caird,  388,  389,  503,  514 
Calkins,  258,  388,  391 
Clarke,  34,  36 

Commonplace,  the,  15,  145  ff. 
Communion,  154  ff.,  219  ff.,  282 
Composure,  86,  96,  145 
Conscience,  21,  22,  161-163,  175, 

!78,  297,  351 
Consciousness,     18,     106,     252; 

Hegel  on,  407  ff. 
Contingency,  464,  471   ff.,  495, 

504  ff. ;   in  nature,  512  ff. 
Conventionality,  144 
Cosmic  consciousness,   49,    173, 

2OI 

Criticism,   8-12,    17,   32,   61-74, 
no,  368,  373,379 


D 


Daseyn,  453,  461,  465 
Detachment,  93,   103,   117,   140 
Dialectic,   47,   73,   275,   393   ff.; 

discovery    of,     417;      in     the 

Logic,  428  ff.,  482  ff. 
Dictionary    of    Philosophy,    34, 

190,  241,  390,  398,  456 
Divine  Order,  the  47,  93,  107  ff., 

in-121,  314,  316 


Ecstasy,  223,  227,  238,  246,  249, 
35i,  357;  mystical,  276  ff., 
372 

Emerson,  38,  105,  145,  201,  266, 
368 

Emotions,  the,  immediacy  of,  22 , 
169,  369;  relation  to  friend- 
ship, 84;  cosmic,  173;  nature 
of,  199  ff.;  Royce  on,  200; 
relation  to  feeling,  205,  233; 


539 


54o 


Index 


Emotions,  the — (Continued) 
intellectual  theory  of,  206; 
James-Lange  theory  of,  207; 
Ribot  on,  210;  Irons  on,  214; 
theories  compared,  219;  influ- 
ence of,  221;  value  of,  222; 
religious,  224,  275  ^F.;  as  a 
guide,  226,  229,  313,  331;  con- 
trol of,  227;  relation  to  reality, 
228;  to  love,  230;  estimate  of , 
232;  primitive,  251;  relation 
to  mysticism,  275-295;  when 
acceptable,  297 

Empiricism,  421 

Encyclopedia,  401,  402,  421  ff., 

457,  47i,  475 
Essence,  412,  453,  457  ff.,  478, 

534 

Eternal  and  the  temporal,  the, 
78  ff. 

Eternal  order,  see  Divine  Order 

Eternity,  120 

Evil,  69,  121—124,  5°4  ff-,  526 

Evolution,  37,  53,  115;  philos- 
ophy of,  8— 10,  120 

Existenz,  401  ff.,  459  ff.,  468  ff., 

SOS-SS1 

Experience,  14,  18,  19;  "pure, 
15,  240,  260;  primacy  of,  18, 
6.1,  92,  in,  196,  521;  im- 
mediacy of,  22,  166  ff.,  241, 
248,  256  ff.',  spiritual,  44,  45, 
57,71,87,  128/7.,  156  #.,372; 
mystical,  165,  249,  264,  275 
ff. ;  is  particular,  364 

Expression,  152 


Faculty,  the  spiritual,  20-22,32, 
154-164,  168,  179,  289,  351, 

355 

Faith,  reawakening  of,  2;  tests 
of,  94,  96,  370;  Christian,  107; 
reason  and,  194,  334,  337;  the 
life  of,  324;  place  of,  330  ff.; 
practical,  335;  character  of, 
335  #•;  power  of,  341;  postu- 
lates of,  345;  preservation  of, 
347;  a  gift,  355,  359;  a 
product,  365;  Hegel  on,  423 

Fall,  the  245,  515 

Fatalism,  317,  322 

Fate,  14,  312,  317 

Favouritism,  133  ff.,  306,  316 


Feeling,  spiritual,  26,  33,  51, 133, 
164,  169  ff.'  thought  and,  167; 
intuition  and,  180  ff. ;  rela- 
tion to  emotion,  205  ff. ;  value 
of,  232/7.;  Hegel  on,  234,  423, 
426;  relation  to  ecstasy,  238; 
to  immediacy,  247,  262,  264, 
298,  369;  surety  of,  370 

Fichte,  397,  448 

First,  the  486  ff. 

Fischer,  389,  475 

Freedom,  92-98,  146,  319 

Friendship,  2,  81  ff.,  94,  320 

Fullerton,  333 

Future  life,  the,  Si  ff. 


Gardiner,  263 

Genius,  133  ff. 

Gifts,  88,  93,  118,  131,  139  ff., 
178,  191  ff.,  197,  245,  267; 
spiritual,  87,  118,  133,  142  ff., 
159^,320,355,371;  relation 
to  guidance,  306 

God  (see  Spirit),  as  love,  2,  15, 
40-43,  46,  55,  113,  125,  174, 
330  statically  conceived,  4, 
380  as  creator,  4,  8,  41,  53, 
as  inscrutable,  4,  5,  43, 
as  unknowable,  5,  9;  as 
power,  5,  112,  121,  377; 
naive  view  of,  9-11,  142,  367; 
as  Father,  u,  45,  55,  94,  112, 
319,  330;  mystical  idea  of,  u, 
250,  275  ff.',  as  related  to  man, 
12,  58,  1 7  5, 2  97;  personality  of, 
15,  26,  35,  117,  171;  as  life, 
J7>  73.  270,  361;  knowledge 
of,  26,  28,  357;  relation  to 
evolution,  37,  41,  120;  as 
wisdom,  40,  113;  as  trans- 
cendent, 42;  mind  of,  52; 
purpose  of,  52-54,  57,  98,  115, 
294;  revelation  of,  58  ff.,  70, 
136,  166;  grace  of,  58,  139, 
J73> 308,372;  as  ground,  106; 
relation  to  space,  111-121,  371 
as  reality,  114;  relation  to 
evil,  12  iff. ;  providence  of,  121, 
140,  299;  relation  to  feeling, 
133,  164  ff.;  170,  234  ff.,  352; 
communion  with,  154  ff.,  282; 
relation  to  conscience,  161, 
297;  to  sensibility,  171,  235, 
351;  to  intuition,  178  ff.,  297; 


Index 


54i 


God  (see  Spirit) — (Continued) 
doubt  about  existence  of,  267, 
373;  Hegel  on,  274;  guidance 
of,  307,  330;  relation  to  faith, 
335-340;  as  object  of  thought, 
349;  as  object  of  experience, 
350;  presence  of  compared  to 
beauty,  355 ;  relation  to  suffer- 
ing, 360;  pragmatic  idea  of, 
373  ff->  complete  idea  of,  376; 
as  efficiency,  379;  dependence 
on,  379;  relation  of  presence 
of  to  reality,  381;  Hegel  on 
immanence  of,  423-426;  as 
ultimate  immediate,  440,  450, 

524, 536 

God-sense,  see  Faculty 

Gomperz,  200 

Good,  the,  89,  100,  126,  506 

Grace,  see  God 

Granger,  238 

Greatness,  133  ff. 

Green,  52 

Guidance,  problem  of,  22; 
sources  of,  42,  51,  93,  94,  118, 
131,  151,  157,  174,  364;  rela- 
tion to  plans,  148,  302,  319; 
impulse  as,  167,  186,  313; 
intuition  as,  197;  emotion  as, 
202,  226,  229,  331;  nature  of, 
298  ff. ;  how  obtained,  300; 
types  of,  301,  308;  angelic, 
304;  divine,  307,  330;  ex- 
planation of,  309,  316;  rela- 
tion to  fate,  312;  meaning  of, 
314;  arrival  of,  314;  relation 
to  experience,  315;  is  disin- 
terested, 317;  relation  to 
purpose,  318/7.;  scope  of,  321; 
relation  to  prayer,  323  ff. ;  to 
faith,  328  ff.;  a  growth,  358; 
witness  of  the  Spirit  as,  363; 
test  of,  370 


H 


Harris,  390,  478,  479 

Heart,  the,  15,  94,  224,  233,  352 

Heaven,  79,  80,  in,  116,  137, 
236,  274 

Hegel,  24;  on  Spirit,  34,  61,  236, 
270,274,481;  on  immediacy, 
167,  268,  273  (see  Immediacy) ; 
on  evil,  123,  504  ff.;  on  feel- 
ing, 234;  on  the  Idea,  274 


(see  Idea);  on  Nature,  274, 
512  ff.;  idealism  of,  274,  395, 
401;  literature  on,  387;  dia- 
lectic of,  393;  opinions  on, 
393,  396;  on  "pure  thought," 
398,  401;  on  the  Phenomeno- 
logy, 404  ff.,  439;  postulates 
of,  409;  on  sense-certainty, 
409  ff. ;  on  sensationalism,  415; 
on  empiricism,  421;  on  faith- 
philosophy,  423  ff.;  Logic  of, 
428  ff.;  on  metaphysics,  438; 
on  Existenz,  460  ff. ;  on  law, 
462;  on  "the  whole,"  467; 
on  contingency,  471  (see  Con- 
tingency; Irrational);  on  the 
Begriff,  478  ff.;  on  the  judg- 
ment, 480;  on  the  Idea,  481 
ff. ;  his  doctrine  of  differences, 
494;  attacks  on  Logic  of,  502 ; 
view  of  history,  504  ff.;  of 
matter,  515;  Seth  and 
other  critics  on,  521-533 

Heraclitus,  251,  253,  270,  273, 
522 

Hibben,  388,  390 

Higher  order,  the,  78  ff.,  107  ff., 
196,  299,  371 

History  of  Philosophy,  504,   508 

Hobbes,  245 

Hodgson,  479 

Hoffding,  344,  396 

Hume,  252 

Huxley,  8 


Idea,  the,  270,  274,  395,  431,  443 
474,  477  ff-,  481-535 

Idealism,  17,  20,  31,  48,  54,  105, 
106,  no,  274,  375  ff.;  of 
Hegel,  274,  395.  4io,  535 

I dentitdts system,  432,  493 

Identity,  497 

Illumination,  132,  165,  308 

Immanence,  4,  9,  13,  349,  371 

Immediacy,  of  the  Spirit,  13,  22, 
128  ff.,  150,  172,  380;  scopeof, 
20-23,  154  ff.,  172,  178 /f.,  239, 
364  ff.;  mediation  and,  166; 
character  of ,  167,  250;  spirit- 
ual, 1 68;  relation  to  intuition, 
178—198;  to  emotion,  203,  230 
369;  to  feeling,  233,  247,  262, 
263,  369;  definition  of,  241, 


542 


Index 


Immediacy — (Continued) 

psychological,  241,  269;  psy- 
chical, 242,  246,  254  ff.; 
logical,  243,  258,  269;  types 
of,  244;  ethical,  247  (see  Con- 
science); description  of,  247; 
James  on,  247;  Martineau  on, 
248;  religious,  248;  mystical, 
249,  275-295;  of  the  self, 
250;  universality  of,  250; 
primitive,  251;  relation  to 
activity,  2 53 ,  2  56 ;  as  nextness, 
255 ;  relation  to  personal  expe- 
rience, 259;  relation  to  faith, 
262,  332  ff. ;  subject  of,  263; 
order  and  laws  of,  264;  rela- 
tion to  spontaneity,  266;  sum- 
mary, 269;  import  of,  269- 
2 75;  three  stages  of,  2 70;  rela- 
tion to  absolute  Thought,  274; 
to  guidance,  298  ff.,  364;  its 
place  in  practical  life,  365  ff., 
377;  relation  to  reality,  374; 
to  universals,  380;  in  the 
Hegelian  system,  402  ff.', 
thesis  on,  402 ;  dialectic  prob- 
lem of,  404 ;  in  the  Phenomen- 
ology, 404  ff.',  relation  to  the 
Begriff,  409,  477  ff.;  psychic 
meanings  of,  410,  417;  as 
"this,"  411 ;  as  "now,"  413;  as 
activity,  414,  41 7 ;  as  sensuous 
presentation,  415;  logically 
differentiated,  416;  Kant  on, 
422;  relation  to  divine  im- 
manence, 425;  conclusions, 
425;  moral,  426;  logical,  427 
ff.;  as  pure  Being,  431,  43  5  De- 
lation to  pure  thought,  433  ff. ; 
God  as,  440,  450;  as  absolute 
beginning, 44 1, 450;  "simple," 
443;  as  implicitness,  444;  as 
determinate,  445;  as  Nichts, 
446;  as  Ego,  448;  logical  sum- 
mary, 449-453;  as  absolute 
first,  455;  ambiguities  of, 
455;  Royce  on,  455;  Seyn  as, 
4575  Wesen  as,  458;  Existenz 
as,  459;  relation  to  experi- 
ence, 460;  as  Daseyn,  461;  as 
appearance,  462  ff. ;  as  parts, 
466;  relation  to  Wirklichkeit, 
468  ff.  ;  as  contingency,  471, 
504-528,  533;  as  irrational, 
472,  512-533;  duality  of,  475; 


relation  to  judgment,  480;  to 
Idea  481;  in  absolute  method, 
481  ff. ;  movement  from,  485; 
not  a  First,  486,  493,  497;  re- 
lation to  stagesof  method,  487 ; 
to  system,  489;  persistence  of, 
492;  at  end  of  Logic,  494-504; 
relation  to  identity,  49  7;  mean- 
ings summarised,  499;  be- 
yond Logic,  504  ff.;  in  nature, 
512;  as  matter,  515;  relation 
to  relativity,  518-521;  Seth's 
criticism  of,  521;  as  " gege- 
ben,"  522 ;  relation  to  tychism, 
522;  to  the  rational,  523;  to 
McTaggart's  criticism,  525;  to 
Baillie's,  528;  thesis  proved, 

532-537 
Immediatism,  269,  272,  276,  297, 

375 
Immortality,    81    ff.,    100,    108, 

1 19,  120 

Impressions,  158,  185,  191,  326 
Impulse,  167,  186,  187,  201,  203, 

222,  226,  313,  365 
Inner  light,  the,   45,    138,   237, 

301 

Innocence,  69,  245,  368,  423 
Inscrutable,  4,  5,  43,  112 
Insight,  70,  184,  192,   197,  230, 

3°3 

Inspiration,  70,  129  ff.,  135,  166 

Intellect,  the,  21,  26,  58,  140, 
192-195 

Interpretation,  139,  166  ff.,  180, 
248  ff.,  260,  298,  364 

Intuition,  spiritual,  32,  237; 
nature  of,  178  ff.;  relation 
to  impulse,  186;  denned,  189; 
as  cognition,  190;  to  truth, 
192;  to  intellect,  194  ff.;  as  a 
guide,  197,  300;  to  Spirit, 
237;  relation  to  mysticism, 
289;  Hegel  on,  423  ff.,  448 

Irons,  214  ff. 

Irrational,  the,  23,  274,  393  ff., 
464,  472,  473,  477  ff-,  495. 
501  ff.,  512  ff. 


Jacobi,  425 

James,  188,  207,  214,  228,  239, 

247,  252,   256,   258,  261,  373, 

397,  522 


Index 


543 


Jesus,  58-60,  66,  141,  142,  151, 
170,  280,  282,  285,  292,  339, 

345 

Journal  of  Speculative  Philoso- 
phy, 390,  398,  516 

Judgment,  59-65,  72,  167,  255, 
302,415-427,  436,  480 


K 


Kant,   7,   390,    422,     425,    438, 

478 

Karma,  104 
Krauth-Fleming,  206 


Law,  14,  50,  51,  105,  162,  369  ff., 
462  ff. 

Life,  i  ff.,  14,  17,  24,  270;  the 
course  of,  16,  96,  ff.;  the 
eternal,  see  Immortality 

Logic,  24,  270,  389,  398  ff.t  405, 
417!  problem  of,  418;  begin- 
ning of,  428  ff.t  442;  import- 
ance of,  440;  method  of,  454; 
end  of,  493 

Love,  2,  83,  146,  151;  divine, 
40;  relation  to  persons,  182; 
to  feeling,  185,  237,  264;  to 
emotion,  204,  222-233.  297;  to 
doubt,  267;  to  immediacy, 
273.  365;  spiritual,  358 


M 


Mackenzie,  474 

Man  (see  Self),  as  spirit,  22,  26, 
33,35,5154,57,237,297,353; 
higher  nature  of,  58,  175,  350, 
354;  temperamentally  re- 
garded, 354 

Man  and  the  Divine  Order,  107, 
112,  277,  373 

Martineau,  63.  163,  248,  288 

McTaggart,  388,  391,  425,  435, 
47J»  5°3,  511.  5l6»  521,  525- 

Mediation,  166,  178,  187,  245, 
255,  259  #.,  364,  415-418 

Meditation,  95,  132,  148,  354, 
456,  520-536 

Method,  see  Absolute  method 

Moral  order,  the,  116 


Mystery,  12,  290 

Mystic  experience,  n,  22,  133, 
165,  249,  264,  275  ff. 

Mysticism,  n,  32,  48,  132,  238, 
249-252,  262;  character  of 
275;  illustrated,  276;  adverse 
views  of,  282 ;  misconceptions 
of,  284  ff.;  practical,  291; 
lessons  of,  293;  truth  in,  294; 
irrationality  of,  518,  527 

N 

Natural  and  the  spiritual,  the, 
27,  78-98,  102-127,  !74,  37i 
Nature,  48,  no,  512  ff 
Naturphilosophie ,  512 
Negativity,   487-498,    521,   524, 

53°-553 
Newton,  369 

Nichts,  433,  44i,  446,  451  ft- 
Noel,  390,  519 
Novalis,  200 


Obedience,  29,  43,  320,  330,  353, 

361, 377 

Optimism.  317,  318 
Over-soul,  the,  38 


Pantheism,  4,  31,  169,  250,  276, 

282 
Passion,  122,  125,  138,  146,  203, 

354,  365,  5ii 
Passivity,  164,  246,  249 
Pathetic  fallacy,  44,  47,  61,  251 
Paulsen,  389,  397 
Perception,  254,  262,  415,  422 
Personal  equation,  the,  21,  133 

£.,  182-191,  246,  298 
nomenology,  389,  390;    rela- 
tion to  the  Logic,  401  ff..  417 
430,  439;    beginning  of,   406, 
419,   452,   453,  483,  484;  sig- 
nificance of,  419,  430,  443,  449 
Philosophy,    106,    334;     of   the 
Spirit,  6,  10,  14,  27-29,  32,  45, 
50,  57,  71,  106,  124;  idealistic, 
see  Idealism 

Philosophy  of  History,  504,  510 
Philosophy  of  Religion,  34,  61, 
234-237,  512,  536,  537 


544 


Index 


Philosophy  of  Right,  395,  504  ff., 

534 
Plato,  91,  273,  423,  476,  513-515, 

526 

Plotinus,  486,  493 
Point  of  view  of  God,  the,  9,10, 

13,  17.  367 
Poise,  86,  88,  95,  96,   103,  325, 

363 
Power,  5,  14,  17,  41,  112,  121, 

2I5 

Practicality,  91-93 
Pragmatism,  13,  23,  44,  109,  373, 

399,  522 
Prayer,  u,  128,   157,   168,  301, 

323  #• 

Providence,  121,  140,  299 
Psychology  of  religion,  the,  12, 

239 

Pure  thought,  see  Thought 
Purpose,  15,  39,  52-54,  114  fi., 


Rational,  the,  274,  395,  464,  469, 
472-474,  478 

Realisation  of  the  divine  pres- 
ence, 54,  55,  88,  129,  137 

Reality,  16,  47,  51,  79,  109  ff., 
352,364,  374-383  ;of  evil,  123; 
emotions  and,  228;  of  im- 
mediacy, 265,  269;  in  the 
Hegelian  system,  395,  415, 
421,  427,  481  ff.,  523,  528-531 

Reason,  7,  20,  32  ff.,  59,  194, 
298,  334  ff.;  in  Hegel's  sys- 
tem, 418,  428^.,  450,  473,  474, 

5I2#-,  535 
Receptivity,  28,  93,  95,  131,  160, 

301, 320, 330 
Relativity,  6,  43,  81,   105,  465, 

494,  518-521 
Religious   experience,    12,    128, 

156  ff.,   166,   169  ff.,  275  ff., 

349 
Revelation,  9,  12,  24,  58^.,  150, 

165,  172,  246,  249 
Ribot,  210-214 
Ritchie,  513 
Romanticism,  105,  396 
Rosenkranz,  389,  515 
Royce,  200,  253,  387,  419,  456, 

467,  480 
Rousseau,  245 


Sabatier,  60,  65 
Santayana,  238,  251,  253,  275 
Scepticism,  16,  25,  32,  107  ff. 
Schelling,    396,    397,    432,    445, 

493 

Schopenhauer,  397,  513 

Self  (see  Soul),  15,  21,  35-43; 
duality  of,  25;  import  of,  27- 
29;  spiritual,  39;  as  judge, 
61;  relation  to  Spirit,  147;  as 
immediate,  250,  256,  263,  448; 
mystical  idea  of,  284,  290,  293 ; 
its  finitude,  379;  as  psychical 
"this,"  411  ff. 

Self-abandonment,  43,  164 

Self-consciousness,  25,  68,  98, 
131,  266,  483 

Self-realisation,  80,  86,  294,  310, 

378 

Self-sacrifice,  80 
Sensation,  171,  252-254,  352 
Sensationalism,    260,    269,    274, 


Sense-certainty,  409-420 
Sensibility,   93,    167,    171,    205, 

35.1 

Service,  80,  85,  94,  101,  150,  310 

Seth,  390,  398,  503,  521,  534,  537 

Seyn,  see  Being 

Shaftesbury,  163 

Sigwart,  263 

Sin,  123,  150 

Socrates,  303 

Soul  (see  Self),  119,  157 

Space,  82,  1 1 1-114 

Spencer,  8,  261 

Spinoza,  478 

Spirit  the  presence  of,  3,  13,  28, 
93,  128  ff.,  140,  349,  356;  idea 
of,  4,  14,  17;  typified  by  life, 
5,  53;  immediacy  of,  13,  22, 
128  ff.,  150,  172,  380;  exis- 
tence of,  13,  24,  44-47,  62; 
relation  to  man,  22,  26,  54;  in 
the  universe,  31,  47,  52  ff.; 
definition  of,  31-42,  131; 
Clarke  on,  34;  Hegel  on,  34, 
236,  274;  character  of,  39,  42 
ff.,  49,  131,  145,  355.  36°;  re- 
newing presence  of,  46 ;  in  man, 
5.i,  57,  237,  353;  as  guiding 
life,  51,  94  ff.,  118,  133,  151, 
319  ff.;  reproduced  in  man, 


Index 


545 


Spirit — (Continued} 

52,  56,  103;  realisation  of ,  55, 
88;  relation  to  criticism,  58- 
74;  the  eternal  life  and,  77 
ff. ;  gifts  of ,  87  ;  poise  in,  88 ;  and 
circumstance,  98;  higher  or- 
der of,  1 10  ff. ;  activity  of,  1 18; 
channels  of,  128  ff. ;  hypo- 
theses about,  154  ff. ;  relation 
to  reason,  194;  witness  of,  349 
ff.  (see  Witness);  scope  of, 
355;  as  one,  363,  374;  sum- 
mary, 383 

Spirituality,  25,  80  ff.,  117,  147 
Spiritual  sense,  see  Faculty 
Spiritual  world,  the,  100,  117 
Spontaneity,   28,   93,'   160,    164, 
167,   191,  224,   262-267,  325, 
361 

Stirling,  388,  390,  435,  478 
Staudenmier,  419 
Stout,  271 
Strong,  253 

Subconsciousness,  157,  304 
Supernatural,  the,  79,  80,  308 
Swedenborg,  40,  in,  117,  204 
Symbols,  70,  261,  286 


Temperament,  136,  138, 158,164, 

184,  354 
Temporal,  the,  27,  78  ff.,  115- 

119 
Thought,  262,  274,  437,  45°.  4Si, 

456;   "pure,"  398  #.,  408,  427 

ff-,433ff->  482,  49°.  493.  499~ 

^536 

Time,  82,  115,  257 

Tolerance,  151 

Transcendence,  4,  42,  250,  285 
Trendelenburg,    398,    432,    454, 

525,  532 
Transitivity,  253,  269,  274,  353, 

454,  492 


Trinity,  The,  34,  290 
Truth,  28,  89,  179-183,  201,  269, 
377,440;  of  fact  and  hope,  99 
Turner,  396 
Tychism,  522 


U 


Understanding,  the,  2 1 ,  338,  428 
Universal,  the,  90,  364,  380,  381, 

413,  474,  486,  506,  522 
Universe,  the,  2,  14,  32,  47,  52- 

56,  114  ft- 
Unknowable,  5-8,  261 

Iv 

Values,  20,  41,  48,  77  ff.,  99,  105, 

108,  no,  156,  290,  360,  379 
Visions,  12,  70,  132,  169  ff.,  281 

345 
Voices,  161-163,  175,  297 


\V 


Wallace,  388,  389,  435.  449.  5i3 

Weber,  396 

Werden,  see  Becoming 

Wesen,  see  Essence 

Whole,  the,  466 

Will,  15,  21,  51,  87,  158,  262, 
505,  536 

Wirklichkeit,  see  Actuality 

Witness  of  the  Spirit,  the,  19,  44, 
46,  57,  62-75,  I02»  X94I  re!a" 
tion  to  scepticism,  109;  signifi- 
cance of,  109,  125,  137,  299, 
328;  as  guide,  138,  194,  326, 
355  ft-'*  relation  to  feeling, 
233;  authority  of,  355;  rela- 
tion to  conduct,  363;  intel- 
lectual character  of,  370;  rela- 
tion to  reality,  374;  ultimate 
value  of,  379 

Worship,  129,  150,  291,  350 


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